I cannot answer your question. You use the same word meaning different things. I cannot follow your thought process and cannot provide a meaningful response.(1) an intention is not an act because it is a font of morality (as far as I understand the phrase “font of morality” and “act” they don’t seem to be contradictory). After all it seems that the font of morality is equivalent to this: a person intends something, the something is an object of the act of intending. So intention is identical to act and object under some interpretation. Therefore, the intention and the act cannot be different per the meaning of either act or intention alone.
So why is act supposed to be essentially different from object? I thought that they were two aspects of one thing?
(2) God does except excuses in the proper meaning of the word. For ignorance excuses -I don’t know why you would interpret this any other way.
I’ve read it, but I’m not sure why it would go against what I said. The morality of human acts depends on:I cannot answer your question. You use the same word meaning different things. I cannot follow your thought process and cannot provide a meaningful response.
Please re-read the CCC section on Morality and understand the precision needed in order to address questions of morality of thoughts, words or actions. Then re-phase your question.
I am still confused.I’ve read it, but I’m not sure why it would go against what I said. The morality of human acts depends on:
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
- the object chosen;
- the end in view or the intention;
- the circumstances of the action.
1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39
1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
**So in my formulation the intention can be both the object chosen and the act, for people choose and they choose to intend and to choose is to intend and to intend is to act. The circumstances are also present in so far as a circumstance is a third thing along side the other things, and since any statement may simply be modified by adding a disjunction, it is obvious that every intention can be modified by a circumstance (and indeed any thing is potentially changeable according to circumstances). So the fonts of morality are indeed apodictically, self-evidently true. One cannot deny that I am right, for then one would also be intending to choose to act with that act being the end. **
But perhaps I do make a mistake about something here, namely, by saying we intend to choose. Although that is true in some limited sense, strictly speaking, I think that we have no choice in choosing or intending, for whether we will or not we must choose and intend things with tautological certainty. Is this why you think I trip up?
I’m not sure if Aquinas argued against him or not, but Peter Abelard supported the notion that the decision of the will (which seems to be what you think of as intention) was the only part of the action which merited praise or blame. He argued that once a person decided on an action, the actual performance of the action could not alter the praise/blameworthiness of the action. For example, if you decided to kill your neighbor but failed, you would still be as guilty as if you succeeded.(1) an intention is not an act because it is a font of morality (as far as I understand the phrase “font of morality” and “act” they don’t seem to be contradictory). After all it seems that the font of morality is equivalent to this: a person intends something, the something is an object of the act of intending. So intention is identical to act and object under some interpretation. Therefore, the intention and the act cannot be different per the meaning of either act or intention alone.
So why is act supposed to be essentially different from object? I thought that they were two aspects of one thing?
I essentially did. When one thinks, the intention is to think and the object is thinking and indeed intending to think is also to think.I am still confused.
Please give an example where the intention and the object are the same.
To some degree you are correct because a successful virtuous action is not virtuous per the success (e.g.,if you give someone some charitable money w/o knowing that that person is really rich). But if the outcome is related to one’s intentions then it could definitely affect the moral value of your actions.I’m not sure if Aquinas argued against him or not, but Peter Abelard supported the notion that the decision of the will (which seems to be what you think of as intention) was the only part of the action which merited praise or blame. He argued that once a person decided on an action, the actual performance of the action could not alter the praise/blameworthiness of the action. For example, if you decided to kill your neighbor but failed, you would still be as guilty as if you succeeded.
Yes, I do not want to give up the idea that if I continuously produce bad outcomes, I probably am not virtuous. However, as you have pointed out the desire for succeed must be present in the decision to act if it is to be a virtuous decision. This is only one of the requirements. When dealing with matters of intention, human beings quickly go beyond their ability to judge correctly. I, myself cannot accurately p(name removed by moderator)oint the motives of my own heart let alone another’s. I can determine whether the means of an action and its result are desirable, but the attitude of the heart must remain a mystery. God, however, can judge the heart and truly know whether a decision is truly virtuous. And so the answer to the OP might be that God is rewarding the morality of the action when He rewards good intentions.To some degree you are correct because a successful virtuous action is not virtuous per the success (e.g.,if you give someone some charitable money w/o knowing that that person is really rich). But if the outcome is related to one’s intentions then it could definitely affect the moral value of your actions.
However the fact that outcomes don’t matter still has to be squared with the axiom that “all things want to succeed” for to deny it would be to contradict oneself. Therefore, a virtuous man must still succeed at being virtuous but perhaps the virtuous outcome is not dependent on “accidents beyond our control (like being ignorant that the beggar really was rich)”.