Was Aquinas a Compatibilist?

[Burning_Sapling]

Hi all,

If Aquinas held that (a) man’s perfection consists in the direct vision of God in the afterlife (the beatific vision) and that (b) one cannot but have a rectified will as long as he possesses the beatific vision, then either one of two results might seem to follow: (c1) those who have attained the beatific vision do not have free will, OR (c2) having free will is compatible with not having the capacity to act contrary to the good.

Am I right that Aquinas held (b)? I’m not actually sure about that. If so, am I right that either (c1) or (c2) must obtain if (a) and (b) are both true? If I am, then which of the two would Aquinas have accepted? If the answer is (b), then Aquinas held that having free will is compatible with not having the ability to act otherwise than one does, which would make him a “compatibilist”.

I don’t want Aquinas to have been a compatibilist, but hey, what do I know?

Any help would be much appreciated.

 

[Rhubarb]

What’s wrong with being a compatiblist? I always saw compatiblism as the Christian position - that free will doesn’t clash with the idea of a determinate world.

 

[utunumsint]

I’m currently reading By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas by: Michael S. Sherwin.

It is complicated. I’m struggling through the chapter on the will’s role in practical reasoning. Perhaps by the time I finish with this book I’ll be in a position to answer you.

God bless,
Ut

 

[dmar198]

Hi all,

If Aquinas held that (a) man’s perfection consists in the direct vision of God in the afterlife (the beatific vision) and that (b) one cannot but have a rectified will as long as he possesses the beatific vision, then either one of two results might seem to follow: (c1) those who have attained the beatific vision do not have free will, OR (c2) having free will is compatible with not having the capacity to act contrary to the good.

Am I right that Aquinas held (b)? I’m not actually sure about that. If so, am I right that either (c1) or (c2) must obtain if (a) and (b) are both true? If I am, then which of the two would Aquinas have accepted? If the answer is (b), then Aquinas held that having free will is compatible with not having the ability to act otherwise than one does, which would make him a “compatibilist”.

I don’t want Aquinas to have been a compatibilist, but hey, what do I know?

Any help would be much appreciated.

Neither c1 nor c2 appear follow from the premises you supplied. For one thing, there are significant terms in the conclusions that do not appear in the premises, not even as synonyms, and that is not allowed in logical deduction.

Perhaps a corrected version would look like this:

(1) If a person has the beatific vision, that person cannot sin.
(2) The people in heaven have the beatific vision.
(3) Therefore, the people in heaven cannot sin.
(4) If a person cannot sin, that person does not have free will.
(5) Therefore, the people in heaven do not have free will.

I’m not sure how you’ll think of the above attempt at correcting your syllogism. It certainly changes some substantial things. But I also think #4 is either ambiguous or false. There is a sense in which a person can be rendered unable to sin and yet still have free will. St. Thomas discusses this in reference to the angels in Summa Theologica Part 1 Question 62 Article 8.

If I’m understanding you correctly, you are defining compatibilism as the view that free will is at least sometimes compatible with being unable to sin. If that is really how you define compatibilism, that does appear to be what St. Thomas believed in: based on the link above, he seems to say something equivalent to that in reference to angels. “There is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.” source

However, I will say that that is not my understanding of the term compatibilism. It is my understanding that compatibilists believe free will is compatible with determinism, and I do not think that what St. Thomas believed.

 

[Burning_Sapling]

dmar198, Your reconstruction of my argument is not what I was after. Here is a reconstruction that is more precise than my original formulation. I’ll use your (1)-(3):

(1) If a person has the beatific vision, that person cannot sin.
(2) The people in heaven have the beatific vision.
(3) Therefore, the people in heaven cannot sin.
(4) Therefore, people in heaven cannot do otherwise than to act in accordance with the Good.
(5) Therefore it is either the case that (a) the souls in heaven do not act in accordance with the Good through their own free will or it is the case that (b) the ability to act otherwise than one does is not required for free will (or, in other words, that the principle of alternate possibilities/ PAP is false).

What I was saying would make Aquinas a kind of compatibilist is if he accepted (b) from the conclusion (5). Am I wrong that it is common to refer to people who reject PAP as compatibilists of a certain sort? For instance, people call Susan Wolf a “sourcehood compatibilist” and I was under the impression that this was because she rejected the view that one must be able to act otherwise to be the source of her own morally good actions.

 

[dmar198]

dmar198, Your reconstruction of my argument is not what I was after. Here is a reconstruction that is more precise than my original formulation. I’ll use your (1)-(3):

(1) If a person has the beatific vision, that person cannot sin.
(2) The people in heaven have the beatific vision.
(3) Therefore, the people in heaven cannot sin.
(4) Therefore, people in heaven cannot do otherwise than to act in accordance with the Good.
(5) Therefore it is either the case that (a) the souls in heaven do not act in accordance with the Good through their own free will or it is the case that (b) the ability to act otherwise than one does is not required for free will (or, in other words, that the principle of alternate possibilities/ PAP is false).

There are some new problems with this syllogism. One is easy to fix: between 3 and 4, there ought to be an additional premise. This is because a phrase is used in the #4 that isn’t in #3, and their synonymy is not obvious. Thus, it ought to be broken out into a new syllogism so that it can be more easily examined. Here is a premise you could insert to make #4 follow from #3: “If a person cannot sin, they cannot do otherwise than to act in accordance with the good.”

But there are bigger problems. First, in your new syllogism, the concept of free will is introduced in #5, which is a conclusion. In deductive logic, you can’t introduce new concepts in a conclusion.

Second, I think you should break this Pap concept out of the parentheses it is currently in and give it its own premise. It seems important to the dilemma you are wondering about and we might as well put it out there in a place where it can be openly dealt with.

Third, the use of alternative conclusions in #5 gets confusing in its present form. I think that is likely due to the use of multiple clauses in each alternative conclusion, plus the use of unfamiliar terms. (At least, a couple of the terms are unfamiliar to me.)

I’m not sure how to correct these problems right off the top of my head. It would take a good deal of thought and perhaps some additional research into the concepts involved. I would think that all these additional terms should be broken out into additional premises, but I’m not so sure about that, because it would make the syllogism very hairy.

I want to say I’ll think about it and get back to you, but my brain is getting tired and I might not want to think about it. Sorry. I hope my hole-poking and attempted fix-its did something helpful.

 

[Gilrod7]

Hi all,

If Aquinas held that (a) man’s perfection consists in the direct vision of God in the afterlife (the beatific vision) **and that (b) one cannot but have a rectified will as long as he possesses the beatific vision, then ****either **one of two results might seem to follow: (c1) those who have attained the beatific vision do not have free will, OR (c2) having free will is compatible with not having the capacity to act contrary to the good.

Am I right that Aquinas held (b)? I’m not actually sure about that. If so, am I right that either (c1) or (c2) must obtain if (a) and (b) are both true? If I am, then which of the two would Aquinas have accepted? If the answer is (b), then Aquinas held that having free will is compatible with not having the ability to act otherwise than one does, which would make him a “compatibilist”.

I don’t want Aquinas to have been a compatibilist, but hey, what do I know?

Any help would be much appreciated.

You seem to have some logical transitions/connectives out of place, or maybe I am not really understanding your argument. First, if A is true, then B has to be true for the statement to be true, and if A is false, then B has to be false for the statement to be false, since you have the conjunction AND between premise A and premise B. It seems that you drew your own conclusions, “then either one of two results might seem to follow: (c1) those who have attained the beatific vision do not have free will, OR (c2) having free will is compatible with not having the capacity to act contrary to the good.”

Why won’t you want Aquinas to be a compatibilist? That is an illogical expression since in logic there is no appeal to wants/needs or feelings.

“Is there anything voluntary in human acts?” Aquinas mentions the following, “All human acts are new and non-eternal. But all new, non-eternal motions require an external cause. Therefore, since the principle of every human act is outside of it, no human act is voluntary.” Yet Aquinas points out in one of his books that what makes humanity distinctive from animals, is that we humans have the capacity to reason, the capacity to reason between following our natural order, “instincts” or following the Divine. The situation is not ambiguous, all we have to do as readers, is to take his philosophy into segments and analyze what is his main point in each of the passages.

Following logic, no, he is not a compatibilist; following my own thoughts driven by my own opinions, no, he is not a compatibilist.

 

[Gilrod7]

If assuming that everything you said is true, then this would be the following translation.

(a * (not) b) > ( (not) c1 V c2)

-Substitute
(T** *** (not) T)** >** ( (not) T** V** T)

(T * F) > (F V T)

(F) > (T)

T

Then your statement is true.

Am I right that Aquinas held (b)? Actually Yes, based on what you provided.
If so, am I right that either (c1) or (c2) must obtain if (a) and (b) are both true? If both (a) and (b) are both true, then it must follow that in order to prove that Aquinas was a compatibilist based on the information you provided, (c1) or (c2) have either have to be a false and a true, a false and a false, or a true and a true.

If I am, then which of the two would Aquinas have accepted? Either one.

 

[Burning_Sapling]

If so, am I right that either (c1) or (c2) must obtain if (a) and (b) are both true? If both (a) and (b) are both true, then it must follow that in order to prove that Aquinas was a compatibilist based on the information you provided, (c1) or (c2) have either have to be a false and a true, a false and a false, or a true and a true.

If I am, then which of the two would Aquinas have accepted? Either one.

My point is that if Aquinas accepts (a) and (b) and rejects (c1) then it would seem that he has to accept (c2). If he accepts (c2) then I think he is a kind of compatibilist, since he thinks that it is possible to freely act in accordance with the Good without having the capacity to do otherwise. The principle that one must be able to do otherwise than one does in order to be able to act freely (or of one’s own free will) is called the principle of alternate possibilities (or PAP). Those who reject it are commonly referred to as compatibilists of a certain sort.

Why reject (c1), then? Maybe because one might think that the souls in heaven are genuinely praiseworthy for loving God, or for praying for the living, etc. One might think that in order for an agent to be praiseworthy for an act of x-ing, at least in the relevant sense of praiseworthiness, that agent must have x-ed freely. It would follow that the souls in heaven have free will, or that (c1) is false.

I hope this clarifies any confusion.

 

[utunumsint]

(1) If a person has the beatific vision, that person cannot sin.

I think that for Aquinas, the will and the intellect (each of which work together to freely choose particular goods) are grounded in the nature God gave us. That nature defines some necessary volitions that God has embedded in every human being. So all human beings necessarily will in accordance with this nature. And that human nature specifies that all human beings seek their happiness (beatitude) which also presupposes the desire for being, and for truth (these are all convertible aspects of God, by the way).

Now, where human beings have freedom is in the means by which we choose to attain these built in ends. The will drives the intellect in its act of deliberation in specifying the goals of our actions. The will, after reason has done its work, desires the means to attain its goals and then to enjoy what it has achieved. Now, in the temporal world, all such choices presuppose that we have not attained the ultimate goal of our nature yet. That being the beatific vision. So they are all specific and lesser goods that we are free to choose. We can be mistaken about those choices or even choose sinfully in this temporal world.

However, all of these built in desires will be fulfilled in the beatific vision, I would suppose.

(2) The people in heaven have the beatific vision.
(3) Therefore, the people in heaven cannot sin.

If we have a sense of time in heaven, and if we have to make particular choices between one thing and another, I suppose we might be able to make errors in judgement. But since we already have that which fulfills our built in desires (beatitude), I can’t imagine it having the character of sin, if we define sin as that which separates us from God.

(4) Therefore, people in heaven cannot do otherwise than to act in accordance with the Good.

I think this is probably true, but I don’t think this means that we will always choose rightly in our acts… or never make errors in judgement… perhaps just never sinfully so as to jeopardize our union with God…

(5) Therefore it is either the case that (a) the souls in heaven do not act in accordance with the Good through their own free will

I would say no, if by that you mean an act that would jeopardize their happiness.

or it is the case that (b) the ability to act otherwise than one does is not required for free will (or, in other words, that the principle of alternate possibilities/ PAP is false).

I think this is likely the case, yes.

My two cents anyway, based on the chapter 1 of the book I’m reading… I may be something different to report later on though.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Burning_Sapling]

Thanks, utunumsint! I really appreciate your help.

I think I’ve got it figured out. I think what we have to say is that the souls in heaven do not love God through their own free will, since they do so necessarily. They may decide upon particular ways of expressing their love of God, but they are not free to decide whether or not to love God (and thus do not love God through their own free will) and that is just not a problem.

This solution to the “problem” coheres with Aquinas’ treatment of the question of whether God wills the Good through his own free will given that he wills the Good of necessity (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 19). Aquinas’ answer to this question is basically, “No, but God wills particular ways of expressing his Goodness.” Still we praise God for his Goodness, but our praise of God’s Goodness is different from the praise we extend to people for being morally virtuous through freely willed self-cultivation.

God Bless!

 

[utunumsint]

Thanks, utunumsint! I really appreciate your help.

No problem at all. I just happened to be reading a book on something somewhat related to your question.

I think I’ve got it figured out. I think what we have to say is that the souls in heaven do not love God through their own free will, since they do so necessarily. They may decide upon particular ways of expressing their love of God, but they are not free to decide whether or not to love God (and thus do not love God through their own free will) and that is just not a problem.

I just started the chapter in my book on knowledge and love in human action. Its very interesting how Aquinas describes love. I think (I’m not sure yet) that the nature of love itself may shed some light on why the union of the soul with God in love makes it impossible for the lover of God to want to do evil. I’m also eagerly waiting for how the author will describe the role of grace in this process.

But it is interesting that in Christian theology, both human beings and angels had a purely free moment of decision where they were able to choose for or against God before they got “locked in” so to speak. So its not like those in heaven did not choose to be there. They wanted to be “locked in” eternally like that. Its kind of the flip side of those who choose hell. Most theologians or apologists I’ve heard believe that those in hell want to be there. Its a consequence of their free choice. And then they are “locked in” that choice for eternity.

This solution to the “problem” coheres with Aquinas’ treatment of the question of whether God wills the Good through his own free will given that he wills the Good of necessity (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 19). Aquinas’ answer to this question is basically, “No, but God wills particular ways of expressing his Goodness.” Still we praise God for his Goodness, but our praise of God’s Goodness is different from the praise we extend to people for being morally virtuous through freely willed self-cultivation.

I agree. We praise the virtuous action of others who exist in time like we do, who have their nature…their being… spread out over time. The very concept of choice presupposes a *before *where deliberation happens and an after where the will makes an informed choice.

There is a movement from potency to act implicit in all of this that does not exist in the classical concept of God. God does not have his being spread out over time like we do. There is no movement from potency to act in God because he is completely simple. He is pure actuality. We only come to know about God’s existence through reason by the theory of proportionate causality (via causalitatis), by understanding what God is not (via negativa), and by the via eminentiae or excellentiae, all of which make use of Aquinas’ notion of analogy. We have no direct experience of what it must be like to be a purely actual being outside of time. Only knowledge from analogy.

But we also have the data from Revelation on the Trinity where we have more details about the inner life of God in his simplicity where I would say (maybe ) that the Father **completely **expresses his Goodness in the Son. Both the Son and the Father live in a communion of Love which is the Holy Spirit (somehow). Anyway, I’m not expert on the subject of the Trinity, but when you said “No, but God wills particular ways of expressing his Goodness” I think this has more to do with God’s freedom in creating and sustaining that creation in particular ways. Not so much about how his inner nature works.

God bless,
Ut