Would would be a solid Catholic rebuttal to Jean-Paul Sartre’s assertion (in Being and Nothingness) that God, as a being whose essence is existence, "would be a pour-soi [a being-for-itself; a *consciousness
] who is also an
en-soi [a being-in-itself; a *thing]: which is a contradiction in terms" (
Wikipedia), and therefore could not exist?
I honestly don’t understand the assertion. Why is a conciousness contrary to being a thing? It seems to me that a conciousness would
have to be a thing.
Reading the argument as explained on Wikipedia makes even less sense. There’s no reason to assume that existence necessarily precedes essence in the First Cause, and in fact this would be impossible. They would have to perfectly coincide for the First Cause to exist, and a First Cause is necessary.
On the face, it looks like Sartre’s flaw is in not approaching a First Mover. Nothing we can experience with our senses is the cause of its own movement, in this case the movement from being a potential conciousness (essence) to being an actual conciousness (existence). Nothing can cause itself to move from potential being to actual being, because to be a cause you must be an actual being. So everything is moved from potential being to actual being by something prior to itself, and this can’t go on infinitely because without a First Mover there is no Second Mover, or Third Mover, so on forward into infinity. So there is necessarily a First Mover regardless of how many subsequent movers there are.
In this First Mover (regardless of whether or not it’s the Christian God, or some idiot principle) being (existence) must be identical to essence so that it can be the First Mover. We already know that a First Mover is necessary, therefore it’s necessary that a single entity have the essence of being in itself, rather than a potential for being, and if it is necessary in itself it is always “actualized” and never in potential.
This First Mover must have a concious choice in actualizing the Second Mover, elsewise the Second Mover would “be” at the same instant as the First Mover, which is permanantly being, and so on down the line of movements, meaning that there would be no time as there would be no movement of change. But we can observe that not all things are in being at the same instant (stars were once potential, as were you before your parents conceived you), and further that nothing which is moved is entirely co-terminal with its mover. Since in the natural world the motion of a potential being is always subsequent to its mover, and non-concious beings act infallibly in their natures (water becomes steam when heated, grass grows with proper nutrients, bodies of matter draw eachother together with gravity, ect), if the First Mover were non-concious then it would infallibly move the Second Mover instantly, which is not possible as explained above, so the First Mover must be concious of moving the Second (which could then theoretically move in time by virtue of the fact that it’s not pure actuality, unlike the First Mover, and is therefore subject to change and time and could trigger subsequent effects at different times; this would be the model of deism, and while it’s not the full Christian model, it does necessitate a God).
So just by reason alone we can conclude that there is a being that exists, is actual, in and of itself, and is also concious. Sartre’s objection doesn’t carry much weight for me as presented, but I could be off on his system and conclusions.
Just my personal musings!
Peace and God bless!