Sin and wrongdoing

[Langdell]

Is this a sound proposition?

Everything that is morally wrong is also a sin.

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[James_S_Saint]

Emm… I don’t see how you can separate “sin” and “morally wrong”, but if the Catholic has such a view, I would certainly like to see it.

 

[Oreoracle]

Is this a sound proposition?

Everything that is morally wrong is also a sin.

.

Do you know what “soundness” is? Firstly, propositions are not sound (they are “true” or “false”). Only arguments can be sound. An argument is formed by premises that are used to arrive at a conclusion. If a premise can be tested so that it may be proven true or false (usually such statements pertain to objects and objective definitions), it is considered a proposition. In other words, the terms of a proposition must be applicable to reality. Ethics are not propositions because they are imperatives; they demand for someone to act a certain way rather than describe reality as it is. “Should” and “ought” are not applicable to reality.

Since only propositions have truth values, it follows that ethics have no truth values. They show the desire for the world to exist in a way that it doesn’t…in a way that it should. The most any ethical argument can become is valid. (For an argument to be valid, the conclusion must be true if we assume that the premises are true. The premises, of course, cannot be proven to be true.)

I hope this helps in the future.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Do you know what “soundness” is? Firstly, propositions are not sound (they are “true” or “false”). Only arguments can be sound. An argument is formed by premises that are used to arrive at a conclusion. If a premise can be tested so that it may be proven true or false (usually such statements pertain to objects and objective definitions), it is considered a proposition. In other words, the terms of a proposition must be applicable to reality. Ethics are not propositions because they are imperatives; they demand for someone to act a certain way rather than describe reality as it is. “Should” and “ought” are not applicable to reality.

Since only propositions have truth values, it follows that ethics have no truth values. They show the desire for the world to exist in a way that it doesn’t…in a way that it should. The most any ethical argument can become is valid. (For an argument to be valid, the conclusion must be true if we assume that the premises are true. The premises, of course, cannot be proven to be true.)

I hope this helps in the future.

Oreoracle,

I’m not sure what this has to do with his question. Unless I’m mistaken, he used the casual, not the formal, definition of sound:

1. competent, sensible, or valid: sound judgment.
2. having no defect as to truth, justice, wisdom, or reason: sound advice.

The proposition “Everything that is morally wrong is also a sin” is true. This truth is an analytic truth, however, so it really doesn’t tell us anything. “Morally wrong action” and “sin” are – so far as I can tell – coextensive. Their meanings are contained within each other’s concepts.

Not everybody is studying formal philosophy.

(By the way, not all philosophers agree that ethical statements can have no truth values. I’ll leave it there, for now.)

 

[James_S_Saint]

Do you know what “soundness” is? Firstly, propositions are not sound (they are “true” or “false”). …

Although I admire the effort to be logically proper and accurate, I would have “soundness” and validity issues with what was just proposed to be “logical” or “valid”.

A premise can be “sound” if it is viewed to mean something that “makes sense” and thus provides a “solid ground” to begin further thought. Such is said to be “sound” or “solid”.

The proposition does not ask an ethics related question. It asks if one set of objects fits within another set (logical set-theory). That is a perfectly “logical or rational” thing to ask.

It does not ask if either set is good or bad - ethics.

 

[Langdell]

Oreoracle,

I’m not sure what this has to do with his question. Unless I’m mistaken, he used the casual, not the formal, definition of sound:

The proposition “Everything that is morally wrong is also a sin” is true. This truth is an analytic truth, however, so it really doesn’t tell us anything. “Morally wrong action” and “sin” are – so far as I can tell – coextensive. Their meanings are contained within each other’s concepts.

Not everybody is studying formal philosophy.

(By the way, not all philosophers agree that ethical statements can have no truth values. I’ll leave it there, for now.)

Thanks. I was wondering about this because, in law, not all morally wrong acts are illegal, and not all illegal acts are morally wrong. (Not that that’s news to anyone.) So I have a tendency to think of “the unethical” as a larger, mushier concept than “the punishable.” There appears to be a tight fit between the two in Catholicism.
.

 

[JRKH]

Is this a sound proposition?

Everything that is morally wrong is also a sin.

.

In brief I would say that yes this is a sound proposition.
This presumes however a proper moral disposition and a conscience that conforms to The teachings of The Church.

If something is morally wrong, then it automatically is contrary to the Law of Love and therefore is sinful.

Peace
James

 

[DOShea]

I don’t think you can pin it down to an absolute. While it is somewhat axiomatic, there could be exceptions.

For example, one might agree that it is morally wrong and a sin to take one’s own life. But what if in doing so you save another? I’m thinking of a situation like St. Maximilian Kolbe offering to take the place of a man condemned to death, knowing he was ending his own life in doing so. Far from sin, his act is viewed as saintly, and presumably morally right.

The question then is which one makes the other? Does the moral righteousness of the act change it from sin to saintly, or does the saintly act turn it from a moral wrong to a moral right?

History has produced cases of people who’s faith was challenged, offering the possibility to denounce it and live, or not denounce and die. Some chose the latter, others chose the former, lived, and continued to believe and practice the same faith until a natural death later. This begs the question, which then, is the morally correct thing to do? Which is a sin?

I don’t think it’s as easy as laying down an equation that one equals the other.

 

[Oreoracle]

Not everybody is studying formal philosophy.

Right. I guess I got carried away.

The larger meaning of my post, however, was that Langdell would only hear the opinions of his fellows, and not much more. And since most of the people here are Catholics who believe that God created morality, I imagine that he would be met with overwhelming agreement with his proposition. Anybody who objects to the proposition would be left with quite a debate on their hands, no?

Since sinning is defined as defying God’s will, then equating sin with immorality implies that God’s will is the lone moral standard. In most cases, rejecting this would require one to show that morality is not objective, which I’ve already began to argue here. I don’t wish to hijack Langdell’s thread, though.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Since sinning is defined as defying God’s will, then equating sin with immorality implies that God’s will is the lone moral standard.

God’s *nature *is the lone moral standard. He who is made in the image of God must allow himself to be conformed to that image. God’s nature contains the moral law.

I don’t find the phrase “God’s will” very useful anymore, so I wouldn’t define sin as defying His will. Sin is the avoidance of God, and therefore the avoidance of oneself.

For example, one might agree that it is morally wrong and a sin to take one’s own life. But what if in doing so you save another? I’m thinking of a situation like St. Maximilian Kolbe offering to take the place of a man condemned to death, knowing he was ending his own life in doing so. Far from sin, his act is viewed as saintly, and presumably morally right.

This is why the moral law must be defined in terms of virtue, not in terms of inviolable rules. The right action is what a moral person would do; once we become moral, we will know what the right action is, perfectly.

 

[Oreoracle]

I don’t find the phrase “God’s will” very useful anymore, so I wouldn’t define sin as defying His will. Sin is the avoidance of God, and therefore the avoidance of oneself.

Just out of curiosity, may I ask why you don’t find the phrase useful?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Just out of curiosity, may I ask why you don’t find the phrase useful?

For one, it has been mangled by many Christians, who think that God is their personal buddy that gives them good stuff and then randomly disappears. Their daughter dies, and they say “it was God’s will”. This is shallow, shallow thinking.

Moreover, having a will implies being in time. But God is beyond time. God doesn’t “want” me to do good; God created me and my existence therefore accords with His nature. You cannot “defy God’s will” by doing x, because He made you knowing you would do x. x may still be wrong, and go against God’s nature, but there is no *will *about it.

I’m going overboard. Many useful teachings have used the term, but perhaps more mischief has been done by its misuse.

 

[Langdell]

… For example, one might agree that it is morally wrong and a sin to take one’s own life. But what if in doing so you save another? I’m thinking of a situation like St. Maximilian Kolbe offering to take the place of a man condemned to death, knowing he was ending his own life in doing so. Far from sin, his act is viewed as saintly, and presumably morally right.

The question then is which one makes the other? Does the moral righteousness of the act change it from sin to saintly, or does the saintly act turn it from a moral wrong to a moral right? …

Good question. Does Catholic theology provide an answer?
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[Prodigal_Son]

Good question. Does Catholic theology provide an answer?
.

As I said above, the moral law must be defined in terms of virtue, not in terms of inviolable rules. We are to be transformed into the image of Christ, and when we have that “internal compass”, as it were, we will habitually do all that is morally right.

We must always follow our conscience, but we must also educate our conscience. We do this by reading the Word of God, praying, attending mass, etc. We must sincerely strive to know Jesus. When faced with moral dilemmas, there is *always *a right thing to do (sometimes more than one right thing to do). We just need to be – like a skilled basketball player – trained with the right instincts so that we will do it.

 

[Langdell]

As I said above, the moral law must be defined in terms of virtue, not in terms of inviolable rules. We are to be transformed into the image of Christ, and when we have that “internal compass”, as it were, we will habitually do all that is morally right.

We must always follow our conscience, but we must also educate our conscience. We do this by reading the Word of God, praying, attending mass, etc. We must sincerely strive to know Jesus. When faced with moral dilemmas, there is *always *a right thing to do (sometimes more than one right thing to do). We just need to be – like a skilled basketball player – trained with the right instincts so that we will do it.

PS – Would you say, then, that moral wrong and sin are perfectly coextensive?
.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

PS – Would you say, then, that moral wrong and sin are perfectly coextensive?
.

Yes.

There is a bit of nuance worth considering, however. Consider: the Church says that lying is a sin, and Joe is a compulsive liar. There is likely a pattern of sin that made him a compulsive liar, but I think it is oversimplifying to say that when Joe tells you his name is Sally he is committing a sin. But I would neither say he is doing anything morally wrong, so “moral wrong” and “sin” remain coextensive.

 

[Oreoracle]

Prodigal Son,

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that our moral responsibility for our own actions is proportional to our understanding of God’s nature, right? If so, do you believe that God’s nature is so desirable that we would feel compelled to conform to it if we understood it perfectly, or at least well enough?

 

[tonyrey]

For example, one might agree that it is morally wrong and a sin to take one’s own life. But what if in doing so you save another? I’m thinking of a situation like St. Maximilian Kolbe offering to take the place of a man condemned to death, knowing he was ending his own life in doing so. Far from sin, his act is viewed as saintly, and presumably morally right.

The question then is which one makes the other? Does the moral righteousness of the act change it from sin to saintly, or does the saintly act turn it from a moral wrong to a moral right?

The morality of an act is determined by the motive, the means and the end result(s).
To take a person’s life or to allow oneself to die is always evil because life is a gift from God and infinitely valuable.

But sometimes it is the **lesser **of two evils. To sacrifice one’s life for others - as Jesus did - is the greatest act of love of all.
If we are motivated by love and the consequences are good an evil can be transformed into a supremely good act.
The means does not justify the end but the motive justifies the means if the end is good!
Otherwise Jesus should not have sacrificed himself…

The road to hell is paved with good intentions but the path to heaven is illuminated by God’s love…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Prodigal Son,

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that our moral responsibility for our own actions is proportional to our understanding of God’s nature, right? If so, do you believe that God’s nature is so desirable that we would feel compelled to conform to it if we understood it perfectly, or at least well enough?

Yes, and yes, and I think that was exceedingly well phrased.

Have you read Plato’s Republic? In the Republic, the Forms are extraordinarily hard to discover – but, at they same time, they are so *good *that they compel the philosopher to continue searching for them. This is a paradox, though: if they do not know what the Forms are, then how can the Forms compel them? And yet, if they knew what the Forms were, they wouldn’t need to be compelled! I wrote an involved paper on this last fall, but right now I can hardly even remember my thesis.

Although Plato’s “Forms” may be nonsense, I think that Plato’s concept corresponds quite well to the Christian idea of God. If we knew God, we would want nothing else but to follow Him, but *we can only be compelled by the knowledge of Him *(which we do not have). Thus, compulsion is not the way we come to God; grace is.

At any rate, we cannot be morally responsible for something we don’t know. But – please note – we do not know what we know. That is, we can never be sure if we know “downloading pirated software is OK” or if we are just rationalizing.

 

[Oreoracle]

Have you read Plato’s Republic?

Yes, though that was nearly two years ago when I first began to read about philosophy. Looking back on it, I realize that I understood very little of it. I remember the cardinal virtues and the utility they had in a society, but not much else.

In the Republic, the Forms are extraordinarily hard to discover – but, at they same time, they are so *good *that they compel the philosopher to continue searching for them. This is a paradox, though: if they do not know what the Forms are, then how can the Forms compel them? And yet, if they knew what the Forms were, they wouldn’t need to be compelled! I wrote an involved paper on this last fall, but right now I can hardly even remember my thesis.

Do you still have the paper? I’d love to see it (if that is possible).

At any rate, we cannot be morally responsible for something we don’t know. But – please note – we do not know what we know. That is, we can never be sure if we know “downloading pirated software is OK” or if we are just rationalizing.

Your consistency is refreshing. I’m tiring of the “God is mysterious, yet we understand his nature well enough to form a definitive ethical system that corresponds wholly to that nature” attitude.