Why the Neoplatonic argument (or the argument from composition)doesn't work

[Meng]

Earlier, I was listening to a debate between Edward Feser and Graham Oppy on Capturing Christianity.

In the debate, they were talking about Oppy’s counter-proposal to the conclusion of the Neoplatonic argument, which was that there could be “physical simples” instead of an absolutely simple God. What he was saying was that these physical simples would have the power to continue on existing, which was what explained their existence

Feser objected by pointing out that powers presuppose the substance, which I agree with. He then said something interesting, given the Contingency argument which he also defends. He said that if the power is explained by the substance but the substance was explained by the power, we’d have a “vicious explanatory circle”

But in his book Five Proofs for the Existence of God, he states that God’s nature is the explanation for his existence. But since God is identical to his nature, this is really a shorthand way of saying that God just is his explanation. But isn’t this also an explanatory circle? The explanation of God’s existence is his existence?

So, why then can’t there be explanatory circles for Oppy’s simples? Or, why can’t composite things be explanations for themselves?

This seems to object to Ed Feser’s Neoplatonic argument. If a composite being (say, X+Y) was identical to its explanation (making it necessary), then it wouldn’t need something else external to it to keep the parts X and Y together. The explanatory circle objection wouldn’t work because it would also object to God

 

[adamhovey1988]

Okay, I see a bunch of big words. Could you please make a summary? Some people (such as myself) are interested in philosophy but annoyed by overly technical jargon

 

[Neithan]

I also listened to that debate (about a year ago).

Oppy was basically rehashing the ancient atomist argument from Democritus. Replace “atoms” with “physical simples.”

The reason it’s a vicious circle is because the powers are explained by the substances, so you need an explanation for how the substances have that power. If you try to circle back to the power to explain the substances there is then no actual explanation for either.

God’s nature is the essence of existence. Essence always precedes existence; it’s not circular. (On a tangential note, Sartre objected to this and asserted that existence precedes essence, which is objectively nonsense, but he appealed to subjective experience).

One might reply, OK, so then, the physically simple’s nature is the essence of existence. But its absurd to have multiple essences of existence. In which case we conclude that God is physically simple and indivisible.