M
Mansizedtarget
Guest
Early Christian theology is steeped in the tradition of Greek philosophy. This merging of “natural reason” and revelation allowed a synthesis which yielded such concepts as “hypostatic union” as well as the early Christian theology of grace and will.
It seems that the Catholic notion of free will needs to be revised or at least explained in light of recent developments. Much of this early Greek philosophy of human nature and will depended on particular views of natural science that have since been discredited. Aristotelian physics, for instance, was thoroughly discredited by Newtonian physics which, in turn, gave way to quantum physics.
For instance, we know the “mind” does not reside outside the body but what is ordinarily thought of as reason, emotion, will, decision-making, and the like are a product of the brain, and that problems in the brain yield a variety of bad and confusing behaviors that once upon a time would have been considered signs of demonic possession.
My question is how should Catholic theology evolve based on recent developments in neuroscience? In particular, we know that certain kinds of evils, emotional problems, compulsive behaviors, and even moral decision-making are controlled by particular parts of the brain that, when damaged, yield specific maladaptive behaviors.
To be blunt: as our understanding of the brain and neurosceince is expanding, isn’t the explanatory role of the non-material soul (itself long considered coextensive with reason) shrinking in a sense? That is, what do we think of as “soul” as a greater and greater percentage of matters once considered the domain of free will and the moral agent are now becoming more perfectly described by the structure of the brain and its chemistry.
I genuinely don’t know the answer here or how the latest developments of brain science can be fully reconciled with traditional Christian notions of the soul . . . notions that correspond with colloquial concepts of “the mind.”
I sometimes wonder if the solution may be found in the theology surrounding the heresy of Monothelitism that said Jesus only had one will but two natures. The Orthodox notion is that Jesus in fact had two natures and two corresponding wills. Do we too have a single nature (and will) but two parts: the body and the soul. Paul’s discussion of the “law of the flesh” certainly talks about human life in this way. In other words, we can have a defective human body (and brain to go with it) but still have a perfectable soul whose nature and manifestation may not be wholly apparent from our human vantage point. The role and quality of free will, however, still seems to be more complicated on account of the recent neuroscience developments.
It seems that the Catholic notion of free will needs to be revised or at least explained in light of recent developments. Much of this early Greek philosophy of human nature and will depended on particular views of natural science that have since been discredited. Aristotelian physics, for instance, was thoroughly discredited by Newtonian physics which, in turn, gave way to quantum physics.
For instance, we know the “mind” does not reside outside the body but what is ordinarily thought of as reason, emotion, will, decision-making, and the like are a product of the brain, and that problems in the brain yield a variety of bad and confusing behaviors that once upon a time would have been considered signs of demonic possession.
My question is how should Catholic theology evolve based on recent developments in neuroscience? In particular, we know that certain kinds of evils, emotional problems, compulsive behaviors, and even moral decision-making are controlled by particular parts of the brain that, when damaged, yield specific maladaptive behaviors.
To be blunt: as our understanding of the brain and neurosceince is expanding, isn’t the explanatory role of the non-material soul (itself long considered coextensive with reason) shrinking in a sense? That is, what do we think of as “soul” as a greater and greater percentage of matters once considered the domain of free will and the moral agent are now becoming more perfectly described by the structure of the brain and its chemistry.
I genuinely don’t know the answer here or how the latest developments of brain science can be fully reconciled with traditional Christian notions of the soul . . . notions that correspond with colloquial concepts of “the mind.”
I sometimes wonder if the solution may be found in the theology surrounding the heresy of Monothelitism that said Jesus only had one will but two natures. The Orthodox notion is that Jesus in fact had two natures and two corresponding wills. Do we too have a single nature (and will) but two parts: the body and the soul. Paul’s discussion of the “law of the flesh” certainly talks about human life in this way. In other words, we can have a defective human body (and brain to go with it) but still have a perfectable soul whose nature and manifestation may not be wholly apparent from our human vantage point. The role and quality of free will, however, still seems to be more complicated on account of the recent neuroscience developments.