What is the human person, philosophically?

[JDaniel]

Hi JD. Sadly I don’t have a ton of time on my hands but here we go.

I know very well the distinction between primary matter and extended matter, which is why I qualified the kind of matter to which I was referring. Likewise do I know the distinction between ontological form and ‘shape’ (as a common sensible). These are non-sequiturs.

How are they non-sequiturs?

Furthermore do I know how Thomas believes the process of sensation, intellection, abstraction, and conceptualization works. This is another non-sequitur.

How is this another non-sequitur?

Although it is worth pointing out that your characterization of this process is rather lacking in nuance.

Sorry. I didn’t realize that St. Thomas had come back to add to or amend his writings! (I’ll keep an eye out for him - just a figure of speach. Nothing of the sort is actually intended. )

Proper and common sensibles are, after all, sensibles: they perfect the senses; the intellect does not abstract sensibles at all. It abstracts universal intelligible form exemplified in matter.

Do you actually have any idea what you’re talking about? Truthfully, I can’t be sure.

In particular, the agent intellect abstracts intelligible forms from sensible forms provided by phantasms, which are generated by the phantasia (a power of inner sense, not intellect). But again, this is a non-sequitur, although I’d be happy to clarify with considerable perspicuity, precisely what Thomas thinks regarding cognition, if you’d like.

Of course I would. I look forward to every opportunity I get to talk to someone who really knows St. Thomas.

The real issue here is that you attribute to Thomas Aquinas a position which he demonstrably did not hold; and instead of referring me to Thomas you refer me to Suarez (a notable interpreter of Thomas). But here, I will refer you to Thomas, who most certainly does insist that primary matter is, as I said, the primary principle of individuation.

No. I think you have misunderstood him. Primary matter cannot individuate. St. Thomas regards it as a kind of “chaos.” The two, matter and form individuate, but not either one of them alone. But, at this point, the “matter” is no longer Primary Matter.

I say (and I said) ‘primary’ because in fact it is primary matter in conjunction with its particular dimensive qualities which accounts for individuation.

Its “outlines?”

“*n natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.” – ST I.75.4

“Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.” – ST I.76.2 ad 3*

Let’s take a look at St. Thomas is talking about. Here’s your second quote in more detail:

For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material–that is, not abstracted from material conditions–its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal.

What do you think St. Thomas means by the above?

Now, here is a similar expansion of your first quote:

First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.

What do you think the above means?

continued…

 

[JDaniel]

continuation…

“But matter is the principle of individuation. From this it might perhaps appear to follow that an essence which includes in itself matter along with form is only particular and not universal. And from this it would follow that universals would not have a definition, if essence is that which is signified by a definition. We should notice, therefore, that the principle of individuation is not matter taken in just any way whatever, but only designated [signate] matter. And I call that matter designated which is considered under determined dimensions. Such matter is not placed in the definition of man as man, but it would be placed in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition.” – De Ente et Essentia, 2.22-3

And what does this have to do with “Primary Matter?” What do you think is meant by “signate?”

What worries me is that this is Thomas’ well-known and controversial position which you aver, claiming to speak for Thomas, that he rejects. That is a patently false attribution; I hope you don’t make it again.

Is there anyone out there that has any idea what this person is trying to say? And, by the way, did someone die and make you a moderator?

With regard to conception, again, I stated exactly what Thomas states (except that he refers to ‘sperm’ and ‘menstrual blood,’ having not the notion of ovum). Now you can argue with Thomas; you are free to do so. But do not argue that Thomas held a position which he did not.

Once again: kindly explain what you trying to say, please.

God bless,
jd

 

[Jaaanosik]

Hmmm. Why do you think it is this way rather than the other way 'round? The soul could be the teacher teaching the brain-body consciousness, awareness , and awareness of awareness, could it not?

…
jd

It does not seem so. Consciousness resides in our brains. It’s formed via our senses.

 

[JDaniel]

It does not seem so. Consciousness resides in our brains. It’s formed via our senses.

Jano:

Quite possibly. But, it could also be formed via the our ensoulment; our souls are the animating principles of our bodies. In any event, I’ll go along with it as Greylorn stated it, at least until I can’t any more.

Greylorn is a crotchedy ol’ dude, but he’s no dummy.

God bless,
jd

 

[Alterum]

JD: Apparently this conversation cannot be had; you seem so unfamiliar with its grammar that all you can ask is (1) whether I know what I’m talking about – and it will be clear to a reader of Thomas that I do – or (2) what Thomas means, after quoting passages I quoted at greater length. As though your inability to understand demonstrates that there is some deficiency in my exegesis (but there is little controversy regarding what Thomas says); or as though your asking what I think Thomas means demonstrates that Thomas must mean something other than what he actually says.

But this is really laughable. Thomas follows Aristotle, who also held that the principle of individuation is prime matter – anyone who has studied either of these knows this.

Since you cannot understand me I have fortuitously discovered a chapter from “The Oxford Handbook to Aquinas” (edited by Davies and Stump) online which covers this precise issue. In it you will see that designated (or signate) matter is indeed prime matter, and that prime matter is indeed, according to Thomas Aquinas, the principle of individuation. The chapter is Matter, Form and Individuation by Jeffrey E. Brower.

Again, apparently this is a conversation we cannot have. I actually study this full time. It appears as if you have not studied it at all.

 

[JDaniel]

JD: Apparently this conversation cannot be had

Alterum:

I’ll remain hospitable, then, and take this moment to duck out. I know that I barged in on your private conversation with someone else, but, after all, this is an open forum. It would have been less rude to simply have asked me to butt out. But to insult me and insinuate that you are some great gift to Thomism and that I don’t understand, is to be very full of yourself. Thank you for the paper you provided in your last post. It has always, it seems, been a predilection of people to try to define, in object-terms, primary matter and substantial form.

I’ll leave you with this paragraph from VE Smith, Gen. Sci. of Nat., C VII, p. 121:

"Not capable of being directly experienced or experimented, primary matter and substantial form are likewise the principles of the results we experience and experiment with. Carbon and copper each have a form analogous to sight with respect to the eye, which is a structural effect of sight in matter; each has a form analogous to the habit of geometry with respect to acts, which are the effects of that habit in the human mind. Experience and experiment reveal the function and structure of carbon and copper which in each case is the result of the form in question actualizing or organizing primary matter. We see then not primary matter but effects produced within it by substantial form. If it were not so awkward in English it would be proper to describe gold as golden prime matter, an oak as oaken prime matter, and man as human prime matter. In our burning of wood, wooden prime matter is present at the start of the change and ashen prime matter at the end. Our chemical and physical discussion of the structure of each kind of thing enables us to know more about the effects produced by substantial form in primary matter, and in this fashion we get more knowledge of the form in question than would otherwise be possible. To this problem of the concrete relations between science in the Aristotelian sense and science in the modern sense we shall have to return. Our present interest is only to discourage any tendency to think of primary matter and substantial form as things rather than principles by which mobile things come to be and pass away.

“In this, our third and concluding chapter concerning nature’s first principles, attention was focused on the fundamental reason which makes our world material and mobile, namely primary matter. Matter has been related to form as one of the essential principles of motion and to privation as an accidental principle of change. It was seen that matter is potency and primary matter pure potency; form is always the determining or actualizing principle of mobile being. In this chapter, our nominal definition of primary matter was improved; and it was argued that matter always has an appetite [for Form]. Our final problems showed that a correct understanding of matter could solve the ancient dilemma of Parmenides and even throw light on the relation of science in the ancient sense to science in the modern sense of the term. Any use of science in the modern sense to prove the existence of primary matter, substantial form, and privation could be no more than a dialectical confirmation of what is really proved by other means. For the ultimate assurance of our three first principles is the inductive knowledge that substantial changes truly occur in nature and, since nothing can come from nothing, there must be a primary subject persisting through any substantial change. That substantial change goes on is a primary datum of experience.”

God bless,
jd

 

[Alterum]

Alterum:

I’ll remain hospitable, then, and take this moment to duck out. I know that I barged in on your private conversation with someone else, but, after all, this is an open forum. It would have been less rude to simply have asked me to butt out. But to insult me and insinuate that you are some great gift to Thomism and that I don’t understand, is to be very full of yourself. Thank you for the paper you provided in your last post. It has always, it seems, been a predilection of people to try to define, in object-terms, primary matter and substantial form.

JD: I’m afraid you’ve mistaken charity for insult; for my part, I would have taken an indication of error as benefit. What bothers me is that you continue to insist that, despite our contradicting each other regarding what Thomas says (and what he says is quite clear, as I’ve indicated with numerous direct references), you (who have given no direct references pertaining to this issue) insist that you are right, and that my explanation of your error is insulting and supercilious. Notwithstanding the incoherency here (for you claim to be correcting me yet I have not once charged you with arrogance, but only error, on account of it), I have no patience for that kind of intellectual dishonesty, nor for the superficial show of learning that occasioned it.

With respect to the rest of your post, I don’t see anything to disagree with: the reference you’ve provided seems to accurately describe a difference between matter and form. Nor do I think Thomas would disagree with it. But what this has to do with our excursus into the principle of individuation I’m unsure.

In fact, I think you’ve conflated the ‘determining or actualizing principle’ with the ‘individuating principle’. Substantial form determines prime matter by bringing it from potency to act, making it what it is. But to say that does not yet account for what individuates that form-matter composite (say that cat) from some other form-matter composite determined by precisely the same (not numerically but intrinsically) form (say this cat). For this, as Thomas knew, we need to conceptually determined what in reality is the ‘individuating principle’.

 

[JDaniel]

JD: I’m afraid you’ve mistaken [SNIP]

Let me explain something to you. First of all, I have 3,400 posts herein. Within those 3,400 posts is a plethora of references that I’ve given from the Summa Theologiae, the Commentary on the Metaphysics, the Commentary on the Physics, the Exposition of the Posterior Analytics, On Truth, The Soul, and probably a few others that I can’t remember right now, as well as commentaries on those books from other sources. As anyone here can tell you. I would have thought that if in fact you were trying to be “charitable,” you would have at least checked to see if I had posted any before making your accusations. Within those 3,400 post are hundreds of direct references to the above books, with excerpts directly from them and attributions. So, you are so, so wrong and you have the nerve to tell me I’m wrong? You sound like a little college kid, aka, brat, trying to prove some semblance of adulthood.

In fact, I think you’ve conflated the ‘determining or actualizing principle’ with the ‘individuating principle’. Substantial form determines prime matter by bringing it from potency to act, making it what it is. But to say that does not yet account for what individuates that form-matter composite (say that cat) from some other form-matter composite determined by precisely the same (not numerically but intrinsically) form (say this cat). For this, as Thomas knew, we need to conceptually determined what in reality is the ‘individuating principle’.

So, now you want to converse? If you do, I’ll be happy to continue on, but with a different attitude - from both of us. Let me know if you think we can continue on charitably and I’ll attempt to respond to these last questions. By the way, I don’t have any problem at all with Aquinas’ theory of individuation. But the only point I was making is that it stems from matter, not Prime Matter - and the two are very different. And, even though that makes our jobs of explaining his stuff to the world very much harder, we cannot give-in to the temptation to materialize his first principles, for the sake of expediting some consensus.

One of the problems that everyone seems to have with Aquinas is that he seems to give no point blank explanatory examples of either Form or Primary Matter, that we can put under a microscope, yet we can put the effects of them under one. When Aquinas decides to define something he does so very carefully so that the definitions are tautological. He savors no circularity. And, if he does, as I seem to recall, he tells you what he is doing right up front.

Upon reading that 25 page paper you sent to me, I was, to say the least, somewhat impressed. But, I was also somewhat depressed. Throughout it, apologies were made for their failure to adhere strictly to the words of Aquinas. Rather, in parts, they “put words into his mouth.” But, I read it so see where it would take me. That’s when I realized that the authors were probably very tired of having to explain and re-explain his writings over and over again. I must say that I agree. But, I won’t roll over to something that I believe is purely expediency, just to get past it. You’ll see that I am a perfectionist, where Aquinas is concerned.

That all being said, I’m not perfect. I have been known to make a mistake now and then. But, since I am a perfectionist, I will receive corrections about his philosophies, his science of nature, his concepts of motion, time, cause, and place, etc., with all due humility - precisely because I want to stay as perfect as possible with his thinking.

Anyway, we’re brothers, so we can get away with saying whatever we want to each other! In a way, our bloods are thicker than water.

I await your response.

God bless (as always)
jd

 

[Alterum]

Hey, I will try to reply in a couple of weeks, when I have the time, and say something about medieval theories of individuation.

 

[JDaniel]

Hey, I will try to reply in a couple of weeks, when I have the time, and say something about medieval theories of individuation.

Alterum:

No problem. If i’m alive, I’ll see it. See you then.

God bless,
jd

 

[levinas12]

… we need to conceptually determined what in reality is the ‘individuating principle’.

The individuality associated with a human being is different than the individuality associated with other entities.

A pet cat may be an individual but it is not an individual in the same way that its owner is.

That’s why “person” is invoked to explain the individuality or, better, the singularity of a human being.

 

[Whadyamean]

What is the human person?

How is consciousness, intellect, will, sense appetite and the like involved?

Thanks!

I have heard this statement and found it accurate: “Consciousness is the Light to the awareness of ideas and thoughts. Consciousness is fundamental, and what you are conscious of in awareness constitutes your experience.”

Another: “You are primarily Conscious awareness, and only secondarily a person.”

 

[Jim_Baur]

Is there an official teaching by the Catholic Church as to when God infuses the human soul?

When are we said to be a human person by the official teachings of the Church?

 

[Whadyamean]

Is there an official teaching by the Catholic Church as to when God infuses the human soul?

When are we said to be a human person by the official teachings of the Church?

When is life not? Is it your contention that it advances by fits and starts?

 

[Jim_Baur]

I believe that the human person is formed at conception.

I was just curious if the Catholic Church taught when God infuses the human soul.

Does the Church explicitly teach when human life begins?

Does the Church explicitly teach that personhood begins at conception?

 

[Jaaanosik]

I believe that the human person is formed at conception.

I was just curious if the Catholic Church taught when God infuses the human soul.

Does the Church explicitly teach when human life begins?

Does the Church explicitly teach that personhood begins at conception?

Yes, at the time of conception the human soul is created. The soul is ready to ‘grow’.