3 things that Atheists give up when they reject God

[Rhubarb]

I disagree. An infinite regress is logically impossible and so is the idea that the universe popped out of nothing. That leaves only one possibility. A nature that is not a physical process.

They all essentially amount to saying that if you don’t like cheese and pickle sandwiches then don’t eat it. If you what to avoid what most people consider undesirable consequences lets cooperate. People are not idiots, they already know that. That’s not true morality. That’s simply avoiding what is undesirable.

Strangers save other people lives, sometimes to the loss of they own lives, because they think its truly good, they think there actions have real meaning. Its not because someone suggested that they would like to live in a world where they would be saved. Also, just because somebody likes living does not equate to the idea that life truly has moral value…

Its only complex if you are a metaphysical naturalist. No-ones being coerced. You ought to make the right choice does not equate to the idea that your choices are being determined for you. If everything is essentially and fundamentally an undirected physical process then clearly that process is what determines what you think and do. There is no freewill at all.

Metaphysical naturalism is incoherent with reality. The continued denial of this fact is not due to rationality but a refusal to acknowledge anything that would give credence to the existence of a deity and especially one that tells us what to do.

I had a big long post written that was basically “you sound like you’re not well-read in the subject of meta-ethics, or, you aren’t giving critique and opposing views to divine command enough thought.” It sounds like the canned responses arm-chair apologists use because they were taught them my rote. I’m not even trying to argue against your conclusion - just that I don’t think you reasoning holds up.

But then I realized that is just the nature of this kind of communication. It’s unfair of me to expect you to explain your take on meta-ethics in a forum post, or present a solid set of arguments in a single post. Those authors I mentioned took 300 pages to begin their exploration in their metaphysical theory. You clearly care about this very much and I should give you ample time to present developed thoughts on it.

Instead, I’ll just say that the reason I’m hesitant to fall in line with your thought is because I don’t see any argument or solid reasoning for it. Other than barely-if-any supported claims. And then ask if perhaps you would be willing to expand on your thoughts so I can better see where you’re coming from.

 

[IWantGod]

I had a big long post written that was basically “you sound like you’re not well-read in the subject of meta-ethics, or, you aren’t giving critique and opposing views to divine command enough thought.” It sounds like the canned responses arm-chair apologists use because they were taught them my rote. I’m not even trying to argue against your conclusion - just that I don’t think you reasoning holds up.

But then I realized that is just the nature of this kind of communication. It’s unfair of me to expect you to explain your take on meta-ethics in a forum post, or present a solid set of arguments in a single post. Those authors I mentioned took 300 pages to begin their exploration in their metaphysical theory. You clearly care about this very much and I should give you ample time to present developed thoughts on it.

Instead, I’ll just say that the reason I’m hesitant to fall in line with your thought is because I don’t see any argument or solid reasoning for it. Other than barely-if-any supported claims. And then ask if perhaps you would be willing to expand on your thoughts so I can better see where you’re coming from.

Well if your not willing to explain why you disagree with what i have said so far, then why should i waste my time expanding on what i have said?

You made a point, i made a point. And your response is that because somebody wrote a 300 page book on a subject i couldn’t possibly be correct or know what i’m talking about. Theists have also wrote hundreds of books explaining why metaphysical naturalism is intrinsically flawed. I don’t see how we can continue this conversation If all it amounts to is he said she said.

If your so well read yourself then you should be able to refute my arguments quite easily.

 

[Bradski]

In general, most people…are not compelled by social contracts.

…truly rational atheist does not believe in right or wrong behavior and therefore (they) do not act on…a sense of community.

So neither the moral Christian nor the ungodly atheist acts according to social contracts or a sense of community. Which are effectively the same thing.

Actually, everyone’s actions are shaped by implied communal contracts. To be a member of society, or even a part of a society, there are ‘rules of engagement’. If you agree with them, you follow them. When you don’t, you suffer a guilty conscience.

If you don’t agree with them, you are declining membership of said community.

 

[IWantGod]

So neither the moral Christian nor the ungodly atheist acts according to social contracts or a sense of community. Which are effectively the same thing.

Actually, everyone’s actions are shaped by implied communal contracts. To be a member of society, or even a part of a society, there are ‘rules of engagement’. If you agree with them, you follow them. When you don’t, you suffer a guilty conscience.

If you don’t agree with them, you are declining membership of said community.

You suffer a guilty conscience because you think you’ve done wrong. People who don’t think they have done wrong do not suffer a guilty conscience even if people think they have or even if there are social contracts in place saying you can’t do that.

There may be a social contact saying don’t wear red. You might then decide to wear red thinking there is nothing wrong with that and thus you won’t feel guilty when your caught. Social contracts have little relevance to how we feel morally unless they happen to relate to what we think is wrong or good.

 

[Rhubarb]

Well if your not willing to explain why you disagree with what i have said so far, then why should i waste my time expanding on what i have said?

You made a point, i made a point. And your response is that because somebody wrote a 300 page book on a subject i couldn’t possibly be correct or know what i’m talking about. Theists have also wrote hundreds of books explaining why metaphysical naturalism is intrinsically flawed. I don’t see how we can continue this conversation If all it amounts to is he said she said.

If your so well read yourself then you should be able to refute my arguments quite easily.

I’m more than willing to explain why I disagree with what you have written. I just want to make sure I have a firm understanding of what you are intending to say. I did explain why I think you’re wrong. Like when I mentioned Scanlon and Schroeder. You said their theories amount to “I want = good” Their theories have nothing to do with desire. In fact they both say desire doesn’t cut it. Their theories are couched in reasons for action, and they derive meta-ethics backwards from there. As you would expect a non-cognitivist to do. So all I can say is “well… You’re wrong about what you think about these theories.” I didn’t even get into error theories, like Mackie produced. Or Moore’s non-natural realism. To defeat your 2, I don’t have to show that these are preferable, or correct. Just that we can get morality into our ontology out of them. (Though not in the case of Mackie… That would be a tangent about whether moral claims need any “truth” to them at all)

For example you have written: 1. A rational explanation for physical existence. Either the world has been changing forever (which means an infinite regress and also no ultimate explanation for why things are changing at all; its just a brute fact), or the world popped out of absolutely nothing.

Firstly. You are not addressing the fact that there is research showing that the universe very well might have popped out of nothing. You haven’t explained why you think this dichotomy you’ve created is correct - you just expect us to take it as granted. You haven’t tried to counterfactually reason about what it would mean if you are NOT correct, or your dichotomy is false - if you can show contrary reasoning as contradictory it bodes well for your ideas. What you mean by a “rational explanation” would be nice, too. That word gets bandied about a lot even by professional philosophers and the first thing a philosopher does when they unpack their theory is define terms so we don’t talk past one another. I assume you mean “coherently and consistently, with valid and sound arguments” by “rational” but I want to be clear.

In essence, I want to make sure I understand your ideas before I try again at this. So we’re on the same page with terms, and, etc. Otherwise we’re just going to go “that’s not true” “Nuh-uh.” “Yuh-huh” “Nuh-uh” until one of us gives up bothering to reply.

 

[IWantGod]

I’m more than willing to explain why I disagree with what you have written. I just want to make sure I have a firm understanding of what you are intending to say. I did explain why I think you’re wrong. Like when I mentioned Scanlon and Schroeder. You said their theories amount to “I want = good” Their theories have nothing to do with desire. In fact they both say desire doesn’t cut it. Their theories are couched in reasons for action, and they derive meta-ethics backwards from there. As you would expect a non-cognitivist to do. So all I can say is “well… You’re wrong about what you think about these theories.”

First of all human beings are driven by desire. one being a desire to survive. Yes we reason about things. We can reason about how to get from A to b in a way that incurs the least suffering, but that is essentially because you want to. To speak of a “meta-ethics” is meaningless otherwise.

What you are probably trying to point out is that what the individual wants is not always consistent with what benefits everyone in terms of survival and comfort and that people will probably have to sacrifices for the whole relative to what the subjective agenda is

In any case its really irrelevant what meta-ethics one employs. I have made a metaphysical argument about the relationship between the idea of the good and what is actually ontologically true. Which is a different subject matter entirely.

 

[Rhubarb]

First of all human beings are driven by desire. one being a desire to survive. Yes we reason about things. We can reason about how to get from A to b in a way that incurs the least suffering, but that is essentially because you want to. To speak of a “meta-ethics” is meaningless otherwise.

A divine command theory couches the nature of “the good” in the nature of the deity. This doesn’t appeal to human desires at all. So I don’t know how you can say that it’s meaningless.

I don’t know why there’s scare quotes around meta-ethics in your post. Do you think there’s no distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics?

 

[IWantGod]

Rhubarb;14797129A:

I don’t know why there’s scare quotes around meta-ethics in your post. Do you think there’s no distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics?

Its really irrelevant what meta-ethics one employs in the game of life and survival. I have made a metaphysical argument about the relationship between the idea of the good and its relationship with what is actually ontologically true. Which is a different subject matter entirely.

When i speak of value i’m asking what the ontological value of a thing is. And then i ask if our behavior is rationally consistent with whatever that is.

 

[IWantGod]

A divine command theory couches the nature of “the good” in the nature of the deity. This doesn’t appeal to human desires at all. So I don’t know how you can say that it’s meaningless.

I never claimed that is was meaningless

 

[Bradski]

You suffer a guilty conscience because you think you’ve done wrong. People who don’t think they have done wrong do not suffer a guilty conscience even if people think they have or even if there are social contracts in place saying you can’t do that.

You just repeated what I just said. It might have been easier to say: I agree.

There may be a social contact saying don’t wear red. You might then decide to wear red thinking there is nothing wrong with that and thus you won’t feel guilty when your caught. Social contracts have little relevance to how we feel morally unless they happen to relate to what we think is wrong or good.

I gotta say that you score really well on the ‘bleedin’ obvious’ scale. But very low on the ‘Do not contradict yourself’ scale. You said earlier (twice) that social contracts are not considered in matters of morality. And now you say they are not considered to how we feel morally UNLESS they happen to relate to right or wrong. Which is exactly what we consider to be morality. That is, questions of right and wrong.

 

[Rhubarb]

I never claimed that is was meaningless

To speak of a “meta-ethics” is meaningless otherwise.

I am confused what you are trying to say then in the lower quote.

 

[Bradski]

First of all human beings are driven by desire. one being a desire to survive. Yes we reason about things. We can reason about how to get from A to b in a way that incurs the least suffering, but that is essentially because you want to.

At least you are heading in the right direction here.

 

[IWantGod]

You just repeated what I just said. It might have been easier to say: I agree.

I gotta say that you score really well on the ‘bleedin’ obvious’ scale. But very low on the ‘Do not contradict yourself’ scale. You said earlier (twice) that social contracts are not considered in matters of morality. And now you say they are not considered to how we feel morally UNLESS they happen to relate to right or wrong. Which is exactly what we consider to be morality. That is, questions of right and wrong.

False. You claimed breaking a social contract is the reason that somebody feels guilty. But in truth people feel guilty because they think they have done wrong. A social contract may just happen to relate to what we think is wrong, but it is not the cause of guilt.

 

[IWantGod]

I am confused what you are trying to say then in the lower quote.

Okay. fare enough. I mean Naturalist meta-ethics. I am talking about metaphysics.

 

[Bradski]

False. You claimed breaking a social contract is the reason that somebody feels guilty. But in truth people feel guilty because they think they have done wrong. A social contract may just happen to relate to what we think is wrong, but it is not the cause of guilt.

You are not reading what I write. I get it a lot, so it’s not just you.

I said that if you agree with the social contract and you don’t follow it, then you get a guilty conscience. If you don’t agree with it, then you don’t. But there needs to BE a social contract.

 

[IWantGod]

You are not reading what I write. I get it a lot, so it’s not just you.

I said that if you agree with the social contract and you don’t follow it, then you get a guilty conscience. If you don’t agree with it, then you don’t. But there needs to BE a social contract.

I might agree with the community that while i’m in that community i shouldn’t wear red. But i’m not going to feel guilty if i do wear red and they kick me out. Because it is not truly wrong. It is simply a requirement of a social contract. Social contract alone is not a sufficient criteria for someone to feel guilty. You have to believe that something truly wrong has occurred

 

[Rhubarb]

Okay. fare enough. I mean Naturalist meta-ethics. I am talking about metaphysics.

Forgive me for being dense.

You’re saying that talking about a naturalist meta-ethics requires an appeal to desire? I should think that one could create a naturalistic theory where the good is based on what is “good for survival” or something of the like. That’s just off the top of my head.

Modern neo-Aristotelians, Boyd, Sturgeon, and Brink all out of Cornell University, and Frank Jackson all propose naturalistic morality. It’s midnight so I’m not going to delve super-deep in their writings but it looks like Jackson’s involves a complex logical approach, not an appeal to desires.

I think what would speak more strongly though to your worry about morality existing in our ontology - there are plenty of realists who are not naturalists. Moore was one, for instance. They argue that morality doesn’t depend on naturalistic facts. And yet moral claims are real, and propositions about morality have truth values.

And then finally, I know there’s a big sticking point about wanting there to be a morality at all. But I think an error theory could explain why we believe in morality, but it has no ontological weigh beyond our conventions. I personally am not moved by the need for “a morality” at all. Though I do feel certain actions are just straight wrong. So. I’ve got some serious thinking to do in order to reconcile this contradiction.

 

[Bradski]

I might agree with the community that while i’m in that community i shouldn’t wear red. But i’m not going to feel guilty if i do wear red and they kick me out. Because it is not truly wrong. It is simply a requirement of a social contract. Social contract alone is not a sufficient criteria for someone to feel guilty. You have to believe that something truly wrong has occurred

I keep having to repeat myself. The social contract in itself has no impact on you unless you agree with it. So…If you believe that wearing red is wrong, you will feel guilty doing so. But your argument is now that it’s not sufficient to believe something is wrong. You have to believe it is TRULY wrong.

Which doesn’t really explain much at all.

 

[IWantGod]

I keep having to repeat myself. The social contract in itself has no impact on you unless you agree with it. So…If you believe that wearing red is wrong, you will feel guilty doing so. But your argument is now that it’s not sufficient to believe something is wrong. You have to believe it is TRULY wrong.

Which doesn’t really explain much at all.

I never said that its not sufficient to believe something is truly wrong. i demonstrated that agreeing with a contract, agreeing to rule and conditions alone has nothing to do with whether or not we believe some particular behavior is truly wrong.

You are saying buying into a contract is the same as buying into moral truth.

 

[Bradski]

I never said that its not sufficient to believe something is truly wrong. i demonstrated that agreeing with a contract, agreeing to rule and conditions alone has nothing to do with whether or not we believe some particular behavior is truly wrong.

You are saying buying into a contract is the same as buying into moral truth.

If you agree with a social contract, you accept that it represents a moral truth. The contracts allow us to work together to build societies. They have evolved in the strict sense of the word. That is, the ones that didn’t work didn’t last and the ones that did, we retained.

The contracts then define what we describe as morality.

You seem to want to argue that something is bad because…well, it just is. ‘Truly bad’ as you put it. But there is a reason why we class things as morally right or wrong. They either agree with, or conflict with, our agreed social contracts.