Revisiting the Argument from Motion

[Al_Moritz]

Fr. Barron:

thebostonpilot.com/articleprint.asp?id=172206

 

[Bakmoon]

I personally think that the argument from motion hasn’t fared well over time. The argument makes a lot of assumptions about the nature of change and causation that I don’t think most people would accept any more and I have not yet seen any real argumentation to back up these assumptions.

I’d be very much interested in seeing a modern fully expanded and clarified argument from motion that addresses these concerns but I have yet to see any yet. If anyone can link to a detailed presentation of such an argument I’d be very grateful.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Fr. Barron:

thebostonpilot.com/articleprint.asp?id=172206

Thanks Al.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I personally think that the argument from motion hasn’t fared well over time. The argument makes a lot of assumptions about the nature of change and causation that I don’t think most people would accept any more and I have not yet seen any real argumentation to back up these assumptions.

I’d be very much interested in seeing a modern fully expanded and clarified argument from motion that addresses these concerns but I have yet to see any yet. If anyone can link to a detailed presentation of such an argument I’d be very grateful.

Why don’t you tell us exactly what you are objecting to.

Linus2nd

 

[Bakmoon]

Why don’t you tell us exactly what you are objecting to.

Linus2nd

I’m not so much objecting to the argument as saying that the argument for it given in the Summa Theologica is a very short argument written in a time when Aristotelian causality was generally accepted.

In modern times however, many people do not accept Aristotelian causality, and so for much of the argument to work, either the controversial points must be demonstrated or the argument needs to be rephrased in a way that isn’t as controversial.

Furthermore his argument in the Summa doesn’t actually give a full demonstration on the impossibility of a chain of causes being infinite. All his argument actually says is:

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first
mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.

When the Summa was written this particular point didn’t need a comprehensive discussion as everyone already accepted Aristotle’s position that an infinite chain of motion was impossible, but since Aristotelian causation has become less accepted, this point has become much more controversial.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ argument from motion as presented in the Summa Theologica was a very good argument at the time, but as these points have become more controversial, they now require detailed demonstrations.

 

[TarkanAttila]

When the Summa was written this particular point didn’t need a comprehensive discussion as everyone already accepted Aristotle’s position that an infinite chain of motion was impossible, but since Aristotelian causation has become less accepted, this point has become much more controversial.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ argument from motion as presented in the Summa Theologica was a very good argument at the time, but as these points have become more controversial, they now require detailed demonstrations.

…what is there to dispute? An infinite chain is not possible. Even if it were an ever-cycling loop, as some Hindus teach, one begins drawing a loop somewhere.

Whereas, if time were an infinite track into the past, the trouble is, there could be no first motion. Time as we understand it could not exist, because such time depends on cause and effect, which depends on the finiteness of time not only of each individual action but also of the whole.

And number lines are not effective counter-examples, because numbers are theoretical. Not all numbers describe real things. For example, negative numbers. There is no such thing, really, as -10 apples. There also is no such thing - in nature anyway - as infinity, for the universe is finite. There’s also not really a “zero” in nature, either, for nothing is not-a-thing.

SO…

Aristotelian causality still seems pretty solid to me. Self-explanatory. Obvious.

 

[Bakmoon]

…what is there to dispute? An infinite chain is not possible. Even if it were an ever-cycling loop, as some Hindus teach, one begins drawing a loop somewhere.

Whereas, if time were an infinite track into the past, the trouble is, there could be no first motion. Time as we understand it could not exist, because such time depends on cause and effect, which depends on the finiteness of time not only of each individual action but also of the whole.

First of all, Aristotelian causality does NOT demand that the universe have a beginning. Aristotle thought that the universe extended infinitely into the past, and Aquinas himself was of the opinion that an eternally existing universe was not contrary to reason (although he did believe that it was contrary to divine revelation)

Aquinas’ argument from motion in fact has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of causes extending infinitely into the past. Aquinas is specifically interested in the case of an infinite chain of causation all occurring in the present. This is actually another problem I have with his argument as the whole argument assumes that causes and effects occur simultaneously.

Aristotelian causality still seems pretty solid to me. Self-explanatory. Obvious.

That’s just an assertion though. If a premise of an argument is disputed in debate you aren’t going to convince the other side to accept it just by saying that it’s obvious. If it truly is a self-evident statement then it should be easy to demonstrate.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

Furthermore his argument in the Summa doesn’t actually give a full demonstration on the impossibility of a chain of causes being infinite. All his argument actually says is:

When the Summa was written this particular point didn’t need a comprehensive discussion as everyone already accepted Aristotle’s position that an infinite chain of motion was impossible, but since Aristotelian causation has become less accepted, this point has become much more controversial.

St. Thomas Aquinas’ argument from motion as presented in the Summa Theologica was a very good argument at the time, but as these points have become more controversial, they now require detailed demonstrations.

A brief explanation: Think of this as saying that there must be an actual, final explanation for the movement, that is, that the question why is it moving has an answer.

I’m a math nerd, so I’m going to reduce it to a logical implication problem using letters and numbers and things. The crux of this argument is the same as that of the first cause infinite chain thing. If we use letters A0, A1, A2, … then if the movement of object 1 implies the movement of object 0, and the movement of object 2 implies the movement of object 1, etc, then the infinite chain can be written:

A0<=A1<=A2<=…

And this chain, by itself, simply does not prove that A0 actually holds. St. Thomas gives a brief explanation: the first implication only tells us A0 is true IF we know that A1 is true. But we don’t know that A1 is true. We only know that A1 is true IF A2 is true. And we also don’t know that A2 is true, only that it is if A3 is true, etc. We never arrive at any particular An being true. It’s like having an infinitely long chain of dominoes, but they are set to fall towards the start point. That’s great, but unless you actually know that one fell somewhere in that chain, you don’t know that the start point has fallen over.

But the best way to show that a proof technique fails is to give a counter example. If infinite chains were (by themselves) valid tool for proving their end (start, whatever) point, then we could prove 1=0:

Let A0 be 1=0, A1 be 2=1, A2 be 3=2, etc. Then clearly A0<=A1, (subtract one from each side), as well as A1 <= A2. Each statement An is false, but that doesn’t actually matter - if A1 were true, then A0 would have to be, likewise if A2 were true, then A1 would have to be, etc. So the implications are valid. Extend this indefinitely and we get the infinite chain:

A0<=A1<=A2<=A3<=…

Where every single implication is perfectly valid, but every single statement (including A0) is false. Therefore a valid infinite chain (of this type) does not prove anything by itself, or essentially even if A0 is true, this chain does not explain why that is because by itself it cannot prove that A0 is true, and so it fails to answer the question.

And this is why these infinite chains to do not explain things. (As a matter of interest, this sort of thing can be extended to infinite ordinals beyond omega (‘small’ infinity), where A0<=A1<=A2<=A3<=…<=Aomega, but if that is done this is actually equivalent to an infinite number of finite chains, and in order for it to prove A0, we still need at least one element known to be true (which could be Aomega or some other element.)

 

[TarkanAttila]

First of all, Aristotelian causality does NOT demand that the universe have a beginning.

True. The universe always existed in his conception. He was a pantheist. God is just moving it a logical step backwards, recognising the universe is not completely actual.

Aquinas’ argument from motion in fact has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of causes extending infinitely into the past. Aquinas is specifically interested in the case of an infinite chain of causation all occurring in the present.

You do realise causation exists not only in space but also in time, right?

I do not understand what your commente means. I understand causality as looking something like this: …Abe, born in 1902, begot Benjamin (1933) begot Carlos (1956) begot Dietrich (1977) who begot Edward (1992) who became a monk and died childless.

What are you trying to say?

Or perhaps I am conflating motion with causation? (Though I cannot see much difference, TBH, even in Aquinas. )

That’s just an assertion though.

Clearly. Or else I would have no need to say it.

If a premise of an argument is disputed in debate you aren’t going to convince the other side to accept it just by saying that it’s obvious. If it truly is a self-evident statement then it should be easy to demonstrate.

It is. I just did.

 

[Bakmoon]

A brief explanation: Think of this as saying that there must be an actual, final explanation for the movement, that is, that the question why is it moving has an answer.

I’m a math nerd, so I’m going to reduce it to a logical implication problem using letters and numbers and things. The crux of this argument is the same as that of the first cause infinite chain thing. If we use letters A0, A1, A2, … then if the movement of object 1 implies the movement of object 0, and the movement of object 2 implies the movement of object 1, etc, then the infinite chain can be written:

A0<=A1<=A2<=…

And this chain, by itself, simply does not prove that A0 actually holds. St. Thomas gives a brief explanation: the first implication only tells us A0 is true IF we know that A1 is true. But we don’t know that A1 is true. We only know that A1 is true IF A2 is true. And we also don’t know that A2 is true, only that it is if A3 is true, etc. We never arrive at any particular An being true. It’s like having an infinitely long chain of dominoes, but they are set to fall towards the start point. That’s great, but unless you actually know that one fell somewhere in that chain, you don’t know that the start point has fallen over.

But the best way to show that a proof technique fails is to give a counter example. If infinite chains were (by themselves) valid tool for proving their end (start, whatever) point, then we could prove 1=0:

Let A0 be 1=0, A1 be 2=1, A2 be 3=2, etc. Then clearly A0<=A1, (subtract one from each side), as well as A1 <= A2. Each statement An is false, but that doesn’t actually matter - if A1 were true, then A0 would have to be, likewise if A2 were true, then A1 would have to be, etc. So the implications are valid. Extend this indefinitely and we get the infinite chain:

A0<=A1<=A2<=A3<=…

Where every single implication is perfectly valid, but every single statement (including A0) is false. Therefore a valid infinite chain (of this type) does not prove anything by itself, or essentially even if A0 is true, this chain does not explain why that is because by itself it cannot prove that A0 is true, and so it fails to answer the question.

And this is why these infinite chains to do not explain things. (As a matter of interest, this sort of thing can be extended to infinite ordinals beyond omega (‘small’ infinity), where A0<=A1<=A2<=A3<=…<=Aomega, but if that is done this is actually equivalent to an infinite number of finite chains, and in order for it to prove A0, we still need at least one element known to be true (which could be Aomega or some other element.)

There are problems with that kind of analogy though. In the case of an infinite chain of propositions which give logical implication, the actual truth value of the term A1 is not yet known, and the same is true for A2, A3, etc…

Causality doesn’t work quite like that however. If event A0 is caused by event A1 which is caused by A2 and we are not yet certain what caused A2, that doesn’t prevent us from concluding that A0 was in fact caused. We cannot do the same thing with a chain of statements linked by logical implication though.

This is one of the main reasons why philosophers prefer not to put their arguments in the form of analogies, because it is always a hairy matter to try to give a logical demonstration of something through analogy. Most prefer to use syllogistic reasoning and then use an example as a purely illustrative means.

 

[Bakmoon]

True. The universe always existed in his conception. He was a pantheist. God is just moving it a logical step backwards, recognising the universe is not completely actual.

Aristotle was not a pantheist, but a polytheist. He believed that the universe extends infinitely into the past, but also that there is at least one unmoved mover which is constantly imparting motion into the universe. Aristotle identifies this unmoved mover with the celestial spheres.

You do realise causation exists not only in space but also in time, right?

Yes, I do. The reason why I bring up this issue is that Aquinas specifically is referring to an infinite chain of causation occurring simultaneously as being impossible. Aquinas doesn’t address the case of a causal chain occurring through time in the argument from motion so it’s not relevant.

I do not understand what your commente means. I understand causality as looking something like this: …Abe, born in 1902, begot Benjamin (1933) begot Carlos (1956) begot Dietrich (1977) who begot Edward (1992) who became a monk and died childless.

What are you trying to say?

That is a kind of causation, but that is an example of a past cause creating a future result, which is not actually the kind of causation which Aquinas is talking about in the argument from motion.

Or perhaps I am conflating motion with causation? (Though I cannot see much difference, TBH, even in Aquinas. )

In Aristotelian terminology (which is what Aquinas is using) the term motion refers to any kind of change. It refers to something moving from a state of potentiality into actuality as the result of another thing already possessing actuality acting upon it. So for example in Aristotelian physics, when I light a candle with a match, the lit match is in a state of actuality of fire, and it moves the candle from a potentiality of fire into an actuality of fire. Aristotelianism treats all kinds of change as a movement from potentiality to actuality, so change is simply called motion.

If a premise of an argument is disputed in debate you aren’t going to convince the other side to accept it just by saying that it’s obvious. If it truly is a self-evident statement then it should be easy to demonstrate.

It is. I just did.

The point in controversy is the statement that a causal chain cannot extend infinitely backwards. What you said was:

…what is there to dispute? An infinite chain is not possible. Even if it were an ever-cycling loop, as some Hindus teach, one begins drawing a loop somewhere.

Whereas, if time were an infinite track into the past, the trouble is, there could be no first motion. Time as we understand it could not exist, because such time depends on cause and effect, which depends on the finiteness of time not only of each individual action but also of the whole.

That’s not a demonstration of the disputed point. It’s just rephrasing it and giving an illustration or two. What I mean by a demonstration is giving something like a series of valid syllogisms with premises which are held in common and which conclude saying “…Therefore an infinite regress of causes is not possible.”

 

[Linusthe2nd]

First of all, Aristotelian causality does NOT demand that the universe have a beginning. Aristotle thought that the universe extended infinitely into the past, and Aquinas himself was of the opinion that an eternally existing universe was not contrary to reason (although he did believe that it was contrary to divine revelation)

Let’s be exact. Although Aristotle believed in an eternal universe, he argued that all motion and changes in the sublunar world was caused by the Celestial Spheres above it and that these were moved by the wish or desire ( he thought the spheres had intelligent forms or souls ) to be perfect as the Unmoved Mover was perfect. However, the action of the Spheres on the Sublunar, imperfect world did not extend to creation. So even the Sublunar world was eternal.

However, Thomas did not follow Aristotle slavishly. For example he argues that, in the case of an eternal universe, there is an eternal creation from nothing but not in time. So for Thomas, the Unmoved Mover moves both as an efficient first cause and as a final cause.

Aquinas’ argument from motion in fact has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of causes extending infinitely into the past. Aquinas is specifically interested in the case of an infinite chain of causation all occurring in the present.

That is correct.

This is actually another problem I have with his argument as the whole argument assumes that causes and effects occur simultaneously.

How so? For it is clear that some causes are not simultaneous with the effect. But when the power of the agent cause, having passed through all the instrumental or secondary causes, reaches the effect, the power of the cause and the effect are certainly simultaneous.

That’s just an assertion though. If a premise of an argument is disputed in debate you aren’t going to convince the other side to accept it just by saying that it’s obvious. If it truly is a self-evident statement then it should be easy to demonstrate.

Thomas is demonstrating by logical argument based on observation of moving/changing things. As far as the validity of cause and effect, he depends on Aristotle. So one would have to at least read Thomas’ commentaries on these works.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Aristotle was not a pantheist, but a polytheist. He believed that the universe extends infinitely into the past, but also that there is at least one unmoved mover which is constantly imparting motion into the universe. Aristotle identifies this unmoved mover with the celestial spheres.

Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover does not impart motion. He moves the universe by being a desired final cause, not an efficient cause. In fact, A’s Unmoved Mover does nothing but reflect upon its own perfections, it does not communicate with the universe beneath him.

Also, Aristotle does not identify the Unmoved Mover with the Celestial Spheres, they are entirely separate entities.

That’s not a demonstration of the disputed point. It’s just rephrasing it and giving an illustration or two. What I mean by a demonstration is giving something like a series of valid syllogisms with premises which are held in common and which conclude saying “…Therefore an infinite regress of causes is not possible.”

You will have to read Thomas’ Commentaries on A’s Physics and Metaphysics for that. You can read these as well as we can: dhspriory.org/thomas/

Linus2nd

 

[Iron_Donkey]

There are problems with that kind of analogy though. In the case of an infinite chain of propositions which give logical implication, the actual truth value of the term A1 is not yet known, and the same is true for A2, A3, etc…

Causality doesn’t work quite like that however. If event A0 is caused by event A1 which is caused by A2 and we are not yet certain what caused A2, that doesn’t prevent us from concluding that A0 was in fact caused. We cannot do the same thing with a chain of statements linked by logical implication though.

This is one of the main reasons why philosophers prefer not to put their arguments in the form of analogies, because it is always a hairy matter to try to give a logical demonstration of something through analogy. Most prefer to use syllogistic reasoning and then use an example as a purely illustrative means.

Yes and no. The problem is that the approach you describe is simply looking at proximate causes going backwards one at a time, and you are correct that there is no reason why that chain cannot go on forever. I could say that 1=1 because 2=2 because 3=3 because… and I would never say anything false. I just wouldn’t explain why 1=1 either. (I don’t actually consider this to be an analogy, but rather a subclass of the things which are true, which is applicable, since we are talking about, more or less, all the things, but if you wanted to find a non math example, you could say that the state of the sun is a direct consequence of the state of the sun one second ago, which is a direct consequence of the state of the sun 1+1/2 seconds ago, which is a direct consequence of the sun 1+1/2+1/4 seconds ago, etc, and since those times converge to 2, you’d have an actual infinite chain of things, where each previous step could be used to explain the step that follows, but which clearly fails to fully explain why the sun is the way it is. Except that physics isn’t entirely deterministic, but that’s just a detail, the point is that there is no philosophical reason why you couldn’t do that.)

So again, it’s not that the chain can’t go on forever. It’s that that doesn’t address the actual question. The question was not “keep looking back in time for reasons why things are the way they are”. The question is what is the ultimate reason that things are the way they are.

In the math example, saying that the infinite chain completely explained while 1=1 would get you zero points on the exam, even if you pointed out that you knew that 3=3 but just weren’t sure why that was yet. Partially, because if you claim 3=3 as a fact you can use in your reasoning, you haven’t actually made an infinite chain, you’ve made a chain that terminates at 3=3. 3=3 really would cause 2=2, which would cause 1=1, but unless 3=3 is a known truth, an axiom, you haven’t answered the question - just because you haven’t reduced 1=1 to primitive knowns. You might have reduced it to a known, but that doesn’t actually matter unless you have a full explanation for why that known is true.

Or if you don’t like the math stuff, if I ask you for an ultimate explanation of why the sun is the way it is, and you reference all of the states that it has had over the last 2 seconds, but with the time intervals in between them decreasing so that you fit an infinite number of times in there, you still haven’t answered the question. The Sun is here. It may be that its state 1.5 seconds ago explains its state now, but clearly it doesn’t explain the sun as a whole.

Or to put it another way, if I ask why A0 is true, and you say it is true because A1 is true, but that you don’t know why A1 is true, then you’ve just admitted that you don’t ultimately know why A0 is true. And if you try to make an infinite chain, you admit at each stage that you don’t know why anything in the chain so far is true (or is the way it is or whatever), and, since the chain is infinite, you will always say that you don’t know why anything in the chain is true. Which means that even with the chain we don’t know why A0 is true. Which means the chain didn’t explain A0.

 

[Bakmoon]

This is actually another problem I have with his argument as the whole argument assumes that causes and effects occur simultaneously.

If you actually look at Aristotle’s arguments against an infinite regress of motion in section one of book seven of the Physics he really only makes one argument. First he points out that in the sequence of A being moved by B being moved by C etc… the time it takes for A to move is finite, but the motion of the entire series is infinite, and you can’t have an infinite motion in a finite amount of time.

The problem with this kind of argument is that it only works if the motions are simultaneous. If B occurs before A and C occurs before B etc… then although you do have an infinite, because each part of it occurs at a different time it is only a potential infinite rather than an actual infinite.

Even in terms of the power of the cause being passed down there is no actual infinity with an infinite causal chain. Allow me to demonstrate this first by means of a finite causal sequence. Suppose A is moved by B which is moved by C. The causal power of C moves B and is expended, and the causal power of B in turn moves A. Or alternatively one could say that the causal power of C is converted into the causal power of B which then moves A. The essential point here is that A doesn’t receive an inherited effect of everything in the causal chain but is only moved by the causal power of B.

In the case of an infinite sequence that is not simultaneous we have A being moved by B being moved by C etc… Because the causal power of each term in the sequence is expended (or converted if you prefer) A will not be moved by an actually infinite inherited causal power of B+C+D+… but is instead only moved by the causal power of B, even in the case of an infinite sequence, and so Aristotle’s argument fails.

In the case of Aristotle’s argument in Book 8 section 5 Aristotle gives another argument that goes :

If then everything that is in motion must be moved by something, and by something either moved by something else or not, and in the former case there must be some first mover that is not itself moved by anything else, while in the case of the first mover being of this kind there is no need of another (for it is impossible that there should be an infinite series of movers, each of which is itself moved by something else, since
in an infinite series there is no first term)

But this isn’t really an independent argument because he doesn’t give new justification for assuming that a causal series needs a new term. Presumably Aristotle is simply using that passage to refer back to his argument in book 7 section 1 as if it is an independent argument against an infinite causal regress then it is simply begging the question, and I doubt Aristotle would intend that.

Looking over Aquinas’ commentaries on the Physics, I haven’t seen any actual original arguments on the issue, just paraphrases of Aristotle’s arguments on the issue.

 

[Bakmoon]

Yes and no. The problem is that the approach you describe is simply looking at proximate causes going backwards one at a time, and you are correct that there is no reason why that chain cannot go on forever. I could say that 1=1 because 2=2 because 3=3 because… and I would never say anything false. I just wouldn’t explain why 1=1 either. (I don’t actually consider this to be an analogy, but rather a subclass of the things which are true, which is applicable, since we are talking about, more or less, all the things, but if you wanted to find a non math example, you could say that the state of the sun is a direct consequence of the state of the sun one second ago, which is a direct consequence of the state of the sun 1+1/2 seconds ago, which is a direct consequence of the sun 1+1/2+1/4 seconds ago, etc, and since those times converge to 2, you’d have an actual infinite chain of things, where each previous step could be used to explain the step that follows, but which clearly fails to fully explain why the sun is the way it is. Except that physics isn’t entirely deterministic, but that’s just a detail, the point is that there is no philosophical reason why you couldn’t do that.)

So again, it’s not that the chain can’t go on forever. It’s that that doesn’t address the actual question. The question was not “keep looking back in time for reasons why things are the way they are”. The question is what is the ultimate reason that things are the way they are.

In the math example, saying that the infinite chain completely explained while 1=1 would get you zero points on the exam, even if you pointed out that you knew that 3=3 but just weren’t sure why that was yet. Partially, because if you claim 3=3 as a fact you can use in your reasoning, you haven’t actually made an infinite chain, you’ve made a chain that terminates at 3=3. 3=3 really would cause 2=2, which would cause 1=1, but unless 3=3 is a known truth, an axiom, you haven’t answered the question - just because you haven’t reduced 1=1 to primitive knowns. You might have reduced it to a known, but that doesn’t actually matter unless you have a full explanation for why that known is true.

Or if you don’t like the math stuff, if I ask you for an ultimate explanation of why the sun is the way it is, and you reference all of the states that it has had over the last 2 seconds, but with the time intervals in between them decreasing so that you fit an infinite number of times in there, you still haven’t answered the question. The Sun is here. It may be that its state 1.5 seconds ago explains its state now, but clearly it doesn’t explain the sun as a whole.

Or to put it another way, if I ask why A0 is true, and you say it is true because A1 is true, but that you don’t know why A1 is true, then you’ve just admitted that you don’t ultimately know why A0 is true. And if you try to make an infinite chain, you admit at each stage that you don’t know why anything in the chain so far is true (or is the way it is or whatever), and, since the chain is infinite, you will always say that you don’t know why anything in the chain is true. Which means that even with the chain we don’t know why A0 is true. Which means the chain didn’t explain A0.

A) I’m not asserting an infinite causal chain as giving an ultimate explanation to the question why, so I don’t see how that is a problem.

For that matter, I don’t think positing a first cause can give an ultimate explanation either though. My argument for this point goes as follows:

Basic Assumptions:

1. If A is explained by B and B is not ultimately explained, then A is not ultimately explained either.

Here I define the term “ultimately explained” as “being explained by something that itself requires no explanation” and I define the term “Explanation of X” as “An answer to the question ‘Why is X the case?’”

1. An infinite regress of explanations being explained by other explanations does not give an ultimate explanation.

Argument Proper:

In the first cause model A is caused and explained by B which is caused and explained by C … ending with first cause Z which is itself un-caused. Here’s the problem though: We can still ask ourselves “Why is it the case that Z produced effect Y which produced X… which produced A?” One could answer the question by saying that it is the nature of Z to produce effect Y, but we can still validly ask ourselves “Why is it the case that Z has such a nature?” and until this question can be answered, A is without an ultimate explanation because the chain of explanations ends which something unexplained but still requiring explanation.

It is no surprise to me that with any model, whether an infinite causal chain model or a first cause model, that if you repeatedly ask the question “why is it the case that things are so” you will never come to an ultimate answer. This isn’t the fault of the model per se, but is just part of the nature of the question why.

B) You say that there is no impossibility in such a causal chain. If so, then Aquinas’ argument from motion for the existence of God fails, which is my point. QED.

 

[inocente]

Why don’t you tell us exactly what you are objecting to.

Just thought I’d summarize some standard objections. We’ve discussed them before and I know you don’t accept them, but they remain formidable:

1. The argument divides the world into things which depend on other things. If instead we take a holistic view that all things are interdependent, then things are just a way of conveniently cataloging the world and a thing can’t have an independent existence. As a result the claim that a thing cannot move (change) itself is incoherent.
2. By dividing the world into things, there is an unwarranted assumption that processes must have a beginning, middle and end. But if all things are interdependent then “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” and “this cannot go on to infinity” are incoherent.
3. The assumption that motion needs a cause is unwarranted. It is simpler to assert that motion is the default, and we’re pretty sure this is the case in the observable universe (Newton’s first law).
4. The argument is a posteriori (“evident to our senses”) and yet the concepts of potentiality and actuality are introduced without any evidence that they exist objectively, or are anything more than a somewhat contrived attempt at a qualitative reductionism.
5. The argument is presented as a proof, yet no a posteriori argument can be.

 

[Iron_Donkey]

A) I’m not asserting an infinite causal chain as giving an ultimate explanation to the question why, so I don’t see how that is a problem.

For that matter, I don’t think positing a first cause can give an ultimate explanation either though. My argument for this point goes as follows:

Basic Assumptions:

1. If A is explained by B and B is not ultimately explained, then A is not ultimately explained either.

Here I define the term “ultimately explained” as “being explained by something that itself requires no explanation” and I define the term “Explanation of X” as “An answer to the question ‘Why is X the case?’”

1. An infinite regress of explanations being explained by other explanations does not give an ultimate explanation.

Argument Proper:

In the first cause model A is caused and explained by B which is caused and explained by C … ending with first cause Z which is itself un-caused. Here’s the problem though: We can still ask ourselves “Why is it the case that Z produced effect Y which produced X… which produced A?” One could answer the question by saying that it is the nature of Z to produce effect Y, but we can still validly ask ourselves “Why is it the case that Z has such a nature?” and until this question can be answered, A is without an ultimate explanation because the chain of explanations ends which something unexplained but still requiring explanation.

It is no surprise to me that with any model, whether an infinite causal chain model or a first cause model, that if you repeatedly ask the question “why is it the case that things are so” you will never come to an ultimate answer. This isn’t the fault of the model per se, but is just part of the nature of the question why.

B) You say that there is no impossibility in such a causal chain. If so, then Aquinas’ argument from motion for the existence of God fails, which is my point. QED.

A) The whole point about the First Cause if that if you ask why again, it is not that there is no answer, it is that it is its own answer. It explains everything about itself, which is not the case for most things. When you say “why God?” the answer is just “God,” and only God has that property.

B) Not so. Because as you say, the infinite chain doesn’t completely tell us why the thing is in motion. Which means that reality could be such that the infinite chain is set to go, as it were, but without the final effect happening because nothing started the infinite chain. And the whole point of an infinite chain in this argument is that nothing started the infinite chain. Which is why I started with the 1=0 example. If there is no reason why the infinite chain is there, then it’s simply not, and it’s not going to explain itself (or it’d be God).

 

[Iron_Donkey]

A) The whole point about the First Cause if that if you ask why again, it is not that there is no answer, it is that it is its own answer. It explains everything about itself, which is not the case for most things. When you say “why God?” the answer is just “God,” and only God has that property.

B) Not so. Because as you say, the infinite chain doesn’t completely tell us why the thing is in motion. Which means that reality could be such that the infinite chain is set to go, as it were, but without the final effect happening because nothing started the infinite chain. And the whole point of an infinite chain in this argument is that nothing started the infinite chain. Which is why I started with the 1=0 example. If there is no reason why the infinite chain is there, then it’s simply not, and it’s not going to explain itself (or it’d be God).

To expand on that last bit (alas, I was too slow with my edit):

Basically, the (all of these) argument says that there must be something which needs no explanation, because it just is. One of the common counter arguments is “ok fine, but why can’t that be ‘the universe’.” In this case, we could say “why can’t that be an infinite chain?” If infinite chains can happen without being caused or without any external explanation, then they are such things. But things (well thing) of that sort must have certain properties logically deduced from the self contained nature, (uniqueness, simplicity, etc.) and infinite chains of events fail to have them.

 

[Bakmoon]

A) The whole point about the First Cause if that if you ask why again, it is not that there is no answer, it is that it is its own answer. It explains everything about itself, which is not the case for most things. When you say “why God?” the answer is just “God,” and only God has that property.

Explanation is not the same thing as causation. Causation itself can serve as a kind of explanation, but not all explanations are causal. The argument from motion specifically argues that infinite chains of causes (i.e. movement in the Aristotelian sense) are impossible, not that they fail to give explanation.

Because explanation is a wider concept than causation, we can ask for explanation in cases without causation. For example, to use your math example, the statement 1=1 can be explained by means of the law of identity, but no one would claim that the truth of the statement 1=1 is caused by the law of identity. Clearly it is possible to ask the question “Why is X the case” even in those cases where X is itself uncaused.

It is true that you can’t ask what moves the first mover, but that doesn’t mean that you can’t ask the question “Why is it the case that the first mover produces one effect rather than another” or the question “Why does the first mover posses property X”

B) Not so. Because as you say, the infinite chain doesn’t completely tell us why the thing is in motion. Which means that reality could be such that the infinite chain is set to go, as it were, but without the final effect happening because nothing started the infinite chain. And the whole point of an infinite chain in this argument is that nothing started the infinite chain. Which is why I started with the 1=0 example. If there is no reason why the infinite chain is there, then it’s simply not, and it’s not going to explain itself (or it’d be God).

(Emphasis added)

The underlined portion here is just a rephrasing of the point to be proven rather than a separate justification for it so it is just begging the question. This is quite clear if you put this argument into syllogistic form:

The point to be concluded is that a beginning-less infinite chain of movers cannot occur

1. If an infinite causal chain occurs, then it has a beginning
2. An infinite chain of movers is an infinite causal chain
3. Therefore if an infinite chain of movers occurs, then it has a beginning.

1. If an infinite chain of movers has no beginning, then it doesn’t occur (This is the contropositive of 3)
2. An infinite chain of movers as per the argument from motion has no beginning
3. Therefore an infinite chain of movers as per the argument from motion does not occur

The form of the argument is valid without a doubt, but point 1 of the argument is what the whole debate is about, so using it as a premise without demonstrating it first is begging the question as it is not accepted by both sides.