Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind?

[SimmieKay]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

To clarify: presenting arguments against one specific competing view (e.g. arguments against materialism) does not in itself answer my request, since if (for example) materialism was disproven, that would not by itself prove hylomorphic dualism, since doing so would not exclude the possibility that another competing view (e.g. substance dualism) was true instead. However, if you could successfully knock off each of the major competing views (i.e. argue against materialism and idealism and subjective dualism, even if by separate arguments against each one), that would constitute a strong argument for hylomorphic dualism.

Finally, I am primarily looking for arguments based on natural reason, not those based on divine revelation (Scripture or Tradition).

Simon

 

[Bahman]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

To clarify: presenting arguments against one specific competing view (e.g. arguments against materialism) does not in itself answer my request, since if (for example) materialism was disproven, that would not by itself prove hylomorphic dualism, since doing so would not exclude the possibility that another competing view (e.g. substance dualism) was true instead. However, if you could successfully knock off each of the major competing views (i.e. argue against materialism and idealism and subjective dualism, even if by separate arguments against each one), that would constitute a strong argument for hylomorphic dualism.

Finally, I am primarily looking for arguments based on natural reason, not those based on divine revelation (Scripture or Tradition).

Simon

All of the above mentioned theories have their own problems.

Hylomorphic dualism: Human is composed of soul and mater in this theory. Soul in this theory is form of body. It is the soul which animate matter. The main problem of this theory is that soul is subjected to destruction since human body is subject to destruction.

Materialism: The main problem of this theory is epiphenomenalism.

Idealism: The main argument against idealism is that the stuff we experience does not look like to mind.

Substance dualism: The main problem of this theory is the problem of interaction between matter and soul.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

To clarify: presenting arguments against one specific competing view (e.g. arguments against materialism) does not in itself answer my request, since if (for example) materialism was disproven, that would not by itself prove hylomorphic dualism, since doing so would not exclude the possibility that another competing view (e.g. substance dualism) was true instead. However, if you could successfully knock off each of the major competing views (i.e. argue against materialism and idealism and subjective dualism, even if by separate arguments against each one), that would constitute a strong argument for hylomorphic dualism.

Finally, I am primarily looking for arguments based on natural reason, not those based on divine revelation (Scripture or Tradition).

Simon

Probably the best current philosopher who deals with your question is Edward Feser.
He has written a number of books which either primarily or incidentally deal with defending hylomorphic (or hylemorphic) dualism.
The books I recommend by Feser would be

1. Aquinas
2. The Last Superstition
   and
3. Scholastic Metaphysics ( I haven’t read this, yet, but have read reviews and discussions on it. It may very well be the best source for a complete and detailed presentation of the case for hylomorphic dualism.)

However, Feser does cover the topic quite substantively on his blog and other websites like Strange Notions.
I would begin by reading Feser’s two rebuttals of critiques by Bill Vallicella (a formidible philosopher in his own right) in this collection:

edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/search?q=hylemorphic+dualism

By the way, I would take time to read the comments on the blog posts because these are frequented by a number of philosophers and bright individuals who fill in many details. The questions or issues with particular points that are treated in the combox will help a great deal in understanding unresolved or open questions.

 

[Rhubarb]

The main reason I’ve seen to cling to hylomorphism is because an Aristotelian project requires it. The distinction between form and matter drives most of Aristotle’s theories, and so also later scholastic theories based on Aristotle.

Though I haven’t made a study on the matter, so this is just a cynical guess.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The main reason I’ve seen to cling to hylomorphism is because an Aristotelian project requires it. The distinction between form and matter drives most of Aristotle’s theories, and so also later scholastic theories based on Aristotle.

Though I haven’t made a study on the matter, so this is just a cynical guess.

So, I invite you to dig into the matter a slight bit less cynically and a tad more informed by reading some of what Feser has to say – the blog posts I suggested as a start – and then report back (with a LESS uninformed cynicism and a MORE informed cynicism) regarding where, precisely, hylomorphism is mistaken.

 

[Rhubarb]

By “haven’t made a study”, I mean I haven’t done any real research on expressly this topic. I also didn’t say hylomorphic dualism is wrong.

I personally don’t subscribe to hylomorphic ontology, which is why I take a somewhat cynical view of the above subject. Though I will browse through the blog. The bits of Feser that I have read I haven’t agreed with, but he’s still fun to read.

 

[Peter_Plato]

By “haven’t made a study”, I mean I haven’t done any real research on expressly this topic. I also didn’t say hylomorphic dualism is wrong.

I personally don’t subscribe to hylomorphic ontology, which is why I take a somewhat cynical view of the above subject. Though I will browse through the blog. The bits of Feser that I have read I haven’t agreed with, but he’s still fun to read.

I gather from the above that you understand that it isn’t sufficient to say “I haven’t agreed with…” What is positively REQUIRED is an explication of why “the bits” not only aren’t agreeable to you, but why they aren’t or can’t be true.

Otherwise, you would agree, that a person is merely presuming that what they do agree with is true, a priori, AND that any position that doesn’t comport with those presumptions is simply untrue by presumption.

That would be as close to the definition of shallow cynicism as we could possibly come. A cynicism that has no real reason for existing.

Good to hear that you will “browse through” the blog, though.

 

[Rhubarb]

I gather from the above that you understand that it isn’t sufficient to say “I haven’t agreed with…” What is positively REQUIRED is an explication of why “the bits” not only aren’t agreeable to you, but why they aren’t or can’t be true.

Otherwise, you would agree, that a person is merely presuming that what they do agree with is true, a priori, AND that any position that doesn’t comport with those presumptions is simply untrue by presumption.

That would be as close to the definition of shallow cynicism as we could possibly come. A cynicism that has no real reason for existing.

Good to hear that you will “browse through” the blog, though.

It’s entirely sufficient to say “I haven’t agreed with…” and leave it at that, if that’s all I want to say. Pre-theoretical intuitions play a big part in the foundations of any philosophical discussion. Especially because I’m not arguing against any stance nor am I trying to convince anyone of anything. I’ve admitted that what I’ve said is just musing on the subject. I also think it’s very healthy to approach any theory with skepticism. I’m very curious to see what others have to say, and once I get a chance to Crack open some textbooks and databases, perhaps I will offer an argument. (Though like we all know, not giving an argument doesn’t demonstrate the corectness of hylomorphism. But, like I said, I’m not saying hylomorphism isn’t correct. Just that I’m not convinced)

 

[GEddie]

Because experientially, our mind is distinct from our head; so we need a theory to account for this.

ICXC NIKA

 

[inocente]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

I’d question the assumption that this is still about deciding which philosopher makes the best argument. It’s true that until recently they were the only game in town. With no tools available to investigate objectively, arguments had to be based on a philosopher’s mind trying to explain itself, based on its intuitions, on what it experiences of itself, on what it believes about itself.

But that has now changed, and Aristotelians and Cartesians may not realize how rapidly the science of mind is progressing. Without even trying to draw the conclusion that the mind can be explained from the nervous system alone, it turns out that way in case after case after case.

There’s already a weight of evidence, which those who are still fond of any given philosophy of mind will argue is not yet beyond reasonable doubt, far from a done deal. But researchers keep on researching and the evidence will continue remorselessly to build day by day, year on year.

Whereas opponents, whatever their position, don’t do research and can only stand on the sidelines. So I’d turn the question round: in the same way we moved on from celestial spheres and other such cosmologies, why should a person still listen to any armchair philosophers of mind?

 

[Peter_Plato]

I’d question the assumption that this is still about deciding which philosopher makes the best argument. It’s true that until recently they were the only game in town. With no tools available to investigate objectively, arguments had to be based on a philosopher’s mind trying to explain itself, based on its intuitions, on what it experiences of itself, on what it believes about itself.

But that has now changed, and Aristotelians and Cartesians may not realize how rapidly the science of mind is progressing. Without even trying to draw the conclusion that the mind can be explained from the nervous system alone, it turns out that way in case after case after case.

There’s already a weight of evidence, which those who are still fond of any given philosophy of mind will argue is not yet beyond reasonable doubt, far from a done deal. But researchers keep on researching and the evidence will continue remorselessly to build day by day, year on year.

Whereas opponents, whatever their position, don’t do research and can only stand on the sidelines. So I’d turn the question round: in the same way we moved on from celestial spheres and other such cosmologies, why should a person still listen to any armchair philosophers of mind?

This isn’t a sound argument. It reads like an advertisement.

The issue isn’t merely a philosophy of mind thing, it turns out to be a problem for science in general. The Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the universe is finding adherents in many areas of science. Your “modern” view is slowly being dispelled by science itself which is realizing an Aristotelian type of teleology is embedded in the universe at it deepest levels and that it is explanatory of what the business of science, at its core, is all about.

No, it isn’t true that “mind can be explained from the nervous system alone” unless you presume a whole lot about the nervous system and ignore a whole lot about mind.

 

[utunumsint]

I’d question the assumption that this is still about deciding which philosopher makes the best argument. It’s true that until recently they were the only game in town. With no tools available to investigate objectively, arguments had to be based on a philosopher’s mind trying to explain itself, based on its intuitions, on what it experiences of itself, on what it believes about itself.

The assumption in inocente’s comments here is that the only folks capable to objective investigation are scientist. But this is by no means proven. I would characterize it this way. Science has a good set of tools very adept at discovering certain types of evidence. Just like a metal detector is very good at detecting metal. But where scientists get confused is when they start to think that the only valid way of discovering truth is through their particular tool. They miss out on whole swaths of reality because of this.

Or perhaps another metaphor would help. Science is like a broom that sweeps away everything but the flat surface of the floor and declares that only the floor is reality. However, there is a huge pile of dirt that has been swept under the carpet that it pretends does not exist.

But that has now changed, and Aristotelians and Cartesians may not realize how rapidly the science of mind is progressing. Without even trying to draw the conclusion that the mind can be explained from the nervous system alone, it turns out that way in case after case after case.

An Aristotelian, unlike a Cartesian, is much more comfortable with a close correlation of mind with brain. However, they have arguments that there are some aspects of the human mind that are irreducible.

There’s already a weight of evidence, which those who are still fond of any given philosophy of mind will argue is not yet beyond reasonable doubt, far from a done deal. But researchers keep on researching and the evidence will continue remorselessly to build day by day, year on year.

So we should write neurologists a blank check for all aspect of the human mind and stop this silly philosophizing? I think this is dangerously narrow minded. We follow this path at our own peril.

Whereas opponents, whatever their position, don’t do research and can only stand on the sidelines. So I’d turn the question round: in the same way we moved on from celestial spheres and other such cosmologies, why should a person still listen to any armchair philosophers of mind?

Again, this is assuming that there is only one valid tool for investigating reality. And this claim is not one that science itself is equipped to answer. Only philosophy can answer this question for science. What we need are good scientists who are also good philosophers. Scientists often make massive metaphysical assertions based on what they think the evidence points towards, without realizing that they have stepped outside of their domain.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Peter_Plato]

The issue isn’t merely a philosophy of mind thing, it turns out to be a problem for science in general.

There is such a thing as scientific progress, and it happens through systematic trial and error or, in Karl Popper’s terminology, conjecture and refutation. A “scientific realist” has to be wary, though, about how such realism is defined. A realism that makes reality what contemporary science says it is links reality logically to the human minds of the present day. Science is then just a human product, rooted in time and place. Bringing in future science—or ideal science—may sound more plausible, but even then there is a distinction between science reflecting (or corresponding to) the nature of reality and it being simply a human construction. Once the logical independence of reality from science is accepted, the question is why reality has a character that enables it to be understood scientifically. The intelligibility and intrinsic rationality of reality cannot be taken for granted. Even the greatest scientists, such as Einstein, have seen that the intelligibility of the world is a mystery. He famously remarked that “the eternally incomprehensible thing about the world is its comprehensibility.” Like the way in which mathematics seems to map the intrinsic rational structure of the physical world, this is presupposed within science and cannot be given a scientific explanation. It appears to be a metaphysical fact, and the explanation for which, if there can be one, must come from beyond science.
Source: Why Science Needs Metaphysics
nautil.us/issue/29/scaling/why-science-needs-metaphysics

 

[utunumsint]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

To clarify: presenting arguments against one specific competing view (e.g. arguments against materialism) does not in itself answer my request, since if (for example) materialism was disproven, that would not by itself prove hylomorphic dualism, since doing so would not exclude the possibility that another competing view (e.g. substance dualism) was true instead. However, if you could successfully knock off each of the major competing views (i.e. argue against materialism and idealism and subjective dualism, even if by separate arguments against each one), that would constitute a strong argument for hylomorphic dualism.

Finally, I am primarily looking for arguments based on natural reason, not those based on divine revelation (Scripture or Tradition).

Simon

I think hylomorphic dualism has a lot going for it because idealism and materialism are really two ends of the same Cartesian substance dualism coin. Materialism tries to reduce or eliminate all mental phenomena to physical interactions. Idealism tries to reduce or eliminate all physical phenomena to mental phenomena. This division was mainly created by Descartes. He could never figure out how his two substances could talk to each other (despite his pineal gland theory).

Hylomorphic dualism resolves this problem by postulating a much richer view of the material world with the four causes and by admitting qualitative features of matter. The Cartesian view eliminates anything but the quantitative features of matter and thus you get a truncated view of the physical world.

God bless,
Ut

 

[SimmieKay]

I’d question the assumption that this is still about deciding which philosopher makes the best argument. It’s true that until recently they were the only game in town. With no tools available to investigate objectively, arguments had to be based on a philosopher’s mind trying to explain itself, based on its intuitions, on what it experiences of itself, on what it believes about itself.

But that has now changed, and Aristotelians and Cartesians may not realize how rapidly the science of mind is progressing. Without even trying to draw the conclusion that the mind can be explained from the nervous system alone, it turns out that way in case after case after case.

There’s already a weight of evidence, which those who are still fond of any given philosophy of mind will argue is not yet beyond reasonable doubt, far from a done deal. But researchers keep on researching and the evidence will continue remorselessly to build day by day, year on year.

Whereas opponents, whatever their position, don’t do research and can only stand on the sidelines. So I’d turn the question round: in the same way we moved on from celestial spheres and other such cosmologies, why should a person still listen to any armchair philosophers of mind?

You are referring to observed correlations between mental phenomena and biological processes in the human brain. We know these correlations exist, although our knowledge of the details of them are still rather patchy, but our understanding keeps on improving, and we have every reason to believe that our understanding will continue to grow. You, like many other people today, seem to think these correlations are some sort of argument for materialism; I don’t agree.

A reductionist materialist says the mind is correlated with the brain because the mind is reducible to the brain. But, if a correlation between A and B is evidence of a relationship of reduction between A and B, why does the existence of such a correlation dictate that the arrow of reduction go in one direction only? A reductionist idealist can say the same thing with the arrow of reduction reversed: the brain is correlated with the mind because the brain is reducible to the mind.

Even dualists have a response: while the existence of a relationship of reduction is one possible explanation for an observed correlation, there may be non-reductionist explanations of the same correlation. It is possible for A and B to be closely correlated even when A and B are fundamentally irreducible to each other.

So, while it is a good thing that we are learning more and more about these correlations, doing so brings us no closer to answering the big questions in the philosophy of mind. As an idealist, I believe that idealism can explain these correlations just as well as materialism can. I’m sure many dualists take the same view about dualism. No matter how much more information about correlations between the brain and the mind we acquire, it will give us no more reason to believe in materialism, since that information will always have non-materialist interpretations.

Simon

 

[inocente]

This isn’t a sound argument. It reads like an advertisement.

The issue isn’t merely a philosophy of mind thing, it turns out to be a problem for science in general. The Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the universe is finding adherents in many areas of science. Your “modern” view is slowly being dispelled by science itself which is realizing an Aristotelian type of teleology is embedded in the universe at it deepest levels and that it is explanatory of what the business of science, at its core, is all about.

No, it isn’t true that “mind can be explained from the nervous system alone” unless you presume a whole lot about the nervous system and ignore a whole lot about mind.

It’s not a beauty contest though, so the number of adherents doesn’t mean anything. Nor do supposed turf wars between philosophy and science departments.

It’s simply that it’s now open to investigation, and so will be settled by evidence rather than a priori propositions.

 

[inocente]

The assumption in inocente’s comments here is that the only folks capable to objective investigation are scientist. But this is by no means proven. I would characterize it this way. Science has a good set of tools very adept at discovering certain types of evidence. Just like a metal detector is very good at detecting metal. But where scientists get confused is when they start to think that the only valid way of discovering truth is through their particular tool. They miss out on whole swaths of reality because of this.

But do these supposed turf wars between philosophy and science exist outside of internet forums?

I’d have thought that philosophers, just like scientists and police officers, are concerned with evidence, and philosophical truth cannot contradict evidential truth.

An Aristotelian, unlike a Cartesian, is much more comfortable with a close correlation of mind with brain. However, they have arguments that there are some aspects of the human mind that are irreducible.

Sure. The only problem being that it’s all (increasingly) open to investigation. The notion of celestial spheres lasted for centuries, there were great arguments for it, all those books in all those libraries couldn’t possibly be wrong. By they were, and as evidence rolled in during the 16th century, philosophers and theologians dumped the idea. I’m suggesting that during the 21st century, that will happen re. the mind.

So we should write neurologists a blank check for all aspect of the human mind and stop this silly philosophizing? I think this is dangerously narrow minded. We follow this path at our own peril.

Philosophy of mind was perhaps always a minority sport, with no real interest for centuries until Descartes. In any event, surely any philosopher worthy of the name is excited to see what can be learned from research and how it might help her, rather than shutting out anything which might challenge her preconceptions?

 

[inocente]

You are referring to observed correlations between mental phenomena and biological processes in the human brain. We know these correlations exist, although our knowledge of the details of them are still rather patchy, but our understanding keeps on improving, and we have every reason to believe that our understanding will continue to grow. You, like many other people today, seem to think these correlations are some sort of argument for materialism; I don’t agree.

Though I’m not making a claim for any existing philosophical -ism, including any school of materialism or reductionism. My argument is more that the competing schools of philosophy of mind are (and always were) substitutes for the real deal, and the real deal can only be determined from empirical evidence.

A reductionist materialist says the mind is correlated with the brain because the mind is reducible to the brain. But, if a correlation between A and B is evidence of a relationship of reduction between A and B, why does the existence of such a correlation dictate that the arrow of reduction go in one direction only? A reductionist idealist can say the same thing with the arrow of reduction reversed: the brain is correlated with the mind because the brain is reducible to the mind.

But the evidence doesn’t agree with either of those positions. The evidence is that it goes in both directions, brain affects mind and mind affects brain (“neuroplasticity”).

Even dualists have a response: while the existence of a relationship of reduction is one possible explanation for an observed correlation, there may be non-reductionist explanations of the same correlation. It is possible for A and B to be closely correlated even when A and B are fundamentally irreducible to each other.

Dualism is predicated on reductionism (into matter + form or into substances), so it’s hard to see how it can then legitimately claim to be non-reductionist. And the irreducible claim is a priori and so is always hostage to evidence proving otherwise.

So, while it is a good thing that we are learning more and more about these correlations, doing so brings us no closer to answering the big questions in the philosophy of mind. As an idealist, I believe that idealism can explain these correlations just as well as materialism can. I’m sure many dualists take the same view about dualism. No matter how much more information about correlations between the brain and the mind we acquire, it will give us no more reason to believe in materialism, since that information will always have non-materialist interpretations.

I’m unconvinced that any existing philosophy of mind is too big to fail, and can escape unscathed from what will be learned over the next hundred years.

Even the big questions may be the wrong questions. For instance, the “hard problem of consciousness” is based on a rather fuzzy notion of a thing called consciousness, which may turn out to be more of a folk intuition than a rigorously defined objective state.

 

[Peter_Plato]

It’s simply that it’s now open to investigation, and so will be settled by evidence rather than a priori propositions.

Except that the evidence itself doesn’t “settle” anything. Those “a priori propositions” (AKA Theorems) are required to make sense of the evidence.

This is why good science requires good philosophy: to make sure the theorems (AKA a priori propositions) are sound and valid and properly treat the evidence.

It isn’t an either/or situation. It is both/and.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Even the big questions may be the wrong questions. For instance, the “hard problem of consciousness” is based on a rather fuzzy notion of a thing called consciousness, which may turn out to be more of a folk intuition than a rigorously defined objective state.

If your prediction turns out to be true then it will have been the case of a “fuzzy notion of a thing” (mind or consciousness) discovering its own fuzzy and folky non-existence and irrelevance in the entire enterprise; which itself will turn out to be devoid of the very qualities that could possibly make it a “rigorously defined objective state” since that state (rigorously defined) depends upon consciousness (intelligence) NOT being a fuzzy, folky intuition.

Self-undermining at its core. Knife-in-the back kind of thing. Death-wish stuff, even. :bigyikes: