In his Wednesday Address on Man & Woman (May 14, 1980) footnote 1 John Paul II writes:
The Magisterium of the Church dealt more closely with these problems, in three periods, according to the needs of the age.
The declarations of the period of the controversies with the Pelagians (V-VI centuries) affirm that the first man, by virtue of divine grace, possessed “naturalem possibilitatem et innocentiam” (DS 239), also called “freedom” (“libertas,” “libertas arbitrii”), (DS 371, 242, 383, 622). He remained in a state which the Synod of Orange (in the year 529) calls “integritas”: “Natura humana, etiamsi in illa integritate, in qua condita est, permaneret, nullo modo se ipsam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, servaret…” (DS 389).
The concepts of integritas and, in particular, that of libertas, presuppose freedom from concupiscence, although the ecclesiastical documents of this age do not mention it explicitly.
The first man was furthermore free from the necessity of death (cf. DS 222, 372, 1511).
The Council of Trent defines the state of the first man, prior to sin, as “holiness and justice” (“sanctitas et iustitia”—DS 1511, 1512) or as “innocence” (“innocentia”—DS 1521).
Further declarations on this matter defend the absolute gratuitousness of the original gift of grace, against the affirmations of the Jansenists. The “integritas primae creationis” was an unmerited elevation of human nature (“indebita humanae naturae exaltatio”) and not “the state due to him by nature” (“naturalis eius condicio”—DS 1926). God, therefore, could have created man without these graces and gifts (cf. DS 1955); that would not have shattered the essence of human nature and would not have deprived it of its fundamental privileges (cf. DS 1903-1907, 1909, 1921, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1955, 2434, 2437, 2616, 2617).
In analogy with the anti-Pelagian Synod, the Council of Trent deals above all with the dogma of original sin, integrating in its teaching preceding declarations in this connection. Here, however, a certain clarification was introduced, which partly changed the content comprised in the concept of liberum arbitrium. The “freedom” or “free will” of the anti-Pelagian documents did not mean the possibility of choice, connected with human nature, and therefore constant, but referred only to the possibility of carrying out meritorious acts, the freedom that springs from grace and that man may lose.
Because of sin, Adam lost what did not belong to human nature in the strict sense of the word, that is integritas, sanctitas, innocentia, iustitia. Liberum arbitrium, free will, was not taken away, but became weaker:
"…liberum arbitrium minime exstinctum…viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum… (DS 1521–Trid. Sess. VI, Decr. de Justificatione, C. 1).
Together with sin appears concupiscence and the inevitability of death:
“…primum hominem…cum mandatum Dei…fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse incurrisseque per offensam praevaricationis huismodi iram et indignationem Dei atque ideo mortem…et cum morte captivatatem sub eius potestate, qui ‘mortis’ deinde ‘habuit imperium’…‘totumque Adam per illam praevaricationis offensam secumdum corpous et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse…’” (DS 1511, Trid. Sess. V, Decr. de Pecc. Orig. 1).
Cf. Mysterium Salutis, II, Einsiedeln-Zuirch-Köln 1967, pp. 827-828; W. Seibel, “Der Mensch als Gottes übernatürliches Ebenbild und der Urstand des Menschen.”
For some reason he does not quote Humani Generis, #26 (DS 3891): “Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision.”
Although to my mind in the highlighted paragraph he affirms the same thing.
