Right, lots has been said about traversing an infinite series already. I’m (sadly) going to skip that, because something really interesting’s going on towards the end of your post.
Firstly, a comment on this:
If they are physical entities, then they are contingent and can deteriorate. They must rely on an energy or force to move (as JDaniel points out). More importantly, they must rely on something to give them existence since they are contingent beings.
You’re still very much using empirical comparisons with our universe to drive this.
You say that my states might be physical and hence contingent. I don’t think my GodX universe contains enough complexity for the term ‘physical’ to be meaningfully applied. I haven’t specified any extended spatial dimensions, for example. The only relevant thing about State A is that it’s different from state B.
You say that my (contingent) states must rely on something to give them existence. Well, they rely on GodX, and he’s not contingent, he’s necessary.
You talk of energy, force and deterioration. These are clear appeals to similar concepts in our universe: drawing comparisons with them isn’t going to get us anywhere; there’s no logical reason why energy, force and deterioration have to be meaningful concepts in the pet universe.
Secondly:
MOM’s #5 above is not referring to the “events” in the existence of a supernatural being, but in a natural progression.
Frankly, it doesn’t say that the premiss applies to “natural” things only and has an exclusion carved out for “supernatural” ones. It would have saved us all a lot of time if this had been stated up front. It also sounds like you’re starting to think that this premiss isn’t quite so universal after all…
One could argue that the “events” in the existence of God are an infinite number of things, thus disproving #5.
Yes, one could argue that, and I’d agree with it. It’s logically possible that there’s a deity, somewhat similar to the Christian God, who is eternal and of whom it makes sense to talk of events, states, etc.
[Only somewhat similar, of course, because traditional doctrine is that the Christian God (we’ll call him GodC) is unchanging. So GodC never changed from a state of not having a son, to a state of having one…digression over…]]
But notice what you’ve done: you’ve now directly entertained the possibility of an eternal “thing” that trundles along from one state to the next. And do you object to this thing? Well, the reason you give next is:
#5 was an argument towards proving the existence of God so one cannot use the existence of God to disprove it.
This, I disagree with. It’s irrelevant that #5 can be used as part of an argument towards existence of God. I can make #5 part of an argument for the existence of butterscotch sauce and it’s neither here nor there. The point is that I (and, just about, you*) have now conceived of universes/possible worlds/deities that cast doubt on the logical necessity of #5.
Besides, there may be other reasons for believing something like a deity exists (and apologetics books are full of such reasons). Surely if such reasons are good, then #5 looks shakier than ever?
*Please don’t think I’m putting words in your mouth to score points. I’m genuinely trying to deconstruct exactly what you said towards the end of your post. I fully admit that I haven’t touched the infinite series arguments in the top half.