The Principle of Double Effect

[Ron_Conte]

Yes, I do include the anticipated consequences in the intention; the intended consequences are why we commit the act in the first place, or, as the Catechism says: “the end in view or the intention.” The third font is actually the circumstances, which includes the actual (as opposed to the intended) consequences.

You are misinterpreting the Catechism because you interpret it without sufficient knowledge of magisterial teaching in other sources. Veritatis Splendor makes it clear than consequences are part of the circumstances, not part of the intention.

I’ve numbered the fonts in the quote below from VS.

“74. But on what does the moral assessment of man’s free acts depend? What is it that ensures this ordering of human acts to God? Is it [1] the intention of the acting subject, [3] the circumstances — and in particular the consequences — of his action, or [2] the object itself of his act? This is what is traditionally called the problem of the “sources of morality”.”

This quote also has consequences as the third font, not intention:

“77. In order to offer rational criteria for a right moral decision, the theories mentioned above take account of the intention and consequences of human action. Certainly there is need to take into account both the intention — as Jesus forcefully insisted in clear disagreement with the scribes and Pharisees, who prescribed in great detail certain outward practices without paying attention to the heart (cf. Mk 7:20-21; Mt 15:19) — and the goods obtained and the evils avoided as a result of a particular act. Responsibility demands as much. But the consideration of these [3] consequences, and also of [1] intentions, is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a concrete choice. The weighing of the goods and evils foreseeable as the consequence of an action is not an adequate method for determining whether the choice of that concrete kind of behaviour is [2] “according to its species”, or “in itself”, morally good or bad, licit or illicit. The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.”

Answer me this: at what point is the morality of an action determined - when the act is committed or when the consequences become known? Surely it must be when the act is committed, but if that is true then you can see why the actual consequences cannot change the morality of an act that has already taken place.

The morality of the act is determined when the act is committed. That is why the third font only includes the reasonably anticipated future consequences, which are anticipated based on the past and present circumstances, and not the actual outcome.

So if you decide to drive to the store to buy some groceries, and you get into a severe car accident that causes much harm, you could not have anticipated that harm, so it does not make the decision immoral.

But if you decide to drive drunk, you could anticipate severe harm, and so it is a sin, even if no harm happens to occur.

Yes, the actual consequences do not affect the morality of the act.

 

[Ender]

1. “The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species.”

Doesn’t this say that the consequences - foreseeable or actual - “cannot alter [the] moral species” of an act; that they can only mitigate the responsibility?

The morality of the act is determined when the act is committed. That is why the third font only includes the reasonably anticipated future consequences, which are anticipated based on the past and present circumstances, and not the actual outcome.

But as stated above the “reasonably anticipated future consequences” do not determine the moral nature of the act.

I will say that there is an aspect of this question that for me is not yet resolved. CCC 1754 says this: Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. This says that the circumstances - and especially the consequences - cannot make a bad act good but it does not specifically say that it cannot make a good act bad.

Aquinas appears to address this with respect to circumstances in general but not with regard to consequences: “A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil” (ST I/II 18, 5 ad 4). I have yet to find anything that completely clarifies this.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

Doesn’t this say that the consequences - foreseeable or actual - “cannot alter [the] moral species” of an act; that they can only mitigate the responsibility?

The moral species of the act is determined by the moral object; this is the second font.
The consequences is the third font.
So when the moral object is evil, the act is intrinsically evil; the species or type of act is inherently morally disordered.
The consequences do not change the moral species, i.e. the moral object, and the inherent moral nature (or species) of the act.
Consequences can mitigate responsibility, but cannot make the inherently immoral act become moral.

But as stated above the “reasonably anticipated future consequences” do not determine the moral nature of the act.

That is because the moral nature or species of the act is determined by the moral object; each font is distinct from the other. So consequences (third font) cannot determine the moral nature (second font).

I will say that there is an aspect of this question that for me is not yet resolved. CCC 1754 says this: Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. This says that the circumstances - and especially the consequences - cannot make a bad act good but it does not specifically say that it cannot make a good act bad.

The act has three fonts. The circumstances (in the third font) cannot change the moral quality, i.e. the moral nature or moral species of the act, since this is in the second font. So when an act is in itself evil (having an evil moral object), the second font is bad. Whenever any one font is bad, the other two fonts cannot make the act moral, because one bad font corrupts the act.

However, if intention and moral object are good, a bad third font (when the bad consequences outweigh the good) makes the act immoral. So the consequences can make the act immoral, even if the other two fonts are good. But good consequences cannot make an act moral that has bad intention or bad moral object.

Aquinas appears to address this with respect to circumstances in general but not with regard to consequences: “A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil” (ST I/II 18, 5 ad 4). I have yet to find anything that completely clarifies this.

Thomas was writing before the modern terminology about the three fonts. So when we say circumstances, we mean the third font. But Thomas is using the word circumstances in a broader sense. Then he narrows it, in effect, by specifying which broad circumstances affect the moral object, and which would not. But in modern terminology, whatever determines the moral object is not in the circumstances, but is inherent to the act itself.

So when an act is inherently ordered toward the deprivation of life of an innocent person, then the act is intrinsically evil. Whatever pertains to that inherent ordering toward the moral object (killing the innocent) is not a circumstance in the modern terminology.