T
ThomasLLL
Guest
The CCC, Compendium on Social Teaching, and some of the papal statements are very quick to point out that not all taking is theft. I believe that this is right.
The common example is that a hungry man may take what he needs in accordance with the common destiny of all goods, and that is is a matter of justice, not of charity. (Think Jean Valjean). I do not believe this is right, at least not as presented.
Scripture says that:
Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry; But if he be found, he shall restore sevenfold; he shall give all the substance of his house.
And:
Remove far from me vanity and lies: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: Lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the LORD? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain.
Now it plainly cannot be that by taking what is in justice mine (“When we attend to those in want, we give them what is theirs, not ours.” CCC 2446) one is also taking the name of God in vain. Neither, if it is mine, could I be called “a thief” and required to repay seven times. In the famine (thousands of hungry people) in Egypt, Joseph sold the food he had stockpiled because of God’s warning. You can only lawfully sell what is yours, not what is another’s. If Joseph ransomed them back their own food during a famine, surely he should be the villain of the story, not the hero.
Both St. Thomas and Hugo Grotius address taking vs theft. St Thomas is particularly frequently referenced in the modern documents; but I cannot find in either of them such a broad principle that it begins to encompass foreign aid, public education, &c. Both St Thomas and Grotius seem to be focusing on cases in extremis; that is, urgent necessity where no alternative exists. Grotius focuses on the demands of war, and St. Thomas in his treatment (just above where people prefer to quote) references the same scripture as I do, noticing the guilt in this case is lessened, but not eliminated. He uses it as proof of the rule, and certainly says such an action could be rendered completely just–that is, not theft at all. But since it is not so in the case of the hungry man in Proverbs, I can only understand him as meaning in an even more extreme necessity without alternatives (conditions mentioned previously). Extreme cases without alternatives such as a parched man in a desert, a man seeking shelter from a storm, a man on the point of starvation that finds a chicken, &c. (those are my examples).
Beyond this, he also mentions open and furtive taking. I cannot find him justifying either coercion or taking to help someone else (except if the taking were literally in their place, ie bringing water to the parched man would be acting in his place, but not mugging a man for his wallet because I knew there was someone, somewhere that needed the money), both of which are involved in involuntary redistribution (“now . . . everything comes down to force”, Maistre).
How does the CCC read this so broadly as to include these less dire cases, where alternatives may exist, which seem already to be addressed clearly in Scripture, and in a contrary fashion?
I might add that the chapter on theft in Trent is much more straightforward.
The common example is that a hungry man may take what he needs in accordance with the common destiny of all goods, and that is is a matter of justice, not of charity. (Think Jean Valjean). I do not believe this is right, at least not as presented.
Scripture says that:
Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry; But if he be found, he shall restore sevenfold; he shall give all the substance of his house.
And:
Remove far from me vanity and lies: give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me: Lest I be full, and deny thee, and say, Who is the LORD? or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain.
Now it plainly cannot be that by taking what is in justice mine (“When we attend to those in want, we give them what is theirs, not ours.” CCC 2446) one is also taking the name of God in vain. Neither, if it is mine, could I be called “a thief” and required to repay seven times. In the famine (thousands of hungry people) in Egypt, Joseph sold the food he had stockpiled because of God’s warning. You can only lawfully sell what is yours, not what is another’s. If Joseph ransomed them back their own food during a famine, surely he should be the villain of the story, not the hero.
Both St. Thomas and Hugo Grotius address taking vs theft. St Thomas is particularly frequently referenced in the modern documents; but I cannot find in either of them such a broad principle that it begins to encompass foreign aid, public education, &c. Both St Thomas and Grotius seem to be focusing on cases in extremis; that is, urgent necessity where no alternative exists. Grotius focuses on the demands of war, and St. Thomas in his treatment (just above where people prefer to quote) references the same scripture as I do, noticing the guilt in this case is lessened, but not eliminated. He uses it as proof of the rule, and certainly says such an action could be rendered completely just–that is, not theft at all. But since it is not so in the case of the hungry man in Proverbs, I can only understand him as meaning in an even more extreme necessity without alternatives (conditions mentioned previously). Extreme cases without alternatives such as a parched man in a desert, a man seeking shelter from a storm, a man on the point of starvation that finds a chicken, &c. (those are my examples).
Beyond this, he also mentions open and furtive taking. I cannot find him justifying either coercion or taking to help someone else (except if the taking were literally in their place, ie bringing water to the parched man would be acting in his place, but not mugging a man for his wallet because I knew there was someone, somewhere that needed the money), both of which are involved in involuntary redistribution (“now . . . everything comes down to force”, Maistre).
How does the CCC read this so broadly as to include these less dire cases, where alternatives may exist, which seem already to be addressed clearly in Scripture, and in a contrary fashion?
I might add that the chapter on theft in Trent is much more straightforward.