Moral responsiblity versus the principle of causality

[Tomdstone]

The principle of causality says that everything has a cause. So all of our actions have a cause of one kind or another. So if there is a reason why a person steals from a bank, then would this not mean that she is not morally responsible for her embezzlement? If you say that it is because of her inclination to do evil, then since everything has a cause, there must be a reason why she needs to steal from the bank, whereas others do not want to do this. So again, because of the principle of causality, she is not morally responsible for her actions since they are caused by factors beyond her control. Her free will in this case is somewhat attenuated and weakened and perhaps just an illusion because there are factors beyond her control which are causing her to act the way she does.

 

[Wesrock]

“Everything has a cause” is not exactly right, but I’ll let it slide because the statement applies to everything about us and we’re not using it in a theological proof.

We are not just the sum of quantifiable, physical processes. More importantly, the self is greater than the sum of its parts. It’s not just an effect. In fact, our self-acting as a unified whole can itself cause “lower” processes. I can cause my arm to move. I can cause myself to think about a certain topic. I, as my whole self, direct my other functions and brain processes to a degree. This doesn’t mean I regulate everything, of course.

Second, cause does not just mean efficient cause. We can have material, formal, and final causes for our being. Our self also has a cause for its existence and ability to operate, which is different than saying it is just another cause and/or effect in some deterministic chain of events in which the effect is also deterministic. We do have physical, efficient causes, of course, but that doesn’t sum us up or necessitate determinism.

Causation =/= deterministic universe. We don’t need to lock purselves into viewing our selves and actions as just another physics problem.

 

[Wesrock]

Sorry for the double post, but in Catholic moral theology, there can be mitigating factors. An action may always be wrong, but culpability can be mitigated due to knowledge, soundness of mind, stresses, etc…

But I suspect, since this is the philosophy board, my first response is closer to what you meant.

 

[Tomdstone]

In fact, our self-acting as a unified whole can itself cause “lower” processes…

But your self-acting had a cause. So it was not entirely free. Whatever moved is moved by another? So the movement to embezzlement was moved by something else which means that the embezzler is not morally responsible for the theft, since it was caused by something outside of her control.
Is it true or not that whatever moved is moved by another?

 

[JurisPrudens]

But your self-acting had a cause. So it was not entirely free. Whatever moved is moved by another? So the movement to embezzlement was moved by something else which means that the embezzler is not morally responsible for the theft, since it was caused by something outside of her control.
Is it true or not that whatever moved is moved by another?

Yes, our actions are always moved by some extrinsic cause. However, this does not mean we have no control over our actions.

If there is an external push on me to do an evil deed, like robing a bank (poverty, avarice, etc.), I can have a choice - either to succumb to the push and rob a bank, or to resist it. Because I have a choice, I am responsible for my actions. If I have no choice (e.g., I would starve if I don’t rob a bank), then I am not responsible.

You might ask: what is the cause of our moral choice? Answer - the choice is caused by the God’s grace. He allows some of us to fall into temptation and helps others to persevere. However, on human level, we have a choice.

 

[Wesrock]

But your self-acting had a cause. So it was not entirely free. Whatever moved is moved by another? So the movement to embezzlement was moved by something else which means that the embezzler is not morally responsible for the theft, since it was caused by something outside of her control.
Is it true or not that whatever moved is moved by another?

It is true, but not just in terms of physics. For example, consider billiard balls on a table. Theoretically, if you knew all the details of the table surface, the trajectory of one ball towards another, the angle at which it would strike, you would be able to anticipate the results. It’s a system of efficient causes. These certainly play a role in how we work, and they certainly influence our mind and actions, no doubt. But they are not the sum total of our causes.

Consider instead, and I mean this only by way of analogy, an electric blender plugged into the wall. The blender is dependent on the electricity in order to operate. The electricity is a cause for its operation. But the electricity itself doesn’t determine it’s actual operations. It is simply one cause, that without, the blender could not operate. Now, I don’t propose that we are somehow plugged into some ethereal electrical source that keeps us going, but in addition the physical processes of our operations (brain chemistry, wiring, what have you), we also have other causes of being that allow us to operate without determining our operations. The self has these causes behind it’s existence, but it ultimately also is able to exercise free will. The ability to exercise it is caused, but it’s not simply a physics problem of knowing all the (name removed by moderator)uts and anticipating the results.

I’m not explaining it that well. By by “all things that change have a cause” does not mean those causes are simply (name removed by moderator)uts with deterministic outputs, or that all causes are just a chain of physical events. Our mind has causes that allow it to pursue it’s own choices, not entirely independent of physical causes, but neither is it solely reducible to them for our intentions and actions.

 

[Wesrock]

Just wanted to note that by “physical causes” in my last post, I was mostly referring to what we call “efficient causation.” It’s now too late to make the edit. I do not propose that there are some ethereal causes directing me in like manner.

 

[dmar198]

The principle of causality says that everything has a cause. So all of our actions have a cause of one kind or another. So if there is a reason why a person steals from a bank, then would this not mean that she is not morally responsible for her embezzlement? If you say that it is because of her inclination to do evil, then since everything has a cause, there must be a reason why she needs to steal from the bank, whereas others do not want to do this. So again, because of the principle of causality, she is not morally responsible for her actions since they are caused by factors beyond her control. Her free will in this case is somewhat attenuated and weakened and perhaps just an illusion because there are factors beyond her control which are causing her to act the way she does.

In order to avoid a false dichotomy, you have to make use of the law of contradiction. If you say your position must either be A or B, that may be a false dichotomy if C is a possibility. It is better to say your position must be either A or Not A, because the law of contradiction says that both of those can’t be true and one of them has to be.

With that in mind, a proper dichotomy starts this way: Say you have made a choice. Either your will was determined or it was not determined. If it was determined, the next dichotomy is: Either your will determined itself or it was determined by something other than itself. If the option “not determined” is excluded, these two options are true opposites of one another because they are based on the A or Not A principle that the law of contradiction requires. You correctly excluded the option “not determined” by arguing that every motion has a cause. But you incorrectly excluded the option that she moved her Own will by concluding that “her actions…[must be] caused by factors beyond her control.” Not so: logically, they could Also be caused by factors Within her control.

The problem with your argument from causality (in my opinion) is that it excludes the “determined by itself” option by asserting that the only options are “not determined” and “determined by something other than itself.” That dichotomy is illogical because it leaves out a possibility that the law of contradiction requires to be present.

My proposition is that the will is a cause that is free to produce any of a number of possible effects independently of any prior events. Because there is nothing logically contradictory in this definition of free will, it is a logical possibility. In order to deny its possibility, you would need to show some internal contradiction. Your argument from causality doesn’t work because it is based on a false dilemma. Therefore, self-determinism as defined above is a real logical possibility.

 

[Tomdstone]

My proposition is that the will is a cause that is free to produce any of a number of possible effects independently of any prior events…

But the will is not an uncaused causal agent. Something is causing the will to act the way it does. So the embezzler does not have moral responsibility because something is moving her will to move this way. Everything that is moved is moved by another.

 

[Rhubarb]

The principle of causality says that everything has a cause. So all of our actions have a cause of one kind or another. So if there is a reason why a person steals from a bank, then would this not mean that she is not morally responsible for her embezzlement?

I’ll cut the quote there. There’s a lot to talk about.

Causality is way, way more complicated. I mean, even what constitutes a cause is argued. But I think what you’re discussing is more action theory. I think, and there’s work to support it, that agents like us can take intentional action, or, can be involved in unintentional affairs. Let me draw the distinction with an analogy.

I throw an egg at your house because I hate you. This is a action. I chose to engage in this behavior.

Now,say, I’m carrying my groceries home and some guy hits me with their car. I go flying. And my eggs break all over your house. This is an unintentional… thing. I didn’t choose to egg your house. I didn’t want to. It was still caused though.

Usually speaking, people are only morally responsible for intentional acts, or intentional inaction.

Now one can argue that… Say. Someone with kleptomania can’t really control the urge to steal. Or a heroin addict can’t help the urge to shoot up. Those are some grey areas.

 

[dmar198]

But the will is not an uncaused causal agent. Something is causing the will to act the way it does.

Once it has been created, why can’t the will move itself independently? And cause new events independently of any previous events?

Everything that is moved is moved by another.

A being endowed with the power of self-motion could move itself, right?

 

[Bradski]

The principle of causality says that everything has a cause. So all of our actions have a cause of one kind or another. So if there is a reason why a person steals from a bank, then would this not mean that she is not morally responsible for her embezzlement?

A difficult question of free will. One with which I admit I have trouble.

When Charles Whitman shot and killed so many people from the clock tower at the University of Texas in '66, he was subsequently found to have a brain tumour which:

‘…conceivably could have contributed to his inability to control his emotions and actions.’

Let’s say that it was a contributing factor. A medical condition that caused him to lose some control. That affected his free will choices. How much does this lessen the degree of culpability that Whitman should accept? With neuroscience a lot more advanced a half century later, it could be possible that the same actions today would result in the perpetrator being found not liable for his actions.

So if a medical condition might allow this, why not a genetic disposition as well? As there are genes that are associated with violent behaviour:

"Each criminal (in Finland) was given a profile based on their offences, categorising them into violent or non-violent. The association between genes and previous behaviour was strongest for the 78 who fitted the “extremely violent offender” profile.

This group had committed a total of 1,154 murders, manslaughters, attempted homicides or batteries. A replication group of 114 criminals had all committed at least one murder.

These all carried a low-activity version of the MAOA gene, which previous research has dubbed the “warrior gene” because of its link to aggressive behaviour". bbc.com/news/science-environment-29760212

To what degree can possession of this gene be considered a mitigating factor? Possession of it doesn’t mean you WILL be violent, but it is definitely a contributing cause. One which is beyond the control of the individual.

If a tendency to violence makes you a less moral person, then your genetic make-up is a constituent part of your morality.

 

[Tomdstone]

Once it has been created, why can’t the will move itself independently? And cause new events independently of any previous events? A being endowed with the power of self-motion could move itself, right?

Because whatever moves is put in motion by another. Nothing can move itself because according to Thomas Aquinas :“nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.”
So if the will moves, then this means that it has moved because of something else in a state of actuality, or some reason. This reason could be inside the person or outside the person. Suppose it were inside the person. Now this cannot go on forever with reasons entirely within oneself independently, because it would be like one turtle sitting on another turtle. etc., all the way down. At some point the turtle would need support, so at some point, the reason for the movement of the will is outside of the person himself. Since the movement of the will is eventually caused by something outside of the individual’s intention and control, it must mean that the person cannot be held to be morally responsible for an action which was caused by something exterior and out of his control.
When the will moves, there must have been something which caused it to move as it did.

 

[fhansen]

The principle of causality says that everything has a cause. So all of our actions have a cause of one kind or another. So if there is a reason why a person steals from a bank, then would this not mean that she is not morally responsible for her embezzlement? If you say that it is because of her inclination to do evil, then since everything has a cause, there must be a reason why she needs to steal from the bank, whereas others do not want to do this. So again, because of the principle of causality, she is not morally responsible for her actions since they are caused by factors beyond her control. Her free will in this case is somewhat attenuated and weakened and perhaps just an illusion because there are factors beyond her control which are causing her to act the way she does.

God caused man to have free will-to be free moral agents. That fact means that *man *causes his own moral acts.

 

[dmar198]

Because whatever moves is put in motion by another. Nothing can move itself because according to Thomas Aquinas :“nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.”
So if the will moves, then this means that it has moved because of something else in a state of actuality, or some reason. This reason could be inside the person or outside the person. Suppose it were inside the person. Now this cannot go on forever with reasons entirely within oneself independently, because it would be like one turtle sitting on another turtle. etc., all the way down. At some point the turtle would need support, so at some point, the reason for the movement of the will is outside of the person himself. Since the movement of the will is eventually caused by something outside of the individual’s intention and control, it must mean that the person cannot be held to be morally responsible for an action which was caused by something exterior and out of his control.
When the will moves, there must have been something which caused it to move as it did.

St. Thomas Aquinas appears to answer this objection in Article 3 of his chapter on free will: “Does the will move itself?” newadvent.org/summa/2009.htm#article3

What do you think of that answer?

 

[Tomdstone]

St. Thomas Aquinas appears to answer this objection in Article 3 of his chapter on free will: “Does the will move itself?” newadvent.org/summa/2009.htm#article3

What do you think of that answer?

I need to study this a little more. Some of what he says seems contradictory at this point since he says that the will moves by itself, but then in the next question says that “if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).”

 

[Wesrock]

St. Thomas Aquinas appears to answer this objection in Article 3 of his chapter on free will: “Does the will move itself?” newadvent.org/summa/2009.htm#article3

What do you think of that answer?

This part was of interest to me.

*God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (109, 2). *

 

[Tomdstone]

This part was of interest to me.
*God moves man’s will,. *

But I don’t believe that the movement of a man’s will is 100% from God, because robbing a band is not something that God would support. There is something contradictory about the reasoning here also.

 

[Wesrock]

Er, Aquinas’ own explanation is that God moves man to seek the good. However, man is to determine through his own reason what to do. A man who chooses to, say, rob a bank, has a disordered sense of good, but the reason he does so is because he believes it is better than not robbing a bank. Not because he necessarily lacks a conscience or that nagging voice of human decency, but because he’s perhaps putting more selfish, immediate goods (financial security, thrill, etc…) over others. Those things are good in themselves.

God doesn’t, then, instruct the man to rob a bank. He only serves as that first mover of the will to seek the good, and the will is moved and then normatively chooses how it moves to act.