The Modal Third Way One More

[punkforchrist]

I’ve defended this argument many times in different venues, but I’m always interested in getting additional feedback. I’d like this thread to be part discussion and part debate, if the latter becomes desirable. Here’s a summary of the argument:

1. Something presently exists. (Premise)
2. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
3. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary
   entity N. (Definition)
4. Necessarily, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
5. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing contingent existed. (Premise)
6. Therefore, a necessary entity N exists. (From 3, 4 and 5)

Consider this reductio ad absurdum:

1. N does not exist. (Assumption)
2. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing existed. (From 3 and 5)
3. (8) contradicts (4).
4. Therefore, (7) is false.

To be clear, a contingent thing possibly exists and possibly does not-exist, whereas a necessary thing exists and cannot possibly not-exist. We can also infer that N is eternal and indestructible, since there is no time at which a necessary entity could fail to exist. N is also plausibly very powerful, since it must have the ability to bring into being something as vast as the sum total of all contingent entities.

Thoughts?

 

[Oreoracle]

Is there any reason why this necessary entity could not be, say, the matter in the singularity of the Big Bang? Matter/energy is indestructible as conservation laws attest, it is “powerful” in the sense that it could explain the observable universe, and it is eternal as it has literally existed since the notion of time has been intelligible.

 

[punkforchrist]

Is there any reason why this necessary entity could not be, say, the matter in the singularity of the Big Bang? Matter/energy is indestructible as conservation laws attest, it is “powerful” in the sense that it could explain the observable universe, and it is eternal as it has literally existed since the notion of time has been intelligible.

Prima facie, yes, I think so. Some further metaphysics might suggest that N is a personal agent, however, or even pure actuality, in which case N could not be the sum total of matter and energy. But, you agree that N exists and is eternal, indestructible, and very powerful? We can get into whether N is God in a bit.

 

[Oreoracle]

But, you agree that N exists and is eternal, indestructible, and very powerful?.

If we assume the premises of your argument then yes, N exists. Since I know you have God=N in mind, rather than matter and spacetime as I’d suggest, I have some thoughts: I’m not sure what “eternal” would mean without some notion of time already in place, or what “indestructible” would mean without matter. As for being powerful, “power” strikes me as one of those ambiguous weasel words. You say N is powerful since it accounts for contingent beings’ existence, so I think “explanative” might be a better word.

 

[punkforchrist]

Oreoracle:

If we assume the premises of your argument then yes, N exists. Since I know you have God=N in mind, rather than matter and spacetime as I’d suggest, I have some thoughts: I’m not sure what “eternal” would mean without some notion of time already in place, or what “indestructible” would mean without matter.

I don’t really think of time as a thing per se. It’s simply a measurement of change. The things that change are what exist and are measured by time. Indestructibility is possible without matter. An immaterial thing could easily be indestructible. I can’t think of any contradiction, can you?

As for being powerful, “power” strikes me as one of those ambiguous weasel words. You say N is powerful since it accounts for contingent beings’ existence, so I think “explanative” might be a better word.

Well, in order for A to causally explain B, A would have to have some measure of power. I don’t see any way around that.

 

[Oreoracle]

I don’t really think of time as a thing per se. It’s simply a measurement of change.

Our current theories regard it as being just as real as space. Is mass a thing? It’s just a measurement of inertia, after all.

Indestructibility is possible without matter. An immaterial thing could easily be indestructible. I can’t think of any contradiction, can you?

It’s not a question of finding contradictions, I’m just not at all sure what “indestructible” would mean in a non-physical context. What would it mean, for instance, to say that the number 2 is indestructible?

Well, in order for A to causally explain B, A would have to have some measure of power. I don’t see any way around that.

“Power” just seems like a terribly misleading word. Most people think of “power” as the ability to do what you want unimpeded by others who wish to stop you (that is the sociological definition). In ancient times, God would have been called powerful since he could smite any enemy he wished. If you insist on using that word, that’s fine, but it sounds highly suggestive of something it isn’t.

 

[punkforchrist]

Oreoracle:

Our current theories regard it as being just as real as space. Is mass a thing? It’s just a measurement of inertia, after all.

Time is as real as space (spacetime) on a B-theory of time, but not on an A-theory. Mass is a measurement of inertia? I’ve never heard that.

It’s not a question of finding contradictions, I’m just not at all sure what “indestructible” would mean in a non-physical context. What would it mean, for instance, to say that the number 2 is indestructible?

The number 2, if it exists, is an abstract object. God is an immaterial concrete object, so there’s little parity between the two. In any case, “indestructible” just means that a thing cannot be destroyed or cease to exist. I think it’s pretty easy to understand what it means for something immaterial to be indestructible.

“Power” just seems like a terribly misleading word. Most people think of “power” as the ability to do what you want unimpeded by others who wish to stop you (that is the sociological definition). In ancient times, God would have been called powerful since he could smite any enemy he wished. If you insist on using that word, that’s fine, but it sounds highly suggestive of something it isn’t.

N is certainly unimpeded from causally explaining the sum total of contingent entities C. Hence, I see no problem calling N very powerful.

 

[Oreoracle]

Mass is a measurement of inertia? I’ve never heard that.

Let’s say we subject two objects of differing masses to the same force. Since force=mass*acceleration, the object with greater mass will experience less acceleration. Thus mass measures how difficult it is to accelerate an object, and this resistance we need to overcome to cause acceleration is inertia.

God is an immaterial concrete object, so there’s little parity between the two.

I assure you I’m not trying to be difficult, but I have no clue what “immaterial concrete object” means.

In any case, “indestructible” just means that a thing cannot be destroyed or cease to exist.

If “indestructible” means “can’t cease to exist”, then it is completely synonymous with “necessary”, or it is at the very least entailed by necessity.

N is certainly unimpeded from causally explaining the sum total of contingent entities C. Hence, I see no problem calling N very powerful.

Whatever you say. This is your party, after all.

 

[punkforchrist]

Oreoracle:

Let’s say we subject two objects of differing masses to the same force. Since force=mass*acceleration, the object with greater mass will experience less acceleration. Thus mass measures how difficult it is to accelerate an object, and this resistance we need to overcome to cause acceleration is inertia.

I’ll take your word for it. However, the fact that mass is a measurement of inertia and time is a measurement of change doesn’t mean that both exist. Nevertheless, I don’t really have a problem with saying that time exists. I have no firm commitment in the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists.

I assure you I’m not trying to be difficult, but I have no clue what “immaterial concrete object” means.

Not a problem. The distinction between an abstract object and a concrete object is that the former does not stand in causal relations. Hence, an immaterial concrete object is something immaterial that stands in some kind of causal relation. Let me put it this way. If you think it’s meaningful to say that some material entity is indestructible, then it must be equally meaningful to say that some immaterial entity is indestructible. If one term is meaningful, then so is its negation.

If “indestructible” means “can’t cease to exist”, then it is completely synonymous with “necessary”, or it is at the very least entailed by necessity.

I understand it might seem that way, so let me back up a bit. When Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas talk about God being necessary, they mean that God is eternal and indestructible. The way “necessary” is used nowadays is in the sense of possible worlds semantics: existence in all possible worlds. So, we can talk about N in either the former sense or in the latter.

Whatever you say. This is your party, after all.

You can call it whatever you want. I’m not too concerned with the semantics of the attributes. I’m just trying to explain why I use the term I do.

 

[polytropos]

It’s worth adding that indestructibility and logical necessity may be logically equivalent, ie. necessarily an entity is indestructible if and only if it exists necessarily, but that does not mean that they are “synonymous,” that they signify the same things. (The doctrine of divine simplicity, in fact, would imply that the divine attributes mutually entail each other and so are “logically equivalent,” but they are not the same).

 

[Rhubarb]

Two thoughts come to mind when i read the argument, whether they are helpful or even relavent is up to the reader. >.>

1. It is my (very limited) understanding of physics theory that “something” can plausably come from “nothing”. If this is true I cannot grant (2), on which (4) and (9) hinge. Someone better educated in particle physics than I might overcome this objection to (2) that I have.
2. The argument reads, to me, as an argument to the best explanation. I think this sort of argument can be used to strongly justify a belief in N, but it does not prove to me N.

 

[polytropos]

1. It is my (very limited) understanding of physics theory that “something” can plausably come from “nothing”. If this is true I cannot grant (2), on which (4) and (9) hinge. Someone better educated in particle physics than I might overcome this objection to (2) that I have.

I’d say that such claims often revolve around an equivocation with respect to “nothing.” Physicists often talk about particles coming out of, say, a quantum field or a vacuum, neither of which are “nothing.” Here is a good article on this.

1. The argument reads, to me, as an argument to the best explanation. I think this sort of argument can be used to strongly justify a belief in N, but it does not prove to me N.

Well, it’s deductively valid, so if one accepts the premises, then one ought to accept the conclusion. I think the main difficulty this argument faces is showing that the entity whose existence it shows is identical to God. It seems to have a tougher time at this than other arguments. The divine attributes seem to be somewhat easier to derive given the conclusion of the First or Second Ways, probably because those arrive at an uncaused cause of sorts, while the Third Way arrives at a necessary being.

And it seems to be true that God is not necessarily the only necessary being (taking “necessary” in the modal logic sense, as the argument does). Such a criticism was leveled by, I believe, J.L. Mackie. Ed Feser’s response (iirc–I don’t have his book on hand at the moment) was that Aquinas might accept the matter of the universe as a necessary being, and continue his argument using some premise to the effect that a being either has its necessity in itself or in another necessary being, and matter does not have its necessity in itself. But the latter claim demands substantiation, since it is something that a critic would likely deny.

 

[belorg]

I’ve defended this argument many times in different venues, but I’m always interested in getting additional feedback. I’d like this thread to be part discussion and part debate, if the latter becomes desirable. Here’s a summary of the argument:

1. Something presently exists. (Premise)
2. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
3. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary
   entity N. (Definition)
4. Necessarily, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
5. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing contingent existed. (Premise)
6. Therefore, a necessary entity N exists. (From 3, 4 and 5)

Consider this reductio ad absurdum:

1. N does not exist. (Assumption)
2. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing existed. (From 3 and 5)
3. (8) contradicts (4).
4. Therefore, (7) is false.

To be clear, a contingent thing possibly exists and possibly does not-exist, whereas a necessary thing exists and cannot possibly not-exist. We can also infer that N is eternal and indestructible, since there is no time at which a necessary entity could fail to exist. N is also plausibly very powerful, since it must have the ability to bring into being something as vast as the sum total of all contingent entities.

Thoughts?

The argument doesn’t seem deductively valid to me. Premise (4) does not seem to follow from (1) and (2), because neither (1) not (2) say anything about impossibility, so I don’t see how you can get to conclude from this what necessarily must be the case (4)

 

[polytropos]

The argument doesn’t seem deductively valid to me. Premise (4) does not seem to follow from (1) and (2), because neither (1) not (2) say anything about impossibility, so I don’t see how you can get to conclude from this what necessarily must be the case (4)

The inference will be deductively valid if it is impossible for (4) to be false if (1) and (2) are true. If one can think of any circumstances in which (1) or (2) are true but (4) is false, then the argument is invalid. (This is just from the definition of validity.)

If you wanted to properly quantify the argument, it seems like there are a few steps that would have to be expanded, but the argument seems valid to me. I don’t see how (4) could be false while (1) and (2) are true. If something exists now and something can’t come from nothing, then it seems that you generate a contradiction by supposing that at some point in the past, nothing existed. For then there was once nothing and now something, contradicting (2).

Also, it is worth adding that there is no general problem with deducing necessity from possibility, given the way negation and modal operators interact. (necessarily not p is equivalent to not possibly p).

 

[belorg]

The inference will be deductively valid if it is impossible for (4) to be false if (1) and (2) are true. If one can think of any circumstances in which (1) or (2) are true but (4) is false, then the argument is invalid. (This is just from the definition of validity.)

If you wanted to properly quantify the argument, it seems like there are a few steps that would have to be expanded, but the argument seems valid to me. I don’t see how (4) could be false while (1) and (2) are true. If something exists now and something can’t come from nothing, then it seems that you generate a contradiction by supposing that at some point in the past, nothing existed. For then there was once nothing and now something, contradicting (2).

Also, it is worth adding that there is no general problem with deducing necessity from possibility, given the way negation and modal operators interact. (necessarily not p is equivalent to not possibly p).

Premise (1) is about the actual world, while (4) is about every possible world.
So, a correct logical deduction in (4) would take the form of “there was never a past time **in the actual **world at which nothing existed”. that does not entail, however that whatever existed in the past time in the actual world was a necessary being.
Or, in other words, (4) Should say “In every possible world in which it is the case that something exists at t, there is not a time t-x at which nothing existed”

Let’s suppose that in the actual world a past-eternal contingent being C exists.

Now let’s insert C into the argument.

1.C presently exists. (Premise)

1. C cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary
   entity N. (Definition)
3. Given the present situation in the actual world, there was never a past time in the actual world at which C did not exist. (From 1 and 2)
4. There is a possible world in which there was a past time at which nothing contingent existed. (Premise)
5. Therefore,** C **exists in the actual world. (From 3, 4 and 5)

Consider this reductio ad absurdum:

1. N does not exist. (Assumption)
2. There is a possible world in which there was a past time at which nothing existed. (From 3 and 5)
3. (8) does not contradict (4).
4. Therefore, (7) is not false.

The only thing that can be said about C is that it is past-eternal, but there is nothing in the argument preventing C from annihilating next week.

 

[polytropos]

Premise (1) is about the actual world, while (4) is about every possible world.
So, a correct logical deduction in (4) would take the form of “there was never a past time **in the actual **world at which nothing existed”. that does not entail, however that whatever existed in the past time in the actual world was a necessary being.
Or, in other words, (4) Should say “In every possible world in which it is the case that something exists at t, there is not a time t-x at which nothing existed”

Fair point. It seems that the argument equivocates between two notions of “contingent,” one being “exists in one possible world but not in all possible worlds” and the other being “might come into or go out of existence.”

I don’t see a quick way to fix it. I suppose one could argue that quantified modal logic is not consistent with empty worlds (so one could argue that an either contingent or necessary being exists in all possible worlds), but that is usually regarded as a quirk of quantificational systems.

1.C presently exists. (Premise)

1. C cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary
   entity N. (Definition)
3. Given the present situation in the actual world, there was never a past time in the actual world at which C did not exist. (From 1 and 2)

Your 4. does not follow from your 1. and 2. It is only the case that there was never a past time in the actual world at which C did not exist if no necessary being exists. (C can’t come from nothing, ie. the actual world could not have been empty at any point, but if there exists a necessary being, then there could have been a point at which only the necessary being existed.)

 

[belorg]

Fair point. It seems that the argument equivocates between two notions of “contingent,” one being “exists in one possible world but not in all possible worlds” and the other being “might come into or go out of existence.”

I don’t see a quick way to fix it. I suppose one could argue that quantified modal logic is not consistent with empty worlds (so one could argue that an either contingent or necessary being exists in all possible worlds), but that is usually regarded as a quirk of quantificational systems.

Your 4. does not follow from your 1. and 2. It is only the case that there was never a past time in the actual world at which C did not exist if no necessary being exists. (C can’t come from nothing, ie. the actual world could not have been empty at any point, but if there exists a necessary being, then there could have been a point at which only the necessary being existed.)

Yes, that’s correct.

 

[polytropos]

I am thinking that one might be able to argue:

1. Something exists in the actual world. (Premise)
2. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
3. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary entity N. (Definition)
   4*. There exists some possible world presently identical to the actual world, in which at some past time nothing contingent existed. (From 1 and definition of contingency)
   5*. Therefore, a necessary entity N exists. (From 2, 3, and 4*)

I don’t see what the reductio was doing for us, since 5* (6 in the original argument) already states that a necessary entity exists, and if we were to assume 6* that N does not exist, we can immediately conjoin it with 5* to generate a contradiction.

(As I’ve said before, I think the argument still faces difficulty identifying N with God.)

Something I have also been thinking of is how the argument squares with the Thomistic doctrine of protomatter/potentiality. When a Thomist says that something goes out of existence, they mean that the substance to which a form (identity condition, in this case) was associated has lost its form. But Thomists do not believe that the protomatter, which can be associated with a mass/energy substratum, has therefore gone out of existence. Just the substance has gone out of existence. They believe, furthermore, that protomatter never exists apart from some form. If I burn down a tree, it loses its form of tree but acquires the form of ash. This might be a reason to resist composing the possibility of nothing existing, since it may be the case that whenever a contingent being goes out of existence, another contingent being comes into existence.

 

[belorg]

I am thinking that one might be able to argue:

1. Something exists in the actual world. (Premise)
2. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
3. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary entity N. (Definition)
   4*. There exists some possible world presently identical to the actual world, in which at some past time nothing contingent existed. (From 1 and definition of contingency)
   5*. Therefore, a necessary entity N exists. (From 2, 3, and 4*)

4* Does not seem to follow from 1 and the definition of contingency. There is nothing in the argument that says such a world is possible, so this should be a separate premise.

Something I have also been thinking of is how the argument squares with the Thomistic doctrine of protomatter/potentiality. When a Thomist says that something goes out of existence, they mean that the substance to which a form (identity condition, in this case) was associated has lost its form. But Thomists do not believe that the protomatter, which can be associated with a mass/energy substratum, has therefore gone out of existence. Just the substance has gone out of existence. They believe, furthermore, that protomatter never exists apart from some form. If I burn down a tree, it loses its form of tree but acquires the form of ash. This might be a reason to resist composing the possibility of nothing existing, since it may be the case that whenever a contingent being goes out of existence, another contingent being comes into existence.

I am not aware of any scientist who thinks that it is possible for everything to just “go out of existence”. Anyway, the argument as it is now actually allows for everything to go out of existence next week.
I think the argument requires a complete makeover before it can be consiered a serious challenge to atheism.