The Stanford Encyclopedia's view on Ontological Argument

[Peter_Plato]

For years I thought the first argument was flawed, but now I am not so sure. See James Cutsinger’s fine article here: cutsinger.net/pdf/thinking_the_unthinkable.pdf

Oh, I agree that Anselm is on to something quite profound – the connection between mind and reality; and the nature of mind/intellect itself – which is why the argument has had nine lives. I also agree that the argument hasn’t been “proven false” as so many claim. That doesn’t mean it has been proven true, necessarily.

Thanks for the link to Cutsinger’s article.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Peter,

Oh, I agree that Anselm is on to something quite profound – the connection between mind and reality; and the nature of mind/intellect itself – which is why the argument has had nine lives. I also agree that the argument hasn’t been “proven false” as so many claim. That doesn’t mean it has been proven true, necessarily.

I recall Bertrand Russell framing the question this way. Either it is possible that one can build a bridge between pure thought and reality or it isn’t. He eventually thought it isn’t. Although it is fascinating that he, even if for a brief moment, thought that Anselm’s first argument was sound. (see Richard Dawkins’ anecdote about Russell in The God Delusion chapter on the OA)

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

The “pure thought” Russell was referring to was Anselm’s definition of God, That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Thought (TTWNGBT). Anselm assumed that this idea of God was thinkable (meaningful, consistent, coherent, etc.). Given that definition and employing the principle set forth in Prosl. 3, there is then a strong argument that God exists.

1. Definition: God is TTWNGCBT.
2. Premise: The above concept of God is thinkable.
3. Premise: There are two modes of existence, necessary and contingent.
4. Premise: Whatever exists necessarily is greater than that which exists contingently (principle from Prosl. 3).
5. Reductio ad absurdam argument: Suppose TTWNGCBT exists contingently. But then this poses a contradiction because I could then conceive a something greater, namely that which exists necessarily.
6. Therefore, God cannot exist contingently.
7. Therefore God exists necessarily.
8. God exists.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hartshorne argues that Anselm proved this much: There are only two possibilities. God exists necessarily or God’s existence is impossible. In other words, if our idea of God as TTWNGCBT is thinkable, then God must exist. If our idea of God is not thinkable–i.e. it is nonsense akin to round squares–then God can’t exist.

The position which holds that our concept of God is thinkable but his existence is contingent has been decisively eliminated. This is Anselm’s great discovery.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hartshorne argues that Anselm proved this much: There are only two possibilities. God exists necessarily or God’s existence is impossible. In other words, if our idea of God as TTWNGCBT is thinkable, then God must exist. If our idea of God is not thinkable–i.e. it is nonsense akin to round squares–then God can’t exist.

The position which holds that our concept of God is thinkable but his existence is contingent has been decisively eliminated. This is Anselm’s great discovery.

If Anselm’s argument works, then NOT accepting it isn’t resorting to reason so much as abdicating reason on the pretext of the possibility that our ability to reason might be flawed in some way.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Peter,

If Anselm’s argument works, then NOT accepting it isn’t resorting to reason so much as abdicating reason on the pretext of the possibility that our ability to reason might be flawed in some way.

I think the logic of the argument as I’ve presented it is valid. Folks will continue to debate whether the premises are sound. But I think they are going to have a tough time of it.

But that’s the value of making the elements of an argument explicit. You can evaluate each one. But if you grant the premises, then the conclusion follows. One can always doubt your reasoning ability in accepting or rejecting the premises, but we can’t reasonably doubt reason (logic) itself.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

To reject Premise 2 is to hold that there is no meaningful concept of God. IOW, our definition is nonsense, like talking about round squares or married bachelors. That is the position of the logical positivists who deny there are metaphysical truths.

To reject Premise 3 is to hold that all existence is contingent. IOW, nothing must exist. Therefore absolute nothingness is a “real” possibility. (But good luck in trying to conceive of absolutely nuttin’)

To reject Premise 4 is to deny that something which cannot not exist is greater that something which can not exist. I still haven’t figured out how one could argue that.

The most promising ground avenue of attack is to question premise 2.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hi Peter,

I think the logic of the argument as I’ve presented it is valid. Folks will continue to debate whether the premises are sound. But I think they are going to have a tough time of it.

But that’s the value of making the elements of an argument explicit. You can evaluate each one. But if you grant the premises, then the conclusion follows. One can always doubt your reasoning ability in accepting or rejecting the premises, but we can’t reasonably doubt reason (logic) itself.

But isn’t that precisely what the rebuttal amounts to – we can’t be sure that our reasoning ability sufficiently warrants a claim concerning ontological certainty?

BTW. I do agree that we can’t reasonably doubt reason itself – that is tantamount to insanity.

That is ultimately why faith becomes the ground for reason and reason the ground for faith.

They stand or fall together.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

But isn’t that precisely what the rebuttal amounts to – we can’t be sure that our reasoning ability sufficiently warrants a claim concerning ontological certainty?

…

I don’t think the strongest challenge to the OA rests on our doubts about our reasoning ability. I think it comes from the positivist claim that we cannot, in principle, reason our way from an idea of something to the conclusion that that something exists. They would say that all propositions asserting the existence of something are contingent (could be true or false).

 

[Peter_Plato]

I don’t think the strongest challenge to the OA rests on our doubts about our reasoning ability. I think it comes from the positivist claim that we cannot, in principle, reason our way from an idea of something to the conclusion that that something exists. They would say that all propositions asserting the existence of something are contingent (could be true or false).

Contingent on what?

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Peter,

Contingent on what? The state of reality. If we say “X exists,” positivists would have us always assume reality could prove our proposition false. X may or may not exist in reality or, if it does exist, it could cease existing.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Hi Peter,

Contingent on what? The state of reality. If we say “X exists,” positivists would have us always assume reality could prove our proposition false. X may or may not exist in reality or, if it does exist, it could cease existing.

You aren’t claiming that reality could be true or could be false, are you?

I don’t think the strongest challenge to the OA rests on our doubts about our reasoning ability. I think it comes from the positivist claim that we cannot, in principle, reason our way from an idea of something to the conclusion that that something exists. They would say that all propositions asserting the existence of something are contingent (could be true or false).

The truth or falsity of our propositions can’t be contingent on reality because reality is what it is. It is the disjunction between reality and our thinking of it that creates the contingent nature of our thinking. Explaining the disjunction or bridging the gap between our thinking and reality removes the contingency and would make all our propositions true, virtually by definition.

The fact that our propositions are not currently all true is not contingent on reality but on the disjunction between our thinking and reality. That disjunction is the reason why ontological arguments are often dismissed.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

You aren’t claiming that reality could be true or could be false, are you?

The truth or falsity of our propositions can’t be contingent on reality because reality is what it is. It is the disjunction between reality and our thinking of it that creates the contingent nature of our thinking. Explaining the disjunction or bridging the gap between our thinking and reality removes the contingency and would make all our propositions true, virtually by definition.

The fact that our propositions are not currently all true is not contingent on reality but on the disjunction between our thinking and reality. That disjunction is the reason why ontological arguments are often dismissed.

Reality, as you say, is what it is. We test our propositions about what exists and what doesn’t against reality. Or at least that is my naive view of it.

If there is a disjunction between our thinking and reality, it is because our thinking doesn’t line up with reality. That there is often a disjunction between our propositions about reality and reality itself does not argue against Anselm’s ontological arguments. It is the positivist claim–All propositions about the existence of something could be true or false-- which challenges the key premise of the argument.