This could mean a number of things either singly or in combination…
(a) it sets another in motion yet is not itself in motion in the same respect?
(b) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion in the same respect?
(c) it sets another in motion and is itself in motion but not necessarily in the same respect?
(d) it sets another in motion and is itself not in motion at all (though it may be “in act” eg creation ex nihilo is not “motion”)?
(e) no other thing ever puts this thing into motion?
Any thoughts on which of the above may be rightly affirmed of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover?
Is it the same for Aquinas?
I believe (d) would be Aristotle’s first unmoved mover, i.e., an absolutely unmoved and immutable mover, pure act. In Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics (Book 8), Aquinas says:
“After showing that whatever is moved is moved by another, the Philosopher now begins to show that it is necessary to reach a first immobile mover. And his treatment is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that it is necessary to reach a first that is either immobile or moves itself; In the second he shows that even if a first that moves itself is reached, it is further necessary to reach a first mover that is immobile.”
In Book 1 of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas says:
"[21] Granted this conclusion—namely, that there is a first mover that is not moved by an exterior moving cause—it yet does not follow that this mover is absolutely unmoved. That is why Aristotle goes on to say that the condition of the first mover may be twofold [VIII, 5]. The first mover can be absolutely unmoved. If so, we save the conclusion we are seeking: there is a first unmoved mover. On the other hand, the first mover can be self-moved. This may be argued, because that which is through itself is prior to what is through another. Hence, among things moved as well, it seems reasonable that the first moved is moved through itself and not by another. "
[22] But, on this basis, the same conclusion again follows. For it cannot be said that, when a mover moves himself, the whole is moved by the whole. Otherwise, the same difficulties would follow as before: one person would both teach and be taught, and the same would be true among other motions. It would also follow that a being would be both in potency and in act; for a mover is, as such, in act, whereas the thing moved is in potency. Consequently, one part of the self-moved mover is solely moving, and the other part solely moved. We thus reach the same conclusion as before: there exists an unmoved mover.