Omniscience?

[ateista]

It is asserted that God “knows” everything: past, present and future, and this is called omniscience. But the question arises: is this a meaningful proposion?

What does it mean: “to know something”? It is “to have information about something”. It simply makes no sense to say that God would know something that does not exist and never existed and will not exist. How can one obtain information about a non-existent object? There are no attributes of non-existent entities. Therefore to say that God would “know” a nonexistent book, which was not written by a non-existent author is pure nonsense.

It would make much more sense to say that omniscience means to know everything that can be known. It certainly would not subtract from God’s omniscience to accept that God cannot know the contents of a book, which was never written by a non-existent author, who was never born.

In a sense we follow the stipulation that “omnipotence” does not really mean “to be able to do everything”. Rather we say that omnipotence means that God is able to do anything that can be done. It does not diminish omnipotence that God is unable to create square circles or married bachelors, since these entities cannot exist.

Any thoughts or objections?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

It is asserted that God “knows” everything: past, present and future, and this is called omniscience. But the question arises: is this a meaningful proposion?

What does it mean: “to know something”? It is “to have information about something”. It simply makes no sense to say that God would know something that does not exist and never existed and will not exist. How can one obtain information about a non-existent object? There are no attributes of non-existent entities. Therefore to say that God would “know” a nonexistent book, which was not written by a non-existent author is pure nonsense.

It would make much more sense to say that omniscience means to know everything that can be known. It certainly would not subtract from God’s omniscience to accept that God cannot know the contents of a book, which was never written by a non-existent author, who was never born.

In a sense we follow the stipulation that “omnipotence” does not really mean “to be able to do everything”. Rather we say that omnipotence means that God is able to do anything that can be done. It does not diminish omnipotence that God is unable to create square circles or married bachelors, since these entities cannot exist.

Any thoughts or objections?

This is the standard objection to Molinist scientia media (popularly called the “grounding” objection). According to Molinism God knows even the actions of hypothetical non-existent creatures in hypothetical non-existent circumstances. According to its objectors this is nonsense, not grounded in reality.

 

[ateista]

This is the standard objection to Molinist scientia media (popularly called the “grounding” objection). According to Molinism God knows even the actions of hypothetical non-existent creatures in hypothetical non-existent circumstances. According to its objectors this is nonsense, not grounded in reality.

I see. What I am wondering about what does the word “know” mean according to their usage?

Suppose we talk about tossing a six-sided die. I “know” that it will land with one side upwards showing a number from 1 to 6 (excluding the possibility that someone snatches it in mid-air). But to call that “knowledge” is stretching it to the point of meaninglessness. If that is what they mean, then we can safely discard the Molinist interpretation of “know”.

Or do they mean that God can know the actual outcome on a die-toss, even if it never happens? That is truly sheer nonsense.

Either way omniscience can and must be re-stated as knowing everything that “can be known”. And then we can start to contemplate “what can be known”?

 

[john_doran]

I see. What I am wondering about what does the word “know” mean according to their usage?

it means the same thing as it does for their objectors: to know the truth-value of a proposition.

omniscience just means something like knowing all true propositions and no false ones.

the question is (for molinism) are there true counterfactual propositions? the common objection is that there aren’t, because there is nothing that could actually make them true, or ground their truth.

ateista:

Or do they mean that God can know the actual outcome on a die-toss, even if it never happens? That is truly sheer nonsense.

no: they mean that god knows which tosses occur in which possible worlds, so that if god made one of those worlds actual, the propositions about the die-roll in that world would be true.

that is, he knows what ***would be ***actual (and thus true) if he actualized that world.

 

[Sarpedon]

It would make much more sense to say that omniscience means to know everything that can be known. It certainly would not subtract from God’s omniscience to accept that God cannot know the contents of a book, which was never written by a non-existent author, who was never born.

In a sense we follow the stipulation that “omnipotence” does not really mean “to be able to do everything”. Rather we say that omnipotence means that God is able to do anything that can be done. It does not diminish omnipotence that God is unable to create square circles or married bachelors, since these entities cannot exist.

This may be an orthodox Catholic opinion, for I doubt the question has been definitvely settled.

 

[ateista]

it means the same thing as it does for their objectors: to know the truth-value of a proposition.

Very well, let’s examine this definition. It presumes that any proposition has a truth value associated with it. And that is simply not true. Propositions do not exist in vacuum, they have referents - real or imaginary. Let’s see a few examples:

The proposition: “I am currently typing this post” - has a value of “true” associated with it.
The proposition: “I am currently typing this post and I am smoking a cigarette while doing so” - has a value of “false” associated with it (since I never smoke inside the house).
The proposition: “This proposition is false” - cannot have a true or false value associated with it.
The proposition: “Tomorrow I will have ham-and-eggs for breakfast” - cannot be assigned a true or false value associated with it, until I actually sit down and start to eat my breakfast. It is neither true nor false - yet!
The proposition: “The non-existent meteorite in my back yard is heavy” cannot have a truth value associated with it, because it does not refer to anything.
The proposition: “The smell of the color of number nine is soft” - cannot be assigned a true-false value, because it is non-sensical.

Therefore the definition you presented is deficient. My suggestion is: “to know something is to have valid information about it”. Knowledge presumes a subject - about which we can obtain information.

omniscience just means something like knowing all true propositions and no false ones.

In the light of above this is not satisfactory either. Omnisicence would be: “to know about all propositions and to know what their truth value is, if a truth value can be associated with them”. This definition takes care of the possible propositions, the true and false ones, as well as the undecidable and meaningless ones.

no: they mean that god knows which tosses occur in which possible worlds, so that if god made one of those worlds actual, the propositions about the die-roll in that world would be true.

that is, he knows what ***would be ***actual (and thus true) if he actualized that world.

I have some problems with this interpretation.

First, there is only one world. What does your argument say about the outcome in this world? Second, it presumes that God is constantly “tinkering” with our existence - quite contrary to the Catholic dogma that God leaves us alone and does not interfere with us.

According to your interpretation it is not “us” who instantiate the possible future - through our free decisions - rather God instantiates a world where our “decisions” mean nothing - since in one world there can be only one decision.

Moreover, it is not God who “chooses” a possible world, he cannot choose one, if the die is already tossed, and the spin, momentum etc. predetermine what the outcome will be.

 

[tobias]

The propisition that God is omniscient is inseperable from the propisition that He is omnipresent. It seems that all arguements of limitation of knowledge are bound by limitations of both space and time. For one who is not bound by the constraints of time and space; ‘yet’ has already been realized, and non-existent beings could only be proposition not potential.

 

[Cristiano]

It is asserted that God “knows” everything: past, present and future, and this is called omniscience. But the question arises: is this a meaningful proposition?

What does it mean: “to know something”? It is “to have information about something”. It simply makes no sense to say that God would know something that does not exist and never existed and will not exist. How can one obtain information about a non-existent object? There are no attributes of non-existent entities. Therefore to say that God would “know” a nonexistent book, which was not written by a non-existent author is pure nonsense. …

I think that your point is not aligned with the concept of time and God as Catholics look at it. You are looking at time as a transition from non-existent (future) to existent (past) through this very moment (present). If you accept that God transcends time and that the real limitation is with us because of our perception of time, then things are a little bit easier. Just treat time as a coordinate just like space and you will start to see how the transcendence takes place. It is like a one-dimensional being moving on a two-dimensional Mobius strip or Klein bottle. They perceive that they are moving in one dimension but in truth they are moving into a two-dimensional world.

 

[john_doran]

The proposition: “I am currently typing this post” - has a value of “true” associated with it.
The proposition: “I am currently typing this post and I am smoking a cigarette while doing so” - has a value of “false” associated with it (since I never smoke inside the house).

ok, but then those are propositions that ***do ***have truth-vaues, even by your own lights.

ateista:

The proposition: “This proposition is false” - cannot have a true or false value associated with it.

i would say because the sentence you’re using doesn’t actually express a proposition. it’s not that there’s a proposition with no truth-value (or one that is prepetually in flux), but rather a sentence with no proposition.

ateista:

The proposition: “Tomorrow I will have ham-and-eggs for breakfast” - cannot be assigned a true or false value associated with it, until I actually sit down and start to eat my breakfast. It is neither true nor false - yet!

that depends on what you think about time and about propositional truth, i guess.

if you’re a minkowskian 4D block-universe theorist, then you are actually sitting down eating ham-and-eggs tomorrow morning.

or if you’re a determinist, and if all of the initial conditions together with the relevant coverng laws already exist that together are sufficient, now, to bring it about tomorrow that you have ham-and-eggs for breakfast tomorrow, then the proposition stating that fact will be true.

but even if you’re neither of those things, there is still a truth-value to propositions about the future: how could there not be?

ateista:

The proposition: “The non-existent meteorite in my back yard is heavy” cannot have a truth value associated with it, because it does not refer to anything.

again, this sentence fails to express a proposition.

ateista:

The proposition: “The smell of the color of number nine is soft” - cannot be assigned a true-false value, because it is non-sensical.

ditto for this one.

ateista:

Therefore the definition you presented is deficient. My suggestion is: “to know something is to have valid information about it”. Knowledge presumes a subject - about which we can obtain information.

sure - we come to know that certain information about the thing is true.
atesta:

In the light of above this is not satisfactory either. Omnisicence would be: “to know about all propositions and to know what their truth value is, if a truth value can be associated with them”. This definition takes care of the possible propositions, the true and false ones, as well as the undecidable and meaningless ones.

an unnecessary revision: if to be omniscient is to know only and all of those propositions that are true, then for any proposition that is neither true nor false, or which is undecidable or vague or meaningless, that proposition will a fortiori also not be true, and thus not known by an omniscient being.

ateista:

First, there is only one world. What does your argument say about the outcome in this world?

i don’t think i understand what you’re asking here.

ateista:

Second, it presumes that God is constantly “tinkering” with our existence - quite contrary to the Catholic dogma that God leaves us alone and does not interfere with us.

i don’t see how this follows at all from what i said.

ateista:

According to your interpretation it is not “us” who instantiate the possible future - through our free decisions - rather God instantiates a world where our “decisions” mean nothing - since in one world there can be only one decision.

not true: we were talking about rolling dice. humans actualize possible worlds (or, more accurately, world-segments) when they make free choices.

ateista:

Moreover, it is not God who “chooses” a possible world, he cannot choose one, if the die is already tossed, and the spin, momentum etc. predetermine what the outcome will be.

this doesn’t make any sense: there isn’t any dice or toss or spin or momentum until god (or someone else) actualizes a world in which all those things occur.

 

[ateista]

ok, but then those are propositions that ***do ***have truth-vaues, even by your own lights.

Certainly they do.

i would say because the sentence you’re using doesn’t actually express a proposition. it’s not that there’s a proposition with no truth-value (or one that is prepetually in flux), but rather a sentence with no proposition.

A sentence is just a linguistic form for a proposition. Since we are limited to linguistic type of communication we must use them as conduits to transfer the thoughts and propositions from one mind to another. For all practical purposes sentences and propositions must be used interchangably. Even when you think, your thoughts are in a linguistic form.

But let me ask you: on what basis do you say that one sentence expresses a proposition and another does not? Maybe I will understand your distinction then.

that depends on what you think about time and about propositional truth, i guess.

if you’re a minkowskian 4D block-universe theorist, then you are actually sitting down eating ham-and-eggs tomorrow morning.

or if you’re a determinist, and if all of the initial conditions together with the relevant coverng laws already exist that together are sufficient, now, to bring it about tomorrow that you have ham-and-eggs for breakfast tomorrow, then the proposition stating that fact will be true.

It is impossible to avoid the language. You yourself used the phrase: “will be true”. Which does not resolve the problem: “is it true now?”.

but even if you’re neither of those things, there is still a truth-value to propositions about the future: how could there not be?

There are none today, but there will be tomorrow. Of course you could say that such sentences are not propositions either…

again, this sentence fails to express a proposition.

ditto for this one.

Please explain, why are these sentences not propositions.

sure - we come to know that certain information about the thing is true.

Excellent: so in order to speak of “knowledge” there must be an existing object (either physical or conceptual) and an information about that object which is either true or false. Lacking either one: the object or the information makes the concept of knowledge nonsensical.

an unnecessary revision: if to be omniscient is to know only and all of those propositions that are true, then for any proposition that is neither true nor false, or which is undecidable or vague or meaningless, that proposition will a fortiori also not be true, and thus not known by an omniscient being.

Wait a second. You denied some of my examples as not being “propositions”. Now you speak of propositions as either being true, false, undecidable, vague or meaningless. Please clarify.

You also use a strange construct, which I don’t comprehend. You say that omniscience is “to know only and all of those propositions that are true”. What about those propositions that are not true? Are they not “known” to the omniscient being? A negative knowledge can be just as important and useful as a positive one. So I think that my revision is very important.

 

[Isambard]

This is the standard objection to Molinist scientia media (popularly called the “grounding” objection). According to Molinism God knows even the actions of hypothetical non-existent creatures in hypothetical non-existent circumstances. According to its objectors this is nonsense, not grounded in reality.

God alledgly created the universe Ex nihilo though. He would have to have knowledge about then, non-existant situations and creatures .

 

[Camron]

God alledgly created the universe Ex nihilo though. He would have to have knowledge about then, non-existant situations and creatures .

Bingo!

Plus, many of the arguments presented assume only one actual universe whereas God could pool together all possible outcomes from many different scenarios (universes if you will) to bring about the very best and most fair “actual world” possible.

The story of Isaiah 38:8 is a good example of this pooling because Hezekiah was apparently allowed to see into the possible future to see an event that never actually happened at “that time”, his own death.

Exactly what’s being discussed here is subject to a lot of controversy. But if indeed time did go backward, then a paradox has most likely entered at the moment that time stopped going backward—because Hezekiah was now going to live a “different future” from the one he was going to have. I will note that this is a different future which God still definitely knew about even though it didn’t really exist (because it never actually happened).

I will make the shadow cast by the sun go back the ten steps it has gone down on the stairway of Ahaz.’ " So the sunlight went back the ten steps it had gone down.

PS: I’m not interested in creationist arguments suggesting the sun actually reversed course. But I think this was a possible time-space event caused by God which altered the course of history, changing from one future to another future via introducing a literal paradox in the continuum of time itself.

That’s how I see it anyway.

 

[soma]

When we know the truth that God is omnipresent and that there is nothing else but pure consciousness, we feel at ease and yield to His divine consciousness. When our souls are enlightened with pure consciousness, we don’t attempt to control others by condemning them or manipulating them with the devil because we understand that it is through love that God governs everybody and all of creation. The personal desire to control others comes by mistakenly believing that man is evil and indicates a distrust of God’s ability to govern His own creation. If we worship God by basing our thoughts and our actions on Him who is the strongest force, then the devil has no power. When we see God as one, it will have a beneficial influence upon our minds, our bodies and all of creation because we will be moved to great clarity and good actions. We will become a clear-seeing soul, omniscience helps us to tolerate diversity.

 

[1holycatholic]

God alledgly created the universe Ex nihilo though. He would have to have knowledge about then, non-existant situations and creatures .

Since God exists atemporally, the temporal concept expressed in “…have knowledge about then…” is a contradiction.

 

[Isambard]

Since God exists atemporally, the temporal concept expressed in “…have knowledge about then…” is a contradiction.

The universe is not atemporal however. It did have a fixed period of origin.

 

[1holycatholic]

The universe is not atemporal however. It did have a fixed period of origin.

God’s knowledge is atemporal. God created the temporal universe, but God is not a constituent part of it.

 

[HelenaMT]

It is asserted that God “knows” everything: past, present and future, and this is called omniscience. But the question arises: is this a meaningful proposion?

What does it mean: “to know something”? It is “to have information about something”. It simply makes no sense to say that God would know something that does not exist and never existed and will not exist. How can one obtain information about a non-existent object? There are no attributes of non-existent entities. Therefore to say that God would “know” a nonexistent book, which was not written by a non-existent author is pure nonsense.

It would make much more sense to say that omniscience means to know everything that can be known. It certainly would not subtract from God’s omniscience to accept that God cannot know the contents of a book, which was never written by a non-existent author, who was never born.

In a sense we follow the stipulation that “omnipotence” does not really mean “to be able to do everything”. Rather we say that omnipotence means that God is able to do anything that can be done. It does not diminish omnipotence that God is unable to create square circles or married bachelors, since these entities cannot exist.

Any thoughts or objections?

I didn’t have time to read the whole thread so if this has already been discussed, feel free to ignore.

I have no objection to saying God can only know what can be known.

The question of whether it is meaningful to speak of God’s omniscience this way, though, depends on how we define what* can be known* by God.

It also depends on how you define non-existent. If you mean it in the sense that it is something God will never even imagine, then it is truly non-existent even if God is able to see the whole of time and space. If it means something not yet thought of or created, then whether it is part of God’s knowledge depends on whether you think God is constrained by linear time.

If we define God as being outside of time, then He can know what is , what was, what will be, and maybe even what might be, if what might be is a valid form of information for a being outside of time.

If we define God in a way that somehow constrains Him by time as we understand it, such as not knowing something that does not yet exist or has not yet happened, that limits His knowledge to what is and what was, and He would have to make use of that vast knowledge to speculate on the future. This would seem to make God a part of the physical universe.

In the first option, God can look into time and space from any angle and so can be omniscient in the sense of having access to all information for all time.

In the second, He can only truly know what is and what was. To me , this would still qualify as omniscience in the context of “all that can be known” because if this is the reality you accept, this would be all that could be known if even the Creator couldn’t see past it.

I guess it depends on whether you see God as surrounding the entire universe(s?) and all of time from beginning to end, but not bound by it’s laws, or whether you see God as part of the universe but not beyond it.

I guess both of these take for granted that He would have to also be omnipresent, to be able to truly* know* everything knowable, whether or not the time constraint was there.

 

[JohnJFarren]

JMJ / MMM 080809 Saturday
Hello ateista –
Attention must be paid to your objection. Here’s what you wrote --"It simply makes no sense to say that God would know something that does not exist and never existed and will not exist. How can one obtain information about a non-existent object? There are no attributes of non-existent entities. Therefore to say that God would “know” a nonexistent book, which was not written by a non-existent author is pure nonsense. "

This question asks about things that never will actually exist. What God Knows here is the indefinite number of possibilities in every direction that COULD be IF the thing DID exist.

But another question is even more meaningful. Let’s consider a free choice action that WILL exist 750 years from now and will be posited by someone whose grandparents won’t exist until 100 years from now. Does God Know absolutely the clear choice that WILL come to exist? Of course. In its utmost clarity. How does God Know? (At this point someone will say, “Oh, don’t touch that one! That’s a mystery we cannot know!” THAT’S A COP OUT!) Yes, we can understand how God Knows that.

We creatures live in time. In other words we B E C O M E and that T A K ES T I M E … But God Exists eternally. At the instant of creation God SAW everything completed, in its ACTUALITY – not in some movie of the future. God Saw the whole creation finished, completed, IN ITS ACTUALITY. God didn’t WAIT to know what Abraham would do. And God didn’t know and see it because (first) He determined it (although with GOOD things God COULD do that but usually doesn’t). No. God Saw and Knew (Knows) it in a way similar to the way you see these marks on this computer screen. The words are here right now and you see them. Big miracle? No. Well neither is it a big deal that God Knows all futures.

A very interesting and important added note, though. Prior (I avoid the word BEFORE because that’s a time word) … prior to God’s positing creation in eternity … PRIOR TO … did God know about Abraham? No. Because God hadn’t posited Abraham’s existence. But at the “moment” (horrible time word) God posited, chose to create, God Knew and saw the actuality of everything.

I think it’s all fascinating. Let’s not COP OUT when we don’t have to do so. Yes, certain things are beyond our understanding … but this isn’t one of them.
John (JohnJFarren) Trinity5635@aol.com

 

[ateista]

I have no objection to saying God can only know what can be known.

The question of whether it is meaningful to speak of God’s omniscience this way, though, depends on how we define what* can be known* by God.

Knowledge is a concept. It means to have “information” about something. If one posits that this definition only applies to us, but not to God, then the proposition: “God knows X” is completely meaningless, since the word: “knows” becomes undefined.

It also depends on how you define non-existent.

Both physical and conceptual existence are constrained by space and time. Knowledge (information) can be only obtained about something that exists.

If you mean it in the sense that it is something God will never even imagine, then it is truly non-existent even if God is able to see the whole of time and space.

Imagination does not apply. I can imagine a seven-headed crystal dragon, which expresses itself in pure mathematics, but that “imagination” will not make the dragon real.

If it means something not yet thought of or created, then whether it is part of God’s knowledge depends on whether you think God is constrained by linear time.

I am not questioning God’s existence (whatever that means) being constrained by our time.

If we define God as being outside of time, then He can know what is , what was, what will be, and maybe even what might be, if what might be is a valid form of information for a being outside of time.

No, that does not follow logically.

An analogy: when you watch a movie, you are outside the time of the movie. You are not constrained by the time in the movie. Yet, you cannot have information about the end of the movie until it actually happens within the movie.

If we define God in a way that somehow constrains Him by time as we understand it, such as not knowing something that does not yet exist or has not yet happened, that limits His knowledge to what is and what was, and He would have to make use of that vast knowledge to speculate on the future.

Yes, that is a very good way to present it.

This would seem to make God a part of the physical universe.

But that does not follow. The spectator of the movie does not become part of the movie, is not constrained by the movie - just because his knowledge of the movie is constrained by the time-line inside the movie.

In the first option, God can look into time and space from any angle and so can be omniscient in the sense of having access to all information for all time.

In the second, He can only truly know what is and what was. To me , this would still qualify as omniscience in the context of “all that can be known” because if this is the reality you accept, this would be all that could be known if even the Creator couldn’t see past it.

Very well put again.

I guess it depends on whether you see God as surrounding the entire universe(s?) and all of time from beginning to end, but not bound by it’s laws, or whether you see God as part of the universe but not beyond it.

Based upon the movie analogy, God does not have to be part of our universe, nor be constrained by the laws of our universe.

 

[ateista]

This question asks about things that never will actually exist. What God Knows here is the indefinite number of possibilities in every direction that COULD be IF the thing DID exist.

I don’t object to this, but I don’t think that it could be defined as “knowledge”. It would be called “imagining”. As I replied to HelenMT I can imagine all sorts of things, can even imagine a “married bachelor”, but such imagination can not be called “real”. Imagination is not constrained by even the laws of logic.

The next part of your post is what I planned to bring in after the first part was clarified. You pre-empted it.

But another question is even more meaningful. Let’s consider a free choice action that WILL exist 750 years from now and will be posited by someone whose grandparents won’t exist until 100 years from now. Does God Know absolutely the clear choice that WILL come to exist? Of course. In its utmost clarity. How does God Know? (At this point someone will say, “Oh, don’t touch that one! That’s a mystery we cannot know!” THAT’S A COP OUT!) Yes, we can understand how God Knows that.

This brings up the question: “in what sense is that future decision free?”. In the libertarian notion of free will it means that the decision is not determined by anything.

We creatures live in time. In other words we B E C O M E and that T A K ES T I M E … But God Exists eternally. At the instant of creation God SAW everything completed, in its ACTUALITY – not in some movie of the future. God Saw the whole creation finished, completed, IN ITS ACTUALITY. God didn’t WAIT to know what Abraham would do. And God didn’t know and see it because (first) He determined it (although with GOOD things God COULD do that but usually doesn’t). No. God Saw and Knew (Knows) it in a way similar to the way you see these marks on this computer screen. The words are here right now and you see them. Big miracle? No. Well neither is it a big deal that God Knows all futures.

I highlighted the crucial part: “all futures”. If there are “all possible futures” then the proposition: “God knows all possible futures” is akin to “God can imagine all possible futures” - and that cannot be called “knowledge”.

Even without omniscience I “know” that tossing a die will result in getting a number from one to six, or maybe none, if someone snatches the die in mid-fall (when the result is undefined). But that is not “knowledge” of the actual outcome.

As long as the die is in mid-fall, there is no result that can be known. There is no actual outcome.

A very interesting and important added note, though. Prior (I avoid the word BEFORE because that’s a time word) … prior to God’s positing creation in eternity … PRIOR TO … did God know about Abraham? No. Because God hadn’t posited Abraham’s existence. But at the “moment” (horrible time word) God posited, chose to create, God Knew and saw the actuality of everything.

It is impossible to evade “time-words”.

In your own words (and “prior to” is exactly the same as “before”) there is “some kind of a time” (maybe totally dissimilar to ours) in which God “dwells”. Any phrase pertaining to “activity” presupposes a “before” and an “after”. Of course one can make the proposition that “God eternally willed” the creation (and everything else), but that is a totally meaningless proposition.