My Theory: Creationism

[Shike]

Every confusion of today’s philosophy was anticipated, at least in a less elaborate form, by philosophers of Aristotle’s day.

I would say many confusions in modern philosophy were anticipated.

Nor did the ancient Greeks make the rigid distinction we do between metaphysics and science. That distinction is a relatively recent development.

Yes, perhaps not the ancient Greeks, I have asked more (name removed by moderator)ut from MindOverMatter2 in my last post. But medievals such as Aquinas very much knew the difference between a metaphysical demonstration and scientific theory.

Molecular science makes Aristotle’s distinction between “substance” and “accidents” meaningless.

Science cannot make a proper metaphysical argument meaningless. It’s impossible because metaphysical arguments deal with the presuppositions of science, what needs to be true in order for us to to practice science and have scientific discovery.

For instance, what scientific discovery could, in principle, invalidate the metaphysical principle of identity? The answer is: none.

Once the measurable components of something are eliminated – all its molecules, atoms, subatomic particles, and so on – what you have left is nothing.

Who says everything about an atom is measurable? Can you measure its “whatness”? ‘This atom has more atomness than this atom’ doesn’t make sense; it’s either an atom or not.

No invisible “substance” or “essence” that makes the thing what it is, because with no atoms, what is it? Quantum potentiality? No potentiality can actualize itself (joke here).

You are confusing real separability with unseparable metaphysical principles. The metaphysics in question is on a much deeper level than anything you are offering as a counter-example. Basically, you’re not engaging in what Aristotle is talking about.

Every atom in my body was once at the heart of a star; since being blasted out into the universe, it became part of innumerable bodies before mine, and will continue to do so after mine dissolves. That, plus the E-word, makes the concept of “Form” problematic at best.

Actually there is no problem because formal causality is all about capacities. And something either has a capacity or it doesn’t.

What is the “Form” of “horse”? Their current bodily structure is no more final than those of their ancestors. If the “form” is some yet unrealized future ideal, where does the current version come from? If it is the current version, then forms are not unchanging; in a few million years, it could well be different.

You are confusing two different types of causality here: formal and final causality. There is no problem. I have a book recommendation for you if you desire a more accurate picture of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Since 1859, Plato and Aristotle are interesting and influential parts of the history of philosophy, but no longer fit our current knowledge.

That is quite the sweeping claim. First of all, it isn’t true because as far as I know, the laws of logic have not changed and Aristotle had a large role in mapping out much in the field of logic.
Second of all, the pertinent parts of their philosophy stand independent of scientific findings for the reason given further above.

So your claim is at least doubly wrong.

I wonder, why are you pitting philosophy against science?

 

[SGWessells]

I would say many confusions in modern philosophy were anticipated.

Okay, maybe they missed existentialism or something, but my point remains, that the problems of philosophy did not start with the moderns.

Yes, perhaps not the ancient Greeks, I have asked more (name removed by moderator)ut from MindOverMatter2 in my last post. But medievals such as Aquinas very much knew the difference between a metaphysical demonstration and scientific theory.

I don’t think you’ve demonstrated that claim. And if philosophy and science conflict, which should prevail; the one based on speculation or the one based on observation?

 

[Shike]

Good questions: thank you.

Okay, maybe they missed existentialism or something, but my point remains, that the problems of philosophy did not start with the moderns.

I agree with your general point.

But did Aquinas know the modern scientific method? Did he not believe that certain propositions were to be accepted on faith? Did he recognize the possibility that scientific evidence and Catholic dogma might possibly conflict? If so, which would he recommend we go with?

Aquinas was not familiar with the method (or at least not interested, I do not have enough of a background to answer confidently) but he was certainly familiar with the kind of knowledge that the method yields, both in content and certainty.
Aquinas did believe that certain propositions were to be accepted on a faith that was not contradictory to reason.
Aquinas did recognize the possibility but stated that if such an apparent conflict occurred it was either bad science or a misunderstood doctrine. As far as I know, modern science does not conflict with any Catholic doctrines. I’d be willing to help if you have some examples that you’d like to talk about.

I did not say that science invalidates every theory of metaphysics, only the distinction between “substance” and “accident.”

However small you’d like to break the particles up you would still have a formal cause, its “whatness”. Only those things that naturally exist as a unity are properly called substances. So if individual atoms or smaller particles exist on their own then they would not only have a formal cause, but would be identified as a substance.

I have a hard time seeing how modern science invalidates the distinction between substance and accident, for Aristotle’s Four Causes are a metaphysical analysis of the nature of change. And since science presupposes change in general, then science wouldn’t be able to offer a proper counterexample—the objections would have to come from engaging in metaphysical argumentation.

No atom is “just an atom.” It is an atom of a particular element. That means that it is part of the “accidental” not the “substantial.” Particles can separate from one atom and combine with other particles to become another atom, which is how galaxies began to generate the heavier elements like carbon necessary for life. Where is its “whatness” then?

Substances are those form/matter combos that naturally exist as a unity. If you have a free-floating atom or other particle than it has a substance of its own, not identified with any other composite. An atom in this case would both have accidental and substantial qualities. Why? Because the atom can undergo some change and still remain an atom, and an atom can undergo other changes and cease to be an atom. As long as you have that, it would seem you have a substance.

There doesn’t seem to be any problem with combining atoms to form new substances or separating atoms from an already existing substance.

Something that can transfer from one element to another cannot be part of an eternal unchanging form, can it?

Why not? When the atom is a part of one element it is part of a whole substance, when it is part of another element it is part of another whole substance. Or if it exists by itself it is its own substance. The substantial form can change in the sense that it can go out of existence, and thus you would cease to have a substance. But the same substantial form can come back into existence but “instantiated” into another substance of the same kind.

The immaterial nature of forms is why you can have the same form in different individual substances. Forms are closely connected to capacities. With capacities, you either have them or you don’t; therefore, you either have some formal qualities or you don’t.

According to Copleston, Aristotle taught that substance, while objectively real, was not transcendent, but inherent in the individual (History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Image, 1993, p. 303).

I don’t have my copy handy, but are you sure this is what Copleston said? It seems to me that he would have said that Aristotle said that forms (what Plato said existed in a transcendent realm) are not transcendent but inhere in the individual composite (substance).

He says that, according to Aristotle, “it is the nature of horses that the scientist considers, and not merely Black Beauty or any other individual horse.” But that’s the problem. Aristotle thought horses as a species remain the same, so whether an individual horse was black, speckled, bay, whether it was tall or short, had a deep chest or bowed back, didn’t change their “horseness.” But where would eohippus (earliest progenitor of horses yet discovered) fit into this scheme?

These are good questions. It is important to not confuse metaphysical forms with biological species. Biology might classify organisms based upon sexual reproduction or other factors. But the individual metaphysical forms of Aristotle are closely linked to capacities. So if you have one organism that has the capacity for rational thought and another organism that does not, then their formal elements will differ. Thus modern biology doesn’t conflict with metaphysics, even if a biological species undergoes enough change to not be recognizable as that same species. Basically, capacities are either there or they are not, and that is good enough for Aristotle’s forms.

(continued)

 

[Shike]

(continued)

So where was the form of “horse” when there were no individual horses? Plato had an answer, because he thought the Forms transcended their material copies, but Aristotle didn’t.

When individual horses did not exist there was no form in Aristotle’s sense. But logical possibility in general allows for horses to come into existence. This line of inquiry will take you into the metaphysical question of the nature of existence itself.

According to Feser, The Last Superstition, (St. Augustine Press, 2008, p. 62), a formal cause is “the form, structure or pattern that the matter exhibits, which in this case [a rubber ball] comprises such features as sphericity, solidity, and bounciness.” All these are within the laws of matter and physics. But I was referring to form, not formal causality or potentia.

Ah, The Last Superstition… did you like and/or benefit from the book?

As far as I know form and formal causality are the same. The formal causality is the form. The form is the formal causality.

When no individuals of a metaphysical species exist, then no individual forms exist.

Did eohippus have the capacity to become a horse? Or just the next animal on the Tree of Life on that progression? Was there a final creature in mind from the beginning? If so, it has not yet developed, and no one has any idea what it will be like. How then can it have a form? If substance is inherent in the individual, and the individual changes, then substance changes. A species is provisional. Some last for millions of years unchanged; others are transformed by a natural process and disappear.

One eohippi D) or many do not have the capacity to become a horse just as I do not have the capacity to become a shark. Sure, a population of eohippi can undergo mutation leading to horses, but the individuals always have a concrete formal element. An individual either has a capacity or it doesn’t, and that is sufficient for Aristotle’s formal cause.

Sorry, my claim was a bit too sweeping. But in the area of form, substance, and accidents, and the distinctions thereof, I think I’m right. Modern science has made them obsolete, no matter how many people cling to them because their dogma demands it.

Thank you for willing to admit it; really, it is refreshing because on this sub-forum there is often problems of pride and antagonism.

As to dogma, I’d just like to say that the Catholic Church doesn’t have some official philosophy, however influential Aristotle or others have been. Sure some of the formulations of dogma are formulated in terms of certain philosophies, ie. Transubstantiation, but the reality is what the Church defends and not any specific philosophical system.

It is true, however, that much of Aquinas’ theology and philosophy is held in high regard… but only insofar as it is true.

I don’t think you’ve demonstrated that claim. And if philosophy and science conflict, which should prevail; the one based on speculation or the one based on observation?

The one that is true should prevail.
Metaphysics is one branch of philosophy and is not synonymous with philosophy. I’m pretty certain that certain areas of philosophy admit to scientific verification, it just isn’t the case with metaphysics.

Also, metaphysics specifically is not mere speculation (perhaps other branches of philosophy are). The metaphysical arguments of Aquinas, for instance, include premises that take into account basic observations from experience, such as change exists, or the world exists, or causality exists—facts so general that any endeavor into science presupposes them.

Thank you.
Ciao,
Michael

 

[StrawberryJam]

Metaphysics is a higher branch of Philosophy.
So what. It is just as useless as the other.

 

[SGWessells]

Thank you, Shike, for patiently answering my questions about metaphysics. Clearly, I have a lot to learn. And to punish you for your good deed , I have more questions.

Shike wrote: “When the atom is a part of one element it is part of a whole substance, when it is part of another element it is part of another whole substance.”

I’m sorry, I evidently failed to express myself clearly. All atoms are atoms of a particular element. Elements are defined, that is, they are what they are, by the configuration of their atoms. The atoms of every element have a particular number of protons and electrons unique to that element; that is what makes them atoms of that element rather than another element. For example, an atom of hydrogen that changed into a helium atom would not be the same atom; instead of having one proton and one electron, it would have two of each.

Shike: “As far as I know, modern science does not conflict with any Catholic doctrines. I’d be willing to help if you have some examples that you’d like to talk about.”

Part of this issue depends on the meaning of “inerrancy.” Other parts involve discussions of evolution which are, I believe, banned from this area. If not, I would be happy to discuss them with you.

Shike: “I don’t have my copy handy, but are you sure this is what Copleston said? It seems to me that he would have said that Aristotle said that forms (what Plato said existed in a transcendent realm) are not transcendent but inhere in the individual composite (substance).”

Here is the operative sentence: "The individual alone is substance in the true sense, but the individual sensible thing is compound, and the intellect, in scientific knowledge, goes straight to the universal element, which is really there, though existing only concretely, as an element in the individual." ibid., italics his. It occurs in a discussion of universals and their reality. I may well have misunderstood it, however. My philosophy is a bit rusty.

Shike: " Sure some of the formulations of dogma are formulated in terms of certain philosophies, ie. Transubstantiation, but the reality is what the Church defends and not any specific philosophical system."

I don’t see how one could defend transubstantiation without defending the distinction between substance and accidents such that a substance could change from one thing to another yet still retain the accidents of the previous substance. Chemical analyses of consecrated bread and wine show no chemical difference, so whatever “substance” is, it must be distinct from any detectable atomic particles. But in science, the atoms of a thing make it what it is. If the consecrated elements are composed of the atoms of bread and wine, then bread and wine is all they are. Maybe I’m misunderstanding “substance,” but scientifically, it doesn’t exist. If it can be measured, it is material, thus part of the “accidents.” Isn’t that right?

Shike: “An atom in this case would both have accidental and substantial qualities. Why? Because the atom can undergo some change and still remain an atom, and an atom can undergo other changes and cease to be an atom. As long as you have that, it would seem you have a substance.”

Ah, I see the problem. You are looking at “atoms” as a class of things, comprising atoms of hydrogen, atoms of helium, atoms of oxygen, and so on. Thus we run into the problem of universals I mentioned earlier. If universals exist “concretely, as an element in an individual,” then atoms as a class have no substance, only atoms of a particular chemical element.

Shike: “The one that is true should prevail.”

A conviction I share wholeheartedly. However, it does not tell us by what method the truth is best arrived at, and so dodges the issue.

Shike: “When no individuals of a metaphysical species exist, then no individual forms exist.”

So when those individuals evolve, the form comes into existence?

I found Feser’s book interesting (if a tad whiny),but postpone discussion of it to another post.

 

[Shike]

You are probably correct about the ban; I’m just saying that I don’t see any contradictions between doctrine and science.

Here is the operative sentence: "The individual alone is substance in the true sense, but the individual sensible thing is compound, and the intellect, in scientific knowledge, goes straight to the universal element, which is really there, though existing only concretely, as an element in the individual." ibid., italics his.

The quote does seem to lend credit to what I said. He is talking about forms and their lack of transcendence rather than substance.

I don’t see how one could defend transubstantiation without defending the distinction between substance and accidents such that a substance could change from one thing to another yet still retain the accidents of the previous substance.

Yes and no. Philosophy isn’t going to do much more than show that Transubstantiation is logically possible, even though naturally impossible (If someone can show otherwise, I stand corrected). But one doesn’t have to use those specific words to employ the concepts involved. Likewise it is possible for someone to use a different philosophical system for a defense.

My point is that one philosophical system is not an integral, necessary part of Church teaching. The Church is interested in preserving what was handed to it first and foremost. Second, in probing the depths of a mystery to see what we can understand. The Church is willing to affirm truth wherever it is found–no one philosophical system (insofar as it is true) is exhaustive.

But in science, the atoms of a thing make it what it is.

I agree that science investigates the atomic structure of things, but that is not as strong as the claim that the atoms determine form. Why can’t it be the other way around, that the essence/ formal principle in a thing determines its atomic structure?

Furthermore, (talking more freely and not necessarily addressing something you said) every physical thing appears to be made up of smaller particles; one doesn’t find a physical thing without particles. But this is not the same as saying a physical thing is its particles. And if one agrees that physical things are more than the sum of their parts and think there are such things as emergent properties, then it seems we are back in the same boat talking about the formal cause. Materialism is not supported by science neither is it supported by metaphysics.

If the consecrated elements are composed of the atoms of bread and wine, then bread and wine is *all they are.
*

Metaphysically, there is a jump from the fact that we observe such and such and that this is such and such. In general we should trust our senses to help us determine the nature of a thing. Transubstantiation is a miracle that should not force us to act otherwise and is something that requires trust in God (but not irrational trust).

Maybe I’m misunderstanding “substance,” but scientifically, it doesn’t exist. If it can be measured, it is material, thus part of the “accidents.” Isn’t that right?

Scientifically, substance doesn’t “exist” in the sense that science is concerned with only one maybe two aspects of substance, the material cause and to some degree the efficient. A substance, in philosophical terms, also has a formal and final explanation.

That said, I don’t think it’s correct to say that anything material is accidental as our partly material nature is essential to what we are. But to go further we’d have to pin down some definitions.

Be careful not to fall into the trap of thinking that what science doesn’t prove or can’t prove, doesn’t exist or we can’t know it to exist. The scope of science is not the same as the scope of knowledge, and therefore, the scope of science is not the same as the scope of being.

If universals exist “concretely, as an element in an individual,” then atoms as a class have no substance, only atoms of a particular chemical element.

Not quite. Aristotle’s point is that there is a formal concrete element or principle (metaphysical) that comprises part of an individual. In knowledge, we apprehend that principle, by way of abstraction, in the form of a universal.

In other words, universals are the work of the mind, but exist in the individual as a formal element. In this context, form and universal is not the same, though related.

Either way, if an atom is concretely a part of something else or if it is existing alone, it does not matter for metaphysics and substance. An individual being (which has a natural unity) is considered a substance.

A conviction I share wholeheartedly. However, it does not tell us by what method the truth is best arrived at, and so dodges the issue.

I thought I did answer the issue. If we know a certain doctrine and scientific findings are contradictory, then the evidence given by science is being misconstrued and oversteps the bounds of science (thus probably entering the realm of metaphysics proper). What we seem to experience, however, is an apparent contradiction between doctrine and science–that is, if we do at all. I don’t.

So when those individuals evolve, the form comes into existence?

Yes. The formal cause is contemporaneous with the individual–it’s what makes it what it is, metaphysically speaking.

What’s going to blow your mind as you keep going down the metaphysical rabbit hole, is that most of it (at least in the AT tradition) is necessary (on pain of contradiction) to explain the world we live in, making it a more certain kind of knowledge than what is found by science. But we don’t have to choose… we can have both.