Limits of Hylemorphic Ontology

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

A message from Umbravia:

It is the opinion of the Theologians of the Kingdom that Thomist metaphysics is an excellent tool for explaining change in the organic things. The matter/form distinction is useful for explaining how a boy becomes a man, and yet remains the same person; or how a nation changes over time, or how hops and water become something delightful.

But His Highness Quasi-Tenebrous questions the application of the hylemorphic metaphysics to existential realities. He objects that Thomists often try to make things out of subjective realities. Taking, for example, heresy: Thomistic philosophy tries to make a thing out of heresy, separating it into “material” and “formal” heresy, with the result that heresy is only “really” such when it is confirmed in a legal or judicial setting. On the contrary, His Highness proposes that heresy has no reality apart from particularization in an existent, and that it is always in act. That is to say: there are heretics; there are heretics in the same way that some men and women are sentient, or thieves, or happy - not because they possess a thing, but because of a state of the soul. Heresy, therefore, is not a thing with a substance - and therefore does not have potential and act - but a mental reality.

The government of Umbravia believes that an existential philosophy conceptualizing heresy - and other mental and spiritual realities - in this way leads to a more useful theology when confronting catechesis and apologetics.

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias thinks that His Highness should stop referring to himself in the third person.

He also thinks that Quasi-modo misunderstands the Thomistic discussion of heresy.

 

[Dovekin]

heresy is only “really” such when it is confirmed in a legal or judicial setting.

What is the alternative? Why would you call it “heresy” if it differs from conventional definitions like the Thomistic?

 

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

He also thinks that Quasi-modo misunderstands the Thomistic discussion of heresy.

The Monarch wonders if the immanent Gorgias accuses him of material or formal misunderstanding, and then directs his philosopher to respond:

Thomism has attempted to give existential realities a substance from which it can attribute the material/formal distinction - hence, one of its contributions to theodicy is to say that goodness has a substance, while evil does not (being merely the privation of goodness), and therefore God did not create evil. That this is inadequate is apparent from the time that His Highness’ heir, Omni-Tenebrous, returned from prince school beaten to a pulp by a larger royal child. It may be true that the other boy “lacked goodness” or that his acts were a privation of the virtue of justice, but it does not fully explain the reality. That is because, even if evil does not have a substance, it is nonetheless existentially very real. Conceptualizing evil, heresy, and the like as existing only insofar as subjects are concerned allows for a more-nuance response to the problem of evil.

Nomine regis.

 

[Gorgias]

That this is inadequate is apparent

This doesn’t follow. “Human love” does not have a substance; yet, it can have effects, just as a well-directed fist to the face can.

I’m not seeing that Thomas asserts that ‘heresy’ is a substantial form. Can you cite where he does?

 

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

What is the alternative?

It is the opinion of the Kingdom that the alternative is to consider a person a heretic in the same way that another man might be a thief: the reality is existential. No man is considered a “material thief” or a “formal thief;” he either is, or is not, plain and simple. Analogously, a man is either a heretic or not, based on the person he is, not because he holds to a thing called “heresy.”

In the legal sense, a person may be found guilt of heresy, just as one may be found guilty of theft, but it is less-helpful to pretend that the legal definition changes the quality in the person.

 

[Dovekin]

A person is considered a thief only if he is proven guilty: otherwise he is considered innocent. I do not really see how that is different from heresy.

 

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

“Human love” does not have a substance; yet, it can have effects, just as a well-directed fist to the face can.

His Highness is amused by the idea of a man trying to punch a shadow. His philosopher responds:

“A well-directed fist to the face” is, of course, an action; as such, it does not have a substance. “Fist” of course, does, and “face,” oh, yes, both change and those realities are well-provided for by hylemorphic ontology; and yet, the moral evil involved in striking the other person does not have a substance.

His Highness agrees with your assessment that human love does not have a substance, and yet Thomistic metaphysics must consider that it does, because otherwise it could not be related to goodness, which is the substance of love. Without considering goodness as a substance, and evil as its privation, the theodicy that God created goodness but not evil would be impossible.

As far as quoting Thomas, it is not important to - because His Highness’ philosopher did not claim that Thomas of Aquinas ever made such a claim. It is, nonetheless, used by modern Thomists (though it was deleted as a distinction in the modern Catechism of the Catholic Church); so much so, in fact, that His Highness listened to a lecture in which a Thomist professor claimed that everyone is a material heretic in some form or another. The government of Umbravia finds that an unhelpful definition, and so proposes what it considers to be a better one.

 

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

A person is considered a thief only if he is proven guilty: otherwise he is considered innocent.

The Fourth Barrister of His Highness agrees, but notes that:

Therein lies the problem; the legal definition is posited to be the totality of the concept. Heresy, though, is broader than its legal definition, in the same way as theft is. The King of Umbravia knows that Dovekin would not claim that a man is only a thief if he is caught; he is a thief because of the choice he made: to steal. The legal question comes after, but does not replace the existential reality.

That is why it is more-useful to consider person a heretic based on an existential-state, rather than try and make heresy (or theft) into a substance that a person possesses.

 

[Dovekin]

That is why it is more-useful to consider person a heretic based on an existential-state, rather than try and make heresy (or theft) into a substance that a person possesses.

I would have thought these were not substances, but privations? Oh well.

The King of Umbravia knows that Dovekin would not claim that a man is only a thief if he is caught; he is a thief because of the choice he made: to steal.

Earlier the discussion was of “to consider a person a heretic in the same way that another man might be a thief.” The act of “considering” makes a big difference, particularly when contrasted with the existential state as here. Perhaps a careless slip.

As you have already said, everyone may be a material heretic. It is an internal state, unlike theft. Only when there is an external action, like a judgement by a legal authority, can it be identified. (Usually the act is obstinate refusal of correction by a superior, which you seem to want to leave out of your definition)

 

[Quasi_Tenebrous]

I would have thought these were not substances, but privations?

The Umbravian theologians agree that such is quite confusing. And yet, the fact that the concepts of “form” and “matter” are used (the hylemorphic ontology), indicates that they are being used as thing that “are” (matter) and “becoming” (form), which is only in substances.

Earlier the discussion was of “to consider a person a heretic in the same way that another man might be a thief.” The act of “considering” makes a big difference, particularly when contrasted with the existential state as here. Perhaps a careless slip.

His Highness’ Chief-in-Charge-of-Long-Trains-of-Thought replies:

It may be worthy to re-set here, lest the chain of “you said,” “I said” becomes dizzying. His Highness proposes that the theologian ought to consider that the concept of heresy (which is only an example he is using) is larger than the legal question, just as theft is. The judge considers legal questions, and hence makes legal answers, just as His Highness’ Lemonade-almoner makes delightful beverages. The theologian, though, would err if he pretended the legal reality was the only reality, and hence that the heretic is only such when he is caught.

It is further the position of the Theologians of the Kingdom that Thomism is unequipped to move into considering the existential dimension, since it tries to make things out of existential realities.

As you have already said, everyone may be a material heretic. It is an internal state, unlike theft.

His Highness points out that, in the first sentence, your worthy self uses “heretic,” whereas, in the second, you use “theft.” Yet the two are relevantly dissimilar: Heretic refers to the person; theft, to the action. The Monarch agrees that theft is not an internal state - but he wonders if anyone can disagree that being a thief is.

He therefore suggests you to revise your statement to: “[Thomists] said everyone may be a material heretic. It is an internal state, like being a thief.”

Only when there is an external action, like a judgement by a legal authority, can it be identified. (Usually the act is obstinate refusal of correction by a superior, which you seem to want to leave out of your definition)

His Highness has not proposed a definition, only a philosophic tool. He is bored by legal questions, which is why he exiled all the Thomists and canonists from Umbravia (for he is kinder than Shakespeare).

What is being proposed is that the Thomist distinction between “material” and “formal” is unhelpful in concepts such as heresy. If a person is found guilty of heresy, then he is found guilty of a crime under canon law. Yet crimes under canon law are not the same as sins (though they do try and correspond); it is unnecessary, then, to pretend that the sin of heresy becomes “real” only in a court of canon law. In the Umbravian school of theology, there is merely the fact of being a heretic or not, as an internal state. This avoids the patently ridiculous statement that all people (even St. Thomas Aquinas) are, in some way, material heretics.

 

[Wesrock]

Hylemorphic dualism has nothing to do with the distinction between material and formal heresy.

And until his highness stops posting as satire I’m out.

 

[adgloriam]

The OP reminds me strangely of @theoldcolonel and @Ostiarius with a different persona.

 

[Vico]

…

Reality is objective not subjective. Material heresy (an opinion at variance with the authorized teachings) therefore is the reality. Material heresy implies neither guilt nor sin against faith. Etymology is Latin haeresis , from the Greek hairesis , a taking, choice, sect, heresy.

St. Thomas Aquinas endorsed the philosophical arguments from Plato and Aristotle for the immateriality of the intellect.

 

[Dovekin]

This avoids the patently ridiculous statement that all people (even St. Thomas Aquinas) are, in some way, material heretics.

What was his position on the Immaculate Conception?

What is being proposed is that the Thomist distinction between “material” and “formal” is unhelpful in concepts such as heresy.

Consider the massacre at Beziers, where heretics and Catholics alike were killed, according to accounts that circulated when Aquinas was young. “Formal heresy” helps limit punishment of the innocent.

If you want to eliminate punishment for heresy, ie the Catholic legal system is obsolete, I will agree with you. But there is a use to distinguishing punishable heresy from non-punishable, which is a legal distinction. I do not see what the purpose is of defining “heresy” in an interior, nonpublic sense like you seem to advocate.

 

[o_mlly]

That is to say: there are heretics; there are heretics in the same way that some men and women are sentient, or thieves, or happy - not because they possess a thing, but because of a state of the soul.

The accidents of being sentient and being a thief are not categorically the same. Further, the distinction between “formal” and “material” as it relates to being heretical does not parallel the concepts of “form” and “matter” as it relates to being.

All men have the per se accident of the possibility of sentience.

Most men have the common accident of the possibility of happiness.

Some men have the uncommon accident of the possibility to think and/or speak heretical thoughts.

There are three kinds of accidents in relation to essences:

1. There are those kinds of accidents which are per se or proper accidents as these accidents always accompany any given essence, e.g. a human essence always has a possible intellect and will.
2. Then there are those accidents which are common to many in a species but not necessarily to all, e.g. man, usually, has the possibility to think in conformance with reality, and the possibility to speak the truth.
3. Then there are those accidents which are not common or found in most individuals, but in a few, e.g. man, sometimes, has the possibility to think in non-conformance with reality (material heretic, so to speak) and to speak untruths (formal heretic, so to speak).

 

[IWantGod]

But His Highness Quasi-Tenebrous questions the application of the hylemorphic metaphysics to existential realities.

You are a very funny person.