T
Tannhauser_1509
Guest
I have just recently read a transcript of an address given many years ago by Professor Sterling M. McMurrin, titled “The Philosophical Foundations of Mormon Theology” (Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1979). Particularly noteworthy is his discussion on how traditional theology contrasts with his interpretation of Mormon metaphysics. According to him, the former asserts God as the only necessary being, with all others being contingent; the latter asserts the purpose of each human’s existence as consisting in himself, as all being exists ultimately per se. He expresses that a human substance—which definition he offers is highly Cartesian—is not so much conditioned by moral absolutes—and McMurrin admits that Mormon philosophy tends toward Platonic realism in the moral sphere—but rather synergizes with them. McMurrin states that Mormon metaphysics is essentially pluralistic, allowing for the existence of a practically infinite number of independent absolute realities.
Probably the most absorbing section of his address was where he deals with the problem of evil. I will quote him here:
*It is obvious that the established doctrine of creation ex nihilo] contributes importantly to the absolutistic description of God, because under it God is related only to a universe which is totally his creature and which is therefore utterly contingent upon him and is under his dominion, hence, of his power. As seen in any discussion of the problem of evil, this doctrine occasions considerable embarrassment for both theology and religion, as it appears to assign to God the responsibility for everything that occurs in the world, including events that are immoral or otherwise evil. Consequently much theological effort has been expended to justify the absoluteness of God’s power with his vindication of all responsibility for those elements in his creation that are not compatible with his absolute goodness.
…]
It is obvious that its pluralistic metaphysics and resulting non-absolutistic theology offer Mormon philosophy a most attractive framework for the discussion of the problem of evil, the most persistent of all questions attending a theistic world view. A Mormon theodicy can describe the uncreated elementary character of the material universe as the occasion for natural evil, and can further vindicate God by assigning the responsibility for moral evil to the freedom of will possessed as an essential property by the uncreated and underived spirits that are a “given” in the original structure of the universe.*
I am curious as to how Professor McMurrin would have defined evil, or how he would have answered the question “Is evil evil?”
Another fascinating area of his address deals with how God cannot be simultaneously “unrelated” and “unconditioned” so long as he has created something outside of himself, much less as long as God has personal relationships with his creatures, and even less as long as he has become incarnate man.
My question is, is this a logically valid metaphysic? At what points, if there be any, do his articulations venture from innocent ontological speculation to irrationality?
Probably the most absorbing section of his address was where he deals with the problem of evil. I will quote him here:
*It is obvious that the established doctrine of creation ex nihilo] contributes importantly to the absolutistic description of God, because under it God is related only to a universe which is totally his creature and which is therefore utterly contingent upon him and is under his dominion, hence, of his power. As seen in any discussion of the problem of evil, this doctrine occasions considerable embarrassment for both theology and religion, as it appears to assign to God the responsibility for everything that occurs in the world, including events that are immoral or otherwise evil. Consequently much theological effort has been expended to justify the absoluteness of God’s power with his vindication of all responsibility for those elements in his creation that are not compatible with his absolute goodness.
…]
It is obvious that its pluralistic metaphysics and resulting non-absolutistic theology offer Mormon philosophy a most attractive framework for the discussion of the problem of evil, the most persistent of all questions attending a theistic world view. A Mormon theodicy can describe the uncreated elementary character of the material universe as the occasion for natural evil, and can further vindicate God by assigning the responsibility for moral evil to the freedom of will possessed as an essential property by the uncreated and underived spirits that are a “given” in the original structure of the universe.*
I am curious as to how Professor McMurrin would have defined evil, or how he would have answered the question “Is evil evil?”
Another fascinating area of his address deals with how God cannot be simultaneously “unrelated” and “unconditioned” so long as he has created something outside of himself, much less as long as God has personal relationships with his creatures, and even less as long as he has become incarnate man.
My question is, is this a logically valid metaphysic? At what points, if there be any, do his articulations venture from innocent ontological speculation to irrationality?