What does this procedural norm attached to the new canon for annulments mean?

[1Lord1Faith]

Can anyone put this in layman’s terms?

Title IV - The Sentence, Its Appeals and Effect

Art. 12. To achieve the moral certainty required by law, a preponderance of proofs and indications is not sufficient, but it is required that any prudent doubt of making an error, in law or in fact, is excluded, even if the mere possibility of the contrary is not removed.

w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/motu_proprio/documents/papa-francesco-motu-proprio_20150815_mitis-iudex-dominus-iesus.html

 

[PaulfromIowa]

It means that the standard is higher than a preponderance of the evidence. The standard is “any prudent doubt of making an error… is excluded.”

This is similar to the standard for US criminal trials. The standard is not a preponderance of the evidence, it is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

 

[dans0622]

It means that the standard is higher than a preponderance of the evidence. The standard is “any prudent doubt of making an error… is excluded.”

This is similar to the standard for US criminal trials. The standard is not a preponderance of the evidence, it is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Yes, that’s basically it.

The Judge does not have to have absolute certainty like in a math problem–he can know that there is a mere possibility that the decision is wrong. At the same time, he must have more than mere probability or a dependence on simple “preponderance of evidence.”

The notion of “moral certainty” in nullity trials was explained quite definitively by Pius XII in his 1942 allocution to the Rota. For more information, see here at number 6: w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1980/february/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19800204_sacra-rota.html

Dan

 

[1Lord1Faith]

Thank you for your responses.

The link that Dan provided to the "ADDRESS OF JOHN PAUL II TO THE TRIBUNAL OF THE ROMAN ROTA "(4 February 1980) was enlightening. But it gave me another question:

1. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that the purpose of this investigation is not just any knowledge of the fact, but the reaching of “moral certainty,” that is, of that certain knowledge which “is based on the constancy of the laws and usage that govern human life” (PIUS XII, October 1, 1942, supra p. 18). This moral certainty is a guarantee for the judge that he has found the truth about the fact to be judged, that is, the truth which is the foundation, mother and law of justice, and so makes him sure that he is—from this aspect—able to pronounce a just judgment. This is precisely the reason why the law demands this certainty of the judge, to enable him to proclaim a just judgment ([CIC 1 ] c. 1869, §1).

Taking advantage of the doctrine and jurisprudence that had developed particularly in more recent times, Pius XII declared in an authentic way the canonical concept of moral certainty in the allocution addressed to your tribunal on October 1, 1942. Here are the words that pertain to our case: “Between the two extremes of absolute certainty and quasi-certainty or probability, is that moral certainty which is usually involved in the cases submitted to your court . . . It is characterized on the positive side by the exclusion of well-founded or reasonable doubt, and in this respect it is essentially distinguished from the quasi-certainty which has been mentioned; on the negative side, it does admit the absolute possibility of the contrary and in this it differs from absolute certainty. The certainty of which we are now speaking is necessary and sufficient for the rendering of a judgment” (supra p. 19).

Consequently no judge may pass sentence in favor of the nullity of a marriage if he has not first acquired the moral certainty of the existence of this nullity. Probability alone is not enough to decide a case. To any compromise in this connection, there could be applied what has wisely been said of other laws concerning marriage; any relaxation contains within it an impelling dynamic: “if the custom obtained, the way is paved for the toleration of divorce in the Church, although covered by another name” (letter from the prefect of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church to the president of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S.A., June 20, 1973 7 ).

Is this ^ bolded quote by Pius Xll in his 1942 allocution to the Rota saying that precedent should be used to help the judge decide cases? What specifically stands out in that bolded quote is phrase, “and usage”. And if so, did pope Francis change the practice of judges considering precedent?

 

[1Lord1Faith]

Thank you for your responses.

The link that Dan provided to the "ADDRESS OF JOHN PAUL II TO THE TRIBUNAL OF THE ROMAN ROTA "(4 February 1980) was enlightening. But it gave me another question:

Is this ^ bolded quote by Pius Xll in his 1942 allocution to the Rota saying that precedent should be used to help the judge achieve moral certainty in a decision? What specifically stands out in that bolded quote is the phrase, “and usage”. And if so, did pope Francis change the practice of judges considering precedent in order to arrive at moral certainty?

 

[dans0622]

…
Is this ^ bolded quote by Pius Xll in his 1942 allocution to the Rota saying that precedent should be used to help the judge decide cases? What specifically stands out in that bolded quote is phrase, “and usage”. And if so, did pope Francis change the practice of judges considering precedent?

Hello,

Pius XII’s comment was not about precedent. Ecclesiastical Courts do not rely on precedent.

It seems to me that John Paul II took it a bit out of context to make a different point than Pius XII had made.

Pius XII’s statement was in the context of saying that “certainty” in judgments “is based on the constancy of the laws and usages/customs that govern human life” and it “admits of various degrees.” The original Italian has: “Ora tale certezza, la quale si appoggia sulla costanza delle leggi e degli usi che governano la vita umana, ammette vari gradi.”

The “various degrees” are then spelled out–by Pius XII–in terms of absolute, moral, and quasi-certainty.

That’s how I read it, anyway.

Dan

 

[1Lord1Faith]

Hello,

Pius XII’s comment was not about precedent. Ecclesiastical Courts do not rely on precedent.

It seems to me that John Paul II took it a bit out of context to make a different point than Pius XII had made.

Pius XII’s statement was in the context of saying that “certainty” in judgments “is based on the constancy of the laws and usages/customs that govern human life” and it “admits of various degrees.” The original Italian has: “Ora tale certezza, la quale si appoggia sulla costanza delle leggi e degli usi che governano la vita umana, ammette vari gradi.”

The “various degrees” are then spelled out–by Pius XII–in terms of absolute, moral, and quasi-certainty.

That’s how I read it, anyway.

Dan

Thanks for clarifying the term “usage”. I didn’t know if “usage” was referring to the usage of the laws regarding annulments.

And now…I have a better concept of what “moral certainty” means.

I think Pius Xll’s statement about what certainty in judgments is based on is quite elegant.