William Lane Craig's Objection to Divine Simplicity

[Tannhauser_1509]

Dr. William Lane Craig objects to the classical notion of divine simplicity, specifically as conveyed by Thomists. His objection is expressed in this article.

After reading it, I thought, What’s the problem, Dr. Craig? But, seeing as how he is a more-than-qualified thinker to object to the idea, I’d like to know what may motivate him to have objections to divine simplicity, as well as how he believes it is unbiblical?

Does not Bl. John Duns Scotus satisfy Dr. Craig’s uneasiness with his own explication of formal distinctions (distinctiones formales a partibus rei), as opposed to conceptual or real distinctions?

 

[lmelahn]

Dr. William Lane Craig objects to the classical notion of divine simplicity, specifically as conveyed by Thomists. His objection is expressed in this article.

After reading it, I thought, What’s the problem, Dr. Craig? But, seeing as how he is a more-than-qualified thinker to object to the idea, I’d like to know what may motivate him to have objections to divine simplicity, as well as how he believes it is unbiblical?

I will attempt to answer Dr. Craig’s objections to divine simplicity. Here is the core of his argument (from the article):

As I explain there, the classic doctrine of divine simplicity holds that God is an absolutely undifferentiated unity Who has no distinct attributes, stands in no real relations, Whose essence is not distinct from His existence, and Who just is the pure act of being subsisting. As such, the doctrine of divine simplicity is one that has no biblical support at all and, in my opinion, has no good philosophical arguments in its favor. Moreover, it faces very formidable objections. So in answer to your first question, I do reject the traditional doctrine that God is absolutely simple.

The first problem is the representation that Craig makes of the classical (Aristotelian, Platonic, and Thomistic) understanding of divine simplicity. For example, calling God an “undifferentiated unity” is extremely misleading. When we attribute things to God, the only valid way to do so is to keep in mind that we are attributing to Him properties that, strictly speaking, apply only to His creatures. They apply to God in a way that very much different from the way they apply to creatures; moreover, they apply to Him in a much more eminent way.

Unity is one such divine attribute. Creatures are “one” because they unite together various components or (in more technical terms) principles. For example, all creatures (technically, all substances) have characteristics or properties, called accidents. These accidents are not perfectly identical with the substance, and yet—despite their plurality and changeability—they are all united somehow in a single substance.

With God, the situation is different: He is not a creature—very different from a creature—and so in Him the unity will be much more perfect. Whatever creatures gain from being composed, God already has in infinite measure from being simple and one. He does not need to be divided in order to have perfections, since He is already perfect in Himself.

Calling God “undifferentiated” makes it sound as if God were not something “definite”—as if He were amorphous and diffuse. But that could not be further from the truth: God is the most “definite” being there is. His supreme unity and simplicity arise from an excess of perfection, not a defect.

A similar thing could be said regarding God’s relationships outside of the Persons of the Trinity. It is strictly speaking true that God does not have a real relationship with His creatures, but saying so without explaining it is misleading. In creatures, a relation is a reference that one creature has to another creature. (There is also a special relation that each creature has, which refers it to its Creator.) For example, “fatherhood” is a relation that a father has with respect with his son; “sonship” is the reciprocal relation that a son has with respect to his father. In creatures, therefore, relations are accidents, distinct from the substance. (Strictly speaking, only a substance, such as a man, can have relationships, and only in reference to other substances.) They imply a type of dependence (albeit a weak one) between one substance and another.

God, however, does not have “accidents;” everything that would be an accident for us, God possesses to such a perfect degree that it is the same as His very Substance. (Even his Relations, which are the very same as the Persons.) God cannot “depend” on His creatures in any way whatsoever, and so He does not have, in the strict sense, any real relation (or reference) to His creatures. He does, however, in His very Substance possess, in infinite perfection, what for us would be the accident called “relation.” So it is not as if God is cold or distant toward His creatures—far from it. His love for us is His very Essence.

For the moment, I will simply grant that God’s Divine Essence is identical with His Being—a fact attested to in Exodus 3:14, incidentally.

As far as the claim that divine simplicity is not supported by the Bible, that would require another response, but in fact, it is the central message of the Old Testament. Dr. Craig, I am afraid, fails to distinguish between the Bible’s often metaphorical language and precise, theological and philosophical claims.

For us Catholics, Dr. Craig runs into a much more serious problem: the witness of the Church Fathers, who unanimously affirmed divine simplicity.

Does not Bl. John Duns Scotus satisfy Dr. Craig’s uneasiness with his own explication of formal distinctions (distinctiones formales a partibus rei), as opposed to conceptual or real distinctions?

Perhaps Duns Scotus would satisfy Dr. Craig, but in my opinion Scotus comes dangerously close to compromising divine simplicity, with his doctrine of formal distinctions.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I will attempt to answer Dr. Craig’s objections to divine simplicity. Here is the core of his argument …]

I am so glad to read you again Imelahn. Perhaps you could explain what is the philosophical path that needs to be followed to get to the conclusion that God is simple. That would show the good foundations of this conclusion. I would appreciate it.

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

The first problem is the representation that Craig makes of the classical (Aristotelian, Platonic, and Thomistic) understanding of divine simplicity. For example, calling God an “undifferentiated unity” is extremely misleading. When we attribute things to God, the only valid way to do so is to keep in mind that we are attributing to Him properties that, strictly speaking, apply only to His creatures. They apply to God in a way that very much different from the way they apply to creatures; moreover, they apply to Him in a much more eminent way. …]

So then what do we say of the distinctions within the Trinity? I’ve never gotten into it much, but the Church teaches that the Father is distinct from the Son is distinct from the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father relationally only, not really. What does this mean?

 

[lmelahn]

Incidentally, I realize that I forgot to answer the original question.

I believe that what leads Dr. Craig to his conclusions is his underlying philosophy, which is analytical philosophy. I have not read enough of Dr. Craig to know is positions in detail, but from what I have read he (like all analytical philosophers that I am familiar with) bases his reasoning on modern logic, especially modal logic.

I am not saying that there is anything wrong with modern logic—it is extremely useful for mathematics, computer science, and many aspects of modern science—but, at least as it stands today, it is not a very good tool for natural theology.

For example, you cannot do theology of any kind without using something called the Triplex Via. All of the attributes (properties or characteristics that can be predicated of things) that we are familiar with apply in their normal sense only to creatures. When we try to apply them to God, we have to be mindful of the fact that it will apply to Him in a very different way. For example, God’s goodness is very different from our goodness (although it is ultimately the source of our Goodness). With God, of course, His attributes are different in such as way as to be far more perfect and excellent than our own.

That is the Triplex Via in a nutshell: (1) you predicate some attribute to God; (2) you deny that it it applies to God in the same way as it does to creatures; and (3) you affirm the infinite excellence of that attribute.

I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that all heresies (certainly all of the Trinitiarian heresies) arise from a failure to apply the Triplex Via.

In any case, modern logic was not made with this kind of reasoning in mind; for instance, it tends to forget that some concepts are analogical, not univocal, and I think this is where Craig trips up.

 

[Tannhauser_1509]

Incidentally, I realize that I forgot to answer the original question.

I believe that what leads Dr. Craig to his conclusions is his underlying philosophy, which is analytical philosophy. I have not read enough of Dr. Craig to know is positions in detail, but from what I have read he (like all analytical philosophers that I am familiar with) bases his reasoning on modern logic, especially modal logic.

I am not saying that there is anything wrong with modern logic—it is extremely useful for mathematics, computer science, and many aspects of modern science—but, at least as it stands today, it is not a very good tool for natural theology.

For example, you cannot do theology of any kind without using something called the Triplex Via. All of the attributes (properties or characteristics that can be predicated of things) that we are familiar with apply in their normal sense only to creatures. When we try to apply them to God, we have to be mindful of the fact that it will apply to Him in a very different way. For example, God’s goodness is very different from our goodness (although it is ultimately the source of our Goodness). With God, of course, His attributes are different in such as way as to be far more perfect and excellent than our own.

That is the Triplex Via in a nutshell: (1) you predicate some attribute to God; (2) you deny that it it applies to God in the same way as it does to creatures; and (3) you affirm the infinite excellence of that attribute.

I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that all heresies (certainly all of the Trinitiarian heresies) arise from a failure to apply the Triplex Via.

In any case, modern logic was not made with this kind of reasoning in mind; for instance, it tends to forget that some concepts are analogical, not univocal, and I think this is where Craig trips up.

You’re plenty thorough, lmelahn. I appreciate it greatly. My last question is probably one for a different thread, so I can’t demand that you respond. I would appreciate, however, your (name removed by moderator)ut in another thread I’ve started, which is totally unrelated to this one, but I see that you have a good handle on theology and philosophy; so if you would be able to add something to the discussion, I’d value it.

Thanks again!

 

[lmelahn]

So then what do we say of the distinctions within the Trinity? I’ve never gotten into it much, but the Church teaches that the Father is distinct from the Son is distinct from the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father relationally only, not really. What does this mean?

That is not exactly how the Church explains the Trinity. Actually the first part is correct: the Father is really distinct from the Son, and both are really distinct from the Holy Spirit.

However, within the Holy Trinity, the mutual relations are real: so much so that the relations (at least three of them) actually constitute the Persons. The Father is His Fatherhood; the Son is His Sonship; the Spirit is His Procession. (There is a fourth relation, active spiration, which is not a Person, because it belongs to both Father and Son.)

It is important to recall that the opposition of relation is the only thing that distinguishes one Person from another; indeed each Person is perfectly identical with the (entire) Divine Essence or Substance. The Persons are not “parts” of God, nor do they “share” the Essence among them. (It is rather difficult for us to understand how that works, since there is nothing among creatures that is like this.)

 

[lmelahn]

I am so glad to read you again Imelahn. Perhaps you could explain what is the philosophical path that needs to be followed to get to the conclusion that God is simple. That would show the good foundations of this conclusion. I would appreciate it.

I don’t really have time to get into this tonight in detail, but the key thing to realize is that all creatures are an admixture of act and potency (on various levels).

In particular, potency is what permits the existence of two phenomena that are part-and-parcel of creaturliness: change (a.k.a. “movement” or “motus”) and plurality.

It is probably easier to see the reason that potency is required for there to be change: unless something can have a mode of existence that is different from the one it has now (which is what it means to “be in potency” with respect to something), it cannot change.

Plurality can only occur when something (or a certain kind or genus of things) can exist in more than one way. Individuals of a given species of animals, for examples, exist in different bodies for example, and those bodies are precisely the potential principle that permits the multiplication of that kind or species of animal.

Now, in order for potency to exist, there must be something, which itself already exists, that can “actualize” that potency. (E.g., you are not really “potentially” in Paris unless you have a plane or other means of transport at your disposal to take you there.)

God, however, is the First Cause. There is nothing outside of Him, therefore, that can “actualize” a supposed potency that he might have. It follows that He is entirely “active”—there is not a shred of potency in Him. He is, therefore, both immutable (he cannot be “actualized” by something outside Himself) and simple (he cannot have “parts”*of any kind whatsoever).