L
levinas12
Guest
We have had any number of discussions on other threads that point out some of the “paradoxes” and “antinomies” that crop up when we apply metaphysical categories (e.g., substance, efficient causality) to God.
The reason for this is that God is “outside” the world yet metaphysical categories seem to be “world-dependent”. What I mean is that “time” is involved in their meaning. For instance, “substance” in Aristotle is governed by “presence” which is inescapably temporal (“presence” implies “past” and “future”). Likewise “efficient causality” is temporal, I.e., involves a “before” and “after” (and a “change” in the agent).
What brings all this to a head is the assertion (by Thomas Aquinas himself) that God does not have a “real” relation to the world although the world has a “real” relation to God. This move is necessary to safeguard God’s radical transcendence (that God does not need the world to be God).
But it also leads to “difficulties”.
For example, how can God be a substance without turning God into one entity alongside others?
The reason for this is that God is “outside” the world yet metaphysical categories seem to be “world-dependent”. What I mean is that “time” is involved in their meaning. For instance, “substance” in Aristotle is governed by “presence” which is inescapably temporal (“presence” implies “past” and “future”). Likewise “efficient causality” is temporal, I.e., involves a “before” and “after” (and a “change” in the agent).
What brings all this to a head is the assertion (by Thomas Aquinas himself) that God does not have a “real” relation to the world although the world has a “real” relation to God. This move is necessary to safeguard God’s radical transcendence (that God does not need the world to be God).
But it also leads to “difficulties”.
For example, how can God be a substance without turning God into one entity alongside others?