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NowAgnostic
Guest
I neither agree nor disagree with this. I think it’s something that can neither be proven nor disproven from first principles, and something one choose to accept or not.One of Plato’s arguments for the existence of “Forms” (the equivalent to Aristotle’s “universals,” often known today as “abstracta”) is the so-called “argument from perfection.”
And how do we know it’s not infinitesimally thin unless we know what an infinitesimally thin line looks like? But we can’t see something infinitesimally thin.We might start by observing a line drawn on a piece of paper. The line is not perfectly straight, but how do we know it’s not perfectly straight unless we already know what a perfectly straight line looks like?
The same type of question can be asked about circles and any shape, and indeed, many other things. Let’s put this in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:
I am going to take issue with “We can know that a shape is imperfect.” What is the definition of an imperfect shape? If the definition is one that doesn’t correspond exactly with one of the Forms, then the argument is circular - and besides, there might be a Form corresponding to every possible shape, making every shape perfect. True, “circles” and “ellipses” have precise mathematical definitions, but there is no such thing as an imperfect circle or imperfect ellipse - and for shapes you might think fit those categories, I can generate a new mathematical definition which fits them “perfectly”.Prove A: Forms exist.
Assume ~A: Forms do not exist.
~A → B: If Forms do not exist, then we cannot know that a shape is imperfect.
~B: We can know that a shape is imperfect.
~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Forms exist.
Q.E.D.