2 questions. Euthyprho and Free will

[Curious_Hobbit]

I got 2 separate questions guys. First of all, How do Christians reconcile Euthyphro’s dilemma? I’ve heard a response a while back and it basically said something like goodness is part of God’s nature, but I can’t really remember. Any thoughts?

Also how do we reconcile free will with an all knowing God? If God knows what’s going to happen in our life, are our choices really free?

I’d appreciate any answers you can give. I’ve heard answers to these before, but I can’t exactly remember the significance of the answers. Please post any relevant links, thanks!

 

[Spirithound]

I got 2 separate questions guys. First of all, How do Christians reconcile Euthyphro’s dilemma?

First, the dilemma:

God loves something → therefore it is holy.
If this is correct, it seems that holiness is not objective.

Something is holy → therefore God loves it.
If this is correct, it seems that God is beholden to a higher objective standard.

The solution is that God is what He is, namely perfect, and He cannot be anything other than perfect, otherwise He would not be God, therefore God is beholden to His own nature.

Thus, holiness is objective, and God is that highest objective standard.

How do we reconcile free will with an all knowing God? If God knows what’s going to happen in our life, are our choices really free?

If you do not make your choices, who does?

 

[danserr]

The Euthyprho dilemma is typically used to challenge basing moral values and duties in God. The way it goes "either something is good because God wills it, or else God wills it because it is good. If it is good because God wills it, then what is good becomes arbitrary. But if God wills something because it is good, then whether something is good or bad is independent of God.

The best solution is probably a properly formulated divine command theory of ethics, such as follows:

1. An Action is required of an Agent if and only if a just and loving God commands the agent to do the action.
2. An action is forbidden to an agent if and only if a just and loving God commands an agent not to do the action
3. An action is permitted for an agent if and only if a just and loving God does not command and agent not to do an action.

So the moral duties are grounded in divine commands, and aren’t independent of God.
On the other hand, the commands are not arbitrary, since they are necessary expressions of his just and loving nature.
So asking “what if God commanded child abuse” is a meaningless question, like asking how you would measure the area of a square circle.

This summary is from p.181-182 of Reasonable Faith 3rd Edition, by W.L.Craig. He’s summarizing the academic work of William Alston “What Euthyprho should have said,” and R. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (2000).

 

[dmar198]

I got 2 separate questions guys. First of all, How do Christians reconcile Euthyphro’s dilemma?

God commands us to be holy as He is holy: “Be ye holy, for I am holy.” Thus goodness is part of His nature, not independent of Him, nor is it arbitrary, for He is not arbitrary.

Also how do we reconcile free will with an all knowing God? If God knows what’s going to happen in our life, are our choices really free?

God knows your choices because you make them. Without your choice, there would be no knowledge of that choice. Just as I know Johnny is riding a bycicle, and this knowledge does not injure his free will but depends on it, so God can know all our choices; but this knowledge comes from the fact of what our choice will be when we make it.

Another answer is this: a mother may know that if she gives her child $50, he is not going to go spend it on drugs. She knows this because she knows his nature, his upbringing, and his dedication to religion. That is to say, she has absolutely no doubts about it: he will not use the money for drugs. This does not mean he does not have free will; he COULD do that, but she knows he will not. Foreknowledge thus does not challenge free will.