Why Scientism is a Faith

[AntiTheist]

It appeared to me that you were presenting an argument for your claim that numbers are not real, where ‘real’ means non-imaginary, like GW, as opposed to imaginary, like Spiderman, but not wholly imaginary, like Potatoman (assuming that no such fictional character actually exists).

That’s close.

I would actually phrase it like this: numbers are certainly real in the sense that all thoughts and ideas (and models of reality) are real. They really exist as thoughts and models that can be abstracted from our experience and applied.

They are imaginary in the sense that any actual number itself is completely contingent on human thoughts.

You objected:

If all human minds vanished tomorrow, presumably the idea of George Washington would vanish too. That doesn’t mean that when we think of George Washington, we are not thinking of a real person.

Which is perfectly true, but has nothing to do with my point.

The idea of George Washington is an idea based on an actual, non-imaginary person.

Numbers are different – numbers are models abstracted from reality. The models don’t correspond to anything not contingent on thoughts, like our ideas of people do.

The number “four” is perfectly real itself (that is, it exists as an item of human discourse, quite apart from my thoughts about it), but there’s not a “four” floating around somewhere in reality that it corresponds to. We can use the model to label things that are not contingent on my thoughts (like the number of legs on a dog), but those are legs, not the number four.

Now, I’m not “proving” this to you yet. I’m trying to establish that this is an unproblematic distinction. There is nothing contradictory about the position that numbers are real in one sense and unreal in another.

As long as you agree with this, we can move on.

you have done nothing to prove that numbers are not real, that numbers would cease to exist if they ceased to be the object of at least one human being’s thought. Can you see that?

Of course I can see that. I haven’t tried to do that yet – I’m just trying to establish that you agree that the distinction I’m making – between real and imaginary – is perfectly acceptable and not contradictory. I’m not asking you to agree with my classification of numbers in terms of real and imaginary. I’m just asking you to agree that the distinction I’m making works and is not inherently contradictory in any way.

What about Spiderman? What about Ion? What about Jesus and God and GW and stories about them?

I’ve already discussed those examples, and I don’t find anything problematic or contradictory about saying that they exist in one sense and don’t exist in another.

All I’m asking you to do is to affirm that my distinction between real and imaginary is a workable distinction.

If I’m going to proceed, I can’t have you later on pulling out the “But, but, but, what is reality?” card.

I want us to agree on how I’m using the words “reality” and “imaginary” before proceeding.

Please confirm that my distinction is acceptable.

 

[AntiTheist]

There is obviously no problem, in principle, in general, with concluding that X’s are “real” in the sense of being cultural items that people tell stories about and “not real” or “imaginary” in the sense of being not actually instantiated in nature. Whether *spirits *are a case that can legitimately be substituted for X is a different matter: you have yet to offer any principles which would clue us in as to whether this is problematic or not.

Reading this over, I get the impression that you agree that there is no problem with deciding that something is "real"in one sense and “not real” or “imaginary” in another sense.

You are merely saying that it’s difficult to determine whether some specific examples are real or not.

Am I understanding you correctly?

If I am, and if you agree that we can use “real” and “imaginary” as I have been explaining the terms, then I will move on to how we determine whether or not something is “real” or “imaginary” in general, though I warn you that I will begin with examples that we all agree with and work up to general principles that we can then apply to your supposedly “problematic” examples.

Please confirm that you are on board with this before I proceed.

 

[Betterave]

That’s close.

I would actually phrase it like this: numbers are certainly real in the sense that all thoughts and ideas (and models of reality) are real. They really exist as thoughts and models that can be abstracted from our experience and applied.

Let’s keep this post short and sweet. I’ve already pointed out that I disagree with your analysis here, but please clarify: Would you also say that George Washington “really exists as a thought and model that can be abstracted from our experience and applied” (that sounds rather strange/awkward, so please modify it if you see the need) - or not?

 

[Betterave]

Now, I’m not “proving” this to you yet. I’m trying to establish that this is an unproblematic distinction. There is nothing contradictory about the position that numbers are real in one sense and unreal in another.

As long as you agree with this, we can move on.

I will note that the extremely general point you have concluded with here is not illustrated by your specific example. But with that caveat, of course I agree with your extremely unambitious general point here.

All I’m asking you to do is to affirm that my distinction between real and imaginary is a workable distinction.

Of course it’s workable in itself. That has never been an issue. What is problematic is what you take it to be workable in respect of, i.e., why fixing on this distinction is helpful for our purposes here.

If I’m going to proceed, I can’t have you later on pulling out the “But, but, but, what is reality?” card.

I want us to agree on how I’m using the words “reality” and “imaginary” before proceeding.

Please confirm that my distinction is acceptable.

So obviously your distinction is acceptable in itself. We’ll have to wait and see if what you go on to try to do with it - in respect to the question of this thread - is acceptable.

 

[Betterave]

Unless AntiTheist turns out to have more to say, it appears that his argument has boiled down to the following: There are certain obvious and unproblematic distinctions that we make between real/non-imaginary things and not-real/imaginary things. Therefore, if we take this obvious distinction, and then just stipulate that all the not-so-obvious stuff we believe in is real, and all the not-so-obvious stuff we don’t believe in is imaginary… then we have somehow explained what it means to say that our belief (or non-belief) in existential claims is based on “evidence-based inquiry”…? - while the beliefs of those who do not share our beliefs are not…?

But of course that’s a terrible argument. It’s just begging the question. It does nothing to explain any kind of credible epistemic criterion. It does nothing to explain or justify any particular interpretation of the concrete import of the so-called “method” of “evidence-based inquiry.”

In any case, thank you to AntiTheist for your unusually civil behavior and conscientious effort to avoid resorting to ad hominem and straw man arguments. This has been a much better effort on your part than arguments you’ve made in the past. And of course if you do have more to say on behalf of your position, I’m happy to hear it.

 

[JDaniel]

Unless AntiTheist turns out to have more to say, it appears that his argument has boiled down to the following: There are certain obvious and unproblematic distinctions that we make between real/non-imaginary things and not-real/imaginary things. Therefore, if we take this obvious distinction, and then just stipulate that all the not-so-obvious stuff we believe in is real, and all the not-so-obvious stuff we don’t believe in is imaginary… then we have somehow explained what it means to say that our belief (or non-belief) in existential claims is based on “evidence-based inquiry”…? - while the beliefs of those who do not share our beliefs are not…?

But of course that’s a terrible argument. It’s just begging the question. It does nothing to explain any kind of credible epistemic criterion. It does nothing to explain or justify any particular interpretation of the concrete import of the so-called “method” of “evidence-based inquiry.”

In any case, thank you to AntiTheist for your unusually civil behavior and conscientious effort to avoid resorting to ad hominem and straw man arguments. This has been a much better effort on your part than arguments you’ve made in the past. And of course if you do have more to say on behalf of your position, I’m happy to hear it.

Betterave:

So, what have we concluded about the question of this thread? Is scientism, after all, a faith in science that it will be able to, even if it can’t right now, answer every question we might pose? Can science resolve everything for us . . . or not?

This has been, for me, a great thread to follow. Thank you both.

[EDIT] Actually, thank you all!

God bless,
jd

 

[Betterave]

Betterave:

So, what have we concluded about the question of this thread? Is scientism, after all, a faith in science that it will be able to, even if it can’t right now, answer every question we might pose? Can science resolve everything for us . . . or not?

This has been, for me, a great thread to follow. Thank you both.

[EDIT] Actually, thank you all!

God bless,
jd

I’m glad you found the thread worthwhile. To your questions: No, scientism is not and never has been the claim that science is in principle capable of (positively) answering every question we might pose. (Presumably it *should *always be able to tell us when we don’t or currently can’t know something.) Nor is scientism the claim that science can “resolve everything for us.” AntiTheist was quite clear about these points. Scientism is just the claim that there is something called ‘science’ (or ‘evidence-based inquiry’), which gives us real knowledge about what really exists, and then there is everything else - notably philosophy and religion, I suppose - by which beliefs are proposed to us, beliefs which we are then free to adhere to and live by (to treat as being true), but which necessarily have no rational foundation (by which we can claim they are true).

Alternately, scientism might propose that no beliefs can justifiably be called simply true, but that the only propositions which we can justifiably treat as being true are those which ‘science’ gives us. The problem here is that we then seem to have no justification for treating this basic proposition of scientism itself as being true, and coming up with such a justification turns out to be harder than the honest believer in scientism expected, if this thread is any indication (and again, thanks to AntiTheist for his patience in trying to provide such a justification - it’s always interesting to see someone earnestly attempt the impossible ).

 

[AntiTheist]

if you do have more to say on behalf of your position

Oh, my. I seem to have entirely forgotten about this thread.

I began typing out another post and saved it as an e-mail, but I never actually posted it and thought that I had. Alas!

So, as a belated Christmas present to you, I present the next step in my argument (and again, remember that we are slowly stepping up the ladder. I want to reach agreement on obvious matters before proceeding to the next level).

So obviously your distinction is acceptable in itself.

Ok, good.

My arguments are going to begin from the premise – to which I hope there are no objections – that all normal, healthy people are capable of distinguishing something they are consciously imagining from something that they are not.

From this experience of the non-imaginary world, they can apply inductive reasoning – the mental process of identifying similarities in disparate pieces of evidence and drawing general conclusions from them – and come up with the general properties possessed by real things.

From applying inductive reasoning to experience, we deveop – early in life – an understanding of the general properties that all real things must possess:
– Continuing to exist when not consciously thought about
– Detectable by at least one person

So far so good? Again, to use some very easy and very obvious examples, a real dream can be detected by one person, a real hallucination can be detected by one person, a real urge can be detected by one person, and they’re all equally real.

Just to be extra clear, our induction does not indicate that real things are made real by virtue of their being detected – it indicates that real things can be detected by at least one person. It’s perfectly possible that there are real things out there that no one has detected yet, but until at least one person detects those things, we have no justification for saying that we think they exist.

Now, let’s say that we’re interested in a specific real thing, like an entity [and to be extra clear, when I say “entity,” I mean a being who has an independent existence from other people and who can interact with others]. From our experience since the beginning of our lives, we have built up, through induction, some general conclusions about how to determine whether an entity exists. Importantly, we know that an entity is a thing that can be detected by any independent observer. And we also know that entities are things that have effects on the world that can be detected by any independent observer.

So, to use a very easy and very obvious example – deliberately, because I’m trying to illustrate my ideas – a dog is a real entity because it can be detected by anybody who cares to look for it. Even if we could make the dog invisible somehow, anyone could investigate and touch the dog or watch it walk through snow and observe that there is evidence that an entity is there.

Now, I might have a real hallucination in which I think that there is an invisible dog in my house, but if I said to someone, “I have an invisible dog in my house,” and I cannot produce any evidence that any independent observer could detect, then no one else has any reason to believe me.

The upshot of all of this is that when we claim that we believe that an entity exists, we need to base this belief on evidence – and by evidence, I specifically mean those things that we have used induction to determine are qualities that all real entities possess: our detection of the entity, our detection of the effects we would expect the entity to have, others’ detection of the entity, and others’ detection of the effects we would expect the entity to have.

And again, I am not saying that detection makes an entity real or that all entities that are real have to be detectable by people – I’m saying that people only have a basis for claiming to believe in entities if they have sufficient evidence for them. For example – yes, another easy and obvious example that I’m deliberately using – it may be that spirits exist on some other dimension and are totally undetectable by any person, but in such a case, no person has any rational basis on which to claim belief in spirits.

Let’s stop here. I’m going to explain how we can use this method to test whether or not there is sufficient evidence to think that spirits exist as real entities operating independently of people. Before I do, I want to make sure that we agree on everything that I’ve said.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

AntiTheist

I’m saying that people only have a basis for claiming to believe in entities if they have sufficient evidence for them. For example – yes, another easy and obvious example that I’m deliberately using – it may be that spirits exist on some other dimension and are totally undetectable by any person, but in such a case, no person has any rational basis on which to claim belief in spirits.

This is scientism pure and simple because you are obviously denying the rational possibility of things we cannot detect. Democritus believed in the existence of the atom without being able to detect it. The atom was imagined. We know today that the product of his imagination, while not detectable by Democritus, is real. We have rational evidence for it.

The same applies to any concept of God as Creator and Designer of the universe. There is today a rational ground for believing that the universe was created (the Big Bang). There is also a rational ground for believing that the universe was intelligently designed through the process called Evolution, both of the universe and of life. The God of creation and design is called a spirit because obviously such a God transcends the world of mere matter and energy, having made both by His omnipotence. We can rationally infer the existence of God, just as we can rationally infer the existence of the atom.

But God can also be known by the human heart in ways denied to the intellect. That, of course, is denied by science, because science is at bottom too arrogant about intellect to give credit to the yearnings of the human heart to know and love its Creator.

Scientism is a doctrine of those who live inside a materialistic box and who cannot think outside the box.

 

[buffalo]

Scientism is a doctrine of those who live inside a materialistic box and who cannot think outside the box.

or those that have painted themselves into a materialistic corner, which is irrational in and of itself.

 

[Betterave]

Nice to see you back. Happy new year.

My arguments are going to begin from the premise – to which I hope there are no objections – that all normal, healthy people are capable of distinguishing something they are consciously imagining from something that they are not.

From this experience of the non-imaginary world, they can apply inductive reasoning – the mental process of identifying similarities in disparate pieces of evidence and drawing general conclusions from them – and come up with the general properties possessed by real things.

“From this experience of the non-imaginary world, they can apply inductive reasoning…”

You lost me here. From the acquired abilities to (a) imagine things, (b) observe things, and (c) to label each as such, they can “apply inductive reasoning” so as to “come up with the general properties possessed by real things”? How? What actual process of “inductive reasoning” are you referring to here?

From applying inductive reasoning to experience, we deveop – early in life – an understanding of the general properties that all real things must possess:
– Continuing to exist when not consciously thought about
– Detectable by at least one person

I’m not sure where you got these so-called “general properties” from. Can you explain, beyond your very vague gesture towards “from applying inductive reasoning to experience”?

Now, let’s say that we’re interested in a specific real thing, like an entity [and to be extra clear, when I say “entity,” I mean a being who has an independent existence from other people and who can interact with others]. From our experience since the beginning of our lives, we have built up, through induction, some general conclusions about how to determine whether an entity exists. Importantly, we know that an entity is a thing that can be detected by any independent observer. And we also know that entities are things that have effects on the world that can be detected by any independent observer.

I would say we certainly do not know that entities are things that have effects on the world that can be detected by any independent observer. We in fact know that to be false. Many observations of entities are theory-laden (i.e., not available to those lacking a knowledge/understanding of the relevant background theory) or observer-dependent in some other way (e.g., dependent on a particular sensitivity or acuity of some sensory or intellectual faculty). And we do know this (anyone who has bothered to really think about it, that is).

 

[Charlemagne_II]

As to the subject of this thread, anyone who owns Alister McGrath’s really great book,* The Twilight of Atheism*, should check out chapter 4, especially the section relating to Einstein.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

One scientific doctrine of the evolutionists is that all life evolves. This however cannot be proven at the level of abiogenesis (the appearance of the first life form on earth). The only explanation evolutionists can give for abiogenesis is that it was a fortuitous accident of molecules combining to create a self-sustaining and reproductive living organism.

But this is faith, not science. Abiogenesis is not a reproducible event, since the conditions on the planet for the first appearance of life have long since ceased to exist. If science is based on verifiability, there is no way to verify the accident of abiogenesis. Hence, the theory of evolution is based on faith in an event that can never be proven to have happened by the laws of mutation and natural selection.

 

[Sonoran_Son]

But this is faith, not science. Abiogenesis is not a reproducible event, since the conditions on the planet for the first appearance of life have long since ceased to exist. If science is based on verifiability, there is no way to verify the accident of abiogenesis. Hence, the theory of evolution is based on faith in an event that can never be proven to have happened by the laws of mutation and natural selection.

Why would mutation and natural selection explain abiogenesis? Abiogenesis and evolution are two different topics in science. If abiogenesis was falsified or another theory was proposed that showed how the first organisms came to be, that wouldn’t (necessarily) affect the theory of evolution.

 

[buffalo]

Why would mutation and natural selection explain abiogenesis? Abiogenesis and evolution are two different topics in science. If abiogenesis was falsified or another theory was proposed that showed how the first organisms came to be, that wouldn’t (necessarily) affect the theory of evolution.

More support for IDvolution.

Is gene duplication a viable explanation for the origination of biological information and complexity?

Abstract

All life depends on the biological information encoded in DNA with which to synthesize and regulate various peptide sequences required by an organism’s cells. Hence, an evolutionary model accounting for the diversity of life needs to demonstrate how novel exonic regions that code for distinctly different functions can emerge. Natural selection tends to conserve the basic functionality, sequence, and size of genes and, although beneficial and adaptive changes are possible, these serve only to improve or adjust the existing type. However, gene duplication allows for a respite in selection and so can provide a molecular substrate for the development of biochemical innovation. Reference is made here to several well-known examples of gene duplication, and the major means of resulting evolutionary divergence, to examine the plausibility of this assumption. The totality of the evidence reveals that, although duplication can and does facilitate important adaptations by tinkering with existing compounds, **molecular evolution is nonetheless constrained in each and every case. **Therefore, although the process of gene duplication and subsequent random mutation has certainly contributed to the size and diversity of the genome, it is alone insufficient in explaining the origination of the highly complex information pertinent to the essential functioning of living organisms. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2011

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Sonoran

*Why would mutation and natural selection explain abiogenesis? Abiogenesis and evolution are two different topics in science. If abiogenesis was falsified or another theory was proposed that showed how the first organisms came to be, that wouldn’t (necessarily) affect the theory of evolution. *

Right. Why would it? So what does scientifically explain the origin of life? Nothing in science does. Then it is faith that explains the accidental combining of molecules sufficient to produce life. While evolution may be based on science, abiogenesis is not. It is based on blind trust in the power of nature to rise from inanimate to animate matter.

Just as religious faith is based on blind trust in the power of God to make man rise up out of the slime of the earth.