"Why Is There Something Instead of Nothing?" An article giving a reason for believing God created the universe

[mdgspencer]

Why Is There Something Instead of Nothing? | Catholic Answers Magazine

God is the only candidate for a causal explanation of the contingent universe, this article says.

 

[Dan_Defender]

In the purely atheistic view, in the future the universe stops expanding, comes to a grinding halt and ends up an immense blanket of cosmic dust. Because there is no motion anymore, time ceases to exist. Even in that scenario, the universe is still something as opposed to nothing, so how could it have started as nothing and end in something without God?

 

[FiveLinden]

Why do we need an explanation for there being something?

 

[rossum]

Warning: I am going to be using some symbolic logic below.

Let N be a necessary entity. Now let N cause something other than itself; call that something S.

This gives:

N => S

which is a standard logical implication: if N then S.

An implication can be reversed:

~S => ~N

which reads: if S does not exist then N does not exist. If S is contingent, then ~S is allowed since a contingent entity may or may not exist.

Given that N is a necessary entity then N is always true and ~N is always false. Applying that we have:

N & (~S => ~N)

The result of that is:

S

Intuitively that is true. If N causes S and N always exists, then S also always exists.

To summarise, if a necessary entity is the cause of a second entity then that second entity always exists, and is in effect itself also necessary rather than contingent.

 

[White_Tree]

Intuitively that is true. If N causes S and N always exists, then S also always exists.

To summarise, if a necessary entity is the cause of a second entity then that second entity always exists, and is in effect itself also necessary rather than contingent.

I follow your logic, though I think there is potentially an issue with your first assumption.

N → S implies that something (S) is a necessary and permanent implication of nothing (N). But that doesn’t have to be the case.

I can make a sandwich (I am the cause of the sandwich), and yet I can continue to exist after the sandwich does not.

There is also the possibility of oscillating systems, such as the Mahamanvantara and Mahapralaya in Hinduism. The Pralaya (nothing) and the Manvantara (something), in a sense, cause each other. So:
N → S → N → S → … forever

That setup would actually still conform to your logic, but it wouldn’t look like it does, because each side the oscillation can exist in potentiality.

The cause of a pendulum being swung to the left is the pendulum previously having been swung to the right. So when the pendulum is on the right, the left-swung pendulum is technically “there” but not manifested, since it only exists in potentiality.

Similarly, even when there is Nothing, the Something is still there, but it looks like Nothing. It’s a cause that hasn’t manifested yet. It’s “there,” but it’s not. So for all intents and purposes, it appears to not be there.

Basically, the Something (at least, a manifested Something) does not have to be eternal even if its cause is eternal. It could merely be unmanifested.

 

[rossum]

I can make a sandwich (I am the cause of the sandwich), and yet I can continue to exist after the sandwich does not.

You are contingent, not necessary. There is no paradox with a contingent cause of a different contingent entity. The problem comes with a necessary cause of a contingent entity.

Similarly, even when there is Nothing, the Something is still there, but it looks like Nothing. It’s a cause that hasn’t manifested yet. It’s “there,” but it’s not. So for all intents and purposes, it appears to not be there.

If the appearance changes then the appearance is contingent. What causes the change in the appearance? By my argument, the cause cannot be necessary.

A permanent necessary entity cannot, on its own, cause something which does not also always exist. A contingent additional cause can solve the immediate problem, but then gives rise to what caused that contingent additional cause.

My initial argument showed that N => C has a problem. Allowing (N & X) => C solves the immediate problem, but leaves the question of what causes the contingent entity X.

 

[tafan2]

You state N => S as a truth? Why?

N can exist without causing S to exist. Actually, it should be stated as:

S => N. If S cannot exist without N, therefore if S’s existence implies N’s existence.

Your logic starts out backwards.

 

[tafan2]

Perhaps we don’t. But we certainly seem to desire an explanation for how things have come about. We spend a lot of time studying history, studying evolutionary biology, cosmology.

But, perhaps you are correct, we do not need any if this. However, the arguments for a first cause not primarily to show why our universe exists, but rather to demonstrate that God exists.

 

[White_Tree]

You are contingent, not necessary. There is no paradox with a contingent cause of a different contingent entity. The problem comes with a necessary cause of a contingent entity.

Could you elaborate a little on this, please? I may be unfamiliar with your terminology.

Let’s use the example of a child. If two parents have a child, then those parents are a necessary cause of that child. That specific child, with that specific DNA, could have no other cause but those parents, and the child could not exist if the parents in turn did not exist. The parents are necessary, not contingent, to the existence of the child.

And yet, the child can continue to exist after the parents exist no longer (or vice versa).

Unless you are using “necessary” and “contingent” to mean something else (which I suspect you are), in which case, could you please clarify what you mean by those terms?

 

[rossum]

You state N => S as a truth? Why?

Not as a truth, but as a premise of my argument, and of the article referenced in the OP. A necessary entity (N) is asserted to cause something else (S).

N can exist without causing S to exist.

If and only if N is not a sufficient cause of S, but requires an auxiliary entity to cause S: (N & X) => S. If the full cause of S is present, then S must be present. If N exists while S does not, then N alone is not the full cause of S.

Actually, it should be stated as:
S => N. If S cannot exist without N, therefore if S’s existence implies N’s existence.

Not correct. There may be more than one possible cause of S. It might be that M caused this particular instance of S, not N. A burst dam can cause a flood, but a flood may not mean a dam has burst, just that a lot of rain has fallen in a short time. You are making an unwarranted assumption that N is the only possible cause of S. That is not stated in my premises.

Your logic starts out backwards.

My logic is standard. If we reverse A => B then we get ~B => ~A. If there is no flood then we can be sure that the dam has not burst.

 

[rossum]

Could you elaborate a little on this, please? I may be unfamiliar with your terminology.

In this case I am using “necessary” in a theological context, as per the article in the OP. A necessary being must exist, and cannot not exist.

This is distinct from the logical use of “necessary” in causation, with necessary and sufficient causes. The thrust of my argument is that a theologically necessary entity cannot be a sufficient cause of a theologically contingent entity.

My apologies for the confusion.

 

[tafan2]

Not as a truth, but as a premise of my argument, and of the article referenced in the OP. A necessary entity (N) is asserted to cause something else (S).

That is not how logic works. The premises you start with are assumed truths. N=>S is simply not a logical truth.

My logic is standard. If we reverse A => B then we get ~B => ~A. If there is no flood then we can be sure that the dam has not burst.

I understand what that A implies B gives not B implies not A. What is backwards is N implies S. I don’t know why you brought additional causes into the argument.

 

[White_Tree]

Thank you for clarifying. In that case, yes, I agree with you.

If N is the singular cause of S, then you are right–if N always exists, then S must also always exist.

However, I’m not sure if that logic is applicable here, because the act of Creation described in Genesis does not list God as the singular cause. It is more akin to what you described in your second post:

Allowing (N & X) => C solves the immediate problem, but leaves the question of what causes the contingent entity X.

We are taught by Moses,

And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he them; male and female created he them. – Genesis 1:27

In describing the creation of man in God’s own image, the verse explicitly says, “male and female.” So the act of creation performed by man mirrors the act of creation performed by God, with three causes, not one, as described here:

And the earth was formless and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. – Genesis 1:2-3

So just like in the act of creation performed by man, there is the egg (the waters, the void), the sperm (the Spirit), and the act of fertilization (the Spirit fecundating the waters, and calling forth the light).

As Moses describes, the Earth and the Spirit are both there, present, in the beginning, but the Earth is in a formless state. It is nothingness, emptiness, void. It is the act of fecundation by the Spirit that causes this nothingness to manifest into what we would consider form.

This also mirrors the human act of creation. The sperm and the egg contain all of the forms of the future human being, but in a potential, unmanifested state, which we refer to as DNA. These archetypes appear to be “nothing,” but they manifest and become forms (a person) through the act of fertilization. But they were there, present, in a formless state, in the beginning.

Moses does not say the earth wasn’t there; he says it was formless and void. That is, the earth appeared to be “nothing” (or at least, what we would perceive or understand to be nothing), but in reality it was merely formless, unmanifested archetypes brought into a state of manifestation by an act of the Spirit.

I assume from your avatar that you are a Buddhist. I do not know what lineage you belong to, but I believe it is common understanding in many branches of Buddhism that form and emptiness are merely two different manifestations or appearances of the same thing, as Moses teaches us in the second verse of Genesis.

Now some might argue that both of the eternal (or “necessary”) aspects of that equation, the Void and Spirit, are “God.” And that is fine, but it still leaves the contingent act of stirring the waters as part of the creation equation.

So this is really not the case of a necessary thing causing a contingent thing. Rather, it is two necessary things and a contingent thing causing a contingent thing, that contingent result being the Waters, or the Void, taking on the appearance of form, which we refer to as “the Universe.”

 

[rossum]

What is backwards is N implies S. I don’t know why you brought additional causes into the argument.

In my post, N was God – a necessary entity. S was the material world, which the article in the OP claims was created/caused by God.

My argument points out the problem with a necessary entity causing a contingent entity because the contingent entity may not exist at some point in time.

 

[rossum]

If N is the singular cause of S, then you are right–if N always exists, then S must also always exist.

Hence N => S is impossible and we have (N & X) => S

Now consider X. X is contingent, hence X has a cause. What was that cause? We cannot have N => X because that has the same problem of the necessary N causing a contingent entity. Hence we need (N & Y) => X for some other contingent Y, and we have an infinite regression.

A necessary entity can only cause other necessary entities if the regression is to be avoided.

Being necessary, in the theological meaning, is a restrictive property, preventing a number of operations that are possible for merely contingent entities. Causing a new contingent entity is one of those operations.

 

[tafan2]

I understand what N and S represent. Perhaps the problem is that we are both using a short-cut in the logic formula. It is not correct to say either N=>S or S=>N, what we should do is define the predicate E representing the existence. So your statement would be E(N)=>E(S). Which is not true. E(S)=>E(N) is true, if we N is defined as the necessary entity.

 

[White_Tree]

N => S is impossible

I understand that in the singular sense.

However, it’s not clear to me that why it is impossible for a contingent change in appearance to arise out of a contingent interaction between two necessary things.

Could you elaborate on this, please?

 

[rossum]

So your statement would be E(N)=>E(S). Which is not true.

Since God is the necessary entity, you are in effect saying that God has not created anything; there is no E(S) which was caused by E(N). Very Zen, but I doubt if it is either Catholic or Christian.

 

[rossum]

However, it’s not clear to me that why it is impossible for a contingent change in appearance to arise out of a contingent interaction between two necessary things.

Could you elaborate on this, please?

Given two necessary entities: N and M, what interactions can there be? (N & M) is always true. (N ¦ M) is also always true. Other combinations might perhaps be false. Both N and M are always present so any combination of them is also always present, and remains unchangeably true or false. There is still the problem of an eternally necessarily existent ‘contingent’ entity. There is no such problem with an eternally non-existent contingent entity; the non-existence of unicorns does not present a problem of causation.

So, you propose a change in appearance. That implies that appearance (A) is contingent: it changes from A to A’. What causes that change? We are back to the problem that a necessary entity cannot on its own cause a contingent entity. As soon as an auxiliary contingent entity is added to the left side of the logical implication then we replicate the same problem: what caused the auxiliary entity, called either X or A’ in this discussion.

Making an entity necessary greatly restricts the range of operations it can perform. It has a similar effect to being unchanging; whatever N does now, it has to have been doing for eternity and must continue doing for eternity. Because it cannot change it can never perform any new actions. Anything new is, of necessity, contingent and we are back to my original point. A necessary entity cannot on its own cause a contingent entity.

 

[tafan2]

I have made no statement about N’s or S’s existence. I am simply trying to fix your (obvious) logic error.