Something has got to give

[concerneduser]

First of all what is the current understanding of the catholic teaching of free will and predestination?

-Also how to rebut these claims:

1. Everything seen and unseen that happens, and has happened was the will of God. How? Because everything is interconnected. Either it ‘happened for a reason’ or ‘it was science’ and we know how it works, Didn’t god create both and know the consequences?
2. Something has got to give: Either the will of God, our free will, or the existance of God as we know him through Christianity. Why?
   -The will of God is of everything that happens because he could change it if he wanted to: He knows all that is going to happen before we, our parents, our grandparents, or even the dinosaurs that we evolved from ever existed, he intervenes with our everyday lives if need be, he created us and everyone around us. The interconnected web of what I call ‘interactions’ grows with every second, as never again will everything be exactly the same as it was one split second ago. Therefore: since the beginning of time, since the very creation of the universe and beyond, everything was already written out and known by God. He knows the web of interconnected actions because he started it with one single thing (which we don’t know how it came about scientifically). God chose our DNA/ biology and knew how we were going to react to the different things in our lives. He also controls the sciences of the world, the weather, the mountains, soil erosion, and the instincts of animals on earth. He programed us a certain way, and knows what our reactions will be to those conditions he created. For example: He knew that Hitler and Stalin would raise to power amist a depression in the early 1900s and slaughter millions. But would you say that this slaughter was the will of God? Thats not the God we claim to know. Yet he knew these things would happen and still created these people. Instead, if God wanted to, he could have made Hitler the next ‘Van Gogh’ and a great painter instead of a power hungry mass murderer. Along with this, we are told there is no ‘luck’, only the will of God. We also say many times ‘there is a reason for everything’.
   –Therefore these statements that everything is interconnected in a web makes sense, but goes against Christianity in terms of free will. Because are we not a mere collection of physical molecules working together to create a ‘life’. (I’m not talking about souls here yet). Are we as humans, the way we think, and therefore our actions such as “our decision” to perhaps rob a bank…merely the result of 1. How we think and how our brians developed biologically/ chemically. 2. How we were raised by our parents (or lack there of), and 3. Every day interactions with people, friends, and even the atmosphere.
   -All of these things determine what we will do daily. What we do is made up of our past experiences, which are all known to god, and our future decisions, are based upon those past experiences. Or, they can be influenced by god himself through miracles etc. but then again those are also controlled by god. Therefore everything is predestined since the very beginning of time. Every action has effect another action. And they can only happen once in time. This gives proof to Pre-destination. God knows the effects of everything, and yet he allows them to happen and we attribute things to him.
3. Yet, if we have free will we can supposedly choose between outcomes. Yet, our future actions are a result of previous actions along with ourselves (meaning how we think biologically and chemically in our brains) and therefore we can never say that we have free will. For free will is the ability to choose to do what we please. And since everything is connected…ie (if your grandmother was 1 minute late on that honeymoon boat in the 400’s you wouldn’t exist!). Therefore, it was pre-determined/ pre-destined that you would be born or not born, depending on the actions of the world and your ancestors. Free will therefore is an illusion that we are not effected by our previous experiences and that we have the choice to choose between good and evil.
4. Yet, does sin really exist? From this, no. Why? Because God predestined us to be who we are, as a result of our ‘placement’ in this space/ time. He knew that we would sin, and we sin as a result of the way we think which is determined by either 1. God himself through his intervention in dreams, miracles, etc. Or 2. Through past experiences and interactions with other people and the physical world (ie, the weather, plants, animals, etc). Therefore one who commits murder was already to be known to do so since the beginning of time. And was it their fault? Was it their fault that they ended up the way they were? Or is that ‘being’ a result of physical interactions in the world or spiritual interactions with God that made him the way he is?
5. Now, here’s the thing, If god knows all, and predetermined this man to be a murderer, then why does he claim to judge him? What is the reason to judge a man who as a ‘being’ is simply made up of his experiences in the slums of New York for example which drove him to thinking that a life of crime was morally acceptable and perfectly fine? Wasn’t it Gods will that this man was created the way he was biologically and chemically? Or that he parents even ever got together at all to create him?- God could have stopped this from happening.
   Case in point.- Sin therefore doesent exist. And from this, Christianity collapses. Because without sin there is no reason for judgement, as we are not to blame for how we came to be about. It doesent necessarily rule out God, but it does rule out free will, sin, and judgement.
   —comments?

 

[Eucharisted]

C. The Theory of Predestination post praevisa merita. —This theory, defended by the earlier Scholastics (Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus), as well as by the majority of the Molinists, and warmly recommended by St. Francis de Sales “as the truer and more attractive opinion”, has this as its chief distinction, that it is free from the logical necessity of upholding negative reprobation. It differs from predestination ante praevisa merita in two points: first, it rejects the absolute decree and assumes a hypothetical predestination to glory; secondly, it does not reverse the succession of grace and glory in the two orders of eternal intention and of execution in time, but makes glory depend on merit in eternity as well as in the order of time. This hypothetical decree reads as follows: Just as in time eternal happiness depends on merit as a condition, so I intended heaven from all eternity only for foreseen merit.—It is only by reason of the infallible foreknowledge of these merits that the hypothetical decree is changed into an absolute: These and no others shall be saved.

This view not only safeguards the universality and sincerity of God’s salvific will, but coincides admirably with the teachings of St. Paul (cf. II Tim., iv, 8), who knows that there “is laid up” (reposita est, Greek: apokeitai) in heaven “a crown of justice”, which “the just judge will render” (reddet, Greek: apodosei) to him on the day of judgment. Clearer still is the inference drawn from the sentence of the universal Judge (Matt., xxv, 34 sq.): “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat” etc. As the “possessing” of the Kingdom of Heaven in time is here linked to the works of mercy as a condition, so the “preparation” of the Kingdom of Heaven in eternity, that is, predestination to glory is conceived as dependent on the foreknowledge that good works will be performed. The same conclusion follows from the parallel sentence of condemnation (Matt., xxv, 41 sq.): “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat” etc. For it is evident that the “everlasting fire of hell” can only have been intended from all eternity for sin and demerit, that is, for neglect of Christian charity, in the same sense in which it is inflicted in time. Concluding a pari, we must say the same of eternal bliss. This explanation is splendidly confirmed by the Greek Fathers. Generally speaking, the Greeks are the chief authorities for conditional predestination dependent on foreseen merits. The Latins, too, are so unanimous on this question that St. Augustine is practically the only adversary in the Occident. St. Hilary (In Ps. lxiv, n. 5) expressly describes eternal election as proceeding from “the choice of merit” (ex meriti delectu), and St. Ambrose teaches in his paraphrase of Rom., viii, 29 (De fide, V, vi, 83): “Non enim ante praedestinavit quam praescivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, eorum praemia praedestinavit” (He did not predestine before He foreknew, but for those whose merits He foresaw, He predestined the reward). To conclude: no one can accuse us of boldness if we assert that the theory here presented has a firmer basis in Scripture and Tradition than the opposite opinion.