I agree with Aquinas insofar that Person and Nature are distinct qualities; however, I maintain that a single Person is only capable of possessing one Nature.
Article 4, not 2, would appear to be the more relevant – and thankfully far less dense! However, it is ultimately unsatisfying.
Aquinas goes to some length to describe the Person of the Christ as composite in its possession of two natures; yet such composition makes the second Person of the trinity less than divine, a being of parts. A composite does not fit the apostle John’s description: the Word was with God, and the Word was God. For if the Word is also human, it is less than divine, and so not God – yet Aquinas would have it that it is God simultaneously! This, then, would be the inherent contradiction.
Earlier, in Article 2, Aquinas mentions that Person and Nature are ‘not really distinct’ when it comes to the divine; this, again, would seem to be at odds with the godhead’s possession of a composite nature – and with Aquinas’ own distinction between Person and Nature in Article 1.
And just so everyone who may not have had the good fortune to read the earlier thread before its untimely demise is clear, I am not attacking the faith – in fact, in my first post to that thread I specifically said that this is the function of faith as far as I understand it so far: to allow people to get over their reason telling them something is contradictory or paradoxical and to believe in it anyway.
Sorry it took a while to get back to here. Yes, in that particular genre, M.R. James is my favorite writer.
If I am following you, it seems to me that Aquinas actually has responded to your objections, but you’re just not buying his response. Okay, I can live with that. Let me clarify one point, however; Aquinas is very clear (ST I.3.7) that God is simple in nature and in no way composite. This also applies to the Person of the Word, which is also simple (III.2.4), but which can be described conceptually as composite by reason of Christ’s wholly divine and wholly human natures. However, as you pointed out (quoting Aquinas), Person and Nature are “not really distinct” when speaking of God. This again is due to God’s simplicity; every attribute or feature of God is in a sense identical to every other attribute or feature of God, including Personhood and Nature. Your central objection, it seems to me, is that in dealing with Jesus we are also dealing with a wholly human nature, which seems to be one too many.
Let me try an analogy. (Fellow Christians, if this analogy doesn’t work, please point out the problem; I don’t want to mess up on something so crucial.) Aquinas writes, “Composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them” (III.2.4).
So for example, let’s say the First Lady of the United States and Laura Bush are both the same. However, Laura Bush is in a sense subsumed in “First Lady of the United States,” and the reverse cannot be said to be true. Laura Bush comes into existence; she has a substantial form embodied to bring about Laura Bush; at some point Laura Bush will be no more, at least not in her current embodiment. She will be elsewhere.
However, NONE of those things is true of “First Lady.” The First Lady has no substantial embodied form, did not come into existence in an embodied form, will not pass away in an embodied form. But the First Lady and Laura Bush are united; in fact, they are the same, regarded in two ways. Nature is united to Person in a way that Person cannot be united to nature. When Laura Bush passes away, First Lady will not pass away.
The human nature of Jesus Christ is His by nativity; this nature is united with the Person of the Word without beginning or end. This Person of the Word without beginning or end is also Jesus Christ. The substantial embodied form of Christ’s wholly human nature is united with the Person of the Word, His wholly divine nature.
Again, is this an unusual occurrence? Is it, in fact, wholly miraculous? Does my feeble analogy not even come close? Yes, yes, and yes to all three questions. But is it illogical? I still don’t think so, at least not in the sense that it violates laws of inference.
You are arguing something like this:
- Christ has a wholly divine nature.
- Christ has a wholly human nature.
- But anything can only have one nature.
- Therefore, either 1 or 2 has to be false.
But what I am questioning is # 3. I don’t think it is illogical to dispute that premise.