Is what happens most of the time natural?

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In Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics both philosophers say that what happens for the most part is natural. Even in the Summa, Aquinas asserts that this is true even for humans.

But what does this mean? Is polytheism more natural to man since it lasted longer than monotheism? Is sin more natural to man since it is more popular (at some times) than virtue?

Is what is natural to man (morally, physically, etc.) necessarily more popular?
 
I’ve always thought that polytheism was so prevalent because we know we are eternal. Every culture has thought so, right? I think that if God had not revealed Himself through Scripture and Jesus, we would naturally be polytheists.

As for the natural being popular, well that depends. Its pretty natural to follow along with the crowd. So when, due to some outside influence, whim or what have you, the crowd does or believes something contrary to nature or reason, it is quite natural to go along with it.
 
I’ve always thought that polytheism was so prevalent because we know we are eternal. Every culture has thought so, right? I think that if God had not revealed Himself through Scripture and Jesus, we would naturally be polytheists.
Actually the First Vatican Council defined that the truth of monotheism is discernible from natural reason.
 
In Aquinas’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics both philosophers say that what happens for the most part is natural. Even in the Summa, Aquinas asserts that this is true even for humans.

But what does this mean? Is polytheism more natural to man since it lasted longer than monotheism? Is sin more natural to man since it is more popular (at some times) than virtue?

Is what is natural to man (morally, physically, etc.) necessarily more popular?
What Aquinas means is that God works through secondary [natural] causes. In this sense, what happens in the world is natural, although the Prima Causa is God, and is always in total control of what is happening.

The original religion was monotheism (consider Adam and Eve). It was vastly outnumbered very quickly by polytheistic religions, and did not reappear onto the world scene until Abraham reintroduced it to the world. In that sense, monotheism has lasted longer than polytheism!

The tendency to sin is natural to man (concupiscence), but sin itself is foreign to all of nature. God gave Adam and Eve the preternatural gifts of integrity (integration of will and passions) and immortality (CCC 376) so that sin would not enter into the world.

This really boils down to whether or not God micromanages. A Catholic in good conscience cannot believe in the extreme positions:

Deism–that God is not associated with the world at all after its creation.
Pantheism–that the world is God, and so directly associated with every divine movement.

A synthesis of the two, that God uses causality as well as micromanages in some cases, is acceptable.

What is natural to man is that he desire for God. To try and fit finite pleasures into the desire not for goods, but for Goodness itself, is unnatural. Society without God drifts into a self-consuming lust for autonomy and pleasure.
 
What Aquinas means is that God works through secondary [natural] causes. In this sense, what happens in the world is natural, although the Prima Causa is God, and is always in total control of what is happening.

The original religion was monotheism (consider Adam and Eve). It was vastly outnumbered very quickly by polytheistic religions, and did not reappear onto the world scene until Abraham reintroduced it to the world. In that sense, monotheism has lasted longer than polytheism!

The tendency to sin is natural to man (concupiscence), but sin itself is foreign to all of nature. God gave Adam and Eve the preternatural gifts of integrity (integration of will and passions) and immortality (CCC 376) so that sin would not enter into the world.

This really boils down to whether or not God micromanages. A Catholic in good conscience cannot believe in the extreme positions:

Deism–that God is not associated with the world at all after its creation.
Pantheism–that the world is God, and so directly associated with every divine movement.

A synthesis of the two, that God uses causality as well as micromanages in some cases, is acceptable.

What is natural to man is that he desire for God. To try and fit finite pleasures into the desire not for goods, but for Goodness itself, is unnatural. Society without God drifts into a self-consuming lust for autonomy and pleasure.
Everything which happens naturally either happens in every instance or in most instances. But nothing which happens by fortune or by that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance, happens in every instance or in most instances. For we do not say that in the winter it rains frequently by fortune or by chance. But if it rains frequently during the dog days, we would say that this happens by chance. And in like manner, we do not say that it happens by chance that there is heat during the dog days, but only if this should happen during the winter.

From these two points he argues as follows. Everything which happens either happens by chance or for the sake of an end. Now those things which happen outside the intention of an end are said to happen by chance. But it is impossible for those things which happen in every instance or in most instances to happen by chance. Therefore, those things which happen in every instance or in most instances happen for the sake of an end. -St. Thomas Aquinas dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm

Here St. Thomas Aquinas clearly means to say that whatever happens most of the time is natural and what is natural happens most of the time. The unnatural rather happens only a little.

So I ask again, does this make polytheism more natural than monotheism? If you do, then how can one claim that God is man’s last natural end? How do we reconcile also, the ideas that (1) order can emerge from chaos (chance) and (2) that chance occurrences don’t often happen? I seem to think that we operate in everyday life with this oxymoronic notion that chance and chaos are constant. Perhaps we are merely equivocating? Sometimes by chance we mean occurrences with no discernible cause or things which happen rarely. Is it possible that these two types of chaos are really separate?
 
What Aquinas means is that God works through secondary [natural] causes. In this sense, what happens in the world is natural, although the Prima Causa is God, and is always in total control of what is happening.

The original religion was monotheism (consider Adam and Eve). It was vastly outnumbered very quickly by polytheistic religions, and did not reappear onto the world scene until Abraham reintroduced it to the world. In that sense, monotheism has lasted longer than polytheism!

The tendency to sin is natural to man (concupiscence), but sin itself is foreign to all of nature. God gave Adam and Eve the preternatural gifts of integrity (integration of will and passions) and immortality (CCC 376) so that sin would not enter into the world.

This really boils down to whether or not God micromanages. A Catholic in good conscience cannot believe in the extreme positions:

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Everything which happens naturally either happens in every instance or in most instances. But nothing which happens by fortune or by that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance, happens in every instance or in most instances. For we do not say that in the winter it rains frequently by fortune or by chance. But if it rains frequently during the dog days, we would say that this happens by chance. And in like manner, we do not say that it happens by chance that there is heat during the dog days, but only if this should happen during the winter.

From these two points he argues as follows. Everything which happens either happens by chance or for the sake of an end. Now those things which happen outside the intention of an end are said to happen by chance. But it is impossible for those things which happen in every instance or in most instances to happen by chance. Therefore, those things which happen in every instance or in most instances happen for the sake of an end. -St. Thomas Aquinas dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm

Here St. Thomas Aquinas clearly means to say that whatever happens most of the time is natural and what is natural happens most of the time. The unnatural rather happens only a little.

So I ask again, does this make polytheism more natural than monotheism? If you do, then how can one claim that God is man’s last natural end? How do we reconcile also, the ideas that (1) order can emerge from chaos (chance) and (2) that chance occurrences don’t often happen? I seem to think that we operate in everyday life with this oxymoronic notion that chance and chaos are constant. Perhaps we are merely equivocating? Sometimes by chance we mean occurrences with no discernible cause or things which happen rarely. Is it possible that these two types of chaos are really separate?
Properly speaking, God is not man’s natural end, so I don’t see how it is relevant. Otherwise thinking is an innovation of the Protestant reformers. That is generally my bone to pick with Protestant theology.
II. After God had made all other creatures, He created man, male and female,[4] with reasonable and immortal souls,[5] endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after His own image;[6] having the law of God written in their hearts,[7] and power to fulfil it
Westminster Confession of Faith
Man certainly has a natural desire for God, but he requires grace to participate in God’s life, for God being infinitely higher in virtue than man. Knowledge of God as the only God is certainly possible and in many way demonstrable a posteriori (again, Natural Theology), but if man refuses to encounter who he was created for by refusing to cooperate with grace, it would certainly be logical (within his understanding of options) for him to try and resort to other god-like things, such as believing in multiple gods, or trying to make oneself a god, or trying to make one’s own gods out of pleasurable attachments, etc. Now whether that’s strictly polytheism is up for debate, but polytheism is a more organic term when we consider the idea of idolatry–and rather THOSE two terms I would equivocate.

I don’t understand what (2) has to do with any of this, but (1), that is, how order can arise from chaos, is certainly a more severe question that has haunted me from time to time. Adjacent to this question is the pondering of God created a universe with entropy, in “a wayward state” as the catechism eloquently puts it. So I will finally write this out in order to ponder such an event:

I’m reminded of St. Thomas’ bold statement in Contra Gentiles that evil comes, necessarily, from the good, because evil is accidental (in the sense of not being substantial or essential). Evil attempts to mimic the good by making it (evil) its own end (linked tightly to “polytheism”/idolatry). Thus, even while evil rejects God and is most unlike God, it cannot help but to mimic the good because there are no other metaphysical options! God was certainly genius/somewhat cunning in making all of creation that way :D. In that sense, order arises out of chaos for the same reason evil cannot help but mimic the good. Now I understand that evil and chaos are certainly not strict synonyms (like the Greeks thought), but at least it will give some traction.
With that said, order still necessarily takes precedence over chaos insofar as existence is concerned because of that metaphysical dichotomy. Plus, there are some underlying issues concerning the objectivity of logic which I cannot seem to articulate right now. I understand there are still some holes in my explanation, but that’s the best I have right now!

Peace
Anthony
 
Properly speaking, God is not man’s natural end, so I don’t see how it is relevant. Otherwise thinking is an innovation of the Protestant reformers. That is generally my bone to pick with Protestant theology.

Man certainly has a natural desire for God, but he requires grace to participate in God’s life, for God being infinitely higher in virtue than man. Knowledge of God as the only God is certainly possible and in many way demonstrable a posteriori (again, Natural Theology), but if man refuses to encounter who he was created for by refusing to cooperate with grace, it would certainly be logical (within his understanding of options) for him to try and resort to other god-like things, such as believing in multiple gods, or trying to make oneself a god, or trying to make one’s own gods out of pleasurable attachments, etc. Now whether that’s strictly polytheism is up for debate, but polytheism is a more organic term when we consider the idea of idolatry–and rather THOSE two terms I would equivocate.

I don’t understand what (2) has to do with any of this, but (1), that is, how order can arise from chaos, is certainly a more severe question that has haunted me from time to time. Adjacent to this question is the pondering of God created a universe with entropy, in “a wayward state” as the catechism eloquently puts it. So I will finally write this out in order to ponder such an event:

I’m reminded of St. Thomas’ bold statement in Contra Gentiles that evil comes, necessarily, from the good, because evil is accidental (in the sense of not being substantial or essential). Evil attempts to mimic the good by making it (evil) its own end (linked tightly to “polytheism”/idolatry). Thus, even while evil rejects God and is most unlike God, it cannot help but to mimic the good because there are no other metaphysical options! God was certainly genius/somewhat cunning in making all of creation that way :D. In that sense, order arises out of chaos for the same reason evil cannot help but mimic the good. Now I understand that evil and chaos are certainly not strict synonyms (like the Greeks thought), but at least it will give some traction.
With that said, order still necessarily takes precedence over chaos insofar as existence is concerned because of that metaphysical dichotomy. Plus, there are some underlying issues concerning the objectivity of logic which I cannot seem to articulate right now. I understand there are still some holes in my explanation, but that’s the best I have right now!

Peace
Anthony
Isn’t it rather that God is our natural and supernatural end, and that although God is our natural end, reaching it requires supernatural aid? That was how I think Aquinas wrote about it:

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.

newadvent.org/summa/2.htm

That establishes his belief that God is the natural end, and he later says that only God can bring man to this end.

But perhaps you mean that God in the supernatural sense, is man’s last end only because God has revealed himself to us, while God in the natural sense (we know only that he exists) would be our end if he didn’t so reveal himself? Either way though, explaining the popularity of polytheism would be difficult. Perhaps the ancients were not really polytheists to the fullest extent we think?
 
Isn’t it rather that God is our natural and supernatural end, and that although God is our natural end, reaching it requires supernatural aid? That was how I think Aquinas wrote about it:

It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.

newadvent.org/summa/2.htm

That establishes his belief that God is the natural end, and he later says that only God can bring man to this end.

But perhaps you mean that God in the supernatural sense, is man’s last end only because God has revealed himself to us, while God in the natural sense (we know only that he exists) would be our end if he didn’t so reveal himself? Either way though, explaining the popularity of polytheism would be difficult. Perhaps the ancients were not really polytheists to the fullest extent we think?
I think we are trying to say the same thing. When I say “supernatural end”, I am not meaning that man become substantially supernatural. But rather he participate in the supernatural life, which is eternal, etc. Neither do I think that you, when you say “God as man’s natural end”, mean that God is substantially natural. What I will say is that, insofar as spiritual matters are concerned, grace precedes immanence.

And yes, I do believe you’re on to something. Perhaps the ancients tried to create many God’s because they were delineating the object of their natural tendency into somethings that are simpler–less mysterious and gratuitous, more anthropomorphized theology. The pursuit of God as an absolute object (albeit anthropomorphized into many gods) is certainly different than the participation in God’s life recognizing him as a absolute subject. Perhaps that is our difference?
 
I think we are trying to say the same thing. When I say “supernatural end”, I am not meaning that man become substantially supernatural. But rather he participate in the supernatural life, which is eternal, etc. Neither do I think that you, when you say “God as man’s natural end”, mean that God is substantially natural. What I will say is that, insofar as spiritual matters are concerned, grace precedes immanence.

And yes, I do believe you’re on to something. Perhaps the ancients tried to create many God’s because they were delineating the object of their natural tendency into somethings that are simpler–less mysterious and gratuitous, more anthropomorphized theology. The pursuit of God as an absolute object (albeit anthropomorphized into many gods) is certainly different than the participation in God’s life recognizing him as a absolute subject. Perhaps that is our difference?
We share similar views, though my OP question still remains.
 
We share similar views, though my OP question still remains.
I suppose I have misunderstood the gist of your question then… are you asking the proportion between divine intervention and causal factors? I don’t know that such a thing could be figured out because the only way we can verify proportions a posteriori is through empirical methodology. Alas, such a method only measures causal factors, but not divine intervention!

Perhaps you can state your question a different way so I can try and answer it differently.
 
I suppose I have misunderstood the gist of your question then… are you asking the proportion between divine intervention and causal factors? I don’t know that such a thing could be figured out because the only way we can verify proportions a posteriori is through empirical methodology. Alas, such a method only measures causal factors, but not divine intervention!

Perhaps you can state your question a different way so I can try and answer it differently.
I don’t know why anyone would bring in causal factors and then divide them into divine and natural in this discussion. My question has to do with the proposition “the frequency of events is directly related with their naturalness” and what this means if we believe that polytheistic ideas and etc. were of greater frequency than the supposedly natural ones.

But perhaps you mean that miracles and other effects of divine agency are not frequent and infrequent events are miracles? But how does this answer the question of polytheism and how does it mesh with the clear intention of Aquinas/Aristotle who did not restrict the existence of chance events to miracles alone?

So again here’s my question: If the high frequency of events indicates that they are natural/normal/determinate and if the low frequency of events indicates that they are unnatrual/not-normal/etc. then why is it that unnatural things (say perhaps adultery) can gain popularity for a long time?
 
I don’t know why anyone would bring in causal factors and then divide them into divine and natural in this discussion. My question has to do with the proposition “the frequency of events is directly related with their naturalness” and what this means if we believe that polytheistic ideas and etc. were of greater frequency than the supposedly natural ones.

But perhaps you mean that miracles and other effects of divine agency are not frequent and infrequent events are miracles? But how does this answer the question of polytheism and how does it mesh with the clear intention of Aquinas/Aristotle who did not restrict the existence of chance events to miracles alone?

So again here’s my question: If the high frequency of events indicates that they are natural/normal/determinate and if the low frequency of events indicates that they are unnatrual/not-normal/etc. then why is it that unnatural things (say perhaps adultery) can gain popularity for a long time?
My apologies for the delayed response. I am confused because you are directly inferring that the frequency of events is necessarily an expression of a thing’s nature. Sin makes nature less natural, by reducing its participation in Being. If evil exists in the world, which it does, should that sort of extrapolation beyond the nature of a thing be used with confidence?
 
My apologies for the delayed response. I am confused because you are directly inferring that the frequency of events is necessarily an expression of a thing’s nature. Sin makes nature less natural, by reducing its participation in Being. If evil exists in the world, which it does, should that sort of extrapolation beyond the nature of a thing be used with confidence?
I’m not trying to establish my own opinions here, nor am I making any “Should” statements. Instead, I’m merely saying that if, as Aquinas taught, frequency is proportioned to nature, then why should we believe that evil happens frequently or that deviations from the norm are a frequent occurrence? Or indeed, why should we believe that good occurs less frequently than evil? And yet sometimes, we have all the evidence to believe the above. So how do we reconcile this with the idea that again, frequency is proportioned to nature?
 
I’m not trying to establish my own opinions here, nor am I making any “Should” statements. Instead, I’m merely saying that if, as Aquinas taught, frequency is proportioned to nature, then why should we believe that evil happens frequently or that deviations from the norm are a frequent occurrence? Or indeed, why should we believe that good occurs less frequently than evil? And yet sometimes, we have all the evidence to believe the above. So how do we reconcile this with the idea that again, frequency is proportioned to nature?
This is something I’ll have to mull over and do some reading into. I’m still peeling back the layers of what you’re asking. How did this question arise? What was your train of thought? Can you articulate it here as identical as you can to its origin?

Out of curiosity, are you self-taught in regards to philosophy and theology? Regardless, how long have you been studying it? What is your chief interest or emphatic study?

Psychological variables will help me p(name removed by moderator)oint areas of ideological traction and place supports there. Anything else you are willing to muster would be helpful as well.
 
This is something I’ll have to mull over and do some reading into. I’m still peeling back the layers of what you’re asking. How did this question arise? What was your train of thought? Can you articulate it here as identical as you can to its origin?

Out of curiosity, are you self-taught in regards to philosophy and theology? Regardless, how long have you been studying it? What is your chief interest or emphatic study?

Psychological variables will help me p(name removed by moderator)oint areas of ideological traction and place supports there. Anything else you are willing to muster would be helpful as well.
Origin: see the link to Aquinas in my previous post.

self-taught for 10 years (now I’m 24) and interested in all subjects.
 
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