Realism/Moderate Realism - the Implications

[KevJohn]

Hi All,
Kevjohn here! I am doing some basic reading in Philosophy, and had always known that the implications of the so-called ‘critical problem’ are wide-ranging. If - and of course for us it is not an if to which we subscribe - we cannot know anything for certain, what chance have we of building a solid ethic or philosophical anthropology. Thankfully I am neither Cartesian nor Kantian, but this brings me to my question.

I am looking now at the problem of universals, and whilst I am fairly comfortable with the basics of the various positions, the penny isn’t fully on the ground yet regarding the *implications *. I have a vague notion that nominalism would prevent the development of a robust ethic on the grounds that it would be impossible to say that man should live a certain way without subscribing to the possibility of abstract definition of what man is. But with exagerrated or moderate realism I am not so sure what the ethical implications of each are. I fully expect that the penny will drop on further reflection, but I am interested to get some thoughts.

So, the short version of these paragraphs is:
If you were speaking with someone who is not interested in the problem, how would you outline its implications in ethical terms? What does the problem - and your preferred solution to it - mean for what we can say about how we should live?

Thank you all, Kevjohn
Blessed Be Jesus
PS I am going to be in the city of Aberdeen for two days so if there are any replies before then I will not be able to comment until I have returned to Glasgow

 

[Shike]

Hi All,
So, the short version of these paragraphs is:
If you were speaking with someone who is not interested in the problem, how would you outline its implications in ethical terms? What does the problem - and your preferred solution to it - mean for what we can say about how we should live?

Thank you for giving both paragraphs, it made your question a lot easier for me to understand.

My first thoughts (not suitable to someone without a decent background in philosophy): nominalism → no objective essences → no final causality → no natural law ethics.

To a layman: nominalism entails that someone can’t come up with an objective ethics that includes information about what it means to be a human being!
Solution to a layman: Don’t you think human ethics should take into account that other human beings are human?

Philosophical side note 1: even the egoist realizes he is not the only person (one would hope) in existence and takes other people into account in his ethics. Of course, the egoist doesn’t give much value to other people, but he does give them some kind of value. And if that value isn’t to be completely arbitrary then he has to be able to know what those other people are, namely other human beings. If nominalism is true, then logically, he cannot do that with any air of objectivity. Of course, I suppose the egoist wouldn’t care either way.

Philosophical side note 2: even ethics that are supposedly deontological such as Kant’s aren’t able to be arrived at. For instance, his second categorical imperative talks about human beings as ends-in-themselves… how can he know that if nominalism is true? More interestingly, how can he even know that if his doctrine of phenomena and noumena are true?

Ethics is an area that I have trouble with in discussing to laymen and giving them more than “isn’t it just obvious that you should really try to love others!!!” Otherwise I would start talking about natural law and how much it is based in reason… which could just produce the glazed-eyes look if I didn’t go sufficiently slow and get so excited that I jump around all over the place and don’t make sense.

Did that give some sort of acceptable answer? At least somewhat understandable?

Ciao,
Michael

 

[Jonesboy]

Hi All,
Kevjohn here! I am doing some basic reading in Philosophy, and had always known that the implications of the so-called ‘critical problem’ are wide-ranging. If - and of course for us it is not an if to which we subscribe - we cannot know anything for certain, what chance have we of building a solid ethic or philosophical anthropology. Thankfully I am neither Cartesian nor Kantian, but this brings me to my question.

I am looking now at the problem of universals, and whilst I am fairly comfortable with the basics of the various positions, the penny isn’t fully on the ground yet regarding the *implications *. I have a vague notion that nominalism would prevent the development of a robust ethic on the grounds that it would be impossible to say that man should live a certain way without subscribing to the possibility of abstract definition of what man is. But with exagerrated or moderate realism I am not so sure what the ethical implications of each are. I fully expect that the penny will drop on further reflection, but I am interested to get some thoughts.

So, the short version of these paragraphs is:
If you were speaking with someone who is not interested in the problem, how would you outline its implications in ethical terms? What does the problem - and your preferred solution to it - mean for what we can say about how we should live?

Thank you all, Kevjohn
Blessed Be Jesus
PS I am going to be in the city of Aberdeen for two days so if there are any replies before then I will not be able to comment until I have returned to Glasgow

That man “should” live a certain way is cart before horse - an attempt to empower the elements listed as Man to usurp their own identifying condition, which is Man.

Transcendental conditions are a key to understanding ethics and Kant and Wittgenstein are the boys to look to.

 

[DPMartin]

Hi All,
Kevjohn here! I am doing some basic reading in Philosophy, and had always known that the implications of the so-called ‘critical problem’ are wide-ranging. If - and of course for us it is not an if to which we subscribe - we cannot know anything for certain, what chance have we of building a solid ethic or philosophical anthropology. Thankfully I am neither Cartesian nor Kantian, but this brings me to my question.

I am looking now at the problem of universals, and whilst I am fairly comfortable with the basics of the various positions, the penny isn’t fully on the ground yet regarding the *implications *. I have a vague notion that nominalism would prevent the development of a robust ethic on the grounds that it would be impossible to say that man should live a certain way without subscribing to the possibility of abstract definition of what man is. But with exagerrated or moderate realism I am not so sure what the ethical implications of each are. I fully expect that the penny will drop on further reflection, but I am interested to get some thoughts.

So, the short version of these paragraphs is:
If you were speaking with someone who is not interested in the problem, how would you outline its implications in ethical terms? What does the problem - and your preferred solution to it - mean for what we can say about how we should live?

Thank you all, Kevjohn
Blessed Be Jesus
PS I am going to be in the city of Aberdeen for two days so if there are any replies before then I will not be able to comment until I have returned to Glasgow

Kevjohn

It is very simple:

If there is a way that man shouldn’t live, of which anybody would agree, then there is a Way man should live.

Where that knowledge comes from is according to who wants what, to get what result.

Men follow their want, to get result. Therefore, what does God want to get what result?

 

[Shike]

Kevjohn
If there is a way that man shouldn’t live, of which anybody would agree, then there is a Way man should live.

The first time I read this I agreed.
Now a few days later I read this and realized just how great and simple this truth is… and how it fits into some of my other findings in the field of ethics.

Thank you.

ciao,
Michael

 

[Jonesboy]

The first time I read this I agreed.
Now a few days later I read this and realized just how great and simple this truth is… and how it fits into some of my other findings in the field of ethics.

Thank you.

ciao,
Michael

The particulars of how we should or shouldn’t live, or of “if anything goes” don’t identify Man. Man identifies the particulars.

So ethical considerations are made after the fact of Man. We can’t look at the particulars as ethical sources. That’s why I said cart before horse.

 

[Shike]

The particulars of how we should or shouldn’t live, or of “if anything goes” don’t identify Man. Man identifies the particulars.

So ethical considerations are made after the fact of Man. We can’t look at the particulars as ethical sources. That’s why I said cart before horse.

His comment can be used as tool to help refute moral relativism. It isn’t meant to start at foundations, but is only used after certain assumptions are made.

 

[KevJohn]

Hello everybody!
Thanks for being responsive. Sadly I have not been able to reciprocate. Until now!

Did that give some sort of acceptable answer? At least somewhat understandable?

Ciao,
Michael

Thanks Michael, this a more than adequate confirmation of my suspicions as to the ethical implications of nominalism. Do you think that there are significant differences in the ethical implications of ultra-realism and moderate realism? Given the ostensibly diminished significance that Plato ascribes to the material world, for example, is it possible that one could develop an argument that subordinates person A to person B’s pursuit of the abstract universal? Just a small thought experiment rather than an insinuation that any ultra-realist actually argues this.

Thank you DP Martin for the incisive comment, which is very true. However I am looking for ways to connect this with the problem of universals, Do you have any ideas? Perhaps this does connect it with the problem and I just haven’t twigged, in which case forgive me!

And thanks Jonesboy but I am content with a natural law approach to ethics, wherein man is subject to universal ethics and not the other way around. Both the cart and the horse are at the behest of the cart-maker. I will leave Kant and Wittgenstein aside and listen to the Magisterium and the Tradition. Thanks
Thank you all!
Blessed be Jesus!
Kevjohn

 

[KevJohn]

one more thought here, though perhaps moving in a slightly different direction. If St Augustine is right, and the mind comes to certainty of eternal truths through divine illumination, what does this imply for the ethical culpability of one who has not received this illumination? I think this would be related to the OP
I think i am touching on the problem of Fr De Lubac in Le Surnaturel, of where nature ends and grace begins, and to what extent nature alone affords us the capability to determine truth, but I am not qualified to give an answer to this. I would welcome any thoughts,and would welcome them being kept to the point in hand.
Blessed be Jesus!

 

[Shike]

Hello everybody!]
Do you think that there are significant differences in the ethical implications of ultra-realism and moderate realism? Given the ostensibly diminished significance that Plato ascribes to the material world, for example, is it possible that one could develop an argument that subordinates person A to person B’s pursuit of the abstract universal? Just a small thought experiment rather than an insinuation that any ultra-realist actually argues this.

You know, I’ve never thought about this before. I’d just say that ultra-realism isn’t supportable because of problems like the 3rd man objection and that you don’t get ultra-realism when you ground your philosophy in experience (you get hylemorphism).

But to answer your question… I don’t really think the implications would be all that different. I assume that you are still dealing with the same universals (for instance, truths about humanity) whether on a moderate-realist or ultra-realist account. The main difference with ultra-realism seems that essences are separate beings… but we would still participate in those separate beings, so it would seem that the ethical conclusions would be very similar if not identical. I don’t know for sure.

Good question!

Ciao,
Michael

 

[Shike]

If St Augustine is right, and the mind comes to certainty of eternal truths through divine illumination, what does this imply for the ethical culpability of one who has not received this illumination?

Sounds like I could translate this into natural law terminology and answer your question (you decide if it matches). Would someone be morally culpable if they didn’t know that something was wrong? Answer: it depends whether or not the person was at one time aware of the moral principle in question. Aristotle talks about two kinds of ignorance with regards to moral principles. One type is when the moral principle is not there to begin with. The other type is when, through habituation of vice, your conscience no longer bothers you. It doesn’t seem like those with the first type of ignorance would be morally responsible while the second type would be (though to what degree is debatable).

Basically, why not think everyone receives “Divine illumination” and are aware of the general precepts of natural law, at least before habituation through vice? If memory serves, Aristotle said that someone can’t be totally ignorant of general moral principles. That means, if someone uses their noggin, they could figure out the general moral principle in question even though their conscience didn’t bother them through habitual vice.

Hmm.