Scholastic Reconciliation of Aristotelian Hylomorphism

[Tannhauser_1509]

What resources may serve to answer this question: If Aristotle held that his theory of hylomorphism would preclude the subsistence of any form apart from matter, and vice versa, then how did Aquinas and other Catholic thinkers reconcile hylomorphism with the perdurance of the soul after bodily death?

Thanks in advance for any helpful responses.

 

[Ad_Orientem]

St. Thomas deals with this question very briefly in S.T. I, Q. 75, a5: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

Objection 3. … [T]hings which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form “there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once.”

Although St. Thomas cites Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book VIII, I know that “the Philosopher” discusses form and matter in Book VII, Part 10, where, interestingly, he states:

… Those things which are the form and the matter taken together, e.g. the snub, or the bronze circle, pass away into these materials, and the matter is a part of them; but those things which do not involve matter but are without matter, and whose formulae are formulae of the form only, do not pass away,-either not at all or at any rate not in this way.

You can probably find more answers in St. Augustine’s work on Genesis cited above.

 

[fisherman_carl]

“[Aristotle] thought that thinking worked more independently of the body than any other aspect of the soul. So he said the intellect “seems to be another kind of soul, and this alone admits of being separated, as that which is eternal from that which is perishable” (428b). But note that Aristotle uses the word ‘seems’ – he is not certain.”

(Aristotle, the soul and life after death Michael Lacewing)

I think that Aquinas saw in man’s soul God given powers of intellect and will. Recognizing the intellect does not correspond one to one with any part of the body. There are aspects of reasoning for instance which it is metaphysically impossible for material organs in the body to cause. And thus, since such an immaterial mind already exists apart from the body it is no surprise that it could continue after the body. However, Aquinas believed it did so because of God who desires men to know him.

Aquinas combined Revelation which Aristotle did not have access to, with philosophical reasoning. While Aristotle may not be certain about whether the mind continues to exist. Aquinas had the benefit of divine Revelation.

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

I’m sensing that part of the OP was not perfectly clear, though you both have provided very helpful responses. I did not ask concerning whether any form is, in any way, material; rather, how any form (being immaterial per se) can exist without giving rise to matter.

Aristotle didn’t believe in an afterlife because he thought, without the perdurance of the body, the form/soul of man no longer actualizes anything and therefore ceases to exist along with the body. But Aquinas insisted on the perdurance of the soul after bodily death; what were his justifications?

 

[fisherman_carl]

I have already hinted at how hylemorphism shows this by saying the mind already exists apart from the body. That is for all animals the form of the animal exists exactly one to one with the material body. Thus, for Aquinas when an animal dies its soul or form ceases to exist. However, in humans the form to body ratio is not one to one but asymmetrical. There is something that exists in the form or soul of a human that does not correspond to the body, that is the intellect. And since it exists independent of the body it can therefore survive the death of the body. Aquinas believed the intellect and will were given by God, as man was created in the divine image. And that the highest goal of the intellect is to know God. If you are interested in more information about this take a look at Edward Feser’s books on Aquinas.

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

I have already hinted at how hylemorphism shows this by saying the mind already exists apart from the body. That is for all animals the form of the animal exists exactly one to one with the material body. Thus, for Aquinas when an animal dies its soul or form ceases to exist. However, in humans the form to body ratio is not one to one but asymmetrical. There is something that exists in the form or soul of a human that does not correspond to the body, that is the intellect. And since it exists independent of the body it can therefore survive the death of the body. Aquinas believed the intellect and will were given by God, as man was created in the divine image. And that the highest goal of the intellect is to know God. If you are interested in more information about this take a look at Edward Feser’s books on Aquinas.

I’ve read Feser’s The Last Superstition, but none of his other books are available in my county library system. Drat! I am eager to read his books Aquinas and Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.

So is it correct to say that Aquinas upheld an asymmetry in man’s hylomorphic composition, whereas Aristotle did not?

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

St. Thomas deals with this question very briefly in S.T. I, Q. 75, a5: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

Objection 3. … [T]hings which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form “there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once.”

Yeah, sooo… I’m not well versed in philosophical jargon, so could you provide an English translation of that English translation? What I picked up from that was that Aquinas was arguing that matter-form composites are moving from potency to act, but that forms by themselves have no cause? What does he mean when he says, “A subsistent form …] does not owe its existence to some formal principle”? Are not forms created by God?

 

[fisherman_carl]

I’ve read Feser’s The Last Superstition, but none of his other books are available in my county library system. Drat! I am eager to read his books Aquinas and Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.

So is it correct to say that Aquinas upheld an asymmetry in man’s hylomorphic composition, whereas Aristotle did not?

As I said in post 3 Aristotle thought the mind was somewhat independent of the body as well. Although he was uncertain as to whether it persists after the body died. But thought that it could since it was independent.

Feser’s book ‘Aquinas’ is available for the kindle as an ebook.

 

[Ad_Orientem]

Yeah, sooo… I’m not well versed in philosophical jargon, so could you provide an English translation of that English translation? What I picked up from that was that Aquinas was arguing that matter-form composites are moving from potency to act, but that forms by themselves have no cause? What does he mean when he says, “A subsistent form …] does not owe its existence to some formal principle”? Are not forms created by God?

He’s not saying that forms have no cause absolutely speaking. A “substance” (Latin subsistere, to stand under) has being and operates through itself, as opposed to something which only exists through something else, like shape or color. (How the soul can be said to operate in itself when it requires a body, he explains in Article 2.)

Another key passage from Q. 75 is in Article 6, where he says:

[W]hat belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Again, he’s not saying they have immortality absolutely speaking; their existence still depends on God. But it’s not God’s m.o. to annihilate his rational creatures. And a spiritual being, of its nature, doesn’t decay, age, or die (except in the sense of losing grace).

You may also want to check out Q. 3 on the simplicity of God, and Q. 50 on the substance of angels (which, like God, are pure form, but unlike God contain potential as well as actuality).

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

He’s not saying that forms have no cause absolutely speaking. A “substance” (Latin subsistere, to stand under) has being and operates through itself, as opposed to something which only exists through something else, like shape or color. (How the soul can be said to operate in itself when it requires a body, he explains in Article 2.)

Another key passage from Q. 75 is in Article 6, where he says:

[W]hat belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Again, he’s not saying they have immortality absolutely speaking; their existence still depends on God. But it’s not God’s m.o. to annihilate his rational creatures. And a spiritual being, of its nature, doesn’t decay, age, or die (except in the sense of losing grace).

You may also want to check out Q. 3 on the simplicity of God, and Q. 50 on the substance of angels (which, like God, are pure form, but unlike God contain potential as well as actuality).

Thank you. Those were helpful. I also jumped to another question in his Summa: q. 89, art.1. Reading it has sparked a new question, which may be appropriate for a whole new thread, but I’ll ask anyway:

If the human soul is of a lesser order of intellect than angels/demons, because it comes to understand through a greater number of species rather than beholding things easily in their simplicity, then how does God make the beatific vision possible? Is it an immediate infusion of the Divine light? and if so, how can man behold God in his simple essence if it is proper for man’s soul to know things through “phantasms”?

 

[Ad_Orientem]

If the human soul is of a lesser order of intellect than angels/demons, because it comes to understand through a greater number of species rather than beholding things easily in their simplicity, then how does God make the beatific vision possible? Is it an immediate infusion of the Divine light? and if so, how can man behold God in his simple essence if it is proper for man’s soul to know things through “phantasms”?

Excellent question. And before the Beatific Vision, how does the disembodied soul understand the particular judgment? And what about purgatory and hell? How about the communion of saints?

This is way above my pay grade, and St. Thomas’s answer isn’t the only one out there, but I think I can point you in the right direction. To my way of thinking, the answer has two parts: (1) how a disembodied soul can know at all; (2) how a human intellect can know God, who is both simple and transcendent.

In the passage you cite, St. Thomas says (Art. 1) that “when [the soul] is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects…” and (Art. 2) “in that state it understands itself through itself [rather than through the body]. … Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls…”

(Words in brackets mine.) So that would address how the disembodied soul can know anything at all. But he also says the soul cannot, of its own powers, know things higher than itself except in a defective way. Clearly this applies to angels, but God all the more, who is infinite and transcendent.

Now rewind to Q. 12, How God is known by us. In Article 5, he says:

“Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God … it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect … And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Apocalypse 21:23): ‘The glory of God hath enlightened it’–viz. the society of the blessed who see God.”

He goes on to distinguish seeing God “in” vs. “by” created light (which has to do with seeing God directly vs. indirectly), and answers various objections. I’m not sure I understand this part myself, but if you read the surrounding text you may find more of what you’re looking for.

TL;DR: I think the ultimate answer is that we can’t see God in his essence by our own powers, therefore God grants it to us by elevating us above our nature.

 

[Vico]

What resources may serve to answer this question: If Aristotle held that his theory of hylomorphism would preclude the subsistence of any form apart from matter, and vice versa, then how did Aquinas and other Catholic thinkers reconcile hylomorphism with the perdurance of the soul after bodily death?

Thanks in advance for any helpful responses.

From St. Thomas Aquinas, we have that the person exists due to the partial substance of the rational soul and the physical body. The body cannot exist with the soul but the soul can exist without the body. The soul has unique attributes that suit it to a particular body so it is not truly a universal, and without the body, the person does not exist, so from death to resurrection the person is not constitute even though the soul exists.

The body and soul can be distinct only as distinct parts of the same whole (substantially). Because the whole they constitute is a complete substance, they cannot be distinct in the same way as the whole is distinct from other wholes of the same kind.

Catechism of the Catholic Church
365 The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the “form” of the body: 234 i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature.

234 Cf. Council of Vienne (1312): DS 902.

366 The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God - it is not “produced” by the parents - and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection. 235
235 Cf. Pius XII, Humani Generis: DS 3896; Paul VI, CPG § 8; Lateran Council V (1513): DS 1440.​