P
ProLepanto
Guest
Given that one holds humanity expresses worth beyond being a functioning respiratory system, one must entertain the notion that there are physical acts which are an assault on this value and that they can be unjust. So in the face of such an injustice, the question becomes not whether there needs to be action, but what is the correct action, and when is it acceptable.
The Catholic tradition on just war (and in turn western tradition on just war) is first, that only responsible governments have the right/responsibility to use force. Second, they only have the right on public authority. Third, they only can for a just cause under right intention. While the third requirement is the most difficult to define, it is the first two requirements which have to be first explained. This must be first done in regards to bellum and duellum. Bellum is the social use of force which can be justified and duellum is the personal use of force which according to Thomas Aquinas, is always wrong. This rational stems from the understanding that personal struggle can only be justified by self centered motives. Whereas Duellum has the possibility of charity (caritas), and in turn good. In other words Duellum is the disturbance of the public for private gain, where as Bellum is the disturbance of the private individual for public benefit. And so is the primary good behind just war found in the selfless sacrifice or risk for justice. Consequently with the reality of correct use of force lying in a shared realm of justification, it can only follow that a legitimate social government be the source of the decision and in turn the decision itself be legitimate. Thus the decision to use force by the legitimate government must be in the interest of the entire community over which it resides, lest there is a tyrannical nature behind the use of force which would negate it status as caritas.
Just Cause on the other hand is initially a far more ambiguous qualification. However Thomas Aquinas narrows it down to two kinds. The first, recovery of the stolen, is easily understood. The second: the punishment of evil, is not as clear or easily swallowed though it possess far more lofty sounding justification. But Just Cause is easier to rationalize and accept when both it and the prior justification are realized under the penumbra of obtaining and keeping peace which is for the common good. And so the punishment of evil can be understood as chastising the nation or group in question in order to convince it that such acts will not be tolerated, thus leading to their abandonment. However in modern theories of right of force, justification lies only in immediate self defense and not in the supposed duty to stop collective injustice. This theory of isolationism is though, conversely contrary to the classic Christian understanding of common good.
The third tier of qualification for just war, in classic Catholic teaching is right intention. This notion is fundamentally connected to just cause, but independent in practice. In modern Catholic teachings this understanding is blended with just cause and seems to be left in a kind of permanent preliminary state. However, right intention is also constant in war and not merely an initial justification. This is because there must be a continual effort and goal to do good and in turn obtain peace in order for this third and constant qualification for just war to be met.
Yet it is due to all of these stringent steps required to justify war, that modern teachings preach that war is a kind of last resort. This notion stems from a reductive form of reasoning, first assuming that anything short of war should be tried to fill the void of action presented in the case of an injustice to the community. However this goes contrary to the actual qualitative reasoning that should instead be employed. This is due to the fact that justice cannot be fulfilled by merely using the least invasive method. This would necessitate a focus entirely on method rather than method in conjunction with result. For example a tyrannical murderous regime should not be combated with soft diplomacy that will simply encourage it to continue its destructive ways. Instead the method needs to be approached in conjunction with its intended outcome and means of achieving it. In addition there is a kind of injustice preformed to the victims of such a regime, if at its intersection by the just nation; the aggressor nation is not compensated aptly for its misconduct. Mind you, this compensation is (ideally) not to be done in a vengeful fashion which would necessitate a neglect of the necessity of right intent, but punishment is not the same as vengeance. Vengeance requires a pursuit personally fueled satisfaction approaching deullum. Whereas punishment can be performed in a charitable fashion void of personal goal. Punishment should be understood as both a service to the victim and the aggressor. For the victims suffering does not fail to obtain good if it leads to the correction of the wrong doers.
I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance
While war as a last resort is the most prominent of the newly introduced Heresies in Catholic Just War thought, it is not the only one. “Expectation that the good done by the resort to force will outweigh the evil” is another such new requirement that goes just as contrary to traditional Catholic doctrine as war as a last resort. Such reasoning definitely appears to be sound, and may even initially strike one as a good prerequisite for war. For example, the action of tactically nuking an Island in order to cleanse it of a couple pirates falls into a realm of dis-proportionality. And at the very least should be considered as the imprudent course of action. But can an imprudent war be a just war? Given the example above one would be inclined to think that imprudence would require an ultimate injustice. But when dealing with the subtle eccentricities of global diplomacy, prudence isn’t as clear. This is because in order to figure what the prudent action is, one must be able to suppose the outcome of the deliberated actions prior to doing them. However, who could safely say that leaving Afghanistan untouched for decades would lead to terror attacks on US soil. Surly what would seem an assault on a previous cold war ally (at least nominally speaking) who offered neither physical altercation nor resounding threat would be considered imprudent. Yet being that the region is and was inundated with fanatical zealots whose core beliefs call for the destruction of the western world and whose practices result in the destruction of innocent lives, one of the most primary qualifications for just war is met (the punishment of evil) while still failing to be considered prudent. But the modern overbearing implications of prudence in qualifying Just War do more than just make sure outcome is considered, they make an inference of good for whom. This is due to the fact that it requires a kind of averaging of suffering instead of acting in relation to common good. Not only does this collectivist notion destroy definitions of nations as distinct groups, but the method of its employment is left utterly undefined. How does one go about averaging suffering? Is it weighed on quantity of individuals affected or on a numeral scale of degree? If it is the prior, then it lends itself to utilitarianism which is fundamentally against Catholic doctrine by doing evil (or allowing for evil) for the sake of good. So prudence in regards to quantitative reasoning often falls short in producing or even allowing for just use of force. But if prudence in regards to war is defined more on the grounds of degree of suffering, then it would seem to be contradictory of the very premise of acting prudently; because the severe suffering of a few could justify invasive use of force into the lives of the vast majority who were otherwise unaffected.
But these two contradictory notions of modern Just War doctrine are not alone and have a third and even more poorly reasoned requirement stated with them. This restriction on the traditional Just War teaching is more than just illogical, it is a blatant affront to the most fundamental teaching of Christianity. It is now claimed in the third tier of modern teaching on just war, that in order for war to be just it must have reasonable expectations of success. This rule necessitates an understanding which is disconnected from all of the aforementioned restrictions in that it doesn’t focus on method, intentions or goals, but simply likelihood of intended success. This Catholic modern restriction on war is void of moral basis which fuel theological teachings. The thought that evaluating probability of being able to do good is more important that trying to good and failing, renders virtues such as fortitude and charity null and void. What use is fortitude other than in the face of seemingly insurmountable or at least questionably surmountable odds? And how can there be charity without sacrifice? This last step in defining the modern Catholic understanding of Just War is proof that the ‘new qualifications’ were first meant rather as preclusions to war. Because, how can there be any other purpose to such a restrictive prerequisite void of moral justification? The first two tiers of heresy dismiss some virtues for others, but war only for the sake of success dismisses every virtue for none.
All three Heretical contradictions to Logos itself must be stamped out for: *Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them. *
The Catholic tradition on just war (and in turn western tradition on just war) is first, that only responsible governments have the right/responsibility to use force. Second, they only have the right on public authority. Third, they only can for a just cause under right intention. While the third requirement is the most difficult to define, it is the first two requirements which have to be first explained. This must be first done in regards to bellum and duellum. Bellum is the social use of force which can be justified and duellum is the personal use of force which according to Thomas Aquinas, is always wrong. This rational stems from the understanding that personal struggle can only be justified by self centered motives. Whereas Duellum has the possibility of charity (caritas), and in turn good. In other words Duellum is the disturbance of the public for private gain, where as Bellum is the disturbance of the private individual for public benefit. And so is the primary good behind just war found in the selfless sacrifice or risk for justice. Consequently with the reality of correct use of force lying in a shared realm of justification, it can only follow that a legitimate social government be the source of the decision and in turn the decision itself be legitimate. Thus the decision to use force by the legitimate government must be in the interest of the entire community over which it resides, lest there is a tyrannical nature behind the use of force which would negate it status as caritas.
Just Cause on the other hand is initially a far more ambiguous qualification. However Thomas Aquinas narrows it down to two kinds. The first, recovery of the stolen, is easily understood. The second: the punishment of evil, is not as clear or easily swallowed though it possess far more lofty sounding justification. But Just Cause is easier to rationalize and accept when both it and the prior justification are realized under the penumbra of obtaining and keeping peace which is for the common good. And so the punishment of evil can be understood as chastising the nation or group in question in order to convince it that such acts will not be tolerated, thus leading to their abandonment. However in modern theories of right of force, justification lies only in immediate self defense and not in the supposed duty to stop collective injustice. This theory of isolationism is though, conversely contrary to the classic Christian understanding of common good.
The third tier of qualification for just war, in classic Catholic teaching is right intention. This notion is fundamentally connected to just cause, but independent in practice. In modern Catholic teachings this understanding is blended with just cause and seems to be left in a kind of permanent preliminary state. However, right intention is also constant in war and not merely an initial justification. This is because there must be a continual effort and goal to do good and in turn obtain peace in order for this third and constant qualification for just war to be met.
Yet it is due to all of these stringent steps required to justify war, that modern teachings preach that war is a kind of last resort. This notion stems from a reductive form of reasoning, first assuming that anything short of war should be tried to fill the void of action presented in the case of an injustice to the community. However this goes contrary to the actual qualitative reasoning that should instead be employed. This is due to the fact that justice cannot be fulfilled by merely using the least invasive method. This would necessitate a focus entirely on method rather than method in conjunction with result. For example a tyrannical murderous regime should not be combated with soft diplomacy that will simply encourage it to continue its destructive ways. Instead the method needs to be approached in conjunction with its intended outcome and means of achieving it. In addition there is a kind of injustice preformed to the victims of such a regime, if at its intersection by the just nation; the aggressor nation is not compensated aptly for its misconduct. Mind you, this compensation is (ideally) not to be done in a vengeful fashion which would necessitate a neglect of the necessity of right intent, but punishment is not the same as vengeance. Vengeance requires a pursuit personally fueled satisfaction approaching deullum. Whereas punishment can be performed in a charitable fashion void of personal goal. Punishment should be understood as both a service to the victim and the aggressor. For the victims suffering does not fail to obtain good if it leads to the correction of the wrong doers.
I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance
While war as a last resort is the most prominent of the newly introduced Heresies in Catholic Just War thought, it is not the only one. “Expectation that the good done by the resort to force will outweigh the evil” is another such new requirement that goes just as contrary to traditional Catholic doctrine as war as a last resort. Such reasoning definitely appears to be sound, and may even initially strike one as a good prerequisite for war. For example, the action of tactically nuking an Island in order to cleanse it of a couple pirates falls into a realm of dis-proportionality. And at the very least should be considered as the imprudent course of action. But can an imprudent war be a just war? Given the example above one would be inclined to think that imprudence would require an ultimate injustice. But when dealing with the subtle eccentricities of global diplomacy, prudence isn’t as clear. This is because in order to figure what the prudent action is, one must be able to suppose the outcome of the deliberated actions prior to doing them. However, who could safely say that leaving Afghanistan untouched for decades would lead to terror attacks on US soil. Surly what would seem an assault on a previous cold war ally (at least nominally speaking) who offered neither physical altercation nor resounding threat would be considered imprudent. Yet being that the region is and was inundated with fanatical zealots whose core beliefs call for the destruction of the western world and whose practices result in the destruction of innocent lives, one of the most primary qualifications for just war is met (the punishment of evil) while still failing to be considered prudent. But the modern overbearing implications of prudence in qualifying Just War do more than just make sure outcome is considered, they make an inference of good for whom. This is due to the fact that it requires a kind of averaging of suffering instead of acting in relation to common good. Not only does this collectivist notion destroy definitions of nations as distinct groups, but the method of its employment is left utterly undefined. How does one go about averaging suffering? Is it weighed on quantity of individuals affected or on a numeral scale of degree? If it is the prior, then it lends itself to utilitarianism which is fundamentally against Catholic doctrine by doing evil (or allowing for evil) for the sake of good. So prudence in regards to quantitative reasoning often falls short in producing or even allowing for just use of force. But if prudence in regards to war is defined more on the grounds of degree of suffering, then it would seem to be contradictory of the very premise of acting prudently; because the severe suffering of a few could justify invasive use of force into the lives of the vast majority who were otherwise unaffected.
But these two contradictory notions of modern Just War doctrine are not alone and have a third and even more poorly reasoned requirement stated with them. This restriction on the traditional Just War teaching is more than just illogical, it is a blatant affront to the most fundamental teaching of Christianity. It is now claimed in the third tier of modern teaching on just war, that in order for war to be just it must have reasonable expectations of success. This rule necessitates an understanding which is disconnected from all of the aforementioned restrictions in that it doesn’t focus on method, intentions or goals, but simply likelihood of intended success. This Catholic modern restriction on war is void of moral basis which fuel theological teachings. The thought that evaluating probability of being able to do good is more important that trying to good and failing, renders virtues such as fortitude and charity null and void. What use is fortitude other than in the face of seemingly insurmountable or at least questionably surmountable odds? And how can there be charity without sacrifice? This last step in defining the modern Catholic understanding of Just War is proof that the ‘new qualifications’ were first meant rather as preclusions to war. Because, how can there be any other purpose to such a restrictive prerequisite void of moral justification? The first two tiers of heresy dismiss some virtues for others, but war only for the sake of success dismisses every virtue for none.
All three Heretical contradictions to Logos itself must be stamped out for: *Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them. *