The Unmoved Mover - ambiguity

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This could mean a number of things either singly or in combination…
(a) it sets another in motion yet is not itself in motion in the same respect?
(b) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion in the same respect?
(c) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion but not necessarily in the same respect?
(d) it sets another in motion and is itself not in motion at all (though it may be “in act” eg creation ex nihilo is not “motion”)?
(e) no other thing ever puts this thing into motion?

Any thoughts on which of the above may be rightly affirmed of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover?

Is it the same for Aquinas?
 
This could mean a number of things either singly or in combination…
(a) it sets another in motion yet is not itself in motion in the same respect?
(b) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion in the same respect?
(c) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion but not necessarily in the same respect?
(d) it sets another in motion and is itself not in motion at all (though it may be “in act” eg creation ex nihilo is not “motion”)?
(e) no other thing ever puts this thing into motion?

Any thoughts on which of the above may be rightly affirmed of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover?

Is it the same for Aquinas?
I am afraid that the analogy you are using is an incorrect one. Movement is a propriety of objects. They can either be at rest or in motion. In the Universe however nothing is at rest.
We know that all the matter that comprises the Universe has subatomic particles that are whirling around, vibrating but not at rest.

GOD is not as Fr. Barron likes to say the “Universe’s spaghetti monster” HE is NOT an object.

Aristotle and Aquinas speak of the “Uncaused cause” which is also called the contingency proof of the existance of GOD.

Simply put, all or everything in the Universe has a cause that comes before an action or actuality.
You for example are the cause that I write this response. My mum and dad where the cause that I came to this world.
Causation here merely points to a change of state from potentiality to causality.

If we go backward in time we see that for GOD to not exist we would need an infinite number of causes. And this is illogical for there must be a first cause that sets everything in motion.
This nowadays is further confirmed from the fact that we can actually date the age of the Universe with a very precise amount of error, meaning that our confidence in the actual age has become stronger with every test we have come up with to test this hipothesis.

Hope this helps you in your philosophical musings.

 
This could mean a number of things either singly or in combination…
(a) it sets another in motion yet is not itself in motion in the same respect?
(b) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion in the same respect?
(c) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion but not necessarily in the same respect?
(d) it sets another in motion and is itself not in motion at all (though it may be “in act” eg creation ex nihilo is not “motion”)?
(e) no other thing ever puts this thing into motion?

Any thoughts on which of the above may be rightly affirmed of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover?

Is it the same for Aquinas?
As far as Aristotle is concerned the answer is none of the above. As he makes clear in Book XII of Metaphysics, the Unmoved Mover, whom he calls God, movers the Highest Heaven but does not move Himself, unless one considers " thinking upon thinking " as a movement. Aristotle does not acknowledge or admit of creation at all. The Highest Heaven is moved by love for the Unmoved Mover and the lower heavens are moved out of love for the heaven next higher to them.

For Thomas the question is a bit mixed. For him the Unmoved Mover moves every thing under Him but does not move himself. However Thomas does acknowledge, philosophically, an eternal creation. The question is does he appeal to this in his proofs for the existence of God. The second book of the SCG is all about creation, but Thomas does not say whether this is the philosophical, eternal creation he allows or whether he is now speaking as a theologian speaking of the creation ex nihilo as defined by the Church. He does the same thing in the S.T…

Glad to see a real philosophical question for a change. Things have been going down hill here for the past few months, as far as philosophy is concerned.

Linus2nd
 
This could mean a number of things either singly or in combination…
(a) it sets another in motion yet is not itself in motion in the same respect?
(b) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion in the same respect?
(c) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion but not necessarily in the same respect?
(d) it sets another in motion and is itself not in motion at all (though it may be “in act” eg creation ex nihilo is not “motion”)?
(e) no other thing ever puts this thing into motion?

Any thoughts on which of the above may be rightly affirmed of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover?

Is it the same for Aquinas?
I believe (d) would be Aristotle’s first unmoved mover, i.e., an absolutely unmoved and immutable mover, pure act. In Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics (Book 8), Aquinas says:
“After showing that whatever is moved is moved by another, the Philosopher now begins to show that it is necessary to reach a first immobile mover. And his treatment is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that it is necessary to reach a first that is either immobile or moves itself; In the second he shows that even if a first that moves itself is reached, it is further necessary to reach a first mover that is immobile.”

In Book 1 of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas says:
"[21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that there is a first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause—it yet does not follow that this mover is absolutely unmoved. That is why Aristotle goes on to say that the condition of the first mover may be twofold [VIII, 5]. The first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we save the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved. This may be argued, because that which is through itself is prior to what is through another. Hence, among things moved as well, it seems reasonable that the first moved is moved through itself and not by another. "

[22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion again follows. For it cannot be said that, when a mover moves himself, the whole is moved by the whole. Otherwise, the same difficulties would follow as before: one person would both teach and be taught, and the same would be true among other motions. It would also follow that a being would be both in potency and in act; for a mover is, as such, in act, whereas the thing moved is in potency. Consequently, one part of the self-moved mover is solely moving, and the other part solely moved. We thus reach the same conclusion as before: there exists an unmoved mover.
 

I am afraid that the analogy you are using is an incorrect one. Movement is a propriety of objects.​

Jerry I don’t understand…
I wasn’t using an analogy as far as I know, I was simply quoting Aquinas who was paraphrasing Aristotle.

I am not really interested in modern views on their philosophy, I am attempting to understand them on their own terms using their own words (albeit translated).

Or have I missed something?
 
As far as Aristotle is concerned the answer is none of the above. As he makes clear in Book XII of Metaphysics, the Unmoved Mover, whom he calls God, movers the Highest Heaven but does not move Himself
Hi Linus.
OK
Why doesn’t (e) apply? That is, nothing Other puts this Unmoved Mover into motion?
If He is “unmoved” then surely no “other” substance (or “part” of His own substance) acts on Him?

Why doesn’t (c) apply? That is, He sets another in motion and is Himself in some way in act (for if He was not someway in act then He could not move another)?

Also, when you translate Aristotle as saying “but does not move Himself”…this is ambiguous. Does Aristotle/you mean:
(I) He is not himself in motion OR
(ii) He does not cause His own motion?
 
I believe (d) would be Aristotle’s first unmoved mover, i.e., an absolutely unmoved and immutable mover, pure act. In Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics (Book 8), Aquinas says:
“After showing that whatever is moved is moved by another, the Philosopher now begins to show that it is necessary to reach a first immobile mover. And his treatment is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that it is necessary to reach a first that is either immobile or moves itself; In the second he shows that even if a first that moves itself is reached, it is further necessary to reach a first mover that is immobile.”
In Book 1 of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas says:
"[21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that there is a first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause—it yet does not follow that this mover is absolutely unmoved. That is why Aristotle goes on to say that the condition of the first mover may be twofold [VIII, 5]. The first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we save the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved. This may be argued, because that which is through itself is prior to what is through another. Hence, among things moved as well, it seems reasonable that the first moved is moved through itself and not by another. "

This is interesting…though a little ambiguous.
Would not “a first mover that is immobile” always be the case by the very meaning of the terms (ie its an “apriori analytic” proposition). For if there can be no prior mover to the first mover then, by necessity, this first mover is “immobile”?

I suppose it depends, as you quote below, on whether, wrt to the subject of motion, we are talking complete substance or “parts” thereof.

Joseph Magee holds that in Aquinas’s First Way we are not talking about living things (which, by reason of “parts” (soul/body) is able to move itself without being moved by another. “It is the soul that is the unmoving cause of the motion of living things.”
[22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion again follows. For it cannot be said that, when a mover moves himself, the whole is moved by the whole. Otherwise, the same difficulties would follow as before: one person would both teach and be taught, and the same would be true among other motions. It would also follow that a being would be both in potency and in act; for a mover is, as such, in act, whereas the thing moved is in potency. Consequently, one part of the self-moved mover is solely moving, and the other part solely moved. We thus reach the same conclusion as before: there exists an unmoved mover.
 
Hi Linus.
OK
Why doesn’t (e) apply? That is, nothing Other puts this Unmoved Mover into motion?
If He is “unmoved” then surely no “other” substance (or “part” of His own substance) acts on Him?

Why doesn’t (c) apply? That is, He sets another in motion and is Himself in some way in act (for if He was not someway in act then He could not move another)?

Also, when you translate Aristotle as saying “but does not move Himself”…this is ambiguous. Does Aristotle/you mean:
(I) He is not himself in motion OR
(ii) He does not cause His own motion?
I suggest you read Book XII of Metaphysics or Thomas’ Commentary here:
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Metaphysics.htm

Linus2nd
 
Hi Linus.
OK
Why doesn’t (e) apply? That is, nothing Other puts this Unmoved Mover into motion?
If He is “unmoved” then surely no “other” substance (or “part” of His own substance) acts on Him?

Why doesn’t (c) apply? That is, He sets another in motion and is Himself in some way in act (for if He was not someway in act then He could not move another)?

Also, when you translate Aristotle as saying “but does not move Himself”…this is ambiguous. Does Aristotle/you mean:
(I) He is not himself in motion OR
(ii) He does not cause His own motion?
I think Aristotle means (I) that God is not in motion. I would have selected (d) from your initial choice of options. It seems to me that you are maybe thinking that “being in motion” is synonymous with “being in act.” Being in motion means that you are going from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. God is pure act, so He has no potentialities to actualize. So He’s “in act” but not “in motion.”
 
I suggest you read Book XII of Metaphysics or Thomas’ Commentary here:
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Metaphysics.htm

Linus2nd
Linus you should know by now I am looking for more than static dead words (which I can usually find for myself thanks) but living words that interpret the generic and often ambiguous dead words which don’t explain themselves 👍.

I am not interested in what others write generically out of context, I am interested in what you as a living thinking experienced philosopher can come up with in context applying your wisdom focused on the very particular problematic at hand.
 
I think Aristotle means (I) that God is not in motion. I would have selected (d) from your initial choice of options. It seems to me that you are maybe thinking that “being in motion” is synonymous with “being in act.” Being in motion means that you are going from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. God is pure act, so He has no potentialities to actualize. So He’s “in act” but not “in motion.”
That’s a good observation - my option (d) is a little ambiguous in that regard I admit.

As a complete tangent it is interesting to note that:
  • a being in pure act necessarily has no potentialities to actualise so can never be in motion.
  • Yet the converse apparently is not true. That is, a being with no more potentialities to actualise is not necessarily the Unmoved Mover. I suppose such a being is in pure act all the same. Such are the celestial bodies I believe.
 
I would have selected (d) from your initial choice of options. It seems to me that you are maybe thinking that “being in motion” is synonymous with “being in act.” Being in motion means that you are going from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. God is pure act, so He has no potentialities to actualize. So He’s “in act” but not “in motion.”
Had another thought or two.
Why would you not include (e) as well?

Would you accept the following statements as meaningful and true?
(I) God is pure act
(ii) God is in act
(iii) God acts on other beings (ie as efficient cause of their motion)

And if so does “act” mean the same thing in each assertion?
 
That’s a good observation - my option (d) is a little ambiguous in that regard I admit.

As a complete tangent it is interesting to note that:
  • a being in pure act necessarily has no potentialities to actualise so can never be in motion.
  • Yet the converse apparently is not true. That is, a being with no more potentialities to actualise is not necessarily the Unmoved Mover. I suppose such a being is in pure act all the same. Such are the celestial bodies I believe.
Yeah, I’ve wondered about the case of something that is purely-actual-but-finite as well. Wouldn’t that be a “pure form” though, which Aquinas identifies with angels and demons?
 
Had another thought or two.
Why would you not include (e) as well?

Would you accept the following statements as meaningful and true?
(I) God is pure act
(ii) God is in act
(iii) God acts on other beings (ie as efficient cause of their motion)

And if so does “act” mean the same thing in each assertion?
I suppose (e) is also valid. As for your three new options, it seems that (I) is stating that God is actual in every way, while (II) is stating that God is actual in some unspecified way, and (III) is stating that God is actual specifically in regards to acting on other things. So “act” is being used univocally in all three but the qualifiers are different.
 
Linus you should know by now I am looking for more than static dead words (which I can usually find for myself thanks) but living words that interpret the generic and often ambiguous dead words which don’t explain themselves 👍.

I am not interested in what others write generically out of context, I am interested in what you as a living thinking experienced philosopher can come up with in context applying your wisdom focused on the very particular problematic at hand.
I will try to remember that you aren’t interested in what real philosophers ( A. and T. ) have to say.😃

Linus2nd
 
I will try to remember that you aren’t interested in what real philosophers ( A. and T. ) have to say.😃

Linus2nd
Linus you are a real philosopher (when you commit) but a book written by a Philosopher who has not had the opportunity to happily reflect and amend his philosophy in the light of 1000-2000 years worth of Physical and Metaphysical developments becomes increasingly silent to contemporary problematics.
 
Yeah, I’ve wondered about the case of something that is purely-actual-but-finite as well. Wouldn’t that be a “pure form” though, which Aquinas identifies with angels and demons?
Aquinas speculates on this in SCG. He suggested that a Celestial Body could be very close to Prime Matter (which doesn’t exist in its own right) such that all its potentiality (which is very minimal) is fully actuated meaning it can never change/corrupt (it has no potency to) and so would be eternal. I believe angelic natures, while simple as you say, are still composed of potency and act. Celestial Bodies, by this account, are totally activated (=“pure act”?).
 
Linus you are a real philosopher (when you commit) but a book written by a Philosopher who has not had the opportunity to happily reflect and amend his philosophy in the light of 1000-2000 years worth of Physical and Metaphysical developments becomes increasingly silent to contemporary problematics.
Why not just believe what the Church teaches? Why get hung up on philosophy? God doesn’t demand or expect all of us to be philosophers. Read the Bible and the Catechism and have faith. That is all God asks. Doesn’t seem too hard to me.

I know God created the universe, that takes intelligence. And I am personally convinced that the Unmoved Mover of Thomas is the God of Revelatiion, but not everone agrees. I don’t expect them to and neither does God. All we have to believe is that God loves us and that he is our personal God and that he is perfect in every way. And if he is perfect in every way, he is certainly intelligent.

God Bless
Linus2nd
 
Aquinas speculates on this in SCG. He suggested that a Celestial Body could be very close to Prime Matter (which doesn’t exist in its own right) such that all its potentiality (which is very minimal) is fully actuated meaning it can never change/corrupt (it has no potency to) and so would be eternal. I believe angelic natures, while simple as you say, are still composed of potency and act. Celestial Bodies, by this account, are totally activated (=“pure act”?).
I think something like what you and Aquinas describe is possible in theory. He does call angels “pure forms” though I think, and since the form is the principle of act in an object then a pure form would be fully actual. If angels change it would have to be a change in intellect or will I suppose. I guess Aquinas doesn’t have the last word on angels though since all of our data on angels comes from revelation so we don’t have too much to work with.
 
Why not just believe what the Church teaches? Why get hung up on philosophy? God doesn’t demand or expect all of us to be philosophers. Read the Bible and the Catechism and have faith. That is all God asks. Doesn’t seem too hard to me. God Bless
Linus2nd
I am glad you weren’t Aquinas’s spiritual director 👍.
 
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