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EnterTheBowser
Guest
I’m curious: let’s imagine some set of criteria X. This set of criteria gives a true/false answer for any moral fact. Moreover, if it answers “true” for moral fact Y, it answers “false” for ~Y. Additionally, the criteria are not trivial (eg “utilitarianism is true and all other moral facts are false”). Now, that being said - would the existence of such a set of criteria be “enough”? (Enough in the sense to establish that morality is like science and not like taste). Also, do you think there are multiple possible such sets which return different answers?Not rejection of (3), but finding that (3) is insufficient. Moral subjectivism is trivially consistent with (3).
What I’m really asking for to believe moral objectivism is an account of what it means for *everyone *to to be mistaken about a moral belief, and how they could discover their mistake without first changing their belief about it.
For instance, I have an account for what it means for everyone to be wrong about the Earth being flat, and how they could be convinced of their mistake.
When I say that “everyone is wrong that the Earth is flat”, I mean not only that the Earth is indeed roundish, but that the the statement “The Earth is flat” and “The Earth is roundish” logically entails certain expected perceptions, and the actual perceptions contradict those logically expected from flatness and do not contradict those logically expected from roundishness.
In other words, I need to know how to tell the difference between an assertion of moral fact and its opposite.
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