Transubstantiation as explanation

[Michaelangelo]

I’m curious about the model used by the magisterium to explain the, so called, true presence. As far as I understand it, the terms substance and accidents used by the church have the same meaning as when the terms are used in Greek philosophy.

What I don’t understand is why the church continues to use this explanatory model when nothing even remotely resembling substance or accidents have been observed? Why does the church even try to explain this? Why not simply say “we haven’t the faintest idea what or how” but we believe something happens with the bread and wine? Instead this, in my opinion, rather weak model continues to be taught as truth despite lack of support outside the realm of philosophy.

Have I missed something painfully obvious here?

 

[Aulef]

What do you mean by “ nothing even remotely resembling substance or accidents have been observed“?

 

[Vico]

I’m curious about the model used by the magisterium to explain the, so called, true presence. As far as I understand it, the terms substance and accidents used by the church have the same meaning as when the terms are used in Greek philosophy.

What I don’t understand is why the church continues to use this explanatory model when nothing even remotely resembling substance or accidents have been observed? Why does the church even try to explain this? Why not simply say “we haven’t the faintest idea what or how” but we believe something happens with the bread and wine? Instead this, in my opinion, rather weak model continues to be taught as truth despite lack of support outside the realm of philosophy.

Have I missed something painfully obvious here?

Substance is whatever exists in and of itself, and accidents are what modify substances. Example: the car is the substance and the color, size, and shape of the car are its accidents.

 

[Wesrock]

I’m curious about the model used by the magisterium to explain the, so called, true presence. As far as I understand it, the terms substance and accidents used by the church have the same meaning as when the terms are used in Greek philosophy.

What I don’t understand is why the church continues to use this explanatory model when nothing even remotely resembling substance or accidents have been observed? Why does the church even try to explain this? Why not simply say “we haven’t the faintest idea what or how” but we believe something happens with the bread and wine? Instead this, in my opinion, rather weak model continues to be taught as truth despite lack of support outside the realm of philosophy.

Have I missed something painfully obvious here?

The dogma uses the words species and accident, but all it means is that what was bread becomes the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ and what was wine becomes the blood, body, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ while retaining all appearances of bread and wine. It’s not an explanation of the metaphysics of it changing, it’s just what we accept by faith as a divine miracle. What was bread and wine is now Jesus, as he promised, and has been taught since the apostles.

And the question of observation of substance and accidents really just begs the question but that’s a separate discussion than the dogma.

 

[Michaelangelo]

What do you mean by “ nothing even remotely resembling substance or accidents have been observed“?

I fail to see a correlation between what is being meant by substance in philosophy and what we have observed in nature. Take two different minerals and two different birds. There is no substance difference between the two minerals. And a sparrow and a crow does not have varuous substances. As far as I know, I might add.

 

[Michaelangelo]

Substance is whatever exists in and of itself, and accidents are what modify substances. Example: the car is the substance and the color, size, and shape of the car are its accidents.

It is easy to think that a leaf is green or a chair is blue. But that is not correct. They don’t have a color at all. This is very counter intuitive. And how does the substance differ between a Volvo and Mercedes?

 

[Michaelangelo]

The dogma uses the words species and accident, but all it means is that what was bread becomes the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ and what was wine becomes the blood, body, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ while retaining all appearances of bread and wine. It’s not an explanation of the metaphysics of it changing, it’s just what we accept by faith as a divine miracle. What was bread and wine is now Jesus, as he promised, and has been taught since the apostles.

What I’ve read from the magisterium I can’t see as anything but an attempt at explaining. Instead of simply accepting that the church can’t explain it and say we believe this is the result, it uses these philosophical tools for which there is no support.

And the question of observation of substance and accidents really just begs the question but that’s a separate discussion than the dogma.

I don’t understand what you mean here.

 

[Wesrock]

Vico:

Substance is whatever exists in and of itself, and accidents are what modify substances. Example: the car is the substance and the color, size, and shape of the car are its accidents.

It is easy to think that a leaf is green or a chair is blue. But that is not correct. They don’t have a color at all. This is very counter intuitive. And how does the substance differ between a Volvo and Mercedes?

A Volvo and a Mercedes are not substances, they’re artifacts. The metals they are made of would be examples of substances. I also think you’re using substance incorrectly. You and I are both the same type of substances, but we are different substances because we are different unities.

Also, I disagree with your approach to color there. There’s multiple ways to refer to it. Anyway, there’s other types of accidents besides color.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

The dogma uses the words species and accident, but all it means is that what was bread becomes the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ and what was wine becomes the blood, body, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ while retaining all appearances of bread and wine. It’s not an explanation of the metaphysics of it changing, it’s just what we accept by faith as a divine miracle. What was bread and wine is now Jesus, as he promised, and has been taught since the apostles.

What I’ve read from the magisterium I can’t see as anything but an attempt at explaining. Instead of simply accepting that the church can’t explain it and say we believe this is the result, it uses these philosophical tools for which there is no support.

You’re mixing precise philosophical technical terms up with the fact that transubstantiation is just Latin for “change in what it is,” and you’re mixing analyses like St. Thomas Aquinas’ up with the actual dogmas, which just is “this is what it is and we accept it on faith.”

And the question of observation of substance and accidents really just begs the question but that’s a separate discussion than the dogma.

I don’t understand what you mean here.

It just… seems to miss the point entirely in the substance and accidents division as different types of being and the justification for such a division.

 

[Michaelangelo]

Seriously! How do I add quotations from several different persons in a response? I’m apparently too stupid to figure out that function.

 

[Wesrock]

Seriously! How do I add quotations from several different persons in a response? I’m apparently too stupid to figure out that function.

I copy and paste quotations into a separate document (without posting), prepare my response. Then copy it over into a new post.

 

[Michaelangelo]

A Volvo and a Mercedes are not substances, they’re artifacts. The metals they are made of would be examples of substances. I also think you’re using substance incorrectly. You and I are both the same type of substances, but we are different substances because we are different unities.

But a rock, a car, a bird and a fish, are all made from the same components. The Greeks didn’t think so and Aquinas didn’t think so. This is perfectly understandable given their knowledge about nature. But today we know that there is no difference between what components these examples are made from. So, how do they differ in substance?

Also, I disagree with your approach to color there. There’s multiple ways to refer to it. Anyway, there’s other types of accidents besides color.

And those multiple ways are?

 

[Michaelangelo]

I copy and paste quotations into a separate document (without posting), prepare my response. Then copy it over into a new post.

I will now put on my silly hat and quietly go sit in the timeout corner for being this stupid.

Thank you!

You’re mixing precise philosophical technical terms up with the fact that transubstantiation is just Latin for “change in what it is,” and you’re mixing analyses like St. Thomas Aquinas’ up with the actual dogmas, which just is “this is what it is and we accept it on faith.”

Then why are the technical philosophical terms used in the catechism when explaining the dogma of transubstantiation?

It just… seems to miss the point entirely in the substance and accidents division as different types of being and the justification for such a division.

Is there a justification for such a division?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

A Volvo and a Mercedes are not substances, they’re artifacts. The metals they are made of would be examples of substances. I also think you’re using substance incorrectly. You and I are both the same type of substances, but we are different substances because we are different unities.

But a rock, a car, a bird and a fish, are all made from the same components. The Greeks didn’t think so and Aquinas didn’t think so. This is perfectly understandable given their knowledge about nature. But today we know that there is no difference between what components these examples are made from. So, how do they differ in substance?

Because unlike a car, a bird and a fish are more than the sum of their parts. Substance refers to the “substantial” unity of a being. They operate as wholes with intrinsic operations and ends. Substance refers to the unified whole that is a thing.

Also, I disagree with your approach to color there. There’s multiple ways to refer to it. Anyway, there’s other types of accidents besides color.

And those multiple ways are?

“Naive” color realism is still a thing defended as intrinsic properties of things, for one, even somewhat separated from our perception of those colors.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

You’re mixing precise philosophical technical terms up with the fact that transubstantiation is just Latin for “change in what it is,” and you’re mixing analyses like St. Thomas Aquinas’ up with the actual dogmas, which just is “this is what it is and we accept it on faith.”

Then why are the technical philosophical terms used in the catechism when explaining the dogma of transubstantiation?

Because the terms have meaning outside of Aristotlean-Thomist metaphysics, and we still need to be able to be clear about what is meant. The dogma is as I said in the first post. It is one thing, then it changes to Jesus while for all appearances it still looks like it did. And we accept that on faith.

It just… seems to miss the point entirely in the substance and accidents division as different types of being and the justification for such a division.

Is there a justification for such a division?

Yes. An apple is a thing which exists in itself. Redness, roundness, sitting flat, and so on do not exist apart from the things they inhere in. Certainly more can be said but I’m phone posting from Walmart and probably look weird.

 

[christismylord]

The word “substance” refers to any individual being, anything that exists in and of itself.

“Accidents” are always distinct from substance, and the substance is their source of being.

In the Eucharist: the substance of the bread and wine changes, but the accidents remain the same. That is, what they are is now different, but what they are like is not. The substance (very essence and being) of the bread and wine, by transubstantiation, are changed into the substance (very essence and being) of the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus. Christ said “This is My body,” which would not be true if the substance of the bread were to remain there. Therefore, the substance of the bread must be completely nonexistent, but Christ’s body is completely existent in the Eucharist after consecration. So the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of Christ’s body, blood, soul, and divinity. So the accidents of the bread and wine remain the same, while the substance is completely changed by divine power.

I see it as this: the miracle of the Eucharist is not comprehensible in its entirety; we can’t understand exactly everything that happens. As curious creatures with a love for God, we try to explain it to the best of our ability in human terms. Aquinas tries to explain the miracle within Aristotle’s terminology and philosophy. By rational human thought, we can deduct that this reasoning can be held as compatible with the miracle of the Eucharist. That is, the theory does not go against any principles of what we know about the Eucharist, and can help us to understand what little we can, to the best of our ability. Aquinas is not saying that this principle completely explains the Eucharist in every possible way, but that it can be deducted that these reasonings may lead us to better glimpse, by using our best knowledge of philosophy, of some of the truths about the nature of the Eucharist.

Also:

But a rock, a car, a bird and a fish, are all made from the same components. The Greeks didn’t think so and Aquinas didn’t think so. This is perfectly understandable given their knowledge about nature. But today we know that there is no difference between what components these examples are made from. So, how do they differ in substance ?

We don’t say that a rock, car, bird, or fish are different in substance. And we don’t just say that the bread and wine turn into human flesh and blood. If we did, then I could understand your confusion. But we say that the blood and wine turn into the body, blood, soul and divinity of Christ. Now we believe that God, an uncreated being, who is in nature Spirit, differs in “substance” than any created being made of matter. (Now humans have spirits as well but this is besides the point, as we are taking about matter (bread/wine) turning into a different substance (body and blood, joined with the spirit/divinity of God.) In this way, the essence and being of God’s divinity, fully present in the incarnate Christ, differs than bread or wine (created non-living matter.)

 

[Michaelangelo]

Because unlike a car, a bird and a fish are more than the sum of their parts. Substance refers to the “substantial” unity of a being. They operate as wholes with intrinsic operations and ends. Substance refers to the unified whole that is a thing.

Is there any support for this claim about the fish and the bird being more than their components, outside the realm of philosophy?

“Naive” color realism is still a thing defended as intrinsic properties of things, for one, even somewhat separated from our perception of those colors.

My guess is that it is within the realm of philosphy this color realism is defended as an intrisic property? Or?

 

[Vico]

Vico:

Substance is whatever exists in and of itself, and accidents are what modify substances. Example: the car is the substance and the color, size, and shape of the car are its accidents.

It is easy to think that a leaf is green or a chair is blue. But that is not correct. They don’t have a color at all. This is very counter intuitive. And how does the substance differ between a Volvo and Mercedes?

In Aristotle’s metaphysics there is one category for substance and nine categories for accidents: quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation, action, and being acted on. The accident is a property with no necessary connection to the essence of the thing.

 

[Michaelangelo]

Thank you for your effort. I do appreciate it.

The word “substance” refers to any individual being, anything that exists in and of itself.

“Accidents” are always distinct from substance, and the substance is their source of being.

In the Eucharist: the substance of the bread and wine changes, but the accidents remain the same. That is, what they are is now different, but what they are like is not.

The substance (very essence and being) of the bread and wine, by transubstantiation, are changed into the substance (very essence and being) of the body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus.

But there is no underlying source of being that differs between bread and wine. There is a perceptive difference between bread and wine to us, due to our sensory limitations. Therefore it is easy to understand why people thought there is some underlying difference.

I see it as this: the miracle of the Eucharist is not comprehensible in its entirety; we can’t understand exactly everything that happens. As curious creatures with a love for God, we try to explain it to the best of our ability in human terms. Aquinas tries to explain the miracle within Aristotle’s terminology and philosophy.

Yes he tried, believing that there is a underlying difference between e.g. bread and wine. And the church continue to use that model. When both Aquinas and the church could say “we don’t know”. Why?

By rational human thought, we can deduct that this reasoning can be held as compatible with the miracle of the Eucharist. That is, the theory does not go against any principles of what we know about the Eucharist, and can help us to understand what little we can, to the best of our ability. Aquinas is not saying that this principle completely explains the Eucharist in every possible way, but that it can be deducted that these reasonings may lead us to better glimpse, by using our best knowledge of philosophy, of some of the truths about the nature of the Eucharist.

In light of what we understand of nature today, I can’t see any justification for using this terminology and the underlying meaning in it. And again, I understand why Aquinas thought this explanation would work, given that he thought there is a underlying difference between bread and wine.

We don’t say that a rock, car, bird, or fish are different in substance.

But you just said earlier:

The substance (very essence and being) of the bread and wine,

Does not that mean that you say there is a underlying difference between bread and wine? And thus an underlying difference between the rock, the car, the fish and the bird. Which is to say that there is a difference in substance between them?

 

[Michaelangelo]

In Aristotle’s metaphysics there is one category for substance and nine categories for accidents: quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation, action, and being acted on. The accident is a property with no necessary connection to the essence of the thing.

Is there any support for this categorisation in light of our understanding of nature today?