Questions on Stanford Encyclopedia's entry on "Other Minds"

[Ben_Sinner]

I was wondering if there was anything to refute that no philosophy of mind can “remove” the problem of other minds or make it “easier” to. Claims that the SE make.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/#3.2

…it has been argued that the problem cannot be removed, nor can it be made easier to solve, by embracing any particular philosophy of mind.

**This is written in a very academic style, so it’s hard for me to fully understand some of the paragraphs. What is meant by the following paragraph here?
**
Any theory of mind is a general theory, so is a theory of minds (or, in the case of eliminative materialism, their non-existence). So it has to embrace minds wherever they are found, or fail to be found. So it has to cover all human beings, oneself and others.

As well as this?

But how does the theorist know that minds exist, or do not exist? The theory is to hold of minds in general, to be inclusive of other hunan beings in particular, so it cannot legitimately be used to justify the claim that those other minds do, in fact, exist. That the theory is a true theory depends on some independent justification that such minds exist. To take a specific theory of mind: to argue that functionalism makes the other minds problem straightforwardly soluble is unacceptable. Functionalism cannot be known to hold of minds in general unless it holds of other minds and that cannot be known unless those minds have been shown to exist.

 

[PseuTonym]

What is meant by the following paragraph here?

Any theory of mind is a general theory …]

If you do a case study of your own mind, and you don’t study any other minds, then the author claims that your case study doesn’t merit the label “general theory” because it is based on only one specific case: your mind.

…] so is a theory of minds

In other words, if you develop a general theory of mind, then the generalizations are based on study of at least two examples. You would have to observe your own mind and at least one other mind. That way, your generalizations are based on observation of at least two cases.

…] (or, in the case of eliminative materialism, their non-existence).

In other words, eliminative materialism denies that there are any minds, and to avoid being dogmatic we accept eliminative materialism as a theory of mind. So a general theory of mind is a theory of at least two minds, or a theory of zero minds.

So it has to embrace minds wherever they are found, or fail to be found. So it has to cover all human beings, oneself and others.

Now the author is saying that two minds wouldn’t be enough. A general theory of mind explains the minds of all human beings. The author also uses the phrase “oneself and others”, making explicit what was earlier hinted at.

As well as this?

But how does the theorist know that minds exist, or do not exist? The theory is to hold of minds in general, to be inclusive of other human beings in particular, so it cannot legitimately be used to justify the claim that those other minds do, in fact, exist. That the theory is a true theory depends on some independent justification that such minds exist. To take a specific theory of mind: to argue that functionalism makes the other minds problem straightforwardly soluble is unacceptable. Functionalism cannot be known to hold of minds in general unless it holds of other minds and that cannot be known unless those minds have been shown to exist.

Focus on the final sentence:
If you know that functionalism is an accurate portrayal of your own mind, but you don’t know that functionalism is an accurate portrayal of the minds of other people, then you don’t know that functionalism is a true theory of minds in general. Now, you have to know that other minds exist, before you can know that functionalism is an accurate portrayal of other minds.

This paragraph about functionalism may help:

Another theory of mind, functionalism, would seem to accept that there is a problem of other minds but one which presents little difficulty. Mental states are conceived of as inner states which are the means by which an organism responds to its surroundings. The different mental states are characterized by their various roles, their typical causes and effects. They are in this way alone distinguished one from another. So a burning pain is that inner state typically caused by being burned and typically leading to wincing and crying out and such like behavior. It follows that all that is required to reach the conclusion that other human beings have such inner states is merely careful observation of how they behave and in what circumstances.

The inner mental state of pain that you experience is always your own pain experienced in your own mind. The problem is that you are only one case. Functionalism involves a relationship involving three entities: cause in the surroundings, inner state, and behavior. The weak point is the inner state. If you try to generalize based on your own inner state, then you are basing your generalizations on only one case: your own mental state.

 

[Ben_Sinner]

Now the author is saying that two minds wouldn’t be enough. A general theory of mind explains the minds of all human beings. The author also uses the phrase “oneself and others”, making explicit what was earlier hinted at.

Why wouldn’t two be enough? Why would one need to prove all people’s minds exist?

It seems contradictory to say that proving only one person other than yourself has a mind doesn’t solve the problem that other minds than your own exist…well they do, because there is one person other than yourself that has one.

One only needs to prove that there are at least two people who have minds in order to conquer the problem of other minds. What if there are only two people in existence? That would be all minds, right?

I find this confusing.

 

[PseuTonym]

One only needs to prove that there are at least two people who have minds in order to conquer the problem of other minds. What if there are only two people in existence? That would be all minds, right?

Are we still talking about the text, or is that a question for me to answer without necessarily considering the text?

The first thought that comes to mind is:

You could rely upon an abstract proof that God exists and that God has a mind. God is a person, you are the other person, and those are the only two minds. We might put the label “monotheistic solipsism” on that view.

 

[Ben_Sinner]

Are we still talking about the text, or is that a question for me to answer without necessarily considering the text?

The first thought that comes to mind is:

You could rely upon an abstract proof that God exists and that God has a mind. God is a person, you are the other person, and those are the only two minds. We might put the label “monotheistic solipsism” on that view.

I’m still talking about the text.