What is person in Trinity?

[STT]

I think one should have a good definition for person since God is three persons and one being.

 

[AugustTherese]

God is three Divine Persons, one nature or essence.

What do you mean by ‘being’?

 

[Wesrock]

In its discussion of the term “person” when applied to the Trinity, the New Advent article reads:

For the constitution of a person it is required that a reality be subsistent and absolutely distinct, i.e. incommunicable. The three Divine realities are relations, each identified with the Divine Essence. A finite relation has reality only in so far as it is an accident; it has the reality of inherence. The Divine relations, however, are in the nature not by inherence but by identity. The reality they have, therefore, is not that of an accident, but that of a subsistence. They are one with ipsum esse subsistens . Again every relation, by its very nature, implies opposition and so distinction. In the finite relation this distinction is between subject and term. In the infinite relations there is no subject as distinct from the relation itself; the Paternity is the Father–and no term as distinct from the opposing relation; the Filiation is the Son. The Divine realities are therefore distinct and mutually incommunicable through this relative opposition; they are subsistent as being identified with the subsistence of the Godhead, i.e. they are persons.

The term is used to identify opposing but virtually distinct relations in the Godhead.

Speculative theology can go deeper than that, but further than that is not dogma.

 

[STT]

So person is a relation? Relation between what?

 

[rom]

I think one should have a good definition for person since God is three persons and one being.

A person is an intelligent substance which, because it is intelligent, is responsible for its act. Not all substances are persons, but only substances with an intelligent nature. A pigeon has a nature, and acts by that nature, but it is not a person. In contrast, man does not merely have a nature, but an intelligent nature by which he understands and be responsible for his act. Thus, man is a person.

The term is used to identify opposing but virtually distinct relations in the Godhead.

The Subsisent Relations (or Persons) in the Blessed Trinity do not really differ from each other with respect to the Divine Substance, but they do really differ from each other as opposite terms of a relation. They do not differ merely by a virtual distinction.

So person is a relation? Relation between what?

The Father is distinct from the Son as the one generating. The Son is distinct from the Father as the one begotten. The Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father and the Son as the love between the Father and the Son and as the one who proceeds from both. So, while all these Relations are the same with respect to the divine Substance, they are really different with respect to each other as opposite terms of their relations. There is no internal contradiction here, for it is not impossible for two or more things to be the same in one respect, but to be different in another respect.

 

[Richca]

The traditional definition for person in catholic theology comes from Boethius and which is defined as ’ an individual substance of a rational nature’. This is the definition Aquinas uses in his theology and treatise/s on the Trinity. In regards to the persons of the Trinity, substance in this definition means an individual existing person but it does not have reference to the divine nature or substance which is one. Substance is defined as that which exists or subsists in itself, an individual existing thing. So in reference to the persons of the Trinity, the three persons or hypostases (this is substance/person in greek) subsist individually and distinct from each other but in one divine rational/intelligent nature or substance.

 

[rom]

In regards to the persons of the Trinity, substance in this definition means an individual existing person but it does not have reference to the divine nature or substance which is one.

I am struggling with the above quoted sentence because it is not clear to me what you mean. The truth is that each individual divine Person does have a reference to the divine nature, because the divine nature IS the nature of each divine Person. Each divine Person is a substance, but not a distinct substance from that of the other two Persons. Each Person is different from the others, not with respect to their substance, but as terms of a relation.

If Dan is the father of Roy, then the relation of fatherhood exists, with Dan and Roy as the two opposite terms of the relation. If Dan and Roy subsist in the same substance, – which, of course, does not happen among humans, – they would still be distinct from each other because Dan would be the father and Roy the son, although they are “consubstantial” or have the same substance. They would be two distinct persons, but not two distinct substances. And they will each have a reference to the substance that they share.

Saying that they are both persons does not violate Boethius’ definition, because each is still an individual substance of a rational nature. Their individuality is not removed by the fact that they have a common substance, because their individuality comes from their being opposite terms of the relation, not from their being two individual substances.

 

[Richca]

Richca:

In regards to the persons of the Trinity, substance in this definition means an individual existing person but it does not have reference to the divine nature or substance which is one.

I am struggling with the above quoted sentence because it is not clear to me what you mean. The truth is that each individual divine Person does have a reference to the divine nature, because the divine nature IS the nature of each divine Person. Each divine Person is a substance, but not a distinct substance from that of the other two Persons. Each Person is different from the others, not with respect to their substance, but as terms of a relation.

What I mean is that the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition of person does not mean the essence otherwise in reference to the Trinity, the definition of person could be taken to mean three essences since there are three persons in the Trinity but we believe the Trinity of persons to be of one essence. This is what Aquinas says also in the ST, Pt. I, Q. 30, art.1, reply to obj. 1. The word ‘nature’ in Boethius’ definition refers to the essence.

For example, if we substitute essence for substance in Boethius’ definition, we would have ‘an individual essence of a rational nature’. Since there are three persons in God, it would follow that God is three subsisting individual essences which is not correct. Substance can have a few meanings and Aquinas goes over this in ST, Pt. I, Q. 29, art.2. It gets quite technical and can be difficult to follow at times. In this article, Aquinas says that substance can go by the name or word ‘subsistence’ for as substance is said to exist in and by itself and not in another. It is to this meaning of substance in Boethius’ definition which is meant I believe, namely, an individual and incommunicable self subsistent person, or in other words, a distinct individual subsisting ‘substance’ or person (or suppositum, cf. Q. 30, art. 1, reply to obj.1) in the Godhead.

Accordingly, as I’m not understanding ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition of person to mean the essence, I said that substance in the definition of person ‘does not have reference to the divine nature or substance which is one’. What I mean here is that substance in the definition of person as I’m understanding it and in reference to God does not mean the divine essence which is but one and this is what I meant by ‘reference to the divine nature or substance which is one’.

We both agree that the Trinity is three persons in one essence. I think the confusion arising here is that you are taking the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition of person to refer to or mean the divine essence when I am not. You are correct that the persons of the Trinity are the divine essence but the divine essence is that by which the Trinity of persons are one God, not that in which their is distinction in God in three persons even though the persons are the divine essence.

 

[Vico]

I think one should have a good definition for person since God is three persons and one being.

Modern Catholic Dictionary, Person:

“An individual substance of a rational nature” (Boethius). Therefore every individual intellectual substance which is complete in itself, uncommunicable and existing for itself, is a person. Essential to person in theological terms are intelligence and substantiality, wholeness in oneself and especially individuality. From individuality flow such features of personhood as distinctiveness, incommunicability, and uniqueness. Among human persons there are also the elements of responsibility and possession of distinctive rights. (Etym. Latin persona , actor’s mask; character; supposition of a rational nature.)

God is absolutely simple (without composition) and three persons in essence.

 

[Richca]

(continued)

The distinction in God arises from there being three persons in God by the very word ‘person’ and its definition for one is the person of the Father, another is the person of the Son, and a third is the person of the Holy Spirit. We also understand that the distinction arises from the relations of origin. But here again, the relations are the subsistent persons. God is one in the unity of the divine essence and God is three in the distinction of the three persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

 

[YHWH_Christ]

In modern psychology, a person is usually counted as an individual entity with a center of consciousness. That’s why I think there is a lot of confusion regarding the persons of the Trinity today. Really though it wasn’t until the middle ages where the term prospon (person, which in Greek literally means “face” or “mask”) became introduced because of confusion over the word hypostasis which was still sometimes confused with substance because it did originally have that connotation in Greek until theologians in the 4th and 5th century began to apply it to the distinct relations in the Trinity. Latin also translated the word as substantia (substance) which created a lot of confusion in the west. Really what the fathers are describing when they speak of the Trinity is three centers (I am hesitant to say ‘mode’ because of confusion with Modalism) of existence in one being, with them being wholly distinct and unconfused and separate but still one in their being.

It’s always been difficult describing this stuff because words change in meaning, translations become messy, and highly technical terminology is used. It can all lead to easy confusion. Theologians and philosophers over the centuries have had to shape the way we speak of the Trinity in order that we might conceive it as it had been originally conceived by the first Christians and to come to an even better understanding, yet ironically this has led to many unintentional heresies.

 

[rom]

I think the confusion arising here is that you are taking the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition of person to refer to or mean the divine essence when I am not.

Among creatures there is a distinction between substance and its essence. But in God His substance is identical to His essence (ST, Part I, Q.3, Art. 3). This is why when Boethius’ definition is applied to God, the phrase “individual substance of a rational nature” is exactly the same as “individual essence of a rational nature.” But that is true only when you apply Boethius definition to God, not when you apply it to creatures.

Things are predicated differently when we speak of God. Let me explain this a little bit because the distinction between the divine Persons is really a distinction of the relations within the Godhead.

Among creatures there is a distinction between a substance and its accidents, because accidents are determining features of a substance. A man is distinct from his wisdom, which is an accident. But in God in whom there are no accidents, it is proper to say not merely that God is wise, but that He is Wisdom itself, because there is no distinction between His Substance and His Wisdom. Thus, God is the same as Subsistent Wisdom. The same is true of the relations within the Godhead. Among creatures, relations are accidents of their substances; my fatherhood exists in me, but is not my substance. But in God the relations are God Himself. Hence they are called "Subsistent Relations" (ST, Part I, Q. 29, art. 4). The Father, as Father to the Son, is God. The Son, as image of the Father and eternally begotten from the Father, is God. The Holy Spirit, as the Love between the Father and the Son, and proceeding eternally from both, is God. These Relations are "consubstantial" and do not really differ from each other with respect to the Divine Substance.

 

[rom]

In modern psychology, a person is usually counted as an individual entity with a center of consciousness.

Actually that is basically the same as the definition of Boethius, because only a substance of a rational nature can have a center of consciousness. When I defined substance, I defined it as “an intelligent substance which, because it is intelligent, is responsible for its act.” My definition is also not much different from Boethius’ definition because a substance of a rational nature is an intelligent substance. However, in my definition I added the consequence of being intelligent: because it is intelligent, the person is responsible for its act.

Now, why did I find it important to add that phrase in the definition? Because in the theology of the Trinity, each divine Person, as person , is responsible for His act. The act of one Person is His act alone, and not another person’s act. Thus, the Father is the Person sending, while the Son is the person sent and the one who alone took our human nature, suffered on the Cross and redeemed us from sin. The Son alone, and not the Father, is our Redeemer. Likewise, the Holy Spirit is the Person sent by both the Father and the Son, and is the one who alone justifies and sanctifies.

Realizing that each Person has an act distinct from the act of another person, it is also correct to say that only the Son was born of the Virgin Mary, not the Father or the Holy Spirit. And only the Holy Spirit descended as a dove, not the Father nor the Son. For the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are different Persons with different personal acts and missions. But they are all equal in dignity, power and perfection because they are all identical to the same divine Substance.

 

[Richca]

Richca:

I think the confusion arising here is that you are taking the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition of person to refer to or mean the divine essence when I am not.

Among creatures there is a distinction between substance and its essence. But in God His substance is identical to His essence (ST, Part I, Q.3, Art. 3). This is why when Boethius’ definition is applied to God, the phrase “individual substance of a rational nature” is exactly the same as “individual essence of a rational nature.” But that is true only when you apply Boethius definition to God, not when you apply it to creatures.

The word substance in Boethius’ definition of person does not mean the essence but the suppositum or simply person. This is why there are three persons in God but only one essence. Aquinas specifically states this in q. 30, art. 1, reply to obj. 1, and he is talking about the divine persons although it is the same for any person, divine, angelic, or human I believe, namely, that the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition does not mean the essence but the suppositum. The word ‘nature’ in the definition refers to the essence or substance.

From the reply to obj. 1:
The definition of “person” includes “substance,” not as meaning the essence, but the “suppositum” which is made clear by the addition of the term “individual.” To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name “hypostasis.” So, as we say, “Three persons,” they say “Three hypostases.” We are not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.

At the same time, the persons or relations are the same as the essence which appears to be the angle you are coming from and how your interpreting substance in Boethius’ definition. Still, there are not three essences or three substances taking substance here to mean essence, but again, as Aquinas says, substance does not mean essence in Boethius’ definition. Concerning God, we have to admit both that he is one and that he is three, namely, one in essence and three in persons.

 

[Vico]

So person is a relation? Relation between what?

Catechism

252 The Church uses

• (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
• (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
• (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

 

[rom]

The word substance in Boethius’ definition of person does not mean the essence but the suppositum or simply person.

You are right, and I agree with you. Boethius’ definition does not mean essence but suppositum. But in God the suppositum (the divine Substance) is identical to the essence, which is why the Person (or Suppositum) does have a reference also to the Essence.

By saying that the Person has a reference to the Essence, I do not mean to say that there are three Essences. In God each divine Person refers to the same Suppositum, the same Substance, the same Essence. This is why there is only one God. But why are there three Persons? It is not because there are three Essences, and it is not because there are three Supposita either, but because each Person is a different Relation subsisting in the same Essence or Substance (Suppositum).

Richca, if you still disagree, then let us just agree to disagree because I know that you and I do not disagree on the dogma. We have the same faith. In this dialogue, we are merely sharpening our pencils, so to speak. So, let us just both pray and I will be thanking God because I found an intelligent and pleasant person (You!) to discuss this difficult matter with.

 

[Richca]

Thank you for replying . Yes, I know we believe in the same thing concerning the Trinity in that God is three persons in one nature or essence. I also understand that we are discussing the Trinity which in itself is a great mystery of our faith and that the concepts and terms we are discussing in relation to God can be or rather are quite complex and deep and sort of need to be unpacked meticulously with the correct meanings or senses in order for us to not deviate from what we believe. And what we believe we can simply state that we believe God to be three persons in one divine nature or essence. I am not saying either that I have a perfect grasp of St Thomas’ teaching which I am essentially relying on here. There certainly are various aspects of his teaching that I have not grasped as of yet and maybe never will or at least to the degree he understood them.

It seems in one sense, I’m kind of focusing on the Trinity of persons in God or how God is three while you seem to be focused on the unity of God. But because God is three persons in one nature, we can’t absolutely separate as it were the three persons from the one nature or the one nature from the three persons. In this sense, the CCC#256 quotes St Gregory Nazianzus:

‘I have not even begun to think of unity when the Trinity bathes me in its splendour. I have not even begun to think of the Trinity when unity grasps me’.

Now, the OP asked ‘What is person in Trinity’ and so I think my responses have been focused on the triune nature of God because there are three persons in God. The three persons are the distinctions in God while the one essence unites them.

The following are some comments of mine on your post:

You are right, and I agree with you. Boethius’ definition does not mean essence but suppositum. But in God the suppositum (the divine Substance) is identical to the essence,

The suppositums here are simply the persons of the Trinity for we are talking about Boethius’ definition of person. I agree that the persons in God are the same as the divine essence but I think you may be jumping ahead as it were (to the divine essence though understandably so in a certain sense) of what we are talking about here which is the definition of person in relation to God. So, the focus here is about the persons of the Godhead and not really the divine essence. And if Aquinas says that the word ‘substance’ in Boethius’ definition does not mean the essence but suppositum than I think it follows that neither does suppositum here mean the essence. The persons or suppositums in God are individually and distinct subsistencies and bearers of a common single divine nature with the person of the Father as the source of the Trinity and of the other two persons. This I believe is the meaning of the phrase ‘individual substance’ in the definition. ‘Of a rational nature’ completes the definition of person and these words refer to the divine essence or nature since God’s one intellect and one will belongs in common to each of the three persons.

 

[Richca]

(continued)

which is why the Person (or Suppositum) does have a reference also to the Essence.

Since the persons in God are identical to the divine essence, I don’t think I mean to say that the definition of person or substance or suppositum in this definition absolutely has no reference to the divine essence. All the same, as Aquinas says, the word substance in the definition does not mean the essence and again we are talking here primarily about the persons in God and not the divine essence although as I said, we can’t completely separate the persons in God from the unity of the divine essence. But, the persons in God are the distinctions in God. They are not distinguished according to the divine essence by which they are all substantially God. The CCC#252 states it this way:

The Church uses (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity, (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

 

[OmnesBonum]

A person means a character, and each “person” of the trinity is a separate character, but only one entity. The best way to think about the holy trinity is that the “who” of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are different, but the “what” is the same. God is three in one way, and one in a different way, not the same way.