Problem of Evil [2]: The Justice Defense

[Neithan]

[Continued from an intro to the Daylight Atheism essays.]

We saw in the first thread that the logical validity of this form of the PoE is suspect, not only because of the multiple premises but because of a suspicious hidden premise:
»Whatever would be aware of the existence of evil, would be able to eliminate evil, and would desire to eliminate evil, would have eliminated evil.«

Nevertheless, even if the logic isn’t as “iron-clad” as the atheist claims, the argument still has rhetorical persuasiveness. Why hasn’t God, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly loving, eliminated evil? The author serves up a number of theodicies. Do any of them work? The first is the Justice Defense.

The Justice Defense

The atheist does a deft bait-and-switch and swaps out “evil” for “suffer”; but sums up the defense: we suffer because we deserve it, because we are sinners. We are born in a fallen world of suffering because of original sin that we justly inherit.

Our atheist friend points out a few problems:

1. The uneven distribution, apparent randomness and the suffering of the innocent.
2. If suffering was truly just, why do we need courts and jails? There would be no need to inflict further punishment on the wicked if everyone received their just deserts.
3. The test of conscience: If suffering was just, we should never try to alleviate anyone’s suffering, because this would frustrate divinely ordered justice; but this conflicts with our conscience and morals.

Do we suffer because we deserve it? Is our suffering a just punishment?

 

[Abrosz]

Do we suffer because we deserve it? Is our suffering a just punishment?

What did the infants do to deserve the pain of teething?

 

[o_mlly]

Do we suffer because we deserve it? Is our suffering a just punishment?

Romans 5:1-5.

Sin, the source of all evil, spreads its effects widely, like ripples in the water. We are all sinners, no one is innocent, and share in suffering the effects of each others sin.

However, we are now in the middle of God’s plan. We know the ending will be good so we can endure today’s suffering as just one night in an inconvenient hotel, as St. Theresa put it.

To be united with God we must be both completely willing and holy. Perhaps the only way to be fully willing is to know evil and suffer because of it.

The so-called Justice Defense presumes the present state is the eternal state. We know it is not.

We accept suffering and know its source. We do not want to be the cause of an increase in suffering as that requires an increase in evil. We strive to mitigate the effects of evil just as God did and does through Jesus Christ.

Knowing that the source of suffering is the evil caused by sin, we also work to limit the sin of others. Punishment is medicinal. It’s primary purpose is to redress the disorder caused by the offense (EV p.56). The restoration of both the victim and the offender are the objects of punishment. For the the offender, punishment offers an incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.

 

[Neithan]

Is the pain of teething the same thing as suffering? According to Wikipedia (always the best source of information for anything and everything) suffering involves some “perception of harm or threat of harm in an individual.”

 

[Abrosz]

Is the pain of teething the same thing as suffering? According to Wikipedia (always the best source of information for anything and everything) suffering involves some “perception of harm or threat of harm in an individual.”

Wikipedia is not an authoritative resource for specialized knowledge. Suffering is extended pain. And what did the newborn do to deserve this “extended pain”.

 

[Neithan]

And what did the newborn do to deserve this “extended pain”.

If “deserve” is a measure of justice, but the infant is not a moral agent, it doesn’t seem to deserve anything. Or does it deserve pleasures and comforts instead?

 

[Neithan]

no one is innocent

Overall I gather that you’re arguing the Justice Defense fails because it is out of context i.e. it considers only facts about the present state.

But is it true that no one is innocent? Aren’t babies and very young children, and any person without the reasoning ability to discern morals innocent?

 

[0Scarlett_nidiyilii]

In Catholicism, suffering can be either deserved or undeserved.

 

[Magnanimity]

The uneven distribution, apparent randomness

This is probably the most powerful of the arguments. I think theists can adequately respond to (2) and (3) but not to the first part of (1). Atheist philosopher Jitendra Mohanty presented a type of this argument in a debate he did with Ravi Zacharias and W. L. Craig about 20 years ago. It was a powerful argument. Basically, it goes like this: whenever we suffer something that seems wholly out of proportion with other smaller sufferings that we all just tolerate (e.g., a child dying or being diagnosed with cancer) our natural reaction is phenomenological and existential–we ask, “why me?” to which the theist can offer no real answer.

There is no lawlike, universalizable statement that will satisfy 40 year old Paul who was diagnosed with terminal cancer that will most likely kill him within a year. “Why is this extreme suffering happening to me (and not someone else, or to no one else for that matter)?” This question quite naturally will plague Paul. And the theist cannot offer any real comfort besides the hope of Heaven, but the afterlife is ancillary to the question in the here-and-now. Paul wants to know the same question we would all want to know, if we were walking in his shoes. “Why can’t I grow old enough to see my grandchildren? Why is my life being cut short?”

This phenomenological/existential argument from extreme natural evil is indeed a tough one for theists to contend with. Certainly Craig and Zacharias didn’t deal well with the argument during the debate. I’m not sure there is a great theistic response here that can approach the level of “satisfactory.”

 

[Neithan]

I think theists can adequately respond to (2) and (3)

What would those responses be?

 

[Magnanimity]

If suffering was truly just, why do we need courts and jails?

Justice and safety are the purview of governments–they are literally the things that governments are supposed to be doing for societies. Courts/judges and jails go back to time immemorial for humanity. All ancient societies had them, as far as I’m aware. It’s the government’s way of attempting to enact justice in this world. So, I’m not quite sure what this objection is after…

The test of conscience: If suffering was just,

There are many avenues for addressing this. First, how is conscience universalizable (which it is), given naturalism? We’ll hear some inadequate explanation about “survival” in response and be left yawning…
Second, suffering seems to be embedded within the very fabric of this present reality (one must “suffer” to become great at many things–to be a moral exemplar, to be a professional athlete, to be an academic, to be be an orchestral musician, to be patient, etc). But, who said anything about “justice?” Suffering is “just?” According to what/whom? Suffering is “the way it is,” and the atheist and the theist alike have to contend with our universal repulsion to it. Whose worldview more adequately accounts for our phenomenological reaction to suffering? I think that’s the question.

we should never try to alleviate anyone’s suffering, because this would frustrate divinely ordered justice; but this conflicts with our conscience and morals.

Suffering is not always a “good” but sometimes suffering can lead to a greater good. And I’m not always in a position to know which is which. If I perceive that my friend is suffering and I offer to help her and she refuses, what then? I’ve done my moral duty, right? My job is to offer to help alleviate suffering, not to ensure that I make the suffering go away at whatever cost.

 

[Neithan]

So, I’m not quite sure what this objection is after…

I think I see what you’re saying. If all suffering is just, then any suffering we cause each other is just. But on the other hand, if a Christian really believes this, that everyone receives the suffering they deserve in the providence of God, do we need to mete out any punishment according to our own laws? That would seem wholly unnecessary and superfluous.

As for 3. it seems that you’re saying it’s not justice but there’s some other defense, such as the greater good. I think that could work for 1. too, though it’s vague (I’d like to discuss those defenses in other discussion threads eventually, but they’re all part of the essay).

 

[Wesrock]

I’ve not used the justice argument, but I imagine to use it one must have a notion of humankind as a communal family which shares common burden, such that a nation can be judged and punishment applied to the whole. The very individualist thinking that emerged from Enlightenment philosophy would seem anti-thetical to the notion.

 

[Neithan]

The very individualist thinking that emerged from Enlightenment philosophy would seem anti-thetical to the notion.

Because that could include the slaughter of innocents, it feels repugnant to my ethical sense as well; but I was of course educated in our post-Enlightenment West. I can’t accept that God literally and positively willed the Israelites to slaughter Amalekite babies for example. I posted about it a while back.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

The very individualist thinking that emerged from Enlightenment philosophy would seem anti-thetical to the notion.

Because that could include the slaughter of innocents, it feels repugnant to my ethical sense as well; but I was of course educated in our post-Enlightenment West. I can’t accept that God literally and positively willed the Israelites to slaughter Amalekite babies for example. [I [posted](Did God order Israelites to kill babies?) it about it a while back.]

I would have to think that if justice can be visited on a nation for that nation’s communal sins that such judgment is worldly/temporal only, and that eternal judgment would be evaluated individually. That seems consistent with views from antiquity. That gets us into another one of the arguments the atheist blogger objected to.

My comments here are just conversational and speculative, not developed arguments.

 

[Neithan]

I think the insurmountable problem for me on that course is that God is commanding a moral creature to commit a grave sin but for the ordinance of God. That would be justified divine command theory and easily skewered on a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.

 

[Wesrock]

I think the insurmountable problem for me on that course is that God is commanding a moral creature to commit a grave sin but for the ordinance of God. That would be justified divine command theory and easily skewered on a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.

I think you can allow for divine commands that exist under a natural law theory, but that should be its own topic, unless you think it fits into this theodicy.

There are also other approaches that even Church Fathers in antiquity takes to those stories in the Bible, anyway.

 

[Neithan]

I think you can allow for divine commands that exist under a natural law theory, but that should be its own topic, unless you think it fits into this theodicy.

Interesting (and disturbing tbh since we’re talking about slaughtering innocents). Without getting into the details, could that amount to a vindication of the Justice Defense?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

I think you can allow for divine commands that exist under a natural law theory, but that should be its own topic, unless you think it fits into this theodicy.

Interesting (and disturbing tbh since we’re talking about slaughtering innocents). Without getting into the details, could that amount to a vindication of the Justice Defense?

I haven’t really spent a lot of time considering the justice theodicy, and I am a real believer that a theodicy according to natural law as I sketched in your original topic is sufficient to respond to the problem. The idea of justice, then, becomes a secondary consideration that isn’t so much about resolving the alleged contradiction. Instead it provides additional reasoning why (even in the absence of contradiction) reality was made with suffering instead of without.

I’m hemming and hawing a bit. I suppose it could be part of a vindication of a justice theodicy, but you couldn’t do it without also providing convincing justification for communal judgment.

That’s my take.

Edit: Upon more reflection, I personally don’t feel it’s fully salvageable. It seems to rely on some intuitive suppositions which really need to be rationally laid out. It seems at best a supporting addendum, as I originally said, but it doesn’t in itself answer some fundamental questions.

 

[Magnanimity]

that everyone receives the suffering they deserve in the providence of God, do we need to mete out any punishment according to our own laws? That would seem wholly unnecessary and superfluous.

Natural evil is a waaaay bigger deal than many Christians admit. Not moral evil but all the evils that befall us through the course of our lives that make us ask “why?”

Because that could include the slaughter of innocents, it feels repugnant to my ethical sense as well

It should. And @Wesrock is correct, for a millennium and a half, the Eastern and Western church read the OT allegorically and spiritually. It’s only Modernity that ushered in a simplistic literalism—a just-so reading of “history” in those OT passages.