Why just one first mover?

[STT]

I think in the argument from motion one has to show that there is only one mover.

 

[Richca]

I think this is like asking whether there is only one God and so one first mover. Link to St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica on The Unity of God:

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1011.htm

 

[IWantGod]

If a being is the necessary antithesis of nothing, if it necessarily exists, then it is fundamental reality. If there were multiple necessary beings, then there would have to be something that makes one distinct from the other. This would mean that one being lacked something that the other being has.

But a necessary act of reality lacks nothing that is intrinsic to the act of necessary reality. Thus the idea that there is another necessary act of reality would imply that it had something that is not intrinsic to the act of that which necessarily exists, which of course is a contradiction. Fundamental reality has everything that is true of that which is fundamental reality, so there cannot possibly be two of them because if there were it would mean that one of them has something more than what is true of fundamental reality…

 

[Rhubarb]

Because Aristotle said so. And that was dogma in education and thinking for 2500 years. And that kind of traction is hard to go against.

 

[STT]

I think this is like asking whether there is only one God and so one first mover. Link to St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica on The Unity of God:

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1011.htm

Thanks for the link. So he offers three arguments here for uniqueness of God, argument from His simplicity, argument from infinity of His perfection and argument from unity of world. There is however no relation demonstrated in the first and second argument that the first mover must be simple and infinitely perfect. The only related argument to me is the third argument which is about unity of world. He however considered the unity of world as granted. Therefore the third argument is based on this assumption which could be wrong.

 

[STT]

If a being is the necessary antithesis of nothing, if it necessarily exists, then it is fundamental reality. If there were multiple necessary beings, then there would have to be something that makes one distinct from the other. This would mean that one being lacked something that the other being has.

This is the second argument in the link which misses to demonstrate that why God is the first mover and also doesn’t demonstrate that why many same God is impossible.

But a necessary act of reality lacks nothing that is intrinsic to the act of necessary reality. Thus the idea that there is another necessary act of reality would imply that it had something that is not intrinsic to the act of that which necessarily exists, which of course is a contradiction. Fundamental reality has everything that is true of that which is fundamental reality, so there cannot possibly be two of them because if there were it would mean that one of them has something more than what is true of fundamental reality…

We could have two realities which are causality independent, each created by a first mover.

 

[Wesrock]

I addressed that in my argument from motion topic, btw.

If the Unmoved Mover were not unique, multiple instances of the Unmoved Mover would have to be differentiated from each other. But it’s been established that the Unmoved Mover is immaterial, and therefore cannot be distinguished by its material or position in space. It is eternal which means it cannot be distinguished by time. It is perfect meaning that it can’t be distinguished by having some perfection (or in reverse, some privation) that the other lacks. There is no way in principle for multiple instances of an Unmoved Mover to be distinct or differentiated. By the law of identity, the Unmoved Mover must therefore have unity, be one, and be unique.

The Existence of God: The Argument From Motion Philosophy

Post 4 of 8 We’ve established that the existence of things that only potentially exist must be actualized, and furthermore that this requires the existence of at least one being that is just inherently actual. Such a member is called an Unmoved Mover. Is it possible for an Unmoved Mover to have potentiality? Is it possible to have its existence in a non-derived way but to have the capacity to change? Consider a being that exists in a non-derived way with a potential that was not previously act…

There’s additional background material in the preceding posts to that one, of course.

 

[STT]

Because Aristotle said so. And that was dogma in education and thinking for 2500 years. And that kind of traction is hard to go against.

Interesting. I didn’t know that the root of the argument goes back to Aristotle.

 

[Wesrock]

IWantGod:

If a being is the necessary antithesis of nothing, if it necessarily exists, then it is fundamental reality. If there were multiple necessary beings, then there would have to be something that makes one distinct from the other. This would mean that one being lacked something that the other being has.

This is the second argument in the link which misses to demonstrate that why God is the first mover and also doesn’t demonstrate that why many same God is impossible.

But a necessary act of reality lacks nothing that is intrinsic to the act of necessary reality. Thus the idea that there is another necessary act of reality would imply that it had something that is not intrinsic to the act of that which necessarily exists, which of course is a contradiction. Fundamental reality has everything that is true of that which is fundamental reality, so there cannot possibly be two of them because if there were it would mean that one of them has something more than what is true of fundamental reality…

We could have two realities which are causality independent, each created by a first mover.

In which case Unmoved Mover A is Pure Act-A and Unmoved Mover B is Pure Act-B, which 1), means he’s not Simple but 2), means that neither is actually Pure Act. It is absurd to have something which is pure act but then to say that pure act lacks some potential that another has.

 

[STT]

There could be two first mover which causes two causality independent realities.

 

[Magnanimity]

But, for Aristotle there were several unmoved movers, right? They corresponded to celestial bodies, I believe.

 

[Wesrock]

The argument from motion goes back to Aristotle, but I don’t know if Aristotle determined there to be one unmoved mover. His argument was developed further.

 

[STT]

In which case Unmoved Mover A is Pure Act-A and Unmoved Mover B is Pure Act-B,

Ok.

which 1), means he’s not Simple but

Why not? Why we could not have many Gods who each is simple and they are similar?

2), means that neither is actually Pure Act.

Why not? They could be each pure act and causes different reality.

It is absurd to have something which is pure act but then to say that pure act lacks some potential that another has.

I am not saying that.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

In which case Unmoved Mover A is Pure Act-A and Unmoved Mover B is Pure Act-B,

Ok.

which 1), means he’s not Simple but

Why not? Why we could not have many Gods who each is simple and they are similar?

Simplicity is not just physical simplicity, but also metaphysical simplicity. That which is absolutely Simple can not have distinct attributes. You are proposing that they can be distinguished by some modifier A and B, but that is a metaphysical (at the least) complexity, meaning it is not absolutely simple. We run into issues here as well if we were to use the Argument From Contingency, because it follows from that argument “that there is one thing which is Subsistent Being, and there is no distinction between what it is and that it is.” However, if you introduce some distinction by which it can be differentiated from another, then the object under consideration can’t be Subsistent Being.

Why? We’d be claiming that it is Existence Itself + A and it can be distinguished from something which is Existence Itself + B, but in either case then, modifier A and modifier B aren’t Existence Itself, otherwise they’d be identical and not distinctions, which means the thing which we’re claiming is “Existence Itself + A” obviously isn’t the same thing as Existence Itself. Therefore it is not that which just is Subsistent Being, which the Argument From Contingency shows must exist. Therefore, since there can be no distinction made between multiple cases of Subsistent Being or in something that is absolutely Simple, there can at most be only one such case.

Wesrock:

2), means that neither is actually Pure Act.

Why not? They could be each pure act and causes different reality.

It is absurd to have something which is pure act but then to say that pure act lacks some potential that another has.

I am not saying that.

You are. For there is something which B has which A doesn’t, and something which A has which B doesn’t. That is the only manner by which they could be distinguished from each other. And since they cannot be distinguished, then that which causes Reality A and that which causes Reality B must actually be the same thing, or if there are plural, they themselves are not unmoved movers but are therefore also moved by something else which is the unmoved mover.

 

[STT]

Simplicity is not just physical simplicity, but also metaphysical simplicity. That which is absolutely Simple can not have distinct attributes. You are proposing that they can be distinguished by some modifier A and B, but that is a metaphysical (at the least) complexity, meaning it is not absolutely simple.

We run into issues here as well if we were to use the Argument From Contingency, because it follows from that argument “that there is one thing which is Subsistent Being, and there is no distinction between what it is and that it is .” However, if you introduce some distinction by which it can be differentiated from another, then the object under consideration can’t be Subsistent Being.

Why? We’d be claiming that it is Existence Itself + A and it can be distinguished from something which is Existence Itself + B, but in either case then, modifier A and modifier B aren’t Existence Itself, otherwise they’d be identical and not distinctions, which means the thing which we’re claiming is “Existence Itself + A” obviously isn’t the same thing as Existence Itself. Therefore it is not that which just is Subsistent Being, which the Argument From Contingency shows must exist. Therefore, since there can be no distinction made between multiple cases of Subsistent Being or in something that is absolutely Simple, there can at most be only one such case.

You are. For there is something which B has which A doesn’t, and something which A has which B doesn’t. That is the only manner by which they could be distinguished from each other. And since they cannot be distinguished, then that which causes Reality A and that which causes Reality B must actually be the same thing, or if there are plural, they themselves are not unmoved movers but are therefore also moved by something else which is the unmoved mover.

No, I am talking about two conscious beings with the same attributes. I don’t see that as impossibility?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Simplicity is not just physical simplicity, but also metaphysical simplicity. That which is absolutely Simple can not have distinct attributes. You are proposing that they can be distinguished by some modifier A and B, but that is a metaphysical (at the least) complexity, meaning it is not absolutely simple.

We run into issues here as well if we were to use the Argument From Contingency, because it follows from that argument “that there is one thing which is Subsistent Being, and there is no distinction between what it is and that it is .” However, if you introduce some distinction by which it can be differentiated from another, then the object under consideration can’t be Subsistent Being.

Why? We’d be claiming that it is Existence Itself + A and it can be distinguished from something which is Existence Itself + B, but in either case then, modifier A and modifier B aren’t Existence Itself, otherwise they’d be identical and not distinctions, which means the thing which we’re claiming is “Existence Itself + A” obviously isn’t the same thing as Existence Itself. Therefore it is not that which just is Subsistent Being, which the Argument From Contingency shows must exist. Therefore, since there can be no distinction made between multiple cases of Subsistent Being or in something that is absolutely Simple, there can at most be only one such case.

You are. For there is something which B has which A doesn’t, and something which A has which B doesn’t. That is the only manner by which they could be distinguished from each other. And since they cannot be distinguished, then that which causes Reality A and that which causes Reality B must actually be the same thing, or if there are plural, they themselves are not unmoved movers but are therefore also moved by something else which is the unmoved mover.

No, I am talking about two conscious beings with the same attributes. I don’t see that as impossibility?

Are they perfectly identical in themselves?

 

[STT]

Are they perfectly identical in themselves?

There exist two beings. These two beings have exactly the same attributes apart from the sense of self.

 

[Rhubarb]

No, the unmoved mover was the base, which turned the celestial spheres.