What are the 4 causes?

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fakename

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I don’t know what the 4 Aristotelian causes mean. The formal cause is “the blueprint or plan” -does this mean that even formal causes have formal causes, namely the intention to find formal causes? The material cause is “the constituent cause” so does this mean that an aggregate of ideas is the cause of the aggregated idea (are the letters of a word too, the material cause of that word)?

I think a lot of my confusion is due to me taking the four causes too broadly. In fact the causes might only apply to substance -they are ways substances are caused. As such, my view of the material cause as “the constituent of something” is not accurate, rather the material causes is “the constituent of substance” -this is what prevents me from saying that the individuals of a species are the material cause of the whole species, or that both form and matter are material causes of the person -since they constitute him.
 
I don’t know what the 4 Aristotelian causes mean. The formal cause is “the blueprint or plan” -does this mean that even formal causes have formal causes, namely the intention to find formal causes? The material cause is “the constituent cause” so does this mean that an aggregate of ideas is the cause of the aggregated idea (are the letters of a word too, the material cause of that word)?
Formal causes have the intention to find formal causes? :confused: Where are you getting that idea?

Both the formal and material causes are constituent causes.

You could say that the propositions of a syllogism are the material causes of that syllogism.
I think a lot of my confusion is due to me taking the four causes too broadly. In fact the causes might only apply to substance -they are ways substances are caused. As such, my view of the material cause as “the constituent of something” is not accurate, rather the material causes is “the constituent of substance” -this is what prevents me from saying that the individuals of a species are the material cause of the whole species, or that both form and matter are material causes of the person -since they constitute him.
These are disputed questions. In general, form and cause correspond to that-which-actualizes and that-which-is-actualized (each being an intrinsic constituent of the thing).
 
Formal causes have the intention to find formal causes? :confused: Where are you getting that idea?

Both the formal and material causes are constituent causes.

You could say that the propositions of a syllogism are the material causes of that syllogism.

These are disputed questions. In general, form and cause correspond to that-which-actualizes and that-which-is-actualized (each being an intrinsic constituent of the thing).
I’m saying that the blueprint in the mind, the method, of finding formal causes is the formal cause of actually finding formal causes. In that case there are formal causes of formal causes, etc.

About the second paragraph, if formal and material causes are both constituent causes then the whole universe is the cause of the whole universe which seems rather un-orthodox being that God is considered the only highest cause of anything. But under my interpretation there seems to be another high cause of the universe namely the constitution itself of the universe.
 
I’m saying that the blueprint in the mind, the method, of finding formal causes is the formal cause of actually finding formal causes. In that case there are formal causes of formal causes, etc.
Okay, but why are you saying that??
About the second paragraph, if formal and material causes are both constituent causes then the whole universe is the cause of the whole universe which seems rather un-orthodox being that God is considered the only highest cause of anything.
It’s not unorthodox at all. God is the first cause. He is the first efficient cause and the preeminent formal cause, but these ascriptions are independent of the universe’s own intrinsic constitutive causality.
But under my interpretation there seems to be another high cause of the universe namely the constitution itself of the universe.
What do you mean by “high cause”??
 
Okay, but why are you saying that??

It’s not unorthodox at all. God is the first cause. He is the first efficient cause and the preeminent formal cause, but these ascriptions are independent of the universe’s own intrinsic constitutive causality.

What do you mean by this? Is it not true that there is no world soul?

What do you mean by “high cause”??

**By that I mean that if the whole universe (including God) can be abstracted into an idea like “universe” then this idea is the formal cause of the universe because it is the blueprint from which the universe is formed. But Then this formal cause would be highest in being at least equal to God. But that contradicts the fact that there can only be one thing that is highest in being.

I guess then, I mean high cause=highest in being=equal to God.**
 
I don’t know what the 4 Aristotelian causes mean. The formal cause is “the blueprint or plan” -does this mean that even formal causes have formal causes, namely the intention to find formal causes? The material cause is “the constituent cause” so does this mean that an aggregate of ideas is the cause of the aggregated idea (are the letters of a word too, the material cause of that word)?

I think a lot of my confusion is due to me taking the four causes too broadly. In fact the causes might only apply to substance -they are ways substances are caused. As such, my view of the material cause as “the constituent of something” is not accurate, rather the material causes is “the constituent of substance” -this is what prevents me from saying that the individuals of a species are the material cause of the whole species, or that both form and matter are material causes of the person -since they constitute him.
I’ll quote from Dr. Edward Fuser’s book, Aquinas, A Beginner’s Guide. The four causes, 1st and 2nd paragraph.

"Speaking of the explanation naturally leads us to that most famous of Aristotelian metaphysical doctrines, that of the four causes - material, formal, efficient, and final - a doctrine to which Aquinas is fully committed. Return yet again to the rubber ball of our example. The material cause or underlying stuff the ball is made out is rubber; its formal cause, or the form, pattern, or structure it exhibits, comprises such features as its sphericity, solidity, and bounciness. In other words, the material and formal causes of a thing are just matter and form, considered as two aspects of a complete explanation of it. Next we have the efficient cause, that which actualizes a potency and thereby brings something into being. In this case that would be the actions of the workers and/or machines in the factory in which the ball was made, as they molded the rubber into the ball. Lastly we have the *final cause *or the end, goal, or purpose of a thing, which in the case of the ball might be to provide amusement to a child. In combination, these causes provide a complete explanation of a thing. That doesn’t mean that in the case of a ball, for example, you would not have many more questions about it, such as where the rubber came from or who made the factory. But the answers to such questions will be just further instances of material, formal, efficient, and final causes.

The four causes are completely general, applying throughout the natural world and not just to human artifacts. Biological organs provide the most obvious examples. For instance, to understand what a heart is, you need to know its material cause, namely that it is made out of muscle tissue of a certain sort. But there are many muscles in the body that aren’t hearts, so you also need to know its formal cause, and thus such things as that the muscle tissues is organized into ventricles, atria, and the like. Then there is the efficient cause, which in this case would be the biological processes that determined that certain embryonic cells would form into a heart rather than, say, a kidney or a brain. Finally there is the heart’s final cause, namely that it serves the function of pumping blood."
 
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fakename:
I don’t see where you’re getting anything about a world soul.

Your claim: “By that I mean that if the whole universe (including God) can be abstracted into an idea like “universe” then this idea is the formal cause of the universe because it is the blueprint from which the universe is formed. But Then this formal cause would be highest in being at least equal to God”
…is a non sequitur. That the universe is intrinsically formally caused does not make it equal to God.
 
I don’t see where you’re getting anything about a world soul.

Your claim: “By that I mean that if the whole universe (including God) can be abstracted into an idea like “universe” then this idea is the formal cause of the universe because it is the blueprint from which the universe is formed. But Then this formal cause would be highest in being at least equal to God”
…is a non sequitur. That the universe is intrinsically formally caused does not make it equal to God.
soul, I think, is just a synonym for form and thus If there is a formal cause of something that thing has a soul. Of course it is customary to call only the human soul a soul since it is the most important and incorruptible but everything that is form is soul and spirit. So of course if I posit a worldness that is the form of the world, then that worldness is the world-soul.

Second, I’m not sure I’m saying that the universe is simply formally caused and that’s why it is equal to God. Firstly by universe I mean the whole of existence which includes God. Now if this whole has a form -namely universeness- then this formal cause is the cause of the universe and consequently of all the things in it. This would make it the cause of God. So only those things in act can cause other things so the universeness must be in act more so than God, that is, highest in being. If it weren’t highest in act it couldn’t serve as a cause of the whole universe since that which is lower in act to the thing it causes can’t cause it since the effect would not pre-exist in the cause.

So I’m saying that If the universe includes God then the formal cause of the universe is greater than God.
 
soul, I think, is just a synonym for form and thus If there is a formal cause of something that thing has a soul. Of course it is customary to call only the human soul a soul since it is the most important and incorruptible but everything that is form is soul and spirit. So of course if I posit a worldness that is the form of the world, then that worldness is the world-soul.
Soul is not just a synonym for form, so you’re using a false premise here.
Second, I’m not sure I’m saying that the universe is simply formally caused and that’s why it is equal to God. Firstly by universe I mean the whole of existence which includes God. Now if this whole has a form -namely universeness- then this formal cause is the cause of the universe and consequently of all the things in it. This would make it the cause of God. So only those things in act can cause other things so the universeness must be in act more so than God, that is, highest in being. If it weren’t highest in act it couldn’t serve as a cause of the whole universe since that which is lower in act to the thing it causes can’t cause it since the effect would not pre-exist in the cause.
So I’m saying that If the universe includes God then the formal cause of the universe is greater than God.
The universe does not include God. God is creator. The universe is created.
 
Soul is not just a synonym for form, so you’re using a false premise here.

Okay, but then what is the soul besides the form of the body? And does this mean there is a world-form?

The universe does not include God. God is creator. The universe is created.

I think that you are right with this, but I would like to add that this means also that there is no set (set as in set-theory or logic) which includes God? I suppose not, because God is not in any genus, and can’t be defined.
 
Four causes of the universe can summed up very easily. Material cause, energy which was an effect of the first cause. Everything has energy so we must observe the formal cause. Since we are dealing with an entire closed system and can’t be thought of a traditional shape or form to everything in finite existence, we can just make the formal cause of the universe all finite things contained in this system, or everything that has a finite existence. The efficient cause is the first cause, an effect by the very act of God, the uncaused mover. The final cause is an existence to support finite life, but first and foremost humans. Any questions relating to “why”, in relations to the final cause, is outside of the explanation of the four causes in this case.

If we understand God as infinite (the uncaused mover) and the universe as finite existence (that which was an effect of the first cause, caused by the uncaused mover), we can conclude that, as stated by Betterave, the universe does not include God but only into relation to the first cause.
 
Originally Posted by Betterave
Soul is not just a synonym for form, so you’re using a false premise here.

Okay, but then what is the soul besides the form of the body? And does this mean there is a world-form?
The soul is the form of the body but also is intellectual, so separable from the body. As for there being a world form, hard to say. I’d tend to say no; the universe is an aggregate of many forms, but I think that need not imply that the aggregate itself has a single form.
The universe does not include God. God is creator. The universe is created.
I think that you are right with this, but I would like to add that this means also that there is no set (set as in set-theory or logic) which includes God? I suppose not, because God is not in any genus, and can’t be defined.
God is a real being, so I see no reason not to include God in a set.
 
The soul is the form of the body but also is intellectual, so separable from the body. As for there being a world form, hard to say. I’d tend to say no; the universe is an aggregate of many forms, but I think that need not imply that the aggregate itself has a single form.

God is a real being, so I see no reason not to include God in a set.

**True, but then couldn’t I just include God in the set of the universe? But earlier you stated that God couldn’t be included in such a set. I think that God as a set is rather impossible since any set is equal to itself,yet any description of God is not equal to the whole reality of God.
**
 
I’m not sure what you mean. Isn’t the set of God plus the universe a set containing two things: God and the universe? So why would we call this “the set of the universe”?

When we talk about a set that includes God, we refer to God as a being belonging to that set; we do not describe God. So the fact that no description of God is equal to the whole reality of God is simply not a relevant issue.
 
I’m not sure what you mean. Isn’t the set of God plus the universe a set containing two things: God and the universe? So why would we call this “the set of the universe”?

That is, the set of the universe=the set of all existing things or maybe the universal set.

When we talk about a set that includes God, we refer to God as a being belonging to that set; we do not describe God. So the fact that no description of God is equal to the whole reality of God is simply not a relevant issue.

Words are supposed to correlate w/ the outside world. But nothing can adequately correlate 1:1 w/God so our words, concepts, sets are too limited to speak of God as He is and therefore, the whole idea of a set containing God is like the idea of room that contains air -yes the room has air but it doesn’t contain all the air in the universe. As such the air of that room is not a good representation of all the air.
 
Originally Posted by Betterave
I’m not sure what you mean. Isn’t the set of God plus the universe a set containing two things: God and the universe? So why would we call this “the set of the universe”?
That is, the set of the universe=the set of all existing things or maybe the universal set.
I don’t see a problem with that: the universal set is composed of two things: God and the universe. That does not imply that God is part of the universe. ‘The universal set’ is a set; it isn’t the universe.
When we talk about a set that includes God, we refer to God as a being belonging to that set; we do not describe God. So the fact that no description of God is equal to the whole reality of God is simply not a relevant issue.
Words are supposed to correlate w/ the outside world. But nothing can adequately correlate 1:1 w/God so our words, concepts, sets are too limited to speak of God as He is and therefore, the whole idea of a set containing God is like the idea of room that contains air -yes the room has air but it doesn’t contain all the air in the universe. As such the air of that room is not a good representation of all the air.
No, I don’t think that’s right. We have one word (“God”) and one being (God) - there is a perfect 1:1 correlation between these. The word does not attempt to capture God; it simply refers to the being that is God, regardless of how much we happen to know about God.
 
I suppose my confusion comes from forgetting that not all ideas are forms of a thing. Ideas are all forms but not every idea is the form of a certain thing cause if it were, then it would be true that all ideas are perfect expressions of a thing’s essence -something impossible since if it were true, then no one would be wrong.
 
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