Supreme Court upholds Oregon's Death with Dignity Law

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Scalia said in his dissent that the court’s ruling “is perhaps driven by a feeling that the subject of assisted suicide is none of the federal government’s business. It is easy to sympathize with that position.”
At the same time, Scalia said federal officials have the power to regulate doctors in prescribing addictive drugs and “if the term ‘legitimate medical purpose’ has any meaning, it surely excludes the prescription of drugs to produce death.”
These aren’t easy issues from a judicial perspective. Pray for our justices as they struggle with them.
 
They really aren’t easy issues from a judicial perspective. Judicial conservatives particularly are not inclined to easily overturn laws passed by legislatures.

And, under our federal system, it was expected that various States might have different ideas about local issues, and pass laws accordingly.

Conservatives, no less than liberals, should work to pursue legislative ends within the legislatures.
 
Jim,

I agree with you. I think there are a lot of conservatives who have a false notion of what conservative judges will do. They think a liberal activist judge approved abortion, so a conservative judge will rid us of abortion. In reality, conservative judges typically defer to the legislature as they are supposed to. What they do is allow our state legislatures to make abortion and euthenasia legal or illegal.

The real work at hand is twofold - winning the hearts and minds of our fellow citizens and influencing our state and federal legislators.

God Bless,

Robert
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JimG:
They really aren’t easy issues from a judicial perspective. Judicial conservatives particularly are not inclined to easily overturn laws passed by legislatures.

And, under our federal system, it was expected that various States might have different ideas about local issues, and pass laws accordingly.

Conservatives, no less than liberals, should work to pursue legislative ends within the legislatures.
 
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rlg94086:
Jim,

I agree with you. I think there are a lot of conservatives who have a false notion of what conservative judges will do. They think a liberal activist judge approved abortion, so a conservative judge will rid us of abortion. In reality, conservative judges typically defer to the legislature as they are supposed to. What they do is allow our state legislatures to make abortion and euthenasia legal or illegal.

The real work at hand is twofold - winning the hearts and minds of our fellow citizens and influencing our state and federal legislators.

God Bless,

Robert
I pretty much agree with you here. I don’t favor an ideologically-conservative approach to legal interpretation, but I do favor a temperamentally conservative one. I don’t think the decision made by the Oregon voters was the right one, but I’m glad the court showed restraint in allowing Oregonians to make their decision.
 
BTW, it’s my understanding that the “Death with Dignity” law was a ballot initiative, so it really is the Oregon voters, not the state legislature, that passed and approved the law (twice, in fact, if I recall correctly).
 
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JimG:
They really aren’t easy issues from a judicial perspective. Judicial conservatives particularly are not inclined to easily overturn laws passed by legislatures.

And, under our federal system, it was expected that various States might have different ideas about local issues, and pass laws accordingly.

Conservatives, no less than liberals, should work to pursue legislative ends within the legislatures.
Amen, brother. Well said, Jim.

I don’t know many strict constructionists–judicial conservatives in the mold of Justice Scalia, for example–who will tell you that the first three words of the US Constitution (“We the People”) are not the most important words in that great document. Unelected judges holding lifetime tenure should be extremely reluctant to overturn those laws drafted by duly elected–and accountable!–legislative bodies. (And I say that as a Catholic and a political conservative that despises the Oregon law in question.)

I once had a professor–and he, like Justice Scalia, was a conservative–who told me that the authority of the judiciary to declare a legislative act unconstitutional was a lot like the gun on a cop’s hip. The cop always carries his weapon there; everyone knows why that weapon is on his hip; but, at the same time, everyone knows that, thankfully, the overwhelmingly vast majority of cops will serve long enough to collect a pension without ever having to discharge their weapon.
 
Philip P:
BTW, it’s my understanding that the “Death with Dignity” law was a ballot initiative, so it really is the Oregon voters, not the state legislature, that passed and approved the law (twice, in fact, if I recall correctly).
That is correct. I lived in Oregon shortly after it’s passage. The Knights of Columbus had worked hard campaigning against it, but to no avail. It’s very depressing.
 
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Seamus:
Amen, brother. Well said, Jim.

I don’t know many strict constructionists–judicial conservatives in the mold of Justice Scalia, for example–who will tell you that the first three words of the US Constitution (“We the People”) are not the most important words in that great document. Unelected judges holding lifetime tenure should be extremely reluctant to overturn those laws drafted by duly elected–and accountable!–legislative bodies. (And I say that as a Catholic and a political conservative that despises the Oregon law in question.)

I once had a professor–and he, like Justice Scalia, was a conservative–who told me that the authority of the judiciary to declare a legislative act unconstitutional was a lot like the gun on a cop’s hip. The cop always carries his weapon there; everyone knows why that weapon is on his hip; but, at the same time, everyone knows that, thankfully, the overwhelmingly vast majority of cops will serve long enough to collect a pension without ever having to discharge their weapon.
Didn’t Scalia dissent on this case? Perhaps you can explain how that fits in with his “judicial conservatism.” That’s one of those things non-conservatives like me don’t understand - Scalia and Thomas are often held up as “judicial conservatives” but seem quite willing to become “activist” when it suits them. I don’t want to come across as overly cynical, but Scalia’s dissent - and conservative praise of Scalia - often comes across as meaning that conservatives aren’t being honest when they claim they don’t believe in judicial activism. I would appreciate if you could explain to me how this is not the case.
 
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rlg94086:
That is correct. I lived in Oregon shortly after it’s passage. The Knights of Columbus had worked hard campaigning against it, but to no avail. It’s very depressing.
How close were the votes? I often hear about how “unchurched” Oregon is, and the split between Portland and the rest of the state. Did Portland just decide for the whole state, or was there some depth to the support of this initiative?
 
The first time, it eked through with 51 vs 49. The second time it was on the ballot, the result was overwhelming, a 20% spread. I’m not sure what regions those results came from, but the second result was definite. I think part of the reason for the change in % was just stubbornness–outsiders trying to hold up a law fairly decided by Oregon’s voters irritated the Oregonians.
 
Philip P:
Didn’t Scalia dissent on this case? Perhaps you can explain how that fits in with his “judicial conservatism.” That’s one of those things non-conservatives like me don’t understand - Scalia and Thomas are often held up as “judicial conservatives” but seem quite willing to become “activist” when it suits them. I don’t want to come across as overly cynical, but Scalia’s dissent - and conservative praise of Scalia - often comes across as meaning that conservatives aren’t being honest when they claim they don’t believe in judicial activism. I would appreciate if you could explain to me how this is not the case.
Thanks for the respectful nature of your post, Philip. I will certainly do my best to disabuse you.

Yes, Justice Scalia dissented in this case. I’ll leave it to him to explain why he dissented. The entire opinion, including the dissents that you mention (CJ Roberts dissented. Justice Thomas issued a separate dissenting opinion) can be found here:

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&navby=case&vol=000&invol=04-623

That said, I would respectfully dispute your contention that Justice Scalia is a judicial activist when it suits his purpose. (Care to cite any opinions as examples?) Justice Scalia is, for example, a devout Catholic. He is, personally, very much opposed to abortion. (He and his wife have 9 children, one of which is a rather conservative and orthodox priest in Virginia.) His personal views on abortion notwithstanding, Justice Scalia, in his capacity as a Supreme Court Justice, has held that he will vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, in large part because that horrible decision was judicial activism at its worst. He has written, however, that while the Constitution doesn’t grant a right to abortion; it doesn’t prohibit abortion either. In short, Justice Scalia makes the claim, as did my old professor, that where the Constitution is silent, the matter is best left to the various (elected) state legislatures to decide. It is not the appropriate role of unelected Federal judges holding lifetime tenure to force social policy down the throats of the American people, and to do so by nothing more than judicial fiat.

Incidentally, and while we are on the subject of judicial activism, can you please explain to me how I could conclude that the Roe decision was something other than judicial activism run rampant? How, precisely, can the Supreme Court look to a document that makes no mention of pregnancy, much less abortion or trimesters, and somehow conclude that our Constitution guarantees “a right” to abortion at 2 trimesters, but not at 2 trimesters plus one second?
 
See post #2, where I quote Scalia. He even says he sympathizes with the position of the majority. His reasoning is based on the control of drugs prescribed by doctors.
Philip P:
Didn’t Scalia dissent on this case? Perhaps you can explain how that fits in with his “judicial conservatism.” That’s one of those things non-conservatives like me don’t understand - Scalia and Thomas are often held up as “judicial conservatives” but seem quite willing to become “activist” when it suits them. I don’t want to come across as overly cynical, but Scalia’s dissent - and conservative praise of Scalia - often comes across as meaning that conservatives aren’t being honest when they claim they don’t believe in judicial activism. I would appreciate if you could explain to me how this is not the case.
 
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Seamus:
Thanks for the respectful nature of your post, Philip. I will certainly do my best to disabuse you.
Thanks for the link; I’ll check it out.

As for Roe v Wade, I don’t think it was a good decision, either from a Constitutional standpoint or from a results-based one. I don’t have a problem with finding a right to privacy, but I do have a problem with the reasoning that, when the court is unable to decide on personhood, no legal protection should be extended. As you may have noticed, I generally fit more toward the center-left of the political spectrum, and Roe v Wade makes no sense from that side either. How can you argue for the rights on non-citizens (e.g. immigrants, both documented or not, detained prisoners, etc) and accept such reasoning?
 
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Seamus:
That said, I would respectfully dispute your contention that Justice Scalia is a judicial activist when it suits his purpose. (Care to cite any opinions as examples?)
Ok, I’m working through the opinion here (and I intend to stay OT and stick to this case in this thread, fascinating as the topic of how Scalia’s faith influences his work and vice versa is), and here are a few things that stick out to me.
On November 9, 2001, without consulting Oregon or apparently anyone outside his Department, the Attorney General issued an Interpretive Rule announcing his intent to restrict the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide. Incorporating the legal analysis of a memorandum he had solicited from his Office of Legal Counsel, the Attorney General ruled [that assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose] I-C
The rest of the majority opinion goes into detail as to what authority the Controlled Substances Act gives the attorney general. There does not seem to be anything giving the AG the ability to make the determination as to waht constitutes “legitimate medical pupose,” and even in areas the CSA does give the AG authority, there are generally guideilnes which need to be followed but which were not in this case. To wit:
The Attorney General does not have the sole delegated authority under the CSA. He must instead share it with, and in some respects defer to, the Secretary, whose functions are likewise delineated and confined by the statute. The CSA allocates decisionmaking powers among statutory actors so that medical judgments, if they are to be decided at the federal level and for the limited objects of the statute, are placed in the hands of the Secretary. Section II-B
Scalia, in his dissent, instead seems to feel that the AG does, in fact have the authority on his own to make the determination as to what constitutes “legitimate medical pupose.” To wit:
Even if the Directive were entitled to no deference whatever, the most reasonable interpretation of the Regulation and of the statute would produce the same result. Virtually every relevant source of authoritative meaning confirms that the phrase "legitimate medical purpose"4 does not include intentionally assisting suicide. “Medicine” refers to “[t]he science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, or alleviation of disease.”
and, next paragraph down,
In the face of this “overwhelming weight of authority,” the Court’s admission that “[o]n its own, this understanding of medicine’s boundaries is at least reasonable,” ante, at 26 (emphasis added), tests the limits of understatement. The only explanation for such a distortion is that the Court confuses the normative inquiry of what the boundaries of medicine should be–which it is laudably hesitant to undertake–with the objective inquiry of what the accepted definition of “medicine” is. Sec. II
Now to me, the difference between these opinions is that the majority held that the AG does not have the authority on his own to determine legitimate medical purpose. Scalia’s dissent seems to say that the AG does have this authority, because legitimate medical purpose is an objective criteria that needs no further consultation.

My problem with Scalia’s reasoning is this idea of objective criteria. That’s fine within a community of shared values (e.g. Catholicism, with its magisterium and natural law). In a diverse, pluralistic community, though, I don’t see how you can appeal to some outside objective criteria. The criteria are determined by those whom the system designates as qualified to make them, in this case physicians and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. I think Scalia gives far too much deference to the AG here. It is “conservative” I suppose in its appeal to the idea of a unitary, shared set of values (his “objective” criteria), but certainly not conservative in the limited power, state’s rights way in which it grants the AG ability to make medical judgments on his own authority.
 
Even though I hate Oregon’s creepy “Death with Dignity” law, I’m wondering if perhaps the Supreme Court made the correct decision in this case.

It is my understanding that John Ashcroft was going to try to prosecute doctors who prescribed drugs for patients who wanted to commit suicide. In other words, John Ashcroft was trying to make up a Federal law that didn’t exist. Then, the Supreme Court came along and said that the State of Oregon had a right to pass that law, and they upheld it.

This is in sharp contrast to how a lot of judges seem to be attempting to legislate from the bench, as they did in Roe vs. Wade. The Republicans claim that they want to get government off our backs. Then, they turn around and try to override laws made by the states. This is a little off subject, but they did the same thing with using mirajuana for medicinal purposes.

I agree that a doctor who helps someone commit suicide is morally a murderer. However, if he did it because it was legal in the State of Oregon, then he shouldn’t be prosecuted.

In other words, I wish the states had power to make laws without the Supreme Court constantly stepping in and invalidating these laws. In this case, the law that the Supreme Court refused to invalidate was an immoral law, but at least the power to legislate stayed in the hands of the people of Oregon.
 
Philip P:
There does not seem to be anything giving the AG the ability to make the determination as to waht constitutes “legitimate medical pupose,”
The act does not define what “legitimate medical purpose” is. If it did, then the ruling would be unanimous in one way or another (unless the justices were prepared to rule or advise that the act was unconstitutional – I personally do not believe judicial review legitimately extends beyond the realm of civil justice (including “criminal law”) administered by the courts – so for instance a ruling that a sentencing law is unconstitional would be an effectual one whereas a ruling that an appropriation bill is inconstitutional would not be effectual as that ruling is itself unconstitunal hopefully as judged by the legislature in defense of her own constitutional rights – but the legislature can choose to take such rulings as being advisory in nature and defer to them in that way – just as the court can choose to take legislative fact finding as advisory and defer to them in the court’s decision making except in unusual circumstances)

Now given that the act does not define it, it by default leaves the executive to define it. It certainly does not leave the judiciary to define it – that would be a case of judges making law. In some systems of govt, judges do make law. Not in ours, or at least it is not supposed to work that way.

I suppose a case could be made that a court can overturn the definition given it by an executive should that definition be one that no reasonable person could hold. But I do not see how any reasonable person, judge or justice, could hold to such a position.
My problem with Scalia’s reasoning is this idea of objective criteria. That’s fine within a community of shared values (e.g. Catholicism, with its magisterium and natural law). In a diverse,
What you seem to fail to realize is that natural law is that very thing which any human community has or ought to have as “shared values.” By framing the discussion in terms of “values” instead of “virtues” you are presenting morality from the outset as something determined merely by subjective whim. The concept of natural law rather is that certain moral truths are embedded within humanity, within the nature of man, and the nature of creation, and that therefore these moral truths can be known, in principle, through the light of natural reason, without any recourse to revelation or “Catholicism”

To argue against this, one must actually argue that such a thing, natural law, does not exist. It does not suffice to say that some do not believe in it or that men differ as to the finer points of the natural law. For the fact that a tiny minority of men may not believe it exists and the fact that many – even within Catholicism – disagree as to the finer points of the natural law, does not at all address the central claim of natural law proponents nor of their central claim as to how natural law ought interact with civil justice – and for that matter with society in general, including the legislative and executive and the whole public square.

Your presenting the matter from your own point of view – a subjectivist one – does not counter or rebut their point of view; it merely presents your own in a positive way.
not conservative in the limited power, state’s rights way
Perhaps those who describe themselves as “conservative” ought be able to define for themselves what that means. Also, perhaps we ought not pigeon hole people as either “conservative” or “liberal” and see how individual people are at variance with our pre-definied pigeon hole categories.

Human thought in general, and in this area in particular, is so complex that it is folly to assume that there are somehow 2 centers of thought and that all legal minds somehow congregate around one or the other. On many legal issues indeed there are not 2, but 3 or even 4 distinct positions. Even within a particular school of legal thought – for instance “originalism” – there are at least 2 or 3 distinct forms of originalism. Even within a particular society such as the Federalist Society, there are at least 3 or 4 ideas that become central to one’s political or legal views. Even within the conservative side of American politics, there are at least 4 or 5 centers of conservative thought with some of these even denying the appelation of conservative to the others – and these schools of thought have names, either self-applied or applied by others: theoconservative, neoconservative. paleoconservative, etc.

Thus what you have done here is to essentially criticize not any internal inconsistency of legal belief by any justice but the inconsistency between their legal belief and your pigeon hole category! That far from being something a Justice should be ashamed of is something a Justice should be proud of 😃
 
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