I understand the argument. The argument commits petitio principii. In effect, it has assumptions that are unstated that one is trying not to state. In effect, the way you present the argument, you make an efficient cause tautological to being in motion. Hence, you have assumed the prime mover if there is any motion.\quote]
I could demonstrate how this is not the case in a separate post. The belief that this is what is happening (particularly in Aquinas) is usually based in the critique of the 5 ways by Anthony Kenny. Good man, but he misses the suitability of the argument.
kbachler;7663172:
The above is confused on several fronts.
First, all motion is temporal. It is impossible to have motion without time.
Why is this the case? To be affected is a type of motion and it is without time. The classical example is knowledge. The process of understanding something is temporal but when that process reaches its terminus it is now ‘knowledge of’ and that motion in the soul is without time but, it is still a movement. This is one brief example where we can see that effect and cause happen at exactly the same moment without any successive time.
Second, M-theory and related mathematical theories can already show that something mathematically can arise from nothing. Hence, the concept of an unmoved mover is unnecessary. There is no logic reason to even look for such a mover.
This is logically true. However, the point you provide does not touch the issue of a prime mover. Even with a prime mover the universe arises from nothing. There is no contradiction. There is only a contradiction of the prime mover is, in some way, material. However, this is not what is being asserted.
Third, NO LOGIC can pierce in any definitive sense into a universe without a time variable. The most we can say, for example, is that it is absurd to assume that in such a place, that something cannot arise from nothing, because whatever laws of physics are at work in such a place (if any) are very different than the laws that are at work here, and therefore to assume that the same mathematics or logic work in such a place is a very poor assumption indeed. There is no experiential reason for such an assumption.
Fourth, in the end, ALL assumptions in some form depend on what is empirical and its relation to belief.
Your notion of Logic is in some areas too strong (with relation to the natural world) and in some places to weak (in its explanatory power). I think that when you say ‘Logic’ you mean ‘Modern Logic’ which is unfortunately lacking in the task of dealing with this this issue. In other words, its the wrong tool for the job.