Is universalism logically certain?

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  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
Yes. While I’m not one to ask for proof-texts, perhaps some scriptural support for this view. In the joint Lutheran/Catholic document, The Hope of Eternal Life, provides this in its discussion of the issue:
D. Hell and the Possibility of Eternal Loss
  1. If Scripture is rich in affirmations of eternal life as the hope of humanity and the goal of God’s redemptive work, it is equally clear that the goal of eternal life can be missed as a result of human sinfulness. So, for example, the willful rejection of the Word of God is said to make one unworthy of eternal life (Acts 13:46). The opposite of the hope of eternal life we may call the possibility of eternal loss.
  1. Scripture is vivid in its imagery conveying the possibility of eternal loss. The New Testament uses the name Gehenna, usually translated as “hell,” to denote a place (or state) of punishment for evil. In the Gospel of Mark Jesus speaks of Gehenna as a place of “inextinguishable fire” where “their worm never dies” (Mk. 9:44, 48). The imagery is drawn from Old Testament texts such as Isa. 66:24 that speak of the punishment of the wicked. Numerous other New Testament passages use the symbolism of fire to speak of the punishment that awaits evildoers (Mt. 3:12; 13:42, 50; 25:41; Heb. 10:27; 2 Pet. 3:7; Jude 7; Rev. 19:20; 20:10, 13-14; 21:8).
  1. When we turn to the Pauline and Johannine literature, we find further admonitions regarding the possibility of eternal loss. For example, in Romans 2:6-8 Paul warns: God “will repay according to each one’s deeds: to those who by patiently doing good seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; while for those who are self-seeking and who obey not the truth but wickedness, there will be wrath and fury.” Paul speaks of “enemies of the cross of Christ” whose end is destruction (Phil. 3:18-19) and metaphorically of “objects of wrath that are made for destruction” (Rom. 9:22). The author of 2 Thess. 1:9 uses the term “eternal destruction” to speak of the punishment that awaits those who do not obey the gospel. Likewise, John 3:36 sets the one who believes in the Son and who has eternal life in contrast to the one who disobeys the Son, who will not see life; on him the wrath of God remains.
  1. The frequent use of fire imagery in the New Testament in connection with the punishment of evildoers raises the question of its theological significance. Since God himself can be called the “consuming fire” (Heb. 12:29), imagery of the punishment of evildoers in fire may be understood to depict not simply the eternal torment that awaits the wicked (Lk. 16:23-25, 28; Rev. 20:10), but also eternal confrontation with the judgment of God. If the hope of eternal life means hope for the recovery of unending communion with God, the possibility of hell and eternal loss is the possibility that a human can, through sin, become fully and finally lost to eternal communion with God.
And there is much more. In short, Lutherans and Catholics recognize that we can hope and pray for the salvation of all, but we also recognize the possibility that there is condemnation, too.

usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/ecumenical/lutheran/hope-eternal-life.cfm

Jon
 
Yes. While I’m not one to ask for proof-texts, perhaps some scriptural support for this view. In the joint Lutheran/Catholic document, The Hope of Eternal Life, provides this in its discussion of the issue:

And there is much more. In short, Lutherans and Catholics recognize that we can hope and pray for the salvation of all, but we also recognize the possibility that there is condemnation, too.

usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/ecumenical/lutheran/hope-eternal-life.cfm

Jon
Certainly.

John 1:9 The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world.

John 12:32 And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself.

1 Cor. 15:22 For since by a man came death, by a man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive.

1 Tim 2:1-6 I urge, then, first of all, that petitions, prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for all people— for kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all people.

1 Tim 4:10 For to this end we toil and strive, because we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe.
 
Certainly.

John 1:9 The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world.

John 12:32 And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself.

1 Cor. 15:22 For since by a man came death, by a man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive.

1 Tim 2:1-6 I urge, then, first of all, that petitions, prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for all people— for kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all people.

1 Tim 4:10 For to this end we toil and strive, because we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe.
What about those who do not have their hope set on the living God?

We should, at all time, lift our prayers for all people, and Christ is indeed the ransom for all people. So, we look at the entirety of scripture, and recognize that it is that view, not that of a verse or two, that convinces. Christ Himself speaks of the Rich man and Lazarus, and of eternal loss itself.

Jon
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
“If anyone says or thinks that the punishment of demons and of impious men is only temporary, and will one day have an end, and that a restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) will take place of demons and of impious men, let him be anathema” --Constantinople II canon 9.
 
What about those who do not have their hope set on the living God?

We should, at all time, lift our prayers for all people, and Christ is indeed the ransom for all people. So, we look at the entirety of scripture, and recognize that it is that view, not that of a verse or two, that convinces. Christ Himself speaks of the Rich man and Lazarus, and of eternal loss itself.

Jon
Philippians 2:9-11 says
Therefore God exalted him to the highest place
and gave him the name that is above every name,
that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow,
in heaven and on earth and under the earth,
and every tongue acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord,
to the glory of God the Father.
and 1 Cor. 12:3 says
Therefore I want you to know that no one who is speaking by the Spirit of God says, “Jesus be cursed,” and no one can say, “Jesus is Lord,” except by the Holy Spirit.

Taking those two passages together, we can see that everyone will confess Jesus as Lord, and therefore that everyone will have the Holy Spirit.​

But what about Dives and Lazarus?

Jesus tells this parable before his crucifixion. Therefore, it has no bearing on the consequences of said crucifixion. Once Jesus is crucified, Dives, like everyone else, will be drawn to Jesus, and his knee will bow and his tongue will confess that “Jesus is Lord” and he will be saved.
 
“If anyone says or thinks that the punishment of demons and of impious men is only temporary, and will one day have an end, and that a restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) will take place of demons and of impious men, let him be anathema” --Constantinople II canon 9.
Actually, that sentence comes from 10 anathemas pronounced by Emperor Justinian at the Synod of Constantinople (543), a more local meeting of bishops.
ldysinger.stjohnsem.edu/@magist/0543-53_an-orig/01_introd.htm#_ftn3

It does not have the force of 15 anathemas of the 2nd Council of Constantinople (553), because it is not restated in them: ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214.xii.ix.html
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
For the first set: There’s an issue with language here. I think your 2) oversimplifies the issue. I would say that

2.1) God wills that all have the opportunity to choose between Him and not Him.
2.2) God wills that all who choose Him join with Him in heaven.
2.3) God wills that our wills not be overridden, and so despite it being the better option (and the one God would prefer) that we choose Him, He will not force the issue.

But there is also a problem with 3, even if 2 is taken as is: If God creates Fred and Fred chooses Hell, God is not responsible for the fact that Fred chooses Hell. Fred is responsible for that. So it is not God that violates God’s will, but Fred. Now it is true that God allowed Fred to violate God’s will, but allowing something to happen isn’t the same as doing it and while working to prevent a bad thing using acceptable means (which God does - He doesn’t give up on us lightly) is good and often even necessary, simply overriding free will, even if refraining from doing so would allow the evil of a violation of God’s own will, would be evil - see 2.3.

So there is no instance of God violating God’s will, nor even of God allowing God’s will to be violated by negligence. Rather, God wills that we be saved but leaves the ultimate choice up to us, while working to help us make the better choice in good ways.

Of course, one can still ask why it is that God would create Fred if Fred would end up in Hell. I offer the following possible way of examining the question.

It is better to exist than not to exist, even if one exists in Hell. Therefore if God conceives of the idea of Fred (which He does, since, being God, all possibilities about everything ever are always known to Him), and determines that Fred will go to Hell, then refuses to create him for this reason, He has actually created fewer good things than if He created Fred and and then allowed Fred to, of his own free will, choose Hell.

Therefore there is more created good (all other things fixed) if a person who will choose Hell is created than if he is not - and there is no matter of “replacing” this created person with someone who would choose heaven. First, that devalues what it is to be a person, and second there is no need to replace - God can simply create the person who would choose heaven as well.

This doesn’t completely answer the question of why it would be done, however, but it does point out the flaws in thinking that a world of only those who would choose heaven must necessarily be better than one where some choose each - and the mechanisms by which God decides such things are beyond our understanding (see God’s answer to Job). EDIT: though apparently at least some part of this has been figured out by Aquinas (see post below). Go figure. if there’s a question, chances are Aquinas has answered it.

The mechanism being (EDIT: somewhat) inaccessible, we are left with two facts only: God repeatedly warns of the danger of Hell (and God does not lie), and God does what is best. Therefore, it would seem that there is at least the possibility of going to Hell, and that this is in fact what is best.
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
The theory falls apart at point number 4, because it is an unconscionably evil violation of God’s authority. Aquinas addressed this very issue by contemplating that if God, in his foreknowledge, might prevent His creation from using their free will to cause themselves injury by either by inhibiting their free will or by using this knowledge to only create those beings which would choose to accept him, while sparing those who wouldn’t by only keeping them as a potential soul, rather than an actual created soul. The reason this is not so is because God cannot change His mind. If He were to spare those who would use their free will to betray Him, it would be an act of the Creator submitting to his creation, and no less, submitting to creation which is evil. It would be evil triumphing over good, which is something that is inconceivable and impossible with an impeccable God. Furthermore, because it is impossible for evil to diminish the glory of God, then by choosing to betray God they ultimately cause eternal injury only to themselves. Heaven is not diminished because there is such a thing as Hell. Indeed, Hell is a prerequisite to there being a Heaven. A God that “pre-emptively” spares Satan and his children by not creating them would be moralistically the same as creating them and sparing them anyway, because each ordained soul was conceived in God’s mind from eternity to eternity.
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
Your fourth premise is logically flawed in that the definition of Free Will surely is that it is not constrained by the will of another. If God’s will over rides the created will, then it is not free.
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
Your 4th premise is where this breaks down. Certainly God cannot violate his own will, but we can violate his will, this is what sin is. Hence, we can go against God’s will for all to be saved by not wanting to be saved ourselves and thereby condemn ourselves and not be saved.
 
For the first set: There’s an issue with language here. I think your 2) oversimplifies the issue. I would say that

2.1) God wills that all have the opportunity to choose between Him and not Him.
2.2) God wills that all who choose Him join with Him in heaven.
2.3) God wills that our wills not be overridden, and so despite it being the better option (and the one God would prefer) that we choose Him, He will not force the issue.

But there is also a problem with 3, even if 2 is taken as is: If God creates Fred and Fred chooses Hell, God is not responsible for the fact that Fred chooses Hell. Fred is responsible for that. So it is not God that violates God’s will, but Fred. Now it is true that God allowed Fred to violate God’s will, but allowing something to happen isn’t the same as doing it and while working to prevent a bad thing using acceptable means (which God does - He doesn’t give up on us lightly) is good and often even necessary, simply overriding free will, even if refraining from doing so would allow the evil of a violation of God’s own will, would be evil - see 2.3.

So there is no instance of God violating God’s will, nor even of God allowing God’s will to be violated by negligence. Rather, God wills that we be saved but leaves the ultimate choice up to us, while working to help us make the better choice in good ways.

Of course, one can still ask why it is that God would create Fred if Fred would end up in Hell. I offer the following possible way of examining the question.

It is better to exist than not to exist, even if one exists in Hell. Therefore if God conceives of the idea of Fred (which He does, since, being God, all possibilities about everything ever are always known to Him), and determines that Fred will go to Hell, then refuses to create him for this reason, He has actually created fewer good things than if He created Fred and and then allowed Fred to, of his own free will, choose Hell.

Therefore there is more created good (all other things fixed) if a person who will choose Hell is created than if he is not - and there is no matter of “replacing” this created person with someone who would choose heaven. First, that devalues what it is to be a person, and second there is no need to replace - God can simply create the person who would choose heaven as well.

This doesn’t completely answer the question of why it would be done, however, but it does point out the flaws in thinking that a world of only those who would choose heaven must necessarily be better than one where some choose each - and the mechanisms by which God decides such things are beyond our understanding (see God’s answer to Job). EDIT: though apparently at least some part of this has been figured out by Aquinas (see post below). Go figure. if there’s a question, chances are Aquinas has answered it.

The mechanism being (EDIT: somewhat) inaccessible, we are left with two facts only: God repeatedly warns of the danger of Hell (and God does not lie), and God does what is best. Therefore, it would seem that there is at least the possibility of going to Hell, and that this is in fact what is best.
You’ve stated that Fred is responsible for his choice, but you’re assuming that Fred being responsible for that choice completely negates any responsibility God would have for the outcome. You don’t justify that view, except with the statement that allowing a thing to happen is not the same thing as causing it. You don’t defend that statement either, but assuming that it is true, it’s still not clear how that difference would totally negate God’s responsibility.

I can easily give a counter-example: Suppose I’m a parent, and I leave a pot of boiling water on the stove unattended. My child comes in and knocks it over, burning themselves severely. Did I make my child do it? No. Am I still responsible for the outcome? Heck, yes! It’s reasonably foreseeable that an unattended pot of boiling water with a child in the house would lead to injury. And that’s without the divine omniscience that makes knowledge of the outcome certain.

Regarding the equation of being with goodness, God already is all the goodness possible. Creation cannot possibly add to the sum of goodness because that would mean that God was incompletely good without creation. Therefore, this idea that adding a being burning in hell would increase the amount of goodness does not work.
 
You’ve stated that Fred is responsible for his choice, but you’re assuming that Fred being responsible for that choice completely negates any responsibility God would have for the outcome. You don’t justify that view, except with the statement that allowing a thing to happen is not the same thing as causing it. You don’t defend that statement either, but assuming that it is true, it’s still not clear how that difference would totally negate God’s responsibility.

I can easily give a counter-example: Suppose I’m a parent, and I leave a pot of boiling water on the stove unattended. My child comes in and knocks it over, burning themselves severely. Did I make my child do it? No. Am I still responsible for the outcome? Heck, yes! It’s reasonably foreseeable that an unattended pot of boiling water with a child in the house would lead to injury. And that’s without the divine omniscience that makes knowledge of the outcome certain.
By that logic, then God is responsible for all the sin in the world by the mere fact that it exists and nothing exists without God.
 
The theory falls apart at point number 4, because it is an unconscionably evil violation of God’s authority. Aquinas addressed this very issue by contemplating that if God, in his foreknowledge, might prevent His creation from using their free will to cause themselves injury by either by inhibiting their free will or by using this knowledge to only create those beings which would choose to accept him, while sparing those who wouldn’t by only keeping them as a potential soul, rather than an actual created soul. The reason this is not so is because God cannot change His mind. If He were to spare those who would use their free will to betray Him, it would be an act of the Creator submitting to his creation, and no less, submitting to creation which is evil. It would be evil triumphing over good, which is something that is inconceivable and impossible with an impeccable God. Furthermore, because it is impossible for evil to diminish the glory of God, then by choosing to betray God they ultimately cause eternal injury only to themselves. Heaven is not diminished because there is such a thing as Hell. Indeed, Hell is a prerequisite to there being a Heaven. A God that “pre-emptively” spares Satan and his children by not creating them would be moralistically the same as creating them and sparing them anyway, because each ordained soul was conceived in God’s mind from eternity to eternity.
On your view, must God create every potential being?
 
On your view, must God create every potential being?
Not necessarily. God has pre-eternally ordained the time and place that each individual should live and be, therefore each individual that God intended to create, must be created, otherwise he would be changing His mind, which is outside the qualities of God. If God never intended to create a certain theoretical person, then He will never create them.

God had from eternity to eternity conceived of a plan of how St. Satan would live his life in love and obedience to Him, forever in His joyful embrace. He cannot deviate from this intention because of the knowledge of Satan’s rejection and fall, else it would be God submitting to evil.
 
Your fourth premise is logically flawed in that the definition of Free Will surely is that it is not constrained by the will of another. If God’s will over rides the created will, then it is not free.
My point is that if the created will is never created, then nothing exists to be overridden.
 
Your 4th premise is where this breaks down. Certainly God cannot violate his own will, but we can violate his will, this is what sin is. Hence, we can go against God’s will for all to be saved by not wanting to be saved ourselves and thereby condemn ourselves and not be saved.
We can, but under my argument, ultimately, nobody will. It’s a real choice, but every existent being will choose rightly.
 
  1. God creates everyone who exists
  2. God wills that everyone who exists be saved.
  3. If God creates someone who will not be saved, God violates his own will.
  4. God cannot violate his own will.
  5. Everyone who God creates will be saved.
The most important objection to this line of reasoning is “what about free will?” and I answer it like this:
  1. Only existing created beings can have a free will.
  2. No created being exists until God creates it.
  3. A being cannot lose free will if they never exist in the first place.
  4. No being loses free will if God creates only those beings that will use their free will to be saved.
Remember, God’s knowledge of a created being’s future choices does not rob that being of free will, because the knowledge doesn’t actually cause the choice. So it would seem that as long as you grant, God’s omniscience, his will for all to be saved, and the idea that you have to exist first in order to have a free will to lose, universalism is inescapable.

Thoughts?
Ok first your points act as if God is a creature and point four suggests that he submits to his creation.

But simply put. If this is true, “have fun partying with Hitler and terrorists in the afterlife”
 
We can, but under my argument, ultimately, nobody will. It’s a real choice, but every existent being will choose rightly.
Then it was not an actual choice just a perceived choice. Perceived choices are not choices at all
 
By that logic, then God is responsible for all the sin in the world by the mere fact that it exists and nothing exists without God.
And if sin had eternal consequences, that might be a problem. But if everyone is ultimately redeemed, then sin is only a temporary state of affairs, not reflective of God’s ultimate nature.
 
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