Logical problem of evil argument?

[Veritas6]

Hello, here is an interesting argument against God and morality:

“Theodical individualism (TI): necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.

1. If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.
2. If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands
3. We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.
4. Two subconclusions follow from the three premises just established:
5. So: It isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer. [From (2), (3)]
6. So: God does not exist or TI is false. [From (1), (4)]
7. If not even God may treat human beings merely as means, then TI is true.
8. Not even God may treat human beings merely as means.
9. It remains, then, only to draw the argument’s final two inferences:
10. So: TI is true. [From (6), (7)]
11. So: God does not exist. [From (5), (8)]”

What do you think of this?

 

[Brian_K]

I think the premise that suffering is for the benefit of the sufferer himself is not complete. Suffering may be for the benefit of another. St Paul says in Colossians 1:24 “Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I do my share on behalf of His body (which is the church) in filling up that which is lacking in Christ’s afflictions.”

Also, the idea of people being used as means might be seen more as us being allowed to be participants in His plan. All the members of a sportsball team are “means” to winning the game, but they’re also participants in the victory.

All that been said, the fact remains that the problem of evil certainly does tax our logical faculties, and the whole of our being, for that matter.

 

[whatistrue]

What do you think of this?

I don’t believe that theodical individualism is valid. My understanding is that the “greater good” argument applies to creation as a whole, not the particular individual experiencing the evil.

 

[Wesrock]

1. If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.

I would not say this. There are goods that could not be manifest in creation. If one was never scared, one could not have the virtue of courage. If no one was ever in need, one could not manifest the virtue of charity. The diversity and variability of goods (and evils) in the world allows for opportunities to manifest goods that could otherwise not be in creation. It also allows for good to triumph over evil and evil to be shown to be weaker than good, and for a fallen creation to be redeemed.

1. If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands
2. We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.

Is God just a man such that he may be judged as a man. Are men gods such that they may act as God?

The notion that evil is a privation of good fits into a natural law view of goodness and morality. To be good, God needs to be and act God. To be human, man needs to be and act human. Goodness is the fulfillment of the perfections of our natures. God is always purely actual, manifesting his perfections and Godhood as Subsistent Being. Creation neither adds nor subtracts from him nor total goodness. Man is otherwise. He can fail to live up to his humanity. To be and act as man is not the same to be and act as God. That we have certain obligations as humans by the fact that we are human does not mean that God has the same obligations in order to manifest his Subsistent Being.

These two points seem to rely on either Divine Command Theory or the idea that Goodness is a Platonic Ideal separate from God.

To be good is to bring about the perfections of what you are, and that is contingent on what you are.

 

[Veritas6]

From premise 2a, the objector analogizes:

“Consider the case (alluded to earlier) of David Rothenberg, the six-year-old boy set on fire by his abusive father. If God exists and TI is true, then necessarily David ultimately benefits whenever God allows him to experience undeserved, involuntary suffering of such an intense kind. Thus, even if we could easily prevent his suffering, our allowing it is always like allowing him a vaccination known to be for his own net good. Granted, it may be that God wants us to prevent the suffering, but if we fail to prevent it David will be better off as a result.”

 

[SeekSalvation]

You do know the difference between Philosophy and Theology, right?

Philosophy is the intellectual studies of the universe where man can ‘reason’ the natural virtues such as prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

Theology comes through Divine Revelation. In other words, man can not come to know on his own the Divine Virtues of faith, hope, and charity without a Divine intervention

Thus if you have no understanding of ‘Divine Revelation’, there is no possible way to answer your question.

 

[Wesrock]

The logic seems to rely on the unwritten premise that God creates “the best possible world.”

 

[Veritas6]

In another analogy for premise 6, the objector states:

“TI follows from a Kantian view of ethics which states that humans cannot be merely used as a means to an end. If you are being used, in your suffering, as a means to an end, a greater good, then God is defying such Kantian ethical imperatives.

Suppose that God allows Jack to endure undeserved, prolonged, and unbearable pain because it’s the only way to get Jack’s crush, Jill, who has consistently ignored his affections, freely to send Jack a get-well card that he’ll read just before he dies from his painful condition. Jack secures some benefit from the suffering—a freely sent get-well card from Jill—but suppose that his suffering is involuntary in that he wouldn’t regard the benefit as remotely worth the suffering even if he knew that not even God could produce the benefit any other way. Surely God’s conduct in that case falls short of moral perfection. It falls short even if we also suppose that Jack’s suffering produces significant benefits for others obtainable no other way (perhaps news of his suffering triggers generous donations that his hospital wouldn’t otherwise have received). It falls short of moral perfection because it’s unfair to Jack, and this demand for fairness in the treatment of individual persons is what underwrites the Kantian claim. Jack gets some reward, but not enough: not enough because his reward fails, by any reasonable measure, to offset his undeserved, involuntary suffering. The Kantian claim, in short, does imply TI, including TI’s requirement of a net benefit for the sufferer.”

 

[Veritas6]

What do you make of the argument about how God could create some people knowing they would go to hell?:

“He chose to create the world as we know it, most notably, he created human beings out of their innocent nothingness, knowing when he did so, that they would sin – and more, knowing all the sins they would commit against innocents (Hitler-Stalin-Mao).

He knew more than half of all mankind would, at death be consigned to an eternity of suffering, unrelieved ever by any mercy or forgiveness.

Atheists say the act of knowingly creating persons God knew would be sent to eternal suffering, when he had unlimited alternatives and all power, was an unsurpassable act of malignant evil.

Thus, God as defined by Christians is impossible. Or, God as defined is a deceit, because the words used do not mean what people all over the world think they mean. In short, the Christian God is a fraud.”

 

[Gorgias]

Theodical individualism (TI): necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.

I think that isolating it down to the level of the individual might be problematic. Nevertheless, I think “does not produce a net detriment to the sufferer” might have more promise than “produces a net benefit”. After all, the former merely suggests that a good (possibly unrelated) attaches, while the latter requires that the suffering itself, per se, is beneficial as such. That’s a bridge too far, IMHO.

#2 is where the initial assertion begins to fall apart. Once you suggest that individual suffering is the will of God (which is, essentially the argument being made here), then you end up with conclusions like this one – namely, that there’s no obligation to attempt to minimize suffering in some or all cases.

In addition, is the numbering ‘off’ in this argument? #6 asserts “God does not exist or TI is false”, claiming that it follows from #4 (“two subconclusions follow” – one of which actually is #6!).

My personal intuition is that the scope of individual earthly suffering is orders of magnitude smaller than the scope of individual eternal beatitude, and therefore, we can claim that earthly suffering does not result in a net detriment to the sufferer.

“TI follows from a Kantian view of ethics which states that humans cannot be merely used as a means to an end . If you are being used, in your suffering, as a means to an end, a greater good, then God is defying such Kantian ethical imperatives.

You realize that you’re conflating “humans merely used as a means to an end” with “suffering as a means to an end”, right? The subjects are distinct, and the “merely” part isn’t present in the latter assertion. So, “God defies Kantian ethical imperatives” doesn’t attach.

He knew more than half of all mankind would, at death be consigned to an eternity of suffering, unrelieved ever by any mercy or forgiveness.

Notice that it’s not so much “consigned” (which implies “against one’s will”) as “chosen by the moral agent himself” (by virtue of being a consequence of freely chosen acts).

Veritas6:

Atheists say the act of knowingly creating persons God knew would be sent to eternal suffering, when he had unlimited alternatives and all power, was an unsurpassable act of malignant evil.

I hold to the idea that ‘middle knowledge’ is not part of God’s omniscience. The implication is that, although God knows all that is, His omniscience does not include the knowledge of what is not. Moreover, this lack of middle knowledge does not impinge on the assertion that He is omniscient.

So, this would imply that He does not know the eternal destiny of folks until they are destined to be created. Therefore, He does not “create in order to damn”, as Calvinists would assert.

So, it’s not the case that “the Christian God is a fraud”; rather, it’s that the logic leading to that conclusion is faulty.

 

[Wesrock]

He knew more than half of all mankind would, at death be consigned to an eternity of suffering, unrelieved ever by any mercy or forgiveness.

Atheists say the act of knowingly creating persons God knew would be sent to eternal suffering, when he had unlimited alternatives and all power, was an unsurpassable act of malignant evil.

Ultimately divine punishment must be consistent with divine goodness, which means the eternal punishment of those in hell determined by perfect knowledge must be a good, which means that it is just punishment and also manifests the glory of the good over evil. The punishment of those who do and will evil in hell by their own volition is a good, not a malignant evil.

 

[Wesrock]

And the term “innocent nothingness” is just eye roll inducing for me.

 

[o_mlly]

If God exists and TI is true, then, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer.

True. An eternity in union with God surpasses an immortal life in the garden.

If, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer, then (a) we never have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering or (b) our moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering derives entirely from God’s commands

If you substitute the word “prevent” with “mitigate” then (a) is false and (b) is true. Some suffering that results from personal sin is necessary, but no more than than that. Christ’s suffering accomplished humankind’s redemption from Adam’s sin. We now exist in the twin mysteries of grace and sin to accomplish our personal salvation.

We sometimes have a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering, an obligation that does not derive entirely from God’s commands.

All good comes from God. If mitigating suffering is good (it is) then God commands it.

So: It isn’t the case that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering ultimately produces a net benefit for the sufferer. [From (2), (3)]

The revisions above reverse this to be the case rather than not.

So: God does not exist or TI is false. [From (1), (4)]

The mutual exclusivity of God and TI is removed. Both are true.