Of course the fact has not been demonstrated. That’s why it is a premise. And it is a BAD premise, precisely because one can hardly imagine a good argument for it. So surely the argument is an awful one (which I said up front). But it does not beg the question – that is, it is not circular.
its still an assertion. It does not matter if its a premise.
I have never disagreed with that. I put forward the argument in the context of talking about how it’s an absurd argument. But I again deny that it is circular.
You might be right about that, but you must admit it does look like one.
But, it is not as sound as any argument could be. There are better more convincing arguments. And therefore the premise that it is as good as any argument is false.
I’m not sure that you’re familiar with what “sound” means, when applied to an argument. Soundness is merely a matter of (a) having a valid logical form, and (b) having only true premises. It has nothing to do with being convincing. This was Mavrodes’s point: he knew that the argument wasn’t the slightest bit convincing. He was making a point ABOUT arguments for God’s existence; he was not arguing that God existed.
But it is not evident that premise 1 is true. That is precisely why its not convincing.
Agreed.
I agree that someone being convinced depends on the person. But i don’t believe that there is not a reliable way in philosophy of determining whether or not an argument leads to true knowledge about the world. Mavrodes point, if he is making one at all, seems to be that philosophy is an unreliable epistemological method. But i disagree. It seems to me that some people simply do not entirely understand the method.
You said a sound argument is where every premise is true. If that is the case, then by that definition Mavrodes’s argument is not sound.
I am using the definition of “sound” taught in formal logic classes everywhere.
But Mavrodes doesn’t say anything like that, because he doesn’t claim that all premises are equally weak or indefensible.
I knew that you would say something like that. In my defence we are not in a formal logic class. And its been awhile since I have taken a course in formal logic.
So in other words you are just confusing the issue with meaningless words that are not related to what I was saying originally. Did you not previously say…
In the context of the way you stated what you said in the part in bold you said the argument was as sound as any other argument but it was not convincing. Then you go on to say that there might not be any convincing arguments. So in the context of what you said, ( and boy if we are in a formal logic course I would have lots of issues with what you said) , you seem to have been saying that this bad argument for God’s existence is as good as any other, which you seem to further elsewhere. And thus my response to that argument which I already outlined. Now, you want to turn around and say oh that wasn’t the argument all along but he was actually saying something else. Very interesting your response here. Sounds like maybe you are back paddling here. If it was not your point to be saying that the arguments for God’s existence are all just as unconvincing then there is no point to our discussion. You would already agree with me that some arguments are more convincing than others. And it doesn’t just matter if an argument is ‘sound’, but whether it is actually convincing.