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pio_s
Guest
How can we prove our own existance?
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strngrnrth
Guest
Well, ask yourself, who’s asking?
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pio_s
Guest
i mean how do we prove that we are what we think we are, namley matter? Also, how do we prove that everything around us is not just an illusion?
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Mirdath
Guest
You can only prove that you exist – and then not even as matter, but as a thinker. Solipsism makes perfect sense, even though it’s an absurdity; it’s impossible to argue against.
For further reading, check out Descartes’ ontology, and the Brain in a Jar problem.
For further reading, check out Descartes’ ontology, and the Brain in a Jar problem.
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AnAtheist
Guest
Would it matter if the world was an illusion, as long as there is no way to escape it? I think not.
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mangy_dog
Guest
Ok Mr. Anderson (“my name is Neo”),
There is a Latin phrase that describes the matter at hand,
wrappidicus volte axleicus. Where “volte” implies “coming back around”.
Then bouncing it off of the Rosetta Stone we obtain " wrapped around the axle".
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cpayne
Guest
Hi. Doesn’t Putnam’s Brain in a Jar problem presuppose the real existence of brains, vats, evil scientists, and so on?
It seems the testimony of general sense experience is axiomatic; that is, you can argue *from *it, but you don’t have to argue *for *it. So I can prove that I do exist as a human person—I know that I am thinking, and I can see and feel my body.
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mardukm
Guest
There is facial recognition technology. You didn’t write the program for it, so you can rest assured that it was not a product of your own illusion.
You can also get dressed in the dark so you won’t know what you have on (once again, to ensure your appearance is not a product of your own illusion), have someone photograph you, and if the photograph actually reflects what you look like, then you know you exist since you had no prior awareness of what you were actually wearing.
Blessings,
Marduk
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mangy_dog
Guest
Pardon my irreverance in light of the otherwise serious subject of “our existance” or any other “stance” for that matter.
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mangy_dog
Guest
Someone just came into my office to tell me that a co-worker (fellow catholic) just died, this morning.
When he was at the hospital, I was the one person that visited him and asked if he wanted me to bring a priest to him. He, and his daughter stared at me with the look of “why didn’t this occur to us”. The answer was yes, thank you. That was 3 weeks ago.
Existence…
When he was at the hospital, I was the one person that visited him and asked if he wanted me to bring a priest to him. He, and his daughter stared at me with the look of “why didn’t this occur to us”. The answer was yes, thank you. That was 3 weeks ago.
Existence…
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cpayne
Guest
May your faithfulness be blessed, and may he rest in peace.
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mangy_dog
Guest
Mater Dei, miserere pro sua anima et requisce in Deus salus sua.
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Mirdath
Guest
Only if taken entirely literally – the problem may just as well postulate a disembodied, delusional spirit as the ‘I’.
You know you are thinking, yes, but do you know that your sensory (name removed by moderator)uts are accurate?
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cpayne
Guest
Yes, I know that my senses are accurate / “honest.” So do you, actually. Psychologically I am positive that you cannot deny the accuracy and reliability of your senses, unless you know you have a perceptual problem. We treat sense knowledge as axiomatic, as direct contact with reality.
Perceptions, of course, can contradict each other. This is why our perceptions are not themselves objects of knowledge, and cannot be, since true knowledge does not contradict itself. The true objects of knowledge are what we call “real things,” and we know them THROUGH sense perceptions. We know reality directly, in other words—we don’t just “know” perceptions.
Imagine what a person would be like who actually denied the reliability of his or her senses! Wouldn’t that be somewhat psychotic?
Perceptions, of course, can contradict each other. This is why our perceptions are not themselves objects of knowledge, and cannot be, since true knowledge does not contradict itself. The true objects of knowledge are what we call “real things,” and we know them THROUGH sense perceptions. We know reality directly, in other words—we don’t just “know” perceptions.
Imagine what a person would be like who actually denied the reliability of his or her senses! Wouldn’t that be somewhat psychotic?
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Mirdath
Guest
Or you’re pretty sure they are, which isn’t the same thing. The sense of pain you get when touching a flame might just be a remarkably consistent delusion!
But are we right to do so? We have no way of verifying sensory information except by way of more sensory information; it is, as you say, axiomatic – or, perhaps, ‘circular’ might better describe it. The way we treat sense knowledge is, essentially, ‘I think I see because I appear to see’, which, frankly, just doesn’t stand up to examination. We treat it as an axiom because it is inconvenient and absurd to do otherwise, not because it makes sense.
You cannot prove that you are not merely a disembodied mind, the only thing in existence, who is merely deluded into imagining that other minds are arguing that they, too, exist, and that minds are in possession of sensory bodies which allow the perceptions you imagine are flooding into your system. Is such a position ridiculous? Of course! But is it contrary to reason? Unfortunately not.
Probably – and have you ever tried arguing with a psycho?
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cpayne
Guest
I’m still going to disagree on this. When you ask “is it contrary to reason,” you appear to be saying, “Can this position be demonstrated deductively to be wrong?” However, the problem is that deduction begins with axiomatic knowledge, which is precisely what is under discussion!
But you know there are other methods of rational inquiry. Aristotle pointed out that axioms have to be established, not by deduction, but by enumerative induction. These are the ***archai, *the first things or first principles of knowledge.
So I guess what I’m arguing is that the reliability of sensory experience is in fact established rationally—just not by deduction, but rather by induction.
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Mirdath
Guest
Well, so do I – I just enjoy playing devil’s advocate
Solipsism is ridiculous; the only problem is that there’s no way to argue against it. Just remember that however much induction may hold up for you and me, that doesn’t necessarily make it absolute. One might argue ‘all swans are white’ via induction, until they visit Sydney and see the black swans there.
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cpayne
Guest
Well, okay then. :tiphat:
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Cadellin
Guest
As Rene Decartes put it in his “Discourse on Method” (1637):
“Je pense donc je suis.” i.e. “I think therefore I am.”
What more proof do you need?
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