I understand the curiosity, but the logistics of how a ballot could practically present that choice is irrelevant to the discussion, is it not? So, moving on…
Hardly. I make my decisions in part based upon what I understand and perceive as possible. In real life I need to have some understanding of the means that I am choosing and that they are directed toward certain ends. My understanding is that different voting schemes produce different outcomes in the same population. Anticipated outcome matters to me in voting examples, since voting is based upon a choice directed to the common good, and outcome affects the common good. So I cannot freely accept this. This may not matter here, of course.
In your ‘99’ example, you did not vote for a total ban on abortion, and you explained that, though you do hold that abortion ought to be illegal, you chose the ‘rape option’ because of the way that the other 98 were voting. If it were not for your understanding of the probable vote turnout, you would have voted perfectly inline with your conscience understanding of abortion’s inherent evil. (If you were asked to cast the same vote completely unaware of who was voting or the probable outcomes, you would have voted for the ban, wouldn’t you?)
Without any expectations about the other voters or various effects, I would vote for the ban, decidedly.
Then, in the example I proposed–let’s call it the ‘11%’ example–you opted to vote for the ban.
So, because there is a definite scenario where probability influenced your moral vote and a scenario where it did not, I will concur with your declaration that you do not support the idea that “Moral decisions should be affected by the trends of how other people make the same moral decision.” Neither fully embracing nor rejecting the premise, you fall in-between. The in-between is expressed as:
“Moral decisions should sometimes be affected by the trends of how other people make the same moral decision.”
Emphasis added. I view them as similar, but not the always the same, as in the case of national elections as I mentioned before.
The question now becomes, “When, at what times, in what instances, is it appropriate to allow moral decisions to be affected by the trends of how other people make the same moral decision, and when is it inappropriate?” What is the governing principle to distinguish between the two?
Probably what you are looking for from me is the idea of material cooperation. Either that, or simply the idea of side effects not willed but accepted, either justly or unjustly. Material cooperation is allowed
sometimes, but not others. It is important to evaluate the potential effects of the material cooperation before proceeding. In my 99 example, it is easy for me to evaluate some major potential effects and if it fair and reasonable to accept them. The murkier you make it, the less likely I am to engage in something resembling cooperation because I become more likely to be confounded in my attempt to discern the potential effect on the common good and the fairness of my choice. That tendency of mine may or may not be justifiable. Most certainly in a real situation I would require a lot of specifics and a goodly time for inquiry and reflection to weigh side effects before choosing my vote. (those factors are not available in the scenario)
You have not answered my question…
I repeat it here for your convenience:
Are you of the opinion that I cannot vote as I described in my scenario about the 99?
Please explain answer to increase my understanding of what is going on with your thinking on this thread. Understanding increases ability to communicate. Communication increases understanding. I currently see no reason to withhold understanding and communication in a mutual endeavor.
