Persons

[grannymh]

Just to clarify, I’m doing philosophy not theology. And when Benedict says “how could a human individual not be a human person”, he is also doing philosophy.

Whether the Magisterium affirms or does not affirm a specific philosophical position (i.e., about the presence of the human person at the moment of conception) may not be entirely relevant philosophically. The Magisterium is concerned with theology. It may on occasion rule out certain philosophical positions as incompatible with theology but it generally does not engage in philosophy.

But I know that you were asked to provide an authoritative cite. Which you did admirably.

My intention is to elaborate a philosophical understanding that does not reduce “person” to a “center of consciousness” or simply “self-consciousness”.** In philosophical terms, that does not reduce “person” to “cogito”. ****/**quote]

Emphasis mine.

In philosophical terms,** what** is a person?

In philosophical terms, does one ask what is the being known as person?

 

[grannymh]

Just to clarify, I’m doing philosophy not theology. And when Benedict says “how could a human individual not be a human person”, he is also doing philosophy.

Whether the Magisterium affirms or does not affirm a specific philosophical position (i.e., about the presence of the human person at the moment of conception) may not be entirely relevant philosophically. The Magisterium is concerned with theology. It may on occasion rule out certain philosophical positions as incompatible with theology but it generally does not engage in philosophy.

But I know that you were asked to provide an authoritative cite. Which you did admirably.

My intention is to elaborate a philosophical understanding that does not reduce “person” to a “center of consciousness” or simply “self-consciousness”.** In philosophical terms, that does not reduce “person” to “cogito”.**

Emphasis mine

In philosophical terms,** what** is a person?

In philosophical terms, does one ask what is the being known as person?

From the OP, what are the criteria for being a person? From a philosophical position?

 

[levinas12]

Emphasis mine

In philosophical terms,** what** is a person?

In philosophical terms, does one ask what is the being known as person?

From the OP, what are the criteria for being a person? From a philosophical position?

Not entirely sure how to respond. A person is a “who” not a “what”. “What” involves genus with specific difference. So, when asked **what kind of being **is John Doe, you (and Aristotle) would say a rational (specific difference) animal (genus).

But when asked who is that human being, you say “Why, that’s John Doe”. The proper name of a person answers a “who” question; genus with specific difference answer a “what” question.

Criteria are used to define a nature, a class.

But “person” is not a “sortal noun”. There is no genus with specific difference that defines a person. “John Doe” (as opposed to “tree” or "homo sapiens) does not refer to a class of beings

Identifying a person invokes a different language game. For example, you might have mistaken John for Mike; and someone says, “look more closely” and you say, “wow, I thought it was John but it is really Mike”. What “criteria” are involved here?

Even though “person” is distinct from “nature”, a human being (“nature”) also implies a “person”.
As Pope Benedict said, “how could a human being not be a human person”

 

[levinas12]

Maybe ethics could provide criteria for a person. You know a person is present when you are confronted with a special demand. This demand is special because it goes beyond general responsibility to care for the earth and all natural beings, i.e., goes beyond an “ecological” obligation.

This special demand in the final analysis is a request or appeal for love. My dog or cat cannot make this appeal. Only a person can.

 

[grannymh]

Not entirely sure how to respond. A person is a “who” not a “what”. “What” involves genus with specific difference. So, when asked **what kind of being **is John Doe, you (and Aristotle) would say a rational (specific difference) animal (genus).

But when asked who is that human being, you say “Why, that’s John Doe”. The proper name of a person answers a “who” question; genus with specific difference answer a “what” question.

Criteria are used to define a nature, a class.

But “person” is not a “sortal noun”. There is no genus with specific difference that defines a person. “John Doe” (as opposed to “tree” or "homo sapiens) does not refer to a class of beings

Identifying a person invokes a different language game. For example, you might have mistaken John for Mike; and someone says, “look more closely” and you say, “wow, I thought it was John but it is really Mike”. What “criteria” are involved here?

Even though “person” is distinct from “nature”, a human being (“nature”) also implies a “person”.
As Pope Benedict said, “how could a human being not be a human person”

I am following what you are saying; however, I believe that one needs to go beyond Aristotle for the definition of the human species. Catholics consider the spiritual soul not only the “form” of matter but also that the spiritual soul is immediately created by God in order for the person to share in God’s own life. It is Divine Revelation which calls each and every human being a person.

I would think that the unique union of spirit and matter would make the human a both-and nature. Man is both a who and a what. The names Mike or John distinguish persons from one another and the criteria would be the looks, personality, actions etc.

I really do like Pope Benedict’s quote “how could a human being not be a human person” I believe that it is the spiritual soul which confers the dignity of person.

 

[grannymh]

Maybe ethics could provide criteria for a person. You know a person is present when you are confronted with a special demand. This demand is special because it goes beyond general responsibility to care for the earth and all natural beings, i.e., goes beyond an “ecological” obligation.

This special demand in the final analysis is a request or appeal for love. My dog or cat cannot make this appeal. Only a person can.

It is my observation that the human person provides the criteria for ethics. For example, the human person is worthy of profound respect. Ethics describes profound respect.

 

[levinas12]

As Pope Benedict said, “how could a human being not be a human person”

Actually, my quote needs a correction. Pope Benedict said “how could a human individual not be a human person”. But I don’t think this changes the meaning very much.

And mention of the “individual” provokes another thought. DNA, present from the moment of conception, could be seen as further evidence that the person is present as well.

The equation of “soul” with “person” is OK as long as Aristotelian “soul” is not meant. But we must be careful to avoid a too dualistic understanding of “soul”. I don’t think that “soul” is naturally separable from the body; “soul” or “person” is the “expression” of the body (and may be seen as equivalent to the “living body”). Our “person” or “soul” can only survive death through a supernatural intervention by God. The reason for this is that the “person” is the totality of the individual, not simply a part (such as an agent intellect).

And it’s clear that, in the absence of the body, the “person” is “incomplete”. A resurrection of the body is required at some point.

 

[levinas12]

It is my observation that the human person provides the criteria for ethics. For example, the human person is worthy of profound respect. Ethics describes profound respect.

Yes, our experience of the person is the foundation for ethics.

But it may not be possible to explain our experience of the person through concepts associated with traditional metaphysics (where “traditional” equates more or less with Aristotle). For example, the category of “substance” may not be adequate. Because “person” involves a singularity (cannot be defined by genus with specific difference).

This is not to deny that “person” may require a specific nature (not every nature can “accommodate” a person).

 

[levinas12]

The Church says that we must treat a human life as a person from the moment of conception. However it has not waded in the philosophical waters of the issue.

There are a number of philosophical approaches that support the Church’s position that the human person begins with conception. So, one could say Benedict’s quote could be taken to mean that the Church has not put its imprimatur on one of them, to the exclusion of the others.

But I’m not sure it would be accurate to say that the Church holds that there is no good philosophical argument in support of the presence of the human person at the moment of conception. It’s just that there may be several good arguments.

But clearly any philosophical approach that would be incompatible with the presence of the person at conception would not be endorsed by the Church today. For example, it’s hard to imagine that Aristotle’s theory of successive ensoulments (either in terms of vegetative, animal and rational; or in terms of male earlier, female later) would be acceptable to the Church today (even if it may have been 500-700 years ago). The reason is that successive ensoulments would make it difficult if not impossible to argue that the person is actually (not just potentially) present from the moment of conception. And this would jeopardize the Church’s teaching on abortion.

 

[grannymh]

Yes, our experience of the person is the foundation for ethics.

When I say that the human person is worthy of profound respect, I am referring to a reality which does not depend on anyone’s subjective experience.

But it may not be possible to explain our experience of the person through concepts associated with traditional metaphysics (where “traditional” equates more or less with Aristotle). For example, the category of “substance” may not be adequate. Because “person” involves a singularity (cannot be defined by genus with specific difference).

I base my experience of the person on the objective dignity of each and every individual.

This is not to deny that “person” may require a specific nature (not every nature can “accommodate” a person).

A person does require a specific nature. One which reflects the Creator’s gifts to humanity.

 

[levinas12]

When I say that the human person is worthy of profound respect, I am referring to a reality which does not depend on anyone’s subjective experience.

I base my experience of the person on the objective dignity of each and every individual.

A person does require a specific nature. One which reflects the Creator’s gifts to humanity.

I agree there cannot be a human person without human nature. This is why any philosophical approach that denies the presence of human nature at the moment of conception is problematic.

I also agree that the reality of the person exists apart from subjective experience. In fact, the “person”, because he or she is a singularity, has a radical transcendence (is outside the horizon of concepts a priori or a posteriori).

Given this peculiar situation, the question arises how we have access to the reality of the person. So my focus is how a person is “disclosed” to us (through the immediacy of a special relation to that person). You could call this a phenomenological analysis.

The philosopher Levinas is the great expositor of this approach. What motivated him was the inadequacy of traditional metaphysics to account for the “person” (as distinct from the “nature”). For Levinas, the “person” falls outside the ten categories of Aristotle (or the a priori Kantian machinery).